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The Parts of Your Vehicle
In	 an	 operation	 like	 ours,	 the	 suppliers	 will	 make	 you	 or	
break	you.1
Motor vehicle producers are among the world’s most recognizable 
brands.	Thanks	to	elaborate	marketing,	nameplates	like	Ford,	Toyota,	
and	Volkswagen	are	familiar	to	consumers	around	the	world.	Consum-
ers	are	attracted	 to	 the	 ruggedness	of	Ford,	 the	 reliability	of	Toyota,	
or	the	style	of	Volkswagen.	Yet	the	driving	experience—comfort,	per-
formance, and reliability—primarily is not set by the company whose 
name is on the dashboard, but by the hundreds of suppliers of the vehi-
cle’s parts.
Think about the radio in the center console of your vehicle. A vehicle 
is put together from hundreds of components like the radio. These com-
ponents range from pistons and cylinders to door handles and steering 
wheels. And a radio, in turn, consists of many individual parts, such as 
knobs and wires and sensors, not to mention nuts and bolts and screws. 
Disaggregating a vehicle in this fashion reveals a highly complex sup-
ply chain involving thousands of parts and almost as many individual 
companies. 
The motor vehicle industry is composed of two types of manufactur-
ers:	assemblers	and	parts	makers.	First,	a	handful	of	assemblers,	usually	
referred to in this book as carmakers, put together vehicles at several 
dozen	fina 	assembly	plants	in	the	United	States.	Second,	several	thou-
sand parts makers, usually referred to in this book as suppliers, produce 
the roughly 15,000 parts that go into the vehicles (Australia Department 
for Environment and Heritage 2002). 
Until the late twentieth century, U.S. carmakers produced most of 
their own parts themselves and dominated the suppliers of the parts that 
they	did	purchase	(see	Chapter	2).	In	the	twenty-firs 	century,	responsi-
bility for making many parts has been passed to independently owned 
suppliers. Several thousand companies, employing more than 670,000 
workers, produce several hundred billion dollars worth of parts every 
year for new vehicles assembled in the United States. 
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“The motor vehicle supplier sector has become the backbone of the 
motor vehicle assembly industry, employing . . . substantially more than 
the number of people employed by the assemblers” (Hill, Menk, and 
Szakaly	2007).	About	186,000	workers	were	 employed	 in	U.S.	 fina 	
assembly plants in 2007, compared to approximately 673,000 in parts 
supplier plants (Table 1.1). The true ratio of parts to assembly employ-
ment was even higher than three to one because more than one-fourth 
of the parts purchased in 2006 came from overseas factories, and those 
workers were not included in the comparison.
The total value of all of the parts delivered by Tier 1 suppliers to 
fina 	assembly	plants	averaged	$13,600	per	vehicle	in	2006,	compared	
to	$11,100	in	2000,	an	increase	of	22.5	percent	over	six	years	(Merrill	
Lynch 2007). In comparison, the average expenditure on a new car in-
creased	only	10.0	percent	during	that	period,	from	$20,600	in	2000	to	
$22,650	in	2006	(Ward’s	Automotive	Group	2007).
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE BOOK
The motor vehicle parts industry has been changing geographi-
cally as well as functionally. This book analyzes the linkages between 
changes in the auto industry’s geography and structure. It raises the 
level of understanding of how the industry is organized by providing 
analysis at a much richer level of detail than has been provided in previ-
ous studies. 
This	book	has	two	major	purposes.	The	firs 	is	to	describe	the	key	
characteristics of parts suppliers, which account for the largest and 
increasing share of the value added in manufacturing motor vehicles. 
The analysis relies heavily on data collected concerning several thou-
sand parts plants in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The second 
principal purpose is to describe the changing geography of U.S. motor 
vehicle production at local, regional, national, and international scales. 
The book explains that these spatial changes have resulted from chang-
ing relationships between carmakers and their suppliers.
An industry that was once heavily clustered in Michigan has been 
dispersing to other states, as well as to other countries. In the mid-twen-
tieth century, three-quarters of all parts were made in or near Michigan; 
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in	the	twenty-firs 	century,	only	one-quarter	come	from	there.	Between	
2000 and 2007 alone, Michigan’s employment in the motor vehicle 
parts industry fell by 43 percent, from 227,000 to 129,000. Yet, at a 
regional scale, the U.S. motor vehicle industry is still heavily clustered, 
in a region—known as Auto Alley—that lies in a north–south corridor 
between	the	Great	Lakes	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	
Parts are made by two kinds of companies, original equipment man-
ufacturers (OEMs) and aftermarket suppliers. Original equipment man-
ufacturers make parts for new vehicles, and aftermarket suppliers make 
replacement parts for older vehicles. Original equipment accounts for 
about 70 percent of total parts sales and the aftermarket about 30 per-
cent	(Offic 	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007).	The	dis-
tinction between the two groups is not always clear-cut because more 
than one-third of the 100 largest OEM suppliers also rank among the 
100 largest aftermarket suppliers, but for the most part, the two sectors 
of the motor vehicle industry remain distinct (Automotive Aftermarket 
Suppliers Association 2007; Automotive	News 2007a).
This book is concerned with OEM suppliers, which have vary-
ing characteristics. Some of them are multibillion-dollar enterprises, 
whereas others are very small. Some have been around for more than a 
century,	whereas	others	were	created	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Some	
are family owned, and others are controlled by venture capital.
Employment (000) Share (%)
Carmakers








Total parts suppliers 672.5 78.4
Table 1.1  U.S. Assembly and Parts Employment, 2007 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).
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What nearly all parts makers share in the eyes of the motorist is 
invisibility. If consumers like a vehicle, the carmaker gets the credit. If 
it is disliked, the carmaker is blamed. Even auto industry insiders know 
little about most of the parts makers. Numerous histories have been 
written about carmakers, as well as about their founders and leaders. A 
search of any good-sized library or online retailer will turn up hundreds 
of	books	just	on	Henry	Ford	and	the	Ford	Motor	Co.	A	similar	search	
will reveal that little if anything has been written about the vast majority 
of the parts companies discussed in this book.
Consider, for example, the best-selling car in the United States in 
2007, the Toyota Camry. Two-thirds of the value of the Camry was 
added not by Toyota but by independent suppliers. The motor vehicle 
industry’s principal newspaper, Automotive	 News, depicted some of 
Toyota’s	several	hundred	Camry	suppliers	(Figure	1.1).	Several	were	
Japanese-owned companies with close historical links to Toyota, such 
as the wire harness supplier Yazaki and the spring supplier NHK. But 
consumers attracted to a Japanese car with a well-earned reputation for 
high quality may be surprised to see how few of the parts were actually 
made in Japan or by Japanese companies.
The parts in a 2007 Camry represent a veritable United Nations 
of	ownership,	including	British-based	shaft	supplier	GKN,	Canadian-
based	hinge	supplier	Cosma	(now	Magna),	German-based	ABS	brake	
supplier Robert Bosch, and Swedish-based airbag supplier Autoliv. 
Venerable	U.S.-owned	corporations	were	major	contributors	as	well,	
including hose supplier Dana, valve supplier Eaton, interior supplier 
Lear,	and	paint	supplier	PPG.	Other	parts	makers	highlighted	in	Figure	
1.1 are themselves multinational joint ventures, such as American–Jap-
anese exhaust supplier Arvin Sango and seat supplier Trim Masters, and 
German–Japanese	sealing	supplier	Freudenberg-NOK.
The suppliers mentioned in the two previous paragraphs all are 
ranked among the largest in the motor vehicle industry, each with annu-
al sales in the billions of dollars. Other Camry suppliers are more mod-
estly sized, generating revenues only in the tens of millions of dollars, 
for example, stabilizer bar supplier Brewer Automotive Components, 
headrest	supplier	Gill,	and	oil	fille 	cap	supplier	Miniature	Precision.
When	 the	Ford	F-150,	 the	best-selling	 truck	model	 in	 the	United	
States, was redesigned in 2004, it too had a mix of large and small do-
mestic-	and	foreign-owned	suppliers	(Figure	1.2).	Although	the	F-150	
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was a truck made by a U.S.-owned company and the Camry a car made 
by a Japanese-owned company, the two models had some of the same 
suppliers.	Not	only	did	the	“Japanese”	Camry	and	the	“American”	F-
150 share leading U.S.-owned suppliers such as Dana, Dura, and Lear, 
they	both	had	brakes	and	lights	supplied	by	leading	German	suppliers	
Robert Bosch and Osram Sylvania, respectively.
Suppliers to these two best-selling vehicles differed in two key 
aspects.	The	 leading	F-150	supplier	by	 far,	Visteon	Corp.,	was	not	a	
major	Camry	supplier.	Among	Visteon’s	many	contributions	to	the	F-
150 were alternators, antitheft devices, axles, fuel tanks, headlamps, 
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Automotive	News (2006).
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instrument panels, pumps, radiators, sound systems, and windshields. 
In	2004,	Visteon	was	the	second-largest	parts	maker	in	North	America,	
with	$11	billion	in	sales	for	new	vehicles.	Visteon	was	not	the	F-150’s	




together at arguably the most venerable assembly plant in the country, 
Ford’s	Rouge	complex	in	Dearborn,	Michigan.	At	its	height	of	impor-
tance between the two world wars, the Rouge complex employed more 




















































































than 100,000 workers in more than 100 buildings. Raw materials fa-
mously	arrived	at	one	end	and	finishe 	vehicles	rolled	out	at	the	other.	
Ford’s	twenty-first-centur 	Rouge	assembly	plant	bears	little	physical	
resemblance to the mid-twentieth-century version. A display in the 
Rouge visitor center illustrates how much the complex had changed. 
Yet the plant continued to be a major reason why Michigan was still the 
leading	car-producing	state	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century.
Meanwhile, 300 miles south, Toyota was assembling most of its 
Camrys	in	Georgetown,	Kentucky,	previously	best	known	for	a	small	
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Automotive	News (2006).
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college that hosted the Cincinnati Bengals preseason camp. Toyota de-
liberately chose to build a campus with nearly 10,000 employees in 




Where vehicles are assembled affects where parts are made. Some 
parts are made right next door to the assembly plants, and some are 
made on the other side of the world. In the context of just-in-time pro-
duction, however, we show that most parts are made within a several-
hundred-mile radius of the assembly plant in which they are used. Thus, 
most	of	the	F-150	parts	are	made	within	several	hundred	miles	of	the	
Rouge, and most of the Camry parts are made within several hundred 
miles	of	Georgetown.	
DATA FOR THIS BOOK
The	firs 	challenge	in	writing	about	parts	suppliers	is	actually	fin -




This study’s database, in contrast, has been built by aggregating 
observations from several thousand individual parts plants in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. A large number of variables have been 
collected for every factory operated by the 150 largest North American 
suppliers, as well as more than a thousand smaller companies. Together, 
these plants account for the overwhelming majority of parts production 
in North America, probably well over 90 percent.
One hundred percent coverage cannot be claimed for the database. 
Information may be incorrect for particular plants, and some plants un-
doubtedly have been missed altogether. But this is by far the most com-
prehensive and detailed compilation of data on parts suppliers in North 
America, making it possible to identify trends and draw conclusions at 
a higher level of detail than is possible with summary data.2 
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Government Data Sources
The primary government data source is the U.S. Census of Man-
ufactures,	 collected	 every	 fiv 	 years,	 including	 1997	 and	 2002.	The	
Census of Manufactures provides information about both the value of 
shipments originating from manufacturing establishments and the value 
added at manufacturing establishments in each sector of the economy. 
The census also provides information on employees, payroll, produc-
tion workers, wages, cost of materials, and capital expenditures.
Motor vehicle assembly operations are allocated to North American 
Industrial	Classificatio 	System	(NAICS)	code	3361.	NAICS	3361	 is	
divided into three six-digit codes: NAICS 336111 for automobile manu-
facturing	(i.e.,	fina 	assembly),	NAICS	336112	for	light	truck	manufac-
turing, and NAICS 336120 for heavy truck manufacturing. The value 
of	parts	delivered	 to	automobile	and	 light	 truck	fina 	assembly	plants	
in	 the	United	States	was	$156.2	billion	according	 to	 the	2002	census	
(Table 1.2).
The manufacture of many motor vehicle parts is assigned to NAICS 
3363, which is divided into eight six-digit codes: engines, electrical, 
steering & suspension, brakes, transmissions, fabrics & seats, metal 
stampings, and other. We also include NAICS 336211, motor vehicle 









336330, 336340 Chassis 23.6 9.5
336320 Electronics 25.7 4.0
336370, 336211 Exterior 32.9 11.9
336360 Interior 17.2 19.1
336310, 336350 Powertrain 70.5 42.9
336390 Other 41.4 6.6
Total 211.3 Unknown
— Other NAICS codes Unknown Unknown
— Total value of parts Unknown 156.2
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Manufactures.
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bodies,	in	our	definitio 	of	motor	vehicle	parts.	The	value	of	shipments	
for NAICS codes 3363 and 336211, motor vehicle parts and motor ve-
hicle	bodies,	in	2002	was	$211.3	billion.	The	six-digit	NAICS	codes	are	
subdivided	into	more	detailed	eight-	and	10-digit	codes.	For	example,	
transmissions (NAICS 336350) is divided into transmissions for new 
vehicles (NAICS 33635011), transmissions for heavy trucks and buses 
(NAICS 33635012), transmission parts (NAICS 33635013), axles (NA-
ICS 33635014), and other drivetrain parts (NAICS 33635015). NAICS 
33635015 in turn is divided into seven 10-digit codes, such as clutches 
(NAICS 3363501522) and drive shafts (NAICS 3363501528). 
The large discrepancy between the value of deliveries and the value 
of shipments, as well as the large size of “other” categories, points to 
three	serious	limitations	of	NAICS	data.	First,	shipments	include	both	
original equipment and aftermarket sales. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, an estimated 30 percent of shipments go to the aftermarket, al-
though	precise	figure 	are	not	available	from	the	census	and	percentages	
are likely to vary among NAICS codes. Second, deliveries include both 
domestic-made and foreign-made parts. As discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 13, at the time of the 2002 census, roughly one-fourth of parts 
arriving at U.S. assembly plants were produced in other countries.
The third critical limitation, affecting both shipments and deliver-
ies, is that some key parts, including tires, glass, and paint, have been 
placed in NAICS codes other than 3363 if their primary customers are 
outside the motor vehicle industry. Consequently, it is not possible, us-
ing census data, to break out values on the shipments of these parts to 
vehicle assembly plants. 
This Study’s Database
Rather than relying predominantly on aggregated government data, 
research for this book included creating a database of several thousand 
parts plants by name and address. The starting point for the plant-level 
database was information acquired from ELM International, Inc., a 
Michigan-based vendor of information about automotive suppliers.3
Although it was not designed with research applications in mind, 
the ELM International database purports to offer exhaustive coverage, 
with 4,268 plant-level records in 2006, covering the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico. Additional records are continuously added. Informa-
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tion about individual plants includes name, address, products made at 





industry in recent years. 
The second revision concerned employment level. Plants shown by 
ELM International to have more than 2,000 employees were checked 
either by phone or a review of the company Web site. Employment 
figure 	reported	in	the	ELM	International	database	for	2006	averaged	
about	 one-fourth	 higher	 than	 the	 field-checke 	 employment	 figures 	
Consequently,	 employment	 figure 	based	on	ELM	 International	data	
were not used in this study unless they were found to be in substantial 
agreement with other sources.
We also added plants that should have been included by ELM In-
ternational to the database and removed others that had closed. Every 
plant operated in the United States in 2006 by the 150 largest parts 
suppliers, according to Automotive	News	(2007a),	was	identified 	rep-
resenting a total of approximately 1,600 plants. There was a net of 335 
plants added to the ELM International database, approximately a 20 
percent increase. 
Fourth,	we	collected	additional	information	about	the	4,268	plants	
in the database beyond that provided by ELM International. The age 
of the plant and the nationality of the owner were found for most of 
the plants through contacting the companies or reviewing state indus-
trial directories, press reports, and trade associations (e.g., the Japan 
Auto Parts Industries Association). The latitude and longitude of each 
plant location was geocoded to facilitate mapping of plant distribu-
tions, which was especially important for the geographic analysis found 
throughout this book.
The	fina 	significan 	revision	was	 to	 identify	one	primary	 type	of	
part for each of the 4,268 plants. The ELM International database listed 
up to 13 distinct parts being made at a particular plant; only 1,551 plants 
had only 1 parts code, 37 had at least 10 parts codes, and 4 plants had 
the maximum 13. The mean number of parts codes per plant was about 
2.4.	For	 this	book,	we	assigned	each	plant	one	of	six	codes:	chassis,	
electronic, exterior, interior, generic, and powertrain.
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The principal limitation of the database that could not be overcome 
concerned the customers for each plant. The database showed the names 
of the carmakers to which the parts were ultimately attached, but it rare-
ly listed the name of the immediate customer, which in many cases 
would be another supplier. In other words, most suppliers of seat parts, 
for example, reported their customer to be a carmaker even though the 
seat parts were actually shipped to a seat assembler.
Key	finding 	of	the	database	included:
• Number of plants: 3,179 plants were located in the United States, 
plus	416	in	Canada	and	673	in	Mexico	(see	Figure	1.3).
• Type of owner: 3 percent of the U.S. parts plants were owned by 
carmakers; 42 percent by the 150 largest suppliers, each with an-
nual	North	American	original	equipment	sales	of	more	than	$200	
million; and 55 percent by 1,000 other suppliers.
• Plant size: Median plant employment was 220, mean was 350, 
and 6 percent had more than 1,000 employees.
• Nationality of owner: 77 percent were owned by companies with 
U.S. headquarters and 23 percent by companies with foreign 
headquarters.
• Date of opening: 55 percent were opened before 1980 and 45 
percent between 1980 and 2006.
• Location: 25 percent were located in Michigan, 36 percent in 
other	Great	Lakes	states,	28	percent	in	the	South,	and	11	percent	
in the rest of the country.
• Union: 85 percent of the plants reported on their union status: 30 
percent had a union and 70 percent did not.
• Type of part: 22 percent of plants made parts for the powertrain, 
including the engine and transmission; 19 percent of plants made 
parts for the chassis, including tires, wheels, brakes, steering, and 
suspension; 15 percent of plants made parts for the exterior, in-
cluding bodies, bumpers, glass, and paint; 14 percent of plants 
made parts for the interior, including seats, instrument panels, 
doors, headliners, and carpeting; 15 percent of plants made parts 
for the electronic systems, including engine management, pas-
senger convenience, and safety; and 16 percent of plants made 
generic parts, including bearings, brackets, and hinges.
The	Parts	of	Your	Vehicle			13
Compared with supplier studies by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Center for Automotive Research (CAR), and Merrill Lynch, this study 
has found a smaller percentage of powertrain plants and a larger per-
centage of chassis plants (Table 1.3). The difference can most likely 
be	attributed	to	differences	in	allocating	parts	among	systems.	For	ex-
ample, should the axle be considered part of the powertrain or part of 
the chassis?
BOOK OUTLINE
The book is divided into four sections, based on impacts of chang-
ing carmaker–supplier relationships at various geographic scales:
• Part I: The motor vehicle industry’s traditional core region cen-
Figure 1.3  Parts and Assembly Plants in North America
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook, ELM Interna-
tional, and other sources.
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tered on southeastern Michigan and adjacent Midwest states near 
the	southern	Great	Lakes.	Which	parts	are	still	being	made	in	the	
industry’s traditional home and why? 
• Part II: Local-scale connections between carmakers and their 
suppliers. Which parts are being made very close to their cus-
tomer—a	fina 	assembly	plant—and	how	are	the	rest	of	the	parts	
being moved from supplier to customer? 
• Part III: Clustering of motor vehicle production at the regional 
scale, known as Auto Alley. Why have most suppliers located 
in Auto Alley, and what factors account for choice of location 
within Auto Alley?
•	 Part	 IV:	 International	shifts	 in	production	of	parts	 for	 the	U.S.	
motor vehicle industry. What is the magnitude and rate of growth 
of the outsourcing of parts to other countries, and which of 
the many parts in a motor vehicle are the ones being sourced 
overseas?
CARMAKER–SUPPLIER RELATIONS
Manufacture of original equipment parts constitutes an intermedi-
ate step in the process of producing motor vehicles. As a result, the 
Table 1.3  Percent Vehicle Content by System
System 












Powertrain 22 26 27 33 40 36
Chassis 19 22 9 11 15 18
Electronics 15 17 21 25 11 18
Exterior 15 18 19 23 16 19
Interior 14 17 6 8 18 10
Generic 16 18
NOTE: Columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: McAlinden and Andrea (2002); Merrill Lynch (2007).  
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fortunes of the producers of the parts depend to a large extent on their 
ultimate customers, the carmakers. A book on motor vehicle parts sup-
pliers therefore must acknowledge the perspective of carmakers. In this 
section,	we	briefl 	review	changes	in	the	role	of	parts	makers	from	the	
carmaker’s perspective, as well as the literature on relationships be-
tween carmakers and parts suppliers.
The	“Big	3”	carmakers	(GM,	Ford,	and	Chrysler)	dominated	twen-
tieth-century	production,	but	 they	entered	 the	 twenty-firs 	century	on	
very shaky ground. Their U.S. market share plunged from 95 percent in 
the mid-twentieth century to 75 percent in the late twentieth century to 
50	percent	in	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Ford	and	GM	
faced	 their	most	serious	 financia 	challenges	since	 the	Great	Depres-
sion,	and	Chrysler	was	 firs 	sold	 to	German	carmaker	Daimler-Benz,	
then	 to	private	equity	 fir 	Cerberus.	Reflectin 	 the	declining	market	
share,	the	“Big	3”	were	more	accurately	known	in	the	twenty-firs 	cen-
tury as the “Detroit 3.”
As the Detroit 3 struggled, Japanese-based companies led by Toyota 
were	raking	in	record	profit 	and	market	share.	Foreign-owned	carmak-





to lead world production since the nineteenth century. 
Toyota’s success was based on its distinctive production system 
that	efficientl 	 turned	out	vehicles	nearly	free	of	defects.	The	Toyota	
Production System has many key elements, and often underappreciated 
among them is a distinctive relationship between the carmaker and its 
suppliers. “At least part of Toyota’s success is because of its harmoni-
ous relationship with supplier companies.”4 
In	a	 fiercel 	cutthroat	market,	 the	 relationship	with	suppliers	has	
become a key source of competitive advantage for some carmakers. 
As	Toyota	passed	Ford	and	then	GM	as	the	world’s	largest	carmaker,	
favorable supplier relations contributed to its success. “The automaker 
thinks it can gain a competitive advantage in North America if suppli-
ers	 are	 satisfie 	by	 their	 relationship	with	 the	 automaker”	 (Chappell	
2005b).
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Benefits of Good Carmaker–Supplie  Relations
Researchers have been especially interested in documenting and ex-
plaining the competitive advantage accruing to carmakers as a result of 
good supplier relations. The seminal study The	Machine	That	Changed	
the	 World	 by	 the	 International	Motor	Vehicle	 Program	 based	 at	 the	
Massachusetts Institute of Technology introduced many in the U.S. 
auto industry to the successes of Japanese-inspired lean production, in-
cluding the different relationships between carmakers and suppliers as 
compared with the U.S. model (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).
Research on changing relations between carmakers and their suppli-
ers has emanated from two types of scholars. Analysts in nonacademic 
settings have measured the magnitude of the parts industry and have 
documented the enhanced role of suppliers in the production process. 
Academic researchers have emphasized the underlying meaning and 
significanc 	of	changing	carmaker–supplier	relations	and	the	compara-
tive advantage that accrues to some carmakers through enhanced sup-
plier relations.
Most of the recent studies on the motor vehicle parts sector have 
come from analysts in nonacademic settings. Researchers are based in 
three	types	of	organizations:	auto	industry	specialists,	financia 	services	
firms 	and	government	agencies.	Described	below	are	some	of	the	stud-
ies that industry specialists have released to the public.
The	CAR	Economics	and	Business	Group	has	addressed	changing	
relationships between carmakers and suppliers in numerous studies. 
CAR researchers have estimated the total number of jobs generated by 
the auto industry in the United States and in selected states (Hill 2005; 
Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007), the future size of union membership 
and the Detroit 3 workforce (McAlinden 2007), and a “stay/go” index 
to forecast the likelihood that production of particular types of parts will 
abandon Michigan (McAlinden 2006). 
DesRosiers Automotive Consultants has estimated the magnitude 
of the supplier sector in North America and the likelihood of increased 
overseas	outsourcing	 (DesRosiers	2005,	2006).	The	 fir 	 is	Canadian	
based, so it breaks out U.S. and Canadian data.
The Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA), represent-
ing the perspective of the leading parts makers in North America, has 
documented	the	difficultie 	faced	by	suppliers,	especially	in	the	context	
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of the global economy. OESA has also described the increasing role of 
equity	investment	firm 	in	the	parts	supplier	industry	(De	Koker	2006;	
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association 2007; Original Equip-
ment Suppliers Association 2006).
CSM Worldwide has specialized in forecasting future demand for 
vehicles and parts, with a worldwide focus (Robinet 2005). Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants has also concentrated on future worldwide 
trends in demand for different parts, especially in view of technology 
changes	(Maj,	Benecchi,	and	van	Acker	2004).	The	McKinsey	Global	
Institute within McKinsey & Company has documented productivity 
improvements in the motor vehicle industry (Baily et al. 2005). IRN, 
a Michigan-based consultancy, focuses on auto supplier issues (Korth 
2007).
Studies on the motor vehicle parts sector have also been produced 
by agencies of the federal government. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce	Offic 	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	publishes	an	an-
nual assessment of the parts industry.5 Reports on aspects of the auto 






a result of changing relations with carmakers (see, for example, Stein-
metz 2006). Merrill Lynch has monitored the supplier sector with an 
eye to recommending companies for investment (Merrill Lynch 2007); 
the	 fir 	has	 also	 looked	 at	 future	 energy	 technology	 (Merrill	Lynch	
2006).
Elements of Changing Carmaker–Supplier Relations
The shift from parts and components to modules and systems has 
fundamentally changed the role of parts suppliers in the development 
and production of cars. Analysts agree on the following basic dimen-
sions of change (Wasti and Liker 1999).
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Fewer parts and more modules
What goes into a vehicle can be sorted into the following hierarchy:
• Parts are typically small, individual pieces of metal, rubber, or 
plastic stamped, cut, or molded into distinctive shapes, such as 
knobs and levers.
• Components are several parts put together into recognizable fea-
tures, such as radios and seat covers.
• Modules are several components combined to make functional 
portions of a motor vehicle, such as instrument panels and seats. 
• Systems are groups of components that are linked by function into 
major units of motor vehicles, such as interiors and engines.
In	 the	past	at	 their	 fina 	assembly	plants,	carmakers	gathered	 to-
gether thousands of individual parts and components purchased either 
from independent suppliers or made by their own parts divisions. Now, 
suppliers are being asked to deliver large modules and systems ready to 
be	installed	on	the	fina 	assembly	line.	“A	modular	system	is	composed	
of subsystems (or modules) that are designed independently but still 
function as an integrated whole” (Dyer 2000, p. 171). Modularization 
was	described	by	GM	vice	president	Bob	Lutz	as	“like	the	definitio 	of	
a Lego set” (Mackintosh 2004). 
“What was once a highly vertically integrated industry has become 
ever	more	dependent	on	supplier	companies	to	fulfil 	increasingly	com-
plex piece and module design and production” (Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 
2007, p. 9). As a result, some analysts speculate that “[m]odularization 
may remove the nameplate assembler from directly manufacturing 
much of the product; it becomes rather the marketer, coordinator and 
distributor	of	the	fina 	vehicle”	(Cooney	and	Yacobucci	2005,	p.	41).	
SupplierBusiness.com (2004) described the difference between a 
module and a system this way: “[T]he different parts of a safety system 
or a braking and traction control system are located in separate areas 
of the vehicle and incorporated into several different modules, but they 
will have been designed to work together as a complete system . . . 
[M]odules are being designed as complex units, which incorporate 
multiple functions. Examples of modules include seats, doors, cockpits, 
front-ends and suspension corner modules. Each of these can include 
components from two or more major vehicle systems.”
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A	parts	producer	stated	the	difference	more	flippantly 	“Two	parts	
bolted together is a module. Three parts bolted together is a system.”6
Larger contracts to fewer suppliers
Instead of buying from thousands of suppliers, carmakers are of-
fering large contracts to only a handful of suppliers, which are con-
solidating	into	fewer	larger	firm 	and	driving	smaller	firm 	out	of	the	
industry.
“Productivity improvements and the declining market share of do-
mestic OEMs have led to considerable consolidation among motor ve-
hicle parts suppliers” (Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007, p. 10). “Since the 
early 1990s . . . the largest 20–30 suppliers in the industry have taken on 
a much larger role in the areas of design, production, and foreign invest-
ment, shifting the balance of power in some small measure away from 
lead	firm 	towards	suppliers”	(Sturgeon,	Van	Biesebroeck,	and	Gereffi	
2007, p. 3). As a result, “[w]hile the total number of vehicles produced 
in North America grew by 40 percent between 1991 and 2005—from 
11.6 million to 16.3 million—the combined sales of the largest 150 sup-
pliers in North America almost tripled over the same time period . . .” 
(Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007, p. 24).
Longer relationships between suppliers and carmakers
Instead of awarding contracts annually to the lowest price bidders, 
carmakers are developing long-term relationships with suppliers, at 
least	for	the	several-year	life	of	specifi 	vehicle	models,	if	not	longer.	
“The continued efforts by original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) to reduce costs has led to an ever-increasing amount of manu-
facturing, sub-assembly, and R&D work being shifted to suppliers . . . 
The supplier companies design, engineer and manufacture the vast ma-
jority of the parts that go into a modern-day motor vehicle” (Hill, Menk, 
and	Szakaly	2007,	pp.	1,	9).	“For	niche	vehicles	or	 low-volume	cars	
the entire assembly is sometimes turned over to an outside contractor. 
The practice allows OEMs to assemble vehicles locally without large 
capital investments or to increase production capacity when their own 
assembly plants cannot satisfy demand for an unexpectedly successful 
model”	(Van	Biesebroeck	2006,	p.	210).
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More research and development by suppliers
Instead	of	providing	detailed	specifications 	carmakers	are	giving	
suppliers responsibility for research and development to design and 
build innovative modules and systems.
In	2000,	suppliers	spent	$6.6	billion	on	research	and	product	devel-
opment, accounting for 36 percent of total automotive-related spending 
on	 research	and	development;	 this	 increased	 to	$6.8	billion	 in	2003,	
or 40 percent of all research and product development spending (Hill, 
Menk, and Szakaly 2007). “Most innovations in safety, emissions, and 
entertainment come from Tier 1 suppliers.”7 “Some suppliers are will-
ingly taking on the new responsibilities offered to them by the OEMs, 
transforming themselves into ‘Tier One-Half systems integrators,’ that 
engineer and build complete modules (for example, an entire interior, 
4-corner suspension sets, or an entire rolling chassis) and assume both 
product design and development responsibilities and down stream sup-
ply chain management functions previously undertaken by the OEMs” 
(Offic 	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007,	p.	6).	
Smaller parts inventory and more just-in-time delivery
Instead of maintaining a large inventory of parts, carmakers are re-
quiring suppliers to deliver modules and systems on a just-in-time (JIT) 
basis,	often	within	only	a	few	minutes	before	needed	on	 the	fina 	as-
sembly line. 
“Because	 there	 is	 no	 built	 up	 inventory,	 JIT	 allows	 the	 firm 	 to	
correct quality problems as they are discovered, and to make running 
changes	in	product	specification 	or	volume	requirements	when	need-
ed”	(Offic 	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007,	p.	5).
Two Paradigms for Carmaker–Supplier Relations
Researchers argue that an automaker’s strong relationships to its 
supply	base	can	be	a	valuable	strategic	capability	that	is	difficul 	and	
time-consuming for competitors to imitate. According to Jeffrey Dyer 
(2000, p. 169), “competitive advantage will increasingly be jointly cre-
ated,	and	shared,	by	teams	of	firm 	within	a	value	chain.”
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Analysts’ perspectives on Japanese carmaker–supplier relations 
Japanese carmakers have established constructive partnerships 
with their suppliers. A key to better supplier relations is trust. The three 
leading Japanese carmakers, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, are seen as 
legitimate semi-insiders by supplier companies (Sako 2004, p. 301): 
“Suppliers’ trust of (Japanese carmakers) lay in the latter’s competence 
as	teachers,	but	also	in	devising	a	clear	set	of	rules	for	sharing	specifi 	
gains from short-term intervention, and for letting suppliers appropriate 
wider gains from long-term capability enhancement.”
According to Wasti and Liker (1999), positive supplier relation-
ships are achieved by following six steps: 1) understand how suppliers 
work, 2) turn supplier rivalry into opportunity, 3) supervise vendors, 
4) develop supplier technical capabilities, 5) share information inten-
sively but selectively, and 6) conduct joint improvement activities.
From	 interviews	with	nearly	100	managers	at	Honda	and	Toyota	
as well as their suppliers, Liker and Choi ([2004]; see also Dyer and 
Nobeoka [2000]) concluded that these two carmakers “have struck re-
markable partnerships with some of the same suppliers that are at log-
gerheads with the Big Three and have created latter-day keiretsu across 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico . . . Toyota and Honda have 
managed to replicate in an alien Western culture the same kind of sup-
plier webs they built in Japan.” (Keiretsu	is	define 	on	p.	22.)




suppliers are able to develop technologies that give their customers an 
advantage” (Automotive	News 2005a). Japanese carmakers have nursed 
their suppliers, and suppliers like doing business with them. In addition, 
supplier networks incorporate a complex system of incentives.
The three leading Japanese carmakers do not have identical supplier 
relations (Sako 2004). Although all three transfer knowledge to suppli-
ers through a variety of development activities and management control 
systems, Toyota shares more information with suppliers and has more 
separation between purchasing and engineering development. “[Each 
of the three Japanese carmakers] clearly distinguishes between the in-
ner core of suppliers to which processes for ‘capability enhancement’ 
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are taught in a hands-on manner, and the rest, who are mainly given 
incentives to make improvements through long-term customer commit-
ment. This distinction ensures that tacit knowledge is shared only with 
the inner core. This inner core ranges from 25 companies at Nissan and 
52 at Toyota, and up to 63 at Honda” (Sako 2004, p. 302).
Analysts’ perspectives on Detroit 3–supplier relations 
In contrast, Sako and Helper surveyed 675 Tier 1 suppliers in the 
United States and 472 in Japan during the 1990s and found that “[t]he 
U.S. auto industry has been characterized by decades of adversarial 
buyer-supplier relations” (Mudambi and Helper 1998, p. 789). They 
also state that “suppliers to the U.S. automobile industry have little ex-
pectation of being treated fairly by their customers” (p. 776). Table 1.4 
summarizes the contrast between the two models of supplier relations. 
“Experts agree that American corporations, like their Japanese ri-
vals, should build supplier keiretsu: close-knit networks of vendors 
Table 1.4  Relationships between Suppliers and U.S. and Japanese 
Carmakers 
Criteria Detroit 3a Japanese 3b 
Relationship orientation Adversarial; focus is on 








and late information 
High level and timely 
Protect	confidentia 	
information
Little regard for suppliers’ 
proprietary information or 
intellectual property 
High regard 
Importance of cost vs. 
quality and technology 
By far, primary focus is on 
cost 
Also seek low cost but 
balance it with quality 
improvements and 
technology 
Supplier survival Little regard Concern for long-term 
success and stability 
a	GM,	Ford,	and	Chrysler.	
b Toyota, Honda, and Nissan.
SOURCE: PPI (2005).
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that continuously learn, improve, and prosper along with their parent 
companies” (Liker and Choi 2004, p. 106). The key word in the previ-
ous sentence is should, because the reality is that “current attempts to 
increase informal commitment and trust are constrained by the exis-
tence of adversarial buyer-supplier relations in the past” (Mudambi and 
Helper 1998, p. 776).
U.S. carmakers have tried going down the path of cooperation. Dur-
ing the early 1990s, for example, Chrysler implemented a more coop-
erative way of doing business with its suppliers that showed almost 
immediate improvements in its supplier relationships. In the wake of its 
merger with Daimler, however, that approach was abandoned in favor 
of the traditional way of doing business.8
Mudambi and Helper (1998, p. 789) concluded that relationships 
between U.S. carmakers and suppliers are close even though they are 
adversarial: “[T]he close but adversarial model represents the current 
state of buyer-supplier relations in the majority of cases.” U.S. carmak-
ers have created a framework of formal cooperation with their suppli-
ers, but it is accompanied by uncooperative behavior. U.S. carmakers 
take advantage of the competitive weaknesses of suppliers to reap 
short-term gain (Mudambi and Helper 1998). Especially damning was 
the perspective of U.S. suppliers, which were less trusting than Japa-
nese suppliers, except when they had Japanese carmakers as customers 
(Sako and Helper 1998).
Liker and Choi (2004) show that U.S. carmakers have adopted all of 
the Japanese-inspired organizational strategies, including slashing the 
number of suppliers, awarding long-term contracts to the survivors, en-
couraging Tier 1 suppliers to set up lower-tier networks, ordering sys-
tems and modules instead of parts and components, receiving deliveries 
on a just-in-time basis, and giving suppliers responsibility for quality 
and costs. “However, while these American companies created supply 
chains	that	superficiall 	resembled	those	of	their	Japanese	competitors,	
they didn’t alter the fundamental nature of their relationships with sup-
pliers. It wasn’t long into the partnering movement before manufactur-
ers	and	suppliers	were	fightin 	bitterly	over	the	implementation	of	best	
practices, like continuous quality improvement and annual price reduc-
tions” (Liker and Choi 2004, p. 106).
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Carmaker–Supplier Relations: Converging or Diverging?
Helper and Sako (1995) did detect some convergence in the way 
U.S. and Japanese carmakers work with suppliers. 
• Information disclosure. The percentage of suppliers reporting 
an increase in information disclosed by U.S. carmakers rose from 
38 percent in 1984 and 50 percent in 1989 to 80 percent in 1993; 
the percentage of suppliers reporting an increase in information 
disclosed by Japanese carmakers declined from 80 percent in 
1989 to 77 percent in 1993.
• Joint problem-solving. The percentage of suppliers report-
ing that U.S. carmakers helped them match efforts by compet-
ing suppliers increased from 32 percent in 1989 to 51 percent 
in 1993; the percentage of suppliers reporting that Japanese car-
makers helped them match competitors declined from 45 percent 
in 1989 to 40 percent in 1993.
• Contract length. Suppliers to U.S. carmakers reported that the 
average contract increased from 1.2 years in 1984 to 2.3 years in 
1989 and 2.4 years in 1993; two-thirds of suppliers to Japanese 
carmakers	reported	no	time-specifi 	contracts.
The immense cost pressures faced by the Detroit 3 have since 
pushed the pendulum in the other direction and again made cost the 
main	criterion	in	supplier	selection.	First,	the	Detroit	3	carmakers	have	
been more easily able to source globally, notably from China. As a re-
sult, many North American suppliers now have to compete with the 
“landed costs” of parts produced in China and other low-wage coun-
tries. Second, Internet-based technologies have allowed the Detroit 3 
to	get	 suppliers	 to	compete	on	cost	more	efficiently—a d	more	bru-
tally—than they used to. Confrontational tactics of Detroit 3 purchasers 
include “beat[ing] down prices with electronic auctions or rebidding 
work to a competitor. Japanese are equally tough on price but are com-
mitted to maintaining supplier continuity” (Chappell 2004a; Sherefkin 
and Wilson 2003). Consequently, the relations between carmakers and 
suppliers in America have deteriorated even as the quality of vehicles 
has improved (Liker and Choi 2004). According to Stallkamp (2005b), 
“Typically, in any one of the Big Three automakers there might be more 
than 250 to 300 buyers working at one time, each responsible for man-
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aging a small aspect of the parts or services that go into the vehicle.” 
Isolated from engineering, manufacturing, and marketing people, these 
buyers have been motivated primarily by the desire to reduce the piece 
or unit price. A penny per part adds up to big savings for a buyer. 
Detroit	3	financia 	monitors	have	further	increased	pressure	on	sup-
pliers through “open book pricing,” such as auditing quotes and review-
ing overhead expenses. “What happens is the big guys, major OEMs, 
keep putting more and more requirements on the supplier that are non-
negotiable. They simply say, ‘This is the way it is going to be done as of 
this date, and next year we want another 5 percent price reduction.’”9
In response, Stallkamp (2005b) suggests that suppliers have en-
gaged in an elaborate game:
The	supply	base	participants	quickly	figure 	out	that	a	low	quote	
was the major deciding factor and often bid at cost or even below 
cost	to	secure	the	business.	They	recovered	their	profit 	over	time	
because the development process each of the U.S. companies used 
was so lengthy and convoluted that each part was changed several 
times, each time providing a chance for the supplier to increase 
its price for the design change. Suppliers often padded these de-
sign changes, but because the business was based on the initial 
quote, little was done to move to another supplier because switch-
ing would cost time, cause disruption and possibly produce quality 
issues. 
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
“Industry surveys consistently have shown the U.S. component 
supplier segment to be mistrustful, resentful and rebellious against their 
Big 3 customers, while favorable to the Japanese transplants such as 
Toyota and Honda” (Chappell 2005b). One such survey of carmaker– 
supplier relationships has been conducted annually since 2000 by Plan-
ning	Perspectives	Inc.	(PPI).	From	the	responses	of	more	than	200	sup-
pliers, PPI (2005) constructed a Working Relations Index to measure 
how carmakers treat their suppliers on the basis of 17 business prac-
tices. According to a 2007 PPI survey of 308 North American parts 
makers, including 69 of the 150 largest, Toyota was ranked highest in 
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fostering positive business relationships, followed by Honda, Nissan, 
Chrysler,	GM,	and	Ford	(PPI	2007;	Table	1.5).
Why do supplier relations matter? Because good relationships to 
the supply base have become a key element of some carmakers’ busi-
ness	strategies.	“For	the	Big	3,	the	danger	is	that	suppliers	may	stop	of-
fering them their best technology” (Automotive	News 2005b). Suppliers 
say they have reduced spending on research and development for the 
Detroit 3 and increased it for Japanese carmakers. More mistrustful of 
Detroit 3 business methods, suppliers have been less willing to share 
technology with them or invest in their products as compared with Japa-
nese carmakers (Chappell 2004b). 
Larry Denton, CEO of Dura Automotive Systems, summarized the 
situation in Sherefkin and Wilson (2003): “Catalytic converters, ABS, 
airbags, automatic transmissions, safety belts—those were all innova-
tions that came from the traditional Big 3. We can’t name anything like 
that	 that	has	 come	 in	 the	 last	 fiv 	years	because	 if	 I	 look	 at	 iDrive,	
advanced	diesel	engines,	hybrids,	CVT—where	did	 they	come	from?	
There’s something broke here. Innovation isn’t getting through the old 
domestics . . . Even though we’re all suppliers to all of them, technol-
ogy is headed in one direction because of the business model, and it 
needs	to	be	fixed. 	





% changeCarmaker 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Toyota 314 334 399 415 407 415 2.0 32.2 
Honda 297 316 384 375 368 380  3.3 27.9
Nissan 227 259 294 298 300 289 −3.7 27.3
Chrysler 175 177 183 196 218 199 −8.7 13.7
Ford	 167 161 160 157 174 162 −6.9 −3.0
GM	 161 156 144 114 131 174 32.8 8.1






 1. Bill Taylor, Mercedes-Benz U.S. CEO, quoted in Chappell (2005a).
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		8.	 For	an	enlightening	description	of	that	episode,	see	Stallkamp	(2005a).
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Detroit: Heart of the Auto Industry
To assert that Detroit and the auto industry have long been synonymous 
may	seem	either	unnecessary	or	anachronistic.	For	most	of	the	twentieth	cen-
tury, the city’s central position in the auto industry was so obvious as to need 
no elucidation. As recently as the mid-twentieth century, two-thirds of the 
nation’s auto industry jobs were in Michigan. 
Detroit’s preeminence in the auto industry derived from the emergence 
of the Big 3 carmakers. The clustering of Big 3 management and technical 
operations contributed heavily to the Detroit area’s auto employment during 
the	twentieth	century,	and	they	continue	to	do	so	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	
However, the preponderance of Michigan’s Big 3 auto jobs historically was 
actually in parts-making facilities. In the mid-twentieth century, the Big 3 as-
sembled most of their vehicles outside Michigan, but they made nearly all of 
their parts inside Michigan. 
Since the late twentieth century, the declining fortunes of the Big 3 have 
caused declining fortunes for Detroit. Michigan’s job loss in the auto industry 
in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century	averaged	6	percent	per	year.	Having	lost	their	
status as the three largest carmakers, the Big 3 are now being referred to as 
the Detroit 3, even more closely linking a struggling city with the struggling 
companies.	Derelict	factories	and	empty	offic 	towers	gave	mute	testimony	to	
the collapse of Detroit’s auto industry. 
“Detroit’s long reign as the dominant force in the American car industry 
is	over,”	proclaimed	auto	analyst	Micheline	Maynard	on	the	firs 	page	of	her	
2003 book, and just to make sure, she repeated on the second page, “Detroit’s 
single-handed control of the American automobile industry has been lost for-
ever” (Maynard 2003). Although its auto employment has declined sharply, 
Michigan remains the leading parts-making state. This section discusses how 
the Detroit 3 parts-making operations came to be clustered in that state. It then 
examines the three leading types of parts made in Michigan: engines, bodies, 




Rise and Fall of Vertical 
Integration in the Midwest
[Hyundai officials]know that the Detroit area is the brain center 
of	not	only	the	global	automobile	industry,	but	particularly	
the	North	American	automobile	industry.1





the United States and worldwide, and they remained so until they were 
passed	by	Toyota	in	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century.
Many	reasons	accounted	for	the	success	of	Ford	and	GM,	but	argu-
ably the most important was the ability of the two companies to make 
most	of	 their	own	parts	 instead	of	buying	 them.	Ford	 and	GM	both	
regarded the strategy, known as “vertical integration,” as an important 
competitive advantage. Chrysler, the third of the Detroit-based Big 3 
carmakers, was somewhat weaker in large measure because it was less 
vertically integrated than its two larger competitors. Unable to compete 
with the Big 3 on price and quality, other carmakers were driven out of 
business, and independent suppliers were relegated to a marginal role 
in the production process.
Vertical	integration	was	also	the	basis	for	the	dominance	of	motor	
vehicle production in the Midwest, especially in southeastern Michigan. 
At the height of vertical integration, parts-making was more highly clus-
tered	in	southeastern	Michigan	than	was	fina 	assembly.	Parts	produced	
in	southeastern	Michigan	were	shipped	to	fina 	assembly	plants	located	
near big cities around the country, like New York and Los Angeles.
After	nearly	a	century	of	making	most	of	their	own	parts,	GM	and	
Ford	both	exited	the	parts-making	business	within	a	year	of	each	other,	
in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Making their own parts had become a 
liability	rather	than	an	asset	for	GM	and	Ford	because	other	carmakers	
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were buying better quality parts from independent suppliers at lower 
prices.
Just as the rise of vertical integration underlay southeastern Mich-
igan’s dominance of the motor vehicle industry for much of the twen-
tieth century, so has the end of vertical integration triggered hard times 
in Michigan. At the height of vertical integration, immediately before 
and	after	World	War	II,	Ford	and	GM	together	made	about	60	percent	
of their parts in Michigan but assembled only about 15 percent of their 
vehicles	there.	At	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	Michigan’s	
share	of	Ford	and	GM’s	North	American	fina 	assembly	operations	had	
increased to 20 percent, but the state’s share of parts production had 
fallen to about 25 percent.
BENEFITS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Every manufacturer needs inputs into its production process and 
ways	to	get	its	goods	to	customers.	Vertical	integration	measures	the	ex-
tent	to	which	a	fir 	is	integrated	with	its	“upstream”	sources	of	inputs	
and its “downstream” distribution to customers. 
A	fir 	must	either	procure	inputs	from	other	firm 	or	control	the	in-
put	sources	itself.	A	fir 	that	is	relatively	integrated	upstream	produces	
most of its raw materials and semifabricated inputs itself. Similarly, a 
fir 	either	turns	over	its	output	to	other	firm 	or	controls	the	sources	of	
distribution	itself.	A	fir 	that	is	relatively	integrated	downstream	con-
trols most of its own distribution activities instead of turning over its 
goods to independent wholesalers and retailers. 
The	benefit 	of	vertical	integration	were	recognized	by	economists	
long before the establishment of the motor vehicle industry. Industrial 
organization textbooks (e.g., Scherer and Ross 1990) distinguish sev-
eral	motives	for	vertically	integrating	a	business	activity.	Vertical	inte-
gration	can	have	the	following	benefits
• Reducing costs. According to Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, 
who	proposed	a	 transaction	cost	 theory	of	firms 	activities	will	
be	collected	 in	a	fir 	when	 the	cost	of	using	 the	price	mecha-
nism (procuring across markets) exceeds the cost of organizing 
those same activities through direct managerial control. Several 
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empirical studies have shown that auto manufacturers tend to in-
tegrate the production of a component if the production process 
generates very specialized and nonpatentable know-how (Mas-
ten, Mehan, and Snyder 1989; Monteverde and Teece 1982). 
• Enhancing control. Producers have more control over their eco-
nomic environment; for example, they are provided with immu-
nity from total interruption in the supply of a part.
• Optimizing scale.	Various	production	operations	with	different	
optimal scales can be combined in one corporate structure if mar-
kets are prone to a breakdown of competitive supply conditions. 
At the height of vertical integration in the motor vehicle industry, 
for	example,	the	most	efficien 	assembly	plants	produced	about	
200,000 vehicles per year on two shifts. Stamping body parts 
and machining automotive transmissions are characterized by 
much higher minimum annual volumes, up to 400,000 units each 
(White 1971). The much larger scale of stamping operations lim-
ited the number of possible independent stamping companies. 
Carmakers therefore protected themselves by integrating the 
stamping operation.
Carmakers have shown little interest in “downstream” vertical inte-
gration.	Frustrated	with	the	inexperience	of	early	dealers,	Ford	did	set	
up	company-owned	stores	called	branch	houses	during	the	firs 	decade	
of the twentieth century (Rubenstein 2001). Located in major cities, 
branch	houses	were	staffed	by	Ford	employees	who	received	a	salary	





were	not	sufficientl 	motivated	 to	sell	cars.	According	 to	an	 industry	
analyst writing in the 1920s (Epstein 1928, pp. 135–136), “If a dealer 
has	a	 financia 	 interest	 in	his	own	company,	he	 is	 found	 to	be	much	
more	satisfactory	than	a	branch	manager,	who	has	practically	no	fina -
cial interest in the branch.”
Although they abandoned downstream vertical integration, the Big 
3 remained vertically integrated upstream until the end of the twentieth 
century.	As	recently	as	the	1980s,	GM	produced	more	than	70	percent	
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of	 its	own	parts	 and	Ford	54	percent.	Chrysler,	which	 then	had	 just	
emerged from a near-brush with bankruptcy, produced only 39 percent 




makers were primarily assemblers and distributors, and they were ca-
pable of producing few if any of their own parts. Experimental vehicles 
in the 1890s were put together by adapting parts that were being made 
for other purposes. 
In	Chapter	1,	we	identifie 	six	major	vehicle	systems:	body,	chassis,	
electronics, interior, generics, and powertrain. Early vehicles did not 
have electronics or an interior, but they did have the other four systems. 
A powertrain was needed to propel the vehicle, a body to contain people 
and equipment, a chassis to carry the weight without bogging down, 
and generic parts like nuts and bolts to put the other pieces together. 
Carmakers had to rely on already established companies to obtain 
these parts. Detroit and nearby communities attracted carmakers be-
cause the principal sources of parts were already there. To supply indus-
tries	 that	existed	before	motor	vehicles,	nineteenth-century	firm 	 that	
would later prove to be expert parts makers had settled in a region that 
centered on southeastern Michigan and extended along the southern 
Great	Lakes	between	Buffalo	and	Milwaukee.	
Of the 50 largest suppliers in the United States in 2007, 20 predated 
the establishment of the motor vehicle industry in the 1890s. The list 
includes some of America’s most venerable manufacturers, such as Du-
Pont, established in 1802 to make gunpowder, and Navistar, established 
in	1831	to	make	McCormick	reapers.	Several	of	the	older	firm 	began	
in the nineteenth century as suppliers of parts such as bearings, frames, 
springs, and tires for carriages and bicycles. Others making a success-
ful transition to motor vehicle parts started out producing metal, glass, 
and textile products for household use; some even began as retailers or 
service providers rather than manufacturers.
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Leading Suppliers in 1900
As	commercial	production	of	motor	vehicles	soared	in	the	firs 	few	




century and were responsible for a high share of the value added in the 
manufacturing process. 
Leland & Faulconer
At the top of the list of needs for the early carmakers was a reliable 
engine. In 1900, southeastern Michigan was the leading center for sup-
plying gasoline engines. Once gasoline defeated steam and electricity 
as	the	preferred	power	source	for	car	engines	during	the	firs 	years	of	
the twentieth century, Detroit was the unrivaled leader in supplying mo-
tor vehicle parts.
There were two principal markets for Detroit’s gasoline engines be-
fore	motor	vehicles.	First,	small	stationary	gasoline	engines	were	sold	
to generate power on farms and in other rural settings that lacked access 
to electricity. The nation’s leading supplier of small stationary gasoline 
engines during the 1890s was Lansing-based Ransom E. Olds. He then 




coner, founded in Detroit in 1890 by skilled machinist Henry M. Le-
land	and	lumber	magnate	Robert	C.	Faulconer.	Leland	&	Faulconer	firs 	
worked with Olds in 1899 to correct problems with noisy transmissions, 
then supplied transmissions beginning in 1900 and engines in 1901. 
The	Leland	&	Faulconer	 engine	quickly	 established	 a	 reputation	 for	
delivering more horsepower than its competitors because it was built 
to more exacting manufacturing standards (Hyde 2005, p. 30). Henry 
Leland became president of the Cadillac Automotive Co. in 1903, and 
Leland	&	Faulconer	merged	with	Cadillac	in	1905.
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Dodge Brothers
Founded	by	John	and	Horace	Dodge	in	1900,	Dodge	Brothers	ini-
tially designed and built steam engines for yachts, repaired typesetting 
and typography machines, and made replacement parts for them. Be-
ginning in 1886, the brothers worked in several machine shops in south-
eastern Michigan and Windsor, Ontario. They patented an improved 
bicycle bearing in 1895 and started making the E. & D. Bicycle a year 
later,	with	partner	Fred	S.	Evans	(the	“E”	in	the	name),	as	a	subsidiary	
of	the	Canadian	Typograph	Co.	When	U.S.	and	Canadian	bicycle	firm 	
consolidated into a monopoly in the late 1890s, the Dodge brothers sold 














nant carmaker, the Dodges became wealthy. The brothers used their 
wealth to switch from making parts to making their own cars in 1914. 








The importance of suppliers in the early years of motor vehicle pro-












were allocated to purchasing three types of parts: running gear, body, 
and tires. The most important of these by far was running gear, which 
consisted of the engine, transmission, and axles mounted on a frame. 
Ford	contracted	with	Dodge	Brothers	in	1903	to	supply	650	sets	of	run-
ning	gear	for	$250	each,	accounting	for	62	percent	of	manufacturing	
cost (Hyde 2005, p. 31).
Ford’s	second-leading	supplier	 in	 its	 firs 	year	of	production,	be-
hind	Dodge	Brothers,	was	C.R.	Wilson	Carriage	Co.	Ford	bought	bod-
Table 2.1  Ford Production Costs in 1903
a Includes engine, transmission, axles, and frame.
b Includes wages, rent, insurance, and factory incidentals.
c Includes advertising, salaries, and commissions.
SOURCE:	Based	on	Quaife	(1950)	as	quoted	in	Hyde	(2005,	p.	36)	and	Model	T	Ford	
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ies	from	Wilson	for	$52	each	and	seat	cushions	for	$16	each.	Charles	R.	
Wilson had established a blacksmith and wagon repair shop in Detroit 
in 1870 and a carriage maker (C.R. & J.C. Wilson Carriage Co.) with 
his brother three years later. The brothers split the company during the 
1890s. J.C. Wilson Co. manufactured horse-drawn trucks and wagons, 
and it produced the Wilson Truck between 1915 and 1925. C.R. Wilson 
Carriage Co. concentrated on horse-drawn buggies and carriages and 
was reorganized as the C.R. Wilson Body Co. in 1897.
As	Ford	sales	increased	rapidly	after	introduction	of	the	Model	T	in	
1908, Wilson was no longer the exclusive body supplier. After Charles 
Wilson died in 1924, the body company was merged with several com-
petitors into the Murray Body Co., which survived as an independent 
body supplier until World War II (Theobald 2004).
Ford’s	 third	 largest	 supplier	 in	 1903	 was	 the	 Hartford	 Rubber	
Works	Co.,	which	provided	tires	for	$10	each.	Even	when	carmakers	
started to make most of their own parts, they continued to purchase tires 
from independent suppliers. Hartford became part of the United States 
Rubber Co., the leading tire supplier in the early years of the industry. 
U.S.	Rubber	merged	with	B.F.	Goodrich	Co.	in	1986	to	form	Uniroyal,	
which was acquired by Michelin in 1990.
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AT FORD AND GM
Vertical	integration	at	Ford	and	GM	began	with	production	of	the	
mechanical portion of the vehicle, that is, the powertrain and chassis. 
As electrical components and interiors were added to vehicles, they 
were also integrated into the core competency of the two carmakers. 
The	body	was	last	to	be	added.	By	the	1920s,	Ford	and	GM	were	highly	
integrated with most of their upstream inputs. 
Yet the two companies approached vertical integration differently:
•	 Ford	 set	up	most	of	 its	own	parts-making	operations,	whereas	
GM	acquired	them.	
•	 Ford	clustered	most	parts	production	in	one	complex	in	the	De-
troit	 area,	whereas	GM’s	was	 spread	 throughout	 southeastern	
Michigan. 
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•	 Ford	 integrated	 the	 production	 of	 inputs	 such	 as	 steel,	 glass,	
and	wood	into	its	corporate	empire,	whereas	GM	procured	them	
through market relationships.
With	 the	Big	3	carmakers	 firml 	established,	 the	sequence	of	 lo-
cation decisions characteristic of the pioneering years of the motor 
vehicle industry was reversed. Early carmakers had located in south-
eastern Michigan primarily to be near suppliers. Now independent sup-
pliers began to cluster in southeastern Michigan to be near the Big 3 
carmakers.
Ford Clusters Parts Production
Dependency	 on	 others—be	 they	 associations,	 financiers 	 service	
providers,	or	parts	makers—rankled	Henry	Ford	from	 the	outset.	As-
sociations	protected	monopolies,	financier 	cared	about	the	bottom	line,	
service providers were unreliable, and parts makers could not meet 
Ford’s	demanding	production	schedule.	Through	the	firs 	two	decades	
of	 the	 twentieth	century,	Henry	Ford	defie 	 trade	associations,	elimi-
nated	financia 	backers,	bought	out	suppliers,	and	made	his	own	parts.
Conventional wisdom in 1900 was that cars were toys for the rich, 
and	profi 	would	be	maximized	by	building	a	small	number	of	expensive	
models	that	could	be	sold	at	a	high	per-unit	markup.	In	contrast,	Ford	
believed that demand for cars was universal, and he set about meeting 




Ford starts making parts 
Shortly	after	 the	Ford	Motor	Co.	was	 incorporated	 in	June	1903,	
Henry	Ford	met	with	Fred	L.	Smith,	treasurer	of	Oldsmobile	and	act-
ing president of the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers 




parts, and it was therefore “a mere assemblage place.” Ironically, within 
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a	decade	Ford	would	be	making	more	of	its	own	parts	than	any	other	car-
maker.	And	a	century	later,	Ford—as	well	as	other	carmakers—would	




low-priced cars, while Dodge Brothers continued to supply most of the 
key	parts	for	Ford’s	higher	priced	models.	Henry	Ford’s	motivation	for	
setting up a separate parts-making subsidiary was largely driven by a 
dispute	with	his	principal	 financia 	backer.	Unable	 to	borrow	money	




were either relatives or business associates of Malcomson. 
Henry	Ford	finance 	Ford	Manufacturing	Co.	by	reducing	Ford	Mo-
tor Co. dividends in 1906, against the wishes of Malcomson. After Mal-








2007; Rubenstein 2001, p. 15).
Logical sequencing of parts
Ford	pioneered	one	of	the	principal	innovations	of	vertical	integra-
tion at the Piquette plant: logical sequencing. Three elements of logi-
cal	sequencing	were	noteworthy	in	the	Piquette	plant.	First,	appropri-
ate tools were placed next to each workstation. Traditionally, machine 
tools were kept in one place; a worker needing a particular tool would 
retrieve it, bring it to the workstation, do the work, and return the tool 
to storage.
Second, workstations were arranged in the building so that parts 
would not have to travel far from one operation to the next. According 
to	Ford’s	chief	 tool	designer,	Oscar	C.	Bornholdt,	 logical	sequencing	
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avoided	“a	 lot	of	handling	and	 trucking	and	saved	 lots	of	floo 	space	
. . . Under this method of operation the company did not have to pile 
up parts between machines in the aisles, and it also was able to reduce 
inventory greatly” (Bornholdt 1926, pp. 2–3).
Third,	the	specifi 	number	of	machines	and	workers	allocated	for	
each workstation was appropriate for maintaining even production 
through the factory. According to Bornholdt, “one type of machine 
would produce exactly the number of parts necessary for 100 percent 
production by the next type of machine, the production of all being 
so synchronized that there was no excess or shortages anywhere” 
(Bornholdt 1926, pp. 2–3). 
When	Ford	transferred	production	from	Piquette	to	Highland	Park	
in 1910, logical sequencing was incorporated from the beginning. Se-
quencing	began	at	the	top	floo 	and	flowe 	downward.	Body	parts	were	
fashioned	on	the	fourth	floo ,	painted	on	the	third	floo ,	assembled	on	
the	second	floo ,	and	dropped	on	top	of	the	chassis	on	the	firs 	floo .	As	
at Piquette, engines, transmissions, and other powertrain components 
were	made	on	the	firs 	floo 	of	Highland	Park	because	they	required	the	
heaviest	machinery	(Arnold	and	Faurote	1919).	
Highland Park became famous as the home of the moving assem-
bly	line,	firs 	installed	in	1913.	Starting	as	an	extension	of	the	logical	
sequencing that had been used for several years at Piquette, the moving 
assembly line became the revolutionary centerpiece of the company’s 
approach	 to	vertical	 integration,	overshadowing	Ford’s	other	 innova-
tions in materials handling.
Vertical integration at the Rouge
Within	a	decade	of	moving	into	Highland	Park,	Ford	started	con-
structing a much larger facility along the banks of the River Rouge 
in Dearborn. The Rouge would be the most vertically integrated com-
plex in the auto industry. At its peak around 1940, the Rouge employed 
110,000 workers in 127 structures totaling 11 million square feet spread 
out over 2,000 acres.
At the center of the Rouge complex was a canal slip along the River 
Rouge,	enabling	large	ships	to	arrive	from	the	Great	Lakes	by	way	of	
the Detroit River. Raw materials, such as coal and iron ore, were un-
loaded into large storage bins along the east side of a canal slip that cut 
through the center of the complex. East of the canal slip was a power 
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plant that produced electricity for the complex. Parts operations were 
clustered in three areas of the Rouge complex:
 1) The engine block and other iron components were cast in 
buildings to the north of the canal slip from pig iron smelted 
in Rouge blast furnaces and shaped in the Rouge foundry, the 
world’s largest.
 2) A steel-making complex on the west side of the canal slip 
stamped bodies and powertrain components.
	 3)	 Glass,	tires,	and	other	nonmetal	parts	were	made	in	buildings	
situated to the northwest of the canal slip.
Though	the	Rouge	included	a	fina 	assembly	plant—raw	materials	
were	said	to	arrive	at	one	end	and	finishe 	vehicles	to	depart	at	the	other	
end—most of the parts made at the Rouge, as well as at Highland Park 
before	 it,	were	actually	shipped	 in	knocked-down	 form	 to	other	 fina 	
assembly	plants.	A	railroad	boxcar	could	be	fille 	with	enough	parts	to	
assemble 26 cars, compared to only seven or eight fully assembled cars, 
thereby dramatically reducing the company’s freight bill. 
Ford’s	board	of	directors	authorized	construction	of	a	branch	plant	
in	Kansas	City,	which	opened	in	1912.	By	1917,	Ford	was	assembling	
cars in 30 U.S. cities, using parts made in Michigan.
GM Acquires Parts Producers
GM	founder	William	C.	Durant	was	a	strong	advocate	of	vertical	
integration.	Prior	to	organizing	GM	in	1908,	Durant	had	made	Durant-
Dort Carriage Co. the country’s largest carriage maker through vertical 
integration. Durant believed that parts-making was the key to minimiz-
ing production costs and achieving economies of scale (Epstein 1928, 
pp. 50–53; Pound 1934, p. 88). While competitors assembled carriages 
with parts bought from independent suppliers, Durant-Dort made its 
own bodies, wheels, axles, upholstery, springs, varnish, and whip sock-
ets (Rubenstein 1992, p. 33). “We started out [in the carriage industry] 
as assemblers with no advantage over our competitors,” Durant remi-
nisced. “We paid about the same prices for everything we purchased. 
We realized that we were making no progress and would not unless and 
until we manufactured practically every important part that we used” 
(Durant n.d., p. 12).
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Durant entered the motor vehicle business in 1904, when he was 
asked to reorganize the foundering Buick Motor Co., which was based 
in	 his	 hometown	 of	 Flint,	 Michigan.	 Buick	 founder	 David	 Dunbar	
Buick “was an innovative fellow who had made a fortune in the plumb-
ing business . . . He began to manufacture gasoline engines in 1900 and 
decided to design an automobile. But his business foundered. He tin-
kered a lot, but he did not produce cars commercially” (Wright 1996). 
Under Durant, Buick became the best-selling carmaker in the United 
States	and	formed	 the	“foundation	stone”	of	General	Motors	 in	1908	
(Pound 1934, p. 68).
As Durant moved from making carriages to cars, he continued to 
make vertical integration a key element in his competitive strategy. 
Unlike	Ford,	which	had	Dodge	Brothers	supply	its	firs 	engine,	Buick	
could produce an engine in-house from the start. Although automotive 




began to advertise and promote its patented engine as the ‘valve-in-
head’” (Buick Club of America 2007).




and general manager of Buick from 1916 to 1920, later described Du-
rant’s	charm	particularly	well:	“I	cannot	hope	to	fin 	words	to	express	
the charm of the man. He has the most winning personality of anyone 
I’ve ever known. He could coax a bird right down out of a tree” (Chrys-
ler 1937, p. 143). 
Among the parts makers Durant coaxed to Michigan were Albert 
Champion and Charles Stewart Mott. When Durant was in Boston to 
open	 a	Buick	 showroom,	Champion,	 a	 French-born	 race-car	 driver,	
showed him a magneto he had designed. Durant did not need a mag-
neto, but he was interested to learn that Champion also made spark 
plugs.	At	Durant’s	 invitation,	Champion	moved	 to	Flint	 in	1905	and	
manufactured spark plugs in a corner of the Buick factory. AC Spark 
Plugs	moved	to	a	separate	building	in	Flint	in	1917.
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Durant	had	difficult 	securing	suitable	axles	from	his	carriage-mak-
ing operations, so he wooed Charles Mott, president and general man-
ager of Weston-Mott Company, a leading axle supplier, to relocate from 
Utica,	New	York,	to	Flint	in	1906.	Mott	was	a	descendant	of	a	prominent	
upstate New York family that included his grandfather Samuel Mott, 






Manufacturing Co., Jackson-Church-Wilcox Co., Michigan Auto Parts 
Co., and Michigan Motor Castings Co. These companies made useful 
parts,	but	acquiring	so	many	proved	to	be	a	financia 	drain	on	a	fled -
ling	GM.	
Particularly	disastrous	 to	GM’s	 financia 	health	was	Durant’s	ac-





ers, who replaced Durant with new management, although Durant was 
permitted	to	remain	on	GM’s	Board	of	Trustees.
Ousted	from	GM,	Durant	decided	to	replicate	his	strategy	of	build-
ing cars with an eye for vertical integration. He organized three new 
companies in 1911: Little Motor Car Company, Mason Motor Com-
pany, and Chevrolet Motor Company. Little produced a small car, Ma-
son a four-cylinder engine, and Chevrolet a model based on a prototype 
developed by the well-known Swiss race-car driver Louis Chevrolet. 
Republic Motors was created a year later to market and distribute Chev-
rolet and Little cars.
The Little was a well-designed but underpowered car, whereas the 
Chevrolet was a high-priced, high-performance vehicle with limited 
appeal. To increase Republic’s overall sales, Durant put the Chevrolet 
name on the Little. Louis Chevrolet, furious at having his name associ-
ated with the aptly named Little, left the company, but Chevrolet (i.e., 
the rebadged Little) sales soared. 
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fir 	 [GM	general	manager	Charles]	Nash	 .	 .	 .	 ‘Well,	Charlie,	you’re	
through,’ he told his former employee who he felt had thrown in his lot 
with the bankers” (Wright 1996).
United Motors
Back	at	the	helm	of	GM,	Durant	resumed	his	pursuit	of	vertical	in-
tegration. A key acquisition was United Motors, a holding company for 
several parts makers Durant had created in 1916. Durant also consoli-
dated United Motors, as well as Republic Motors (including Chevrolet), 
into	General	Motors	in	1918.
Major	additions	to	GM	through	the	United	Motors	acquisition	in-
cluded Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company, Harrison Radiator 
Corporation, Hyatt Roller Bearing Company, New Departure Manufac-
turing Company, and Remy Electric Company. 
Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company. Later known by the 
acronym Delco, the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company was 
founded in 1909 and invented an electric self-starting ignition, which 
was	 firs 	 installed	as	 standard	equipment	on	GM’s	Cadillac	 in	1912.	
Delco’s	director	Charles	F.	Kettering,	appointed	head	of	GM’s	newly	
created Research Laboratories in 1920, was instrumental in making 
Dayton,	Ohio,	GM’s	largest	parts-making	center	outside	Michigan.	
Harrison Radiator Corporation.	Founded	in	1910	by	Herbert	C.	
Harrison in Lockport, New York, the Harrison Radiator Corporation 
produced honeycomb-shaped radiators that helped reduce overheating 
(a common problem of early car engines). Although Harrison is cred-
ited	by	some	with	its	invention,	German	automotive	pioneer	Wilhelm	
Maybach held a patent on it.
Hyatt Roller Bearing Company.	Founded	by	John	Wesley	Hyatt	
in 1892 in Harrison, New York, the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company 
started producing roller bearings for cars in 1896. Because a roller bear-
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ing, which consists of a cylinder sandwiched between two races, can 
withstand a relatively heavy load, it is commonly used in transmissions 
and wheels.
New Departure Manufacturing Company. Brothers Edward D. 
and	Albert	F.	Rockwell	founded	New	Departure	in	Bristol,	Connecticut,	
in 1888 to make doorbells. The company started producing ball bear-
ings for car axles in 1907. 
Remy Electric Company. The Remy Electric Company was 
founded	by	brothers	Frank	and	Perry	Remy	in	1896	to	make	magnetos	
for	a	number	of	early	cars,	including	Buick.	After	joining	GM,	Remy	
was merged with Delco into a single electrical parts-making division. 
Remy’s	hometown	of	Anderson,	Indiana,	became	GM’s	second-largest	
parts-making center outside Michigan.
Fisher Body and Packard Electric
Outside	United	Motors,	Durant’s	most	 significan 	contribution	 to	
GM’s	vertical	integration	was	acquiring	a	controlling	interest	in	Fisher	
Body.	Founded	in	Detroit	in	1908	by	the	Fisher	brothers,	the	company	
became	GM’s	 leading	 supplier	 of	 bodies	 during	 the	 1910s.	GM	 ac-
quired 60 percent of the company in 1919 and the remainder in 1926. 
GM	heavily	advertised	“Body	by	Fisher”	and	attached	a	plate	with	the	
phrase on all of its vehicles.
After	Durant	was	ousted	for	a	second	and	fina 	time	in	1920,	GM	
continued to acquire a few other key parts makers, notably Packard 
Electric in 1932. Packard Electric, established by brothers James W. and 
William	D.	Packard,	 firs 	made	 incandescent	 lamps	and	 transformers	
and then assembled luxury cars beginning in 1899. Packard’s carmak-
ing operations were sold to Detroit investors and its lamp operations to 
General	Electric,	leaving	Packard	Electric	to	concentrate	on	wiring.
VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION AT FORD AND GM
Market-based transactions increasingly dominated carmaker rela-
tions with their parts suppliers in the late twentieth century. “A domi-
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nant trend in the organization of production (in both the automotive in-
dustry and elsewhere) during the past decade [1990s] has been the shift 
away from vertical integration as manufacturers have increasingly out-
sourced parts to their suppliers” (Dyer 2000). The share of a vehicle’s 
value added in the production process by parts makers rose rapidly, 
from approximately 40 percent in 1990 to approximately 60 percent in 
2000. Suppliers were anticipated to add 80 percent to the value of a new 
vehicle by 2010.2
The impetus for changing carmaker–supplier relations was the dif-
fusion of lean production into the U.S. manufacturing sector (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1990; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). Starting in the early 
1980s, the arrival of Japanese-owned carmakers in North America illu-
minated a different approach to supplier relations. After World War II, 
resource-constrained Japanese carmakers had fostered partnerships and 
alliances with a small number of suppliers, in the process building long-
term relationships with them. When they came to the United States, 
Japanese carmakers brought some of these key suppliers with them.
Reacting	to	these	changes,	GM	spun	off	most	of	its	parts-making	
plants into an independent company called Delphi Corporation in 1999. 
A	year	later,	Ford	spun	off	most	of	its	parts-making	plants	into	Visteon	
Corporation. Armed with contracts to supply parts to what were still the 
world’s	two	largest	carmakers,	Delphi	and	Visteon	immediately	became	
North America’s two largest parts makers. 
Delphi	and	Visteon	each	reported	initial	quarterly	profit 	between	
0.5 and 1 percent of sales, which was not bad for the troubled auto parts 
sector and better than forecast. But those bright prospects soon faded. 
Within a half-dozen years, Delphi would seek bankruptcy protection, 
and	Visteon	would	not	be	in	much	better	shape.
Delphi	and	Visteon	had	problems	with	both	revenues	and	expenses.	
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for	fina 	assembly	work,	rather	than	the	lower	wages	prevailing	in	the	
motor vehicle parts industry.
From GM to Delphi
GM	consolidated	most	of	its	parts	plants	into	a	division	called	Del-
phi Automotive Systems in 1995. Delphi Corp. became an independent 
company four years later when shares were sold to the public or turned 
over	to	GM	stockholders.	Delphi	immediately	became	the	largest	U.S.-
based parts producer by a wide margin, with North American sales of 
$21	billion.
As an independent company, Delphi initially had seven divisions:
 1) Delphi Energy & Engine Management Systems, primarily 
plants from AC, Delco-Remy, and Rochester Products that 
made fuel lines, ignitions, and other engine parts.
 2)  Delphi Steering Systems, primarily plants in Saginaw, Michi-
gan, that made crankshafts, steering gears, and other cast parts.
 3)  Delphi Chassis Systems, primarily Delco, Hyatt, and New 
Departure plants that made brakes, bearings, shock absorbers, 
and other chassis parts.
 4)  Delphi Harrison Thermal Systems, primarily Harrison Radia-
tor plants that made heating and cooling parts.
	 5)		 Delphi	Interior	Systems,	primarily	Fisher	Body,	Inland	Man-
ufacturing,	and	Guide	Lamp	plants	 that	made	seats,	steering	
wheels, and other interior parts.
 6)  Delphi Packard Electric Systems, primarily Packard plants 
that made wiring.




chairman and CEO Robert S. “Steve” Miller (Detroit News 2005), “[t]he 
basic idea was for Delphi to outrun the legacy problem of its inherited 






Taken in isolation, this would have constituted remarkable growth 




can production declined from 5.7 million vehicles in 1999 to 4.6 million 





bankruptcy in motor vehicle industry history. Steve Miller, who placed 
Delphi in bankruptcy three months after being hired, gave reporters his 
perspective on what went wrong. He focused on three things:
 1)  The spread between automaker labor costs and competitive 
supplier labor costs has widened sharply over the past decade, 
driven by globalization and by rising health care and pension 
costs.
	 2)		 Given	Delphi’s	high	fixe 	costs	and	inflexibl 	labor	rates,	the	
recent	sharp	declines	in	Delphi’s	shipments	to	GM	due	to	their	
market share losses have been devastating.
	 3)		 The	game	plan	for	Delphi	included	“flow-backs 	to	GM	of	ex-
cess	Delphi	workers.	But	GM	has	had	no	room	to	accept	Del-
phi	employees,	resulting	in	a	$100	million	penalty	last	quarter	
(Q3 2005) alone for 4,000 idled workers in Delphi’s jobs bank, 
drawing	full	pay	and	benefit 	(Detroit News 2005).
Emerging from bankruptcy protection would make Delphi a drasti-
cally	different	company	than	the	one	spun	off	by	GM	in	1999.	It	was	
going to be:
• A much smaller company. The number of U.S. plants was to 
be cut from 29 to 8. The jettisoned plants would be sold if a 
buyer could be found, otherwise they would be closed. Hourly 
employment was cut from 33,000 in 2005 to 6,000 in January 
2008 (Clarion	Ledger 2008).
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• A more Mexican-oriented company. Delphi had more employ-
ment and plants in Mexico than in the United States.
• A lower-wage company. Average hourly wages were reduced 
from	about	$28	to	about	$15.
• A more specialized company. Most of the remaining operations 
in North America concentrated on electronics, based on the old 
Packard division’s wiring production that had grown rapidly in 
Mexico during the 1980s.
Concentrating on electronics was a fortuitous choice for Delphi 
because that was the most rapidly growing sector of the industry (see 
Chapter 14). But emerging as an electronics specialist was a far cry 
from the 1999 company that seemed to have the capability of supplying 
nearly any type of part.





 1) Chassis Products, including axles, catalytic converters, shafts, 
steering, and suspension.
 2) Climate Control Products, including air conditioning and en-
gine cooling.
 3) Electronic Products, including audio and driver information.
 4) Exterior Products, including bumpers and headlamps.
	 5)	 Glass	Operations,	including	windows	and	windshields.
 6) Interior Products, including consoles, doors, and instrument 
panels.




president for corporate relations Peter J. Pestillo and UAW vice presi-
dent	and	director	of	the	Ford	Department	Ernest	Lofton—were	golfin 	
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partners who had both held their positions for more than two decades. 
Ford	agreed	 to	“look	 to	Visteon	 first 	as	 its	supplier	of	choice	when	
making sourcing decisions.
Visteon	workers	actually	remained	employees	of	Ford	“on	assign-


















to reduce prices. Still, losses mounted at both companies. 
As	Visteon	 neared	 bankruptcy	 in	 2005,	 a	more	 drastic	 deal	was	
struck.	All	17,700	Ford	employees	 still	assigned	 to	Visteon	were	 re-
turned	 to	Ford.	Ford	offered	buyouts	 to	5,000	and	reabsorbed	 the	re-
mainder.	Visteon	was	relieved	of	a	$2	billion	liability	in	health	care	and	





reduced to 43,000 in January 2008 (Sherefkin 2008).
The	 last	 restructuring	 radically	 altered	 the	makeup	 of	Visteon’s	
North American labor force. With Mexican workers far outnumbering 
UAW	members	at	Visteon,	“they	have	become	 largely	a	foreign	sup-
plier” (Wernle 2005b).
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Chassis, climate control, and interior each accounted for 22 percent 
of	Visteon’s	sales	in	2004.	Powertrain	sales	accounted	for	17	percent,	
electronics for 10 percent, exterior for 4 percent, and glass for 3 per-
cent. After restructuring, climate control had increased to 34 percent of 
Visteon	revenues	in	2005,	electronics	to	26	percent,	and	interiors	to	24	
percent. The other four areas had declined from a combined total of 46 
percent to 16 percent. 
Underlying	the	restructuring	was	the	recognition	that	Visteon	had	
cut back to a single core competency—cockpits—which combined in-




billion in 2007, and sales were still falling.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
The	spin-offs	of	Delphi	and	Visteon	were	the	most	visible	evidence	
that vertical integration as a dominant business strategy had ended in 
the motor vehicle industry along with the old millennium. In the twenty-
firs 	century	the	strongest	carmakers	were	not	the	vertically	integrated	
ones; rather, they were the ones working best with independent parts 
suppliers.
The	Delphi	and	Visteon	spin-offs	were	also	emblematic	of	uncer-
tainties facing the suppliers in the new millennium. Set adrift as in-
dependent companies, neither company was able to survive simply as 
principal parts supplier for its former boss. Nor could either survive as 
a one-stop shopping center for every sort of part, be it large or small, 
expensive or cheap, high-tech or generic.
Once	the	second-largest	supplier	in	the	United	States,	Visteon	fell	to	
ninth place in 2007 and was set to decline further in subsequent years. 
Shed	of	 its	highest-cost	workers	and	unprofitabl 	plants,	Visteon	be-
came primarily an overseas producer, with more employees in Mexico 
than	in	the	United	States.	Like	Visteon,	Delphi	was	likely	to	survive	pri-
marily as a foreign-based company. Wiring, audio equipment, and other 
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electronics would be produced in low-wage countries for insertion into 
vehicles assembled in the United States. 
As	Visteon	struggled	to	survive,	its	corporate	office 	moved	in	2004	
to	Visteon	Village,	a	256-acre,	nine-building	complex,	 in	Van	Buren	
Township, Michigan, 10 miles southwest of Detroit Metro airport, near 






Cars—the business of the company—were banished to peripheral lots, 
leaving employees with a shuttle bus commute or a lengthy hike—a 
somewhat arduous prospect during Michigan’s long, cold winters. 
A	visitor	couldn’t	help	but	wonder	whether	Visteon	Village	was	a	
make-believe place, like Disneyland or Colonial Williamsburg. How 
could	Visteon	plan	 such	 an	 elaborate	 and	 costly	 campus	 in	 the	 face	
of	 financia 	crisis?	Was	Visteon	Village	destined	 to	 join	southeastern	
Michigan’s already unmatched collection of industrial archaeology? 
Notes
 1.  Delphi chairman and CEO Robert S. Miller, quoted in The	 Washington	 Post	
(2005).









“Powertrain” is the term the motor vehicle industry uses to encom-
pass the systems responsible for providing power. The two principal 
powertrain systems are the engine and drivetrain. Components attached 
to the engine and drivetrain, as well as others closely related to the pro-
vision of power, can also be included in the powertrain designation. 
All but a handful of the world’s one billion motor vehicles produced 
during the twentieth century were powered by a four-stroke gasoline-
burning internal combustion engine. The heart of the engine is a piston 
moving back and forth inside a cylinder in four cycles or “strokes.”
•	 On	 the	 firs 	 stroke—called	 the	 intake	 stroke—the	 piston	 de-
scends,	 fillin 	 the	 cylinder	with	 a	mixture	of	gasoline	 and	 air	
drawn through an open intake valve.
• On the second stroke—compression—the piston rises as the in-
take valve is closed, compressing the mixture.
• On the third stroke—power—the piston descends again, driven 
down as the mixture is ignited and explodes.
• On the fourth stroke—exhaust—the piston rises again, pushing 
the spent gases out through an open exhaust valve.
Most gasoline engines have had four to eight cylinders. An eight-
cylinder engine typically had two rows of four cylinders set at a 90 
degree	angle	to	each	other.	Thus	it	was	V-shaped	and	known	as	a	V-8;	if	
there were fewer than eight cylinders, they were more likely to be bored 
in a straight line. 
Displacement is the total volume displaced by all of the pistons in 
the engine block. Horsepower measures the rate at which the engine 
performs work. Before the motor vehicle age, one horsepower had been 
define 	as	the	amount	of	power	needed	to	lift	33,000	pounds	one	foot	
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in	one	minute.	U.S.	engines	have	typically	displaced	three	to	fiv 	liters	
and achieved 150 to 300 horsepower. Engines built elsewhere in the 
world have generally been smaller.
The heart of the drivetrain is the transmission, which contains gears 
that are connected to the engine by means of an input shaft and to the 
axles by means of an output shaft. The purpose of the transmission 
gears is to adjust the input shaft to turn faster or slower than the output 
shaft, depending on conditions. 
The number of revolutions per minute that the input shaft—as well 
as the engine’s crankshaft to which it is attached—rotates is a factor of 
what is known as torque. Torque is a measure of force that produces 
rotation. At a high speed, the engine is capable of turning the crankshaft 
and input shaft more rapidly than is needed to keep the vehicle mov-
ing. In contrast, at a low speed the engine does not generate enough 
torque to move the vehicle except with some assistance. The transmis-
sion gears provide that assistance by increasing the torque delivered by 
the engine at low speed and decreasing it at high speed. 
The transmission adjusts torque by means of gears that mesh with 
each other. To move the vehicle at low speed or up a hill, the transmis-
sion increases torque by connecting the input shaft to a smaller gear and 
the output shaft to a larger gear. As a result, the input shaft turns several 
times before the output shaft makes one complete revolution. On the 
other hand, at high-speed driving or going downhill, gears are engaged 
to slow the rotation of the input shaft.
Carmakers consider the powertrain to be one of their core compe-
tencies because it is vital to vehicle performance and character. A prin-
cipal in-house activity is the assembly of engines and transmissions. 
Although carmakers put together most of their powertrains in-house, 
they purchase most of the parts from independent suppliers. Power-
train components add more value than any other system, an estimated 
$2,750	per	vehicle	in	2004,	but	only	one-fift 	of	the	value	of	the	pow-
ertrain is estimated to be added by independent suppliers (Tomkins plc 
2004, p. 4).
Powertrain production is heavily clustered in the Midwest. Central 
to this distribution is the long-standing regional concentration of nearly 
all of the Detroit 3 facilities for assembling engines and transmissions. 
For	manufacturers	of	powertrain	components,	a	 location	 in	 the	Mid-
west has traditionally offered a compelling combination of proximity to 
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skilled labor, their Detroit 3 customers, and their main sources of inputs 
(such as steel mills that are also clustered in the region).
The dominance of the Midwest in powertrain production has been 
eroded	under	the	influenc 	of	the	leading	Japanese-owned	carmakers,	
which have sited their powertrain plants farther south. Suppliers of 
some powertrain components have also opened facilities in the South. 
Nonetheless, the preponderance of powertrain facilities remain in the 
Midwest because the region’s geographic assets listed in the previous 
paragraph remain important.
POWERTRAIN ASSEMBLY IN THE MIDWEST
In 2008 the Detroit 3 built the vast majority of their engines and 
transmissions themselves at 13 engine plants, 8 engine parts plants, and 
10 transmission plants that were heavily clustered in the Midwest. Car-
makers also outsourced entire engines and transmissions that they could 
not cost-effectively produce themselves. In most cases, outsourcing 
was designed to capture new technology or items with sales potential 
too low to recoup developmental expenses.
Detroit 3 Powertrain Plants
Seven of the 13 Detroit 3 U.S. engine plants were in Michigan, 3 
in	Ohio,	and	1	each	 in	New	York,	Tennessee,	and	Wisconsin	 (Figure	
3.1). The Detroit 3 carmakers also made engines in 2008 at 4 plants in 
Mexico and 2 in Canada.
All of the Detroit 3 transmission plants were located in the Mid-
west.	Five	transmission	plants	were	in	Michigan,	three	in	Ohio,	and	two	
in	 Indiana	 (Figure	3.2).	The	Detroit	3	also	built	 transmissions	at	one	
plant each in Canada and Mexico.
Ford powertrain production
Ford	had	six	North	American	engine	plants	as	of	2008,	one	each	in	
Dearborn and Romeo, Michigan; Brook Park and Lima, Ohio; Wind-
sor,	Ontario;	and	Chihuahua,	Mexico.	Ford	also	produced	engine	parts	
(crankshafts) in Woodhaven, Michigan, and operated casting plants in 
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Brook Park, Ohio, and Windsor, Ontario. It made transmissions at two 
Michigan locations, in Livonia and Sterling Heights, as well as in Sha-
ronville, Ohio.
Until	 the	1950s,	Ford	manufactured	all	of	 its	engines	at	 its	home	
plant	in	the	Detroit	area—firs 	at	Highland	Park	and	then	at	the	Rouge.	
Both complexes had foundries to cast engine blocks and shops to ma-
chine	pistons	and	cylinders.	Finished	engines	were	shipped	by	rail	 to	
Ford’s	branch	 assembly	plants	 around	 the	 country	 for	 installation	 in	
finishe 	 vehicles.	To	 serve	 the	 then-separate	Canadian	market,	Ford	
opened an engine plant in Windsor in 1923.
Ford	subsequently	opened	several	powertrain	parts	and	assembly	
plants in Ohio during the 1950s, enticed by lower taxes and a desire to 
counter what came to be seen as excessive centralization of its opera-
Figure 3.1  Location of Carmakers’ Engine Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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tions	at	 the	Rouge.	Much	of	Ford’s	engine	production	was	 relocated	
to northern Ohio during the 1950s, including several facilities in the 
Cleveland suburb of Brook Park, plus one in Lima. Transmission pro-
duction went to the other end of the state, at a plant in the Cincinnati 
suburb of Sharonville. 
After	the	burst	of	investment	in	Ohio	during	the	1950s,	Ford	added 
powertrain facilities in the Detroit area, including Livonia in 1952, 
Sterling Heights in 1968, Essex, Ontario, in 1981, and Romeo in 1990. 
Another	Cincinnati	suburb,	Batavia,	received	a	Ford	transmission	plant	
in 1980 as front-wheel-drive transaxles became more popular. The Bat-
avia	plant,	situated	on	a	street	named	“Front	Wheel	Drive,”	was	turned	
over	to	supplier	ZF	in	1999	and	subsequently	closed	seven	years	later.	
Figure 3.2  Location of Carmakers’ Transmission Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.




raine, Ohio; Spring Hill, Tennessee; St. Catharines, Ontario; and Ramos 
Arizpe	and	Silao,	Mexico.	GM	also	had	engine	parts	plants	in	Bedford,	
Indiana;	Bay	City	and	Saginaw,	Michigan;	Massena,	New	York;	Defi-




missions in Ramos Arizpe, Mexico. The plant in Spring Hill stopped 
producing transmissions in 2006. Transmission parts were made in 
Fredericksburg,	Virginia.
The	opening	dates	of	GM’s	powertrain	plants	were	spread	evenly	
through the decades. The Tonawanda plant was the oldest, built in 1938. 
Warren and Willow Run dated from the 1940s; Toledo from the 1950s; 
St. Catharines and Windsor from the 1960s; Livonia and Romulus (en-
gine) from the 1970s; Muncie, Ramos, and Silao from the 1980s; and 
Moraine, Romulus (transmission), and Spring Hill from the 1990s. The 
Flint	engine	plant	was	opened	 in	2001	as	a	replacement	for	facilities	
that dated back a century.
Each	of	GM’s	major	car	brands	had	traditionally	been	responsible	
for producing its own powertrain. Individual responsibility was primar-
ily a legacy of each division’s origin as an independent company. Once 
swallowed	up	by	GM	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	each	brand	was	en-




transmissions for its brands were seen as a way to enhance differentia-
tion within the corporation.
GM	broke	down	much	of	its	traditional	brand	distinctiveness	dur-
ing the 1960s when it introduced additional size categories of vehicles, 
such as compacts and intermediates. Chevrolet and Pontiac compacts 
shared key components, as did Oldsmobile and Buick intermediates, 
and so on through the product lineup. 
Several	decades	later,	GM’s	various	engine	plants	were	combined	
into an Engine Division in 1990. In addition, the increasing importance 
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of electronic controls made close integration of engineering, design, 
and	production	for	engines	and	transmissions	essential.	GM	therefore	
combined its Hydra-Matic transmission division with its Engine and 
Central	Foundry	divisions	as	well	as	 its	Advanced	Engineering	Staff	
into a Powertrain division in 1991.
Chrysler powertrain production
Chrysler had three U.S. engine plants in 2008, including two in 
Michigan and one in Wisconsin. Chrysler made all of its North Ameri-
can transmissions in Indiana. The company also had an engine plant in 
Ramos	Arizpe,	Mexico,	and	was	a	partner	in	the	GEMA	joint	venture	
engine plant in Dundee, Michigan. 
Like	Ford,	Chrysler	produced	nearly	all	of	its	components	in	Michi-
gan prior to World War II. Chrysler’s largest parts facility was the Dodge 
Main complex in the Detroit suburb of Hamtramck, where Dodge ve-
hicles were also assembled. Components produced at Dodge Main were 
also trucked to other Chrysler assembly plants clustered in the Detroit 
area. Dodge Main was closed in the early 1980s.
Chrysler opened two other Detroit-area engine plants during the 
1960s, in Trenton on the south side and Warren on the north side. The 
Warren facility on Mound Road was closed in 2002, three years after 
another engine plant was opened in Detroit on the site of a demolished 
stamping facility at Mack Avenue. The Saltillo complex, opened in Ra-
mos	Arizpe	 in	1981,	 included	an	engine	plant	as	well	as	fina 	assem-
bly	and	 stamping	operations.	From	 its	American	Motors	acquisition,	
Chrysler also inherited an engine plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin, dating 
back to 1917. 
Chrysler also had two engine parts plants in North America. En-
gine blocks were cast at a foundry in Indianapolis, acquired by Chrysler 
from	 the	American	Foundry	Co.	 in	1946.	Aluminum	 engine	 compo-
nents were cast at a plant in Etobicoke near Toronto, Ontario, which 
opened in 1942 and was acquired by Chrysler in 1964. 
Chrysler clustered all of its transmission production in Kokomo, In-
diana. The company did not produce a fully automatic transmission un-
til	1953,	13	years	after	GM	began	producing	the	Hydra-Matic.	Produc-
tion of automatic transmissions was placed at a plant on the south side 
of Kokomo in 1956. After it was acquired by Daimler-Benz, Chrysler 
opened two more transmission plants in Kokomo, in 1998 and 2003. 
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Transmission parts (e.g., torque converters) were machined at a plant 
that opened in 1966 in Perrysburg, Ohio, a suburb of Toledo.
After its separation from Daimler, Chrysler was expected to sharply 
increase its powertrain outsourcing between 2007 and 2013 from 42 
percent to 77 percent of engines and from 35 percent to 68 percent 
of transmissions, according to CSM Worldwide (Phillips and Wernle 
2007).	The	firs 	step	in	Chrysler’s	outsourcing	was	a	transmission	plant	
being built near Kokomo. Chrysler was to pay only 43 percent of con-
struction costs and hold only a 15 percent equity stake in the plant. 
Remaining costs, as well as management control of the plant, were the 
responsibility	of	the	German	supplier,	Getrag	Corp	(Phillips	2007).
Outsourced Diesel Engines
The most common outsourcing of entire engines by the Detroit 3 
has been for diesels. The diesel engine was developed by Rudolph Die-
sel during the 1890s. It differs from the more common gasoline engine 
because	 it	 takes	only	 air	 into	 the	 cylinder	on	 the	 firs 	 intake	 stroke,	
rather than a mixture of air and fuel. Instead, fuel is injected only after 
the air has been compressed on the second stroke. The heat of the com-
pressed air rather than a spark ignites the fuel. Compared to a regular 
gasoline	engine,	a	diesel	engine	can	operate	more	efficien ly	because	it	
compresses air at a higher ratio.
In Europe, where diesel engines now account for more than half 
of new car sales, the major vehicle manufacturers build their own. In 
the United States, 1.5 million diesels were manufactured in 2005; two-
thirds were destined for heavy trucks and one-third for light vehicles. 
The major challenge in expanding the market for diesel engines in the 
United States has been emission standards. Under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, Tier 1 emission standards were adopted 
in 1991 and phased-in between 1994 and 1997. Tougher Tier 2 stan-
dards were adopted in 1999 and phased-in between 2004 and 2009. Tier 
2 standards required light-duty diesel engines to emit no more than 0.07 
grams per mile of NOx	(oxides	of	nitrogen).	In	comparison,	Volkswa-
gen cars—the only cars with diesel engines sold in the United States 
in 2005—emitted about 1.25 grams. Companies such as Daimler and 
Robert Bosch were in the process of developing the technology that 
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would enable diesel engines to continue to be sold in the United States 
starting in 2008. 
The location of diesel engine manufacturing plants reinforces the 
clustering of powertrain production in the Midwest. The leading U.S. 
suppliers of diesel engines for light vehicles have been International 
and	Cummins.	A	GM-Isuzu	 joint	 venture,	Dmax,	was	 also	 a	major	
supplier.
International/Navistar 
The largest supplier of diesel engines in the United States for both 
heavy-duty trucks and light vehicles has been International/Navistar. 
Navistar has also been the third-leading producer of heavy-duty trucks 
in	the	United	States,	behind	Freightliner	and	Paccar.	International	start-
ed manufacturing diesel engines in Indianapolis in 1937. That facility 
has	produced	engines	for	Ford	heavy-duty	vehicles.	International	also	
produced	diesel	engines	in	Huntsville,	Alabama	(for	Ford),	and	in	Mel-
rose Park, Illinois (for other companies). Its casting plants for engine 
components were located at Waukesha, Wisconsin, and Indianapolis, 
Indiana.
International has venerable roots as a successor to the McCormick 
Harvesting Machine Co., founded by Cyrus McCormick to produce the 
firs 	successful	reaper,	which	he	invented	in	1831,	as	well	as	other	ma-
chinery that revolutionized American agriculture in the late nineteenth 
century. J.P. Morgan formed the International Harvester Co. (IHC) in 
1902	by	merging	McCormick	with	other	firms 	including	its	principal	
competitor, Deering Harvester Co. IHC dominated agricultural equip-
ment production for much of the early twentieth century.
IHC was acquired in 1985 by J.I. Case Co., another venerable 
nineteenth-century agricultural equipment manufacturer. At the time, 
Case was a subsidiary of Tenneco Inc., which had acquired it in 1967. 
Founded	by	Jerome	I.	Case	in	1842,	Case	was	the	world’s	largest	pro-
ducer	of	steam	engines	 in	 the	nineteenth	century,	and	 it	was	 the	 firs 	
to build a practical stationary steam engine marketed for agricultural 
use. “International Harvester” and “IHC” remained Case brand names, 
while IHC’s truck and diesel engine division was split off as a separate 
company, called Navistar.
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Cummins 
Cummins has been the second-largest supplier of diesel engines in 
the United States. It was founded in 1919 in Columbus, Indiana, by auto 
mechanic	Clessie	Lyle	Cummins.	Financial	backing	came	from	Colum-
bus	banker	William	Glanton	Irwin,	who	had	originally	hired	Cummins	
in 1908 to drive and maintain his car. Irwin’s great-nephew J. Irwin 
Miller became general manager in 1934 and led the company for four 
decades.
Clessie	 Cummins	 built	 what	 the	 company	 claims	 was	 the	 firs 	
diesel-powered car in the United States by placing a diesel engine in 
Irwin’s Packard. Backed by Irwin’s money, Cummins raced diesel-
powered vehicles, setting speed and endurance records that attracted 
truck manufacturers. Attracted by the diesel’s economy and durability, 
Cummins secured the rights to manufacture a Dutch truck known as the 
Hvid.	After	making	significan 	improvements	to	the	Hvid	engine,	Cum-
mins started selling his own diesel engines, primarily for boats, as well 
as stationary ones for farm use. 
As diesel engines became common in trucks, manufacturers of 
trucks merged with engine suppliers, much as manufacturers of cars 
made their own engines. But in the case of Cummins, a merger with 
White Motors in 1963 failed, so Cummins remained an independent 
engine supplier. Cummins’s market was almost exclusively engines for 
medium- and heavy-duty trucks until 1989, when Chrysler offered a 
Dodge Ram pickup truck with a Cummins diesel engine. In addition 
to operations in its hometown, Cummins produced diesel engines in 
Jamestown, New York, and participates in two joint ventures: Consoli-
dated Diesel Co., in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, opened in 1980 
with J.I. Case Corp., and Cummins Komatsu Engine Co. in Seymour, 
Indiana, opened in 1993 with Komatsu, Ltd. One-half of Cummins’s 
$6.3	billion	sales	in	2003	were	overseas.
Dmax and Detroit Diesel 
Dmax, the third-leading producer of diesel engines in the United 
States,	was	owned	40	percent	by	GM	and	60	percent	by	Isuzu.	Isuzu	
has	been	responsible	for	design	and	engineering,	and	GM	for	finance 	
public relations, and support activities. The joint venture produced die-
sel	engines	for	GM	pickups	and	sport	utility	vehicles	beginning	in	2000	




the United States. The company owned the world’s largest builder of 
diesel-powered locomotives, Electro-Motive, until it was sold in 2005 
to	Greenbrier	Equity	Group	and	Berkshire	Partners.	To	produce	die-
sels for motor vehicles, primarily heavy-duty trucks and off-road ma-
chines,	GM	established	the	GM	Diesel	Division	in	Detroit	in	1938.	It	
was turned into an independent company, the Detroit Diesel Corp., in 
1988 as a joint venture with Penske Corp. and was acquired by Daim-
lerChrysler in 2000. 
POWERTRAIN COMPONENTS IN THE MIDWEST
Powertrain-related parts can be divided into four main subsystems: 
1) the engine block, including cylinders, pistons, and valves; 2) the 
thermal system, including cooling and climate control; 3) the exhaust 
system,	including	pipes	and	mufflers 	and	4)	the	drivetrain,	including	
clutches and torque converters.
About 46 percent of plants that make a powertrain part produce 
engine block components, 25 percent produce thermal components, 
20 percent make drivetrain components, and 9 percent make exhaust 
components. These subsystems are discussed in the next four sections. 
Some plants also specialize in generic powertrain parts (e.g., bearings 
and mounts), which are discussed in Chapter 5 along with other generic 
parts. 
The production of all four of the principal powertrain subsystems 
has been concentrated in the Midwest, with the percentages of parts 
made in the Midwest ranging from 59 percent for exhaust components 
to	64	percent	for	the	drivetrain	(see	Table	3.1).	Figure	3.3	illustrates	the	
clustering of powertrain plants in the Midwest. It includes three concen-
tric circles drawn around Detroit. These circles represented quartiles of 
the distance from the suppliers to Detroit, which serves as the reference 
point for the center of this industry. The closest one-fourth of all exterior 
parts suppliers are located within the inner circle, the next closest fourth 
were between the inner and middle circle, the third closest quartile were 
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Table 3.1  Powertrain Parts Plants in the Midwest
Powertrain system Number of plants % in Midwest
Engine block subsystem 849 61.8
Engine bearings and cylinder blocks 44 70.5
Pistons 70 68.6
Crankshafts and balance shafts 37 75.7
Cylinder heads and liners 45 57.8
Valvetrain 146 60.3
Intake and exhaust manifolds 90 72.2
Vibration	dampeners 63 74.6
Oil	pumps,	pans,	and	filter 65 60.0
Belts,	pulleys,	flywheels 	and	dipsticks 58 55.2
Timing gears and chains 17 52.9
Sensors 24 29.2
Other engine parts 190 55.3
Thermal subsystem 463 60.4
Air conditioning 110 61.8
Fans 30 56.7
Radiators 27 29.6
Engine cooling sensors 15 60.0




Ducts, hoses, and tubes 128 66.4
Other cooling and climate control 87 54.0
Exhaust subsystem 167 59.3
Pipes and tailpipes 21 47.6
Catalytic converters 18 27.8
Muffler 	and	resonators 32 50.0
Heat shields 15 73.3
Emission controls 26 69.2
Other exhaust parts 55 70.9
Drivetrain subsystem 379 63.9
Transmission parts 121 68.0
Clutch parts 64 71.9
Differential parts 25 60.0
Gearshift	parts 25 68.0
Other drivetrain parts 144 63.9
Total powertrain 1,858 61.7
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other sources.
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between	the	middle	and	the	outer	circle,	and	the	fina 	quartile	is	beyond	
the outer circle. In other words, one-half of powertrain parts produc-
ers were located within the middle circle, 272 miles from Detroit, and 
three-fourths were within the outer circle, 608 miles from Detroit.
Engine Block
The primary engine block parts include pistons, cylinders, and 
valves, as well as rods and shafts. The Detroit 3 have cast most of their 
engine blocks at in-house casting plants, although some outsourcing 
has begun. Blocks were traditionally made of iron, but aluminum has 
NOTE: Circles are drawn around Detroit and envelop plants producing powertrain parts 
by quartile. In other words, the tightest circle around Detroit envelops a quarter of the 
powertrain auto parts plants in North America.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
Figure 3.3  Location of Powertrain Plants
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become increasingly common, so carmakers typically maintain both 
iron and aluminum casting facilities, though some iron facilities have 
been closed. 
A scattering of other engine parts continued to be made in-house, 
such	as	crankshafts	at	Ford’s	Woodhaven	plant,	pistons	at	GM’s	Bed-
ford	 and	Saginaw	 foundries,	 and	 shafts	 and	 rods	 at	GM’s	Bay	City	
plant. Most other mechanical parts for engines have been outsourced 
by the Detroit 3 to independent suppliers. 
The percentage of engine parts made in the Midwest was exception-
ally high, exceeding 70 percent in many cases, including crankshafts, 




Eaton. Eaton, founded in 1911 to make truck axles, has been a 
valve	specialist	and	major	supplier	of	other	engine	parts.	Its	firs 	chair-
man, Joseph O. Eaton, bought the company in 1922, changed its name 
from	Torbensen	Gear	&	Axle	(named	for	its	firs 	president),	and	moved	
the	company	from	Bloomfield 	New	Jersey,	to	Cleveland	to	be	closer	to	
the center of motor vehicle production. Eaton has been closely associ-
ated with the city of Cleveland since then. A large number of acquisi-
tions and divestitures during the 1990s left Eaton with a very different 
profil 	than	the	original	axle	supplier.	Two-thirds	of	company	revenues	
were generated by nonautomotive products, especially hydraulics and 
electrical controls. 
Federal-Mogul.	Federal-Mogul	has	become	 the	other	 large	U.S.-
owned supplier of engine parts, including engine bearings, pistons, pis-
ton pins, piston rings, cylinder liners, valve seats and guides, transmis-
sion	products,	and	connecting	 rods.	Federal-Mogul	was	created	 from	
the 1924 merger of two pioneering U.S. engine bearings companies, 
Federal	Bearing	and	Bushings	Co.	and	Mogul	Metal	Co.	
• “Mogul” was a trademarked secret process for making engine 
bearings used by the Muzzy-Lyon Co., founded in Detroit in 1899 
by	Edward	F.	Lyon	 and	 J.	Howard	Muzzy.	Muzzy-Lyon	made	
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bearings from an alloy of tin, antimony, and copper based on a 
process that was patented by Isaac Babbitt in 1839 to prevent 
rotating metallic shafts from overheating and wearing out.
•	 Federal	was	 founded	 in	1915	by	 a	group	of	Detroit	business-
men who took over the assets of a defunct brass and aluminum 
foundry to make bronze bearings, castings, and bushings. 
Federal	and	Mogul	made	a	 logical	merger,	according	 to	 the	com-
pany	Web	 site,	because	Federal	did	bronze	 foundry	work	but	 lacked	
the capacity to produce Babbitt metal, whereas Muzzy-Lyon operated a 
Babbitt foundry but had to purchase bronze.
Acquisitions	during	the	1990s,	especially	of	the	British	fir 	T&N	
plc	in	1997,	gave	Federal-Mogul	a	dominant	position	as	the	supplier	of	
more than 90 percent of engine bearings in North America and 50 per-
cent	worldwide.	The	T&N	acquisition	was	especially	important	in	Fed-
eral-Mogul’s goal of becoming a “one-stop” source for engine parts. 
It	was	also	 instrumental	 in	 forcing	Federal-Mogul	 to	 fil 	 for	Chapter	
11 bankruptcy protection in 2001. Inherited from T&N was a massive 
legal liability stemming from claims that asbestos in its products made 
360,000 victims ill. 
Federal-Mogul	may	be	the	best	example	of	a	supplier	gone	awry.	
It grew quickly between 1996 and 1998, following the industry 
trend. It took on more responsibility for engineering and design 
work, got bigger to lower costs through economies of scale and 
diversifie 	its	product	offerings.
One of the problems suppliers have faced is too much seat-of-the 
pants	planning.	In	Federal-Mogul’s	case,	the	company	knew	it	had	
to get bigger to keep up with demand but has had no time to decide 
how	to	wring	efficiencie 	from	the	acquisitions.
The frenetic pace of the industry, while a boon to revenue streams, 
hasn’t been as kind to the bottom line, and suppliers are beginning 
to feel it. (Strong 2000) 
Federal-Mogul	emerged	from	Chapter	11	at	the	end	of	2007.
Foreign-owned suppliers
Other leading suppliers of powertrain parts in the United States 
have	been	foreign-owned	firms 	including	Linamar	Corp.,	Mahle	Inc.,	
Nemak SA., and Teksid Aluminum North America Inc.
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during the 1920s and had two dozen U.S. engine parts facilities in 2007. 
The	company	opened	its	firs 	plants	in	the	United	States	in	the	1970s	
primarily in the South and expanded rapidly through a 2007 acquisi-
tion of Dana Corporation’s engine parts plants, many of which were in 
Michigan.
Nemak SA. Nemak SA was a joint venture that was established 
in	1979	between	Ford	and	 the	Mexican	company	Alfa.	Alfa	was	one	
of Mexico’s largest industrial conglomerates, founded in 1974 through 
combining steel manufacturer Hojalata y Lamina, packaging manufac-
turer Empaques de Cartón Titán, mining company Draco, and a minor-
ity interest in the television broadcaster Televisa. Nemak operated no 
plants	 in	 the	United	States,	although	Ford	 transferred	control	of	 two	
aluminum parts plants in Windsor and Essex, Ontario, to Nemak in 
2000. 
Teksid Aluminum North America Inc. Originally Italian carmaker 
Fiat’s	parts-making	operations,	Teksid	Aluminum	North	America	Inc.	
was spun off in 1978. Teksid opened what it claimed to be the world’s 
largest aluminum foundry in Dickson, Tennessee, in 1987 to produce 
cylinder	heads	and	blocks	for	GM	and	Ford	engines.	It	was	acquired	in	
2002 by TK Aluminum Ltd., a holding company based in Bermuda and 
owned by equity investors led by Questor Management.
Thermal Systems Suppliers
An engine normally operates at a temperature of about 2,000°F,	al-
though much higher temperatures can be reached. In the absence of 
cooling devices, parts would melt or expand to the point that they would 
seize up and be unable to move.
The principal purpose of the thermal system is to remove the en-
gine’s excess heat. The thermal system also heats up the engine to op-
erating temperature as rapidly as possible and maintains the engine at a 
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constant	temperature	because	a	cold	engine	is	less	efficient 	emits	more	
pollutants, and causes parts to wear out faster. 
Most motor vehicle engines are cooled with water, which circu-
lates through pipes and passageways. As the water passes through the 
hot engine, it absorbs heat from the combustion chamber and cools the 
engine. After the water leaves the engine, it passes through a radia-
tor,	which	consists	of	a	core	made	of	finne 	tubes	surrounded	by	cool-
ant tanks. The radiator transfers the heat from the water to air blowing 
through it. To help cool the water, air is pulled in through a grille with 
the help of a fan.
The radiator also supplies heat to the passenger compartment. A fan 
blows air from the radiator core through a heater core into the passenger 
compartment. Alternatively, to cool the passenger compartment, the air 
conditioning system removes excess heat as well as moisture. A fan 
pulls the hot, humid air through an evaporator and a condenser, where 
a liquid refrigerant condenses water from the hot air and discharges it 
from the vehicle before returning the “cooled” air through the evapora-
tor back to the passenger compartment.
Cooling and climate control modules have attracted several of the 
largest foreign-owned suppliers to the United States, and they control 
the largest share of the market. Nonetheless, most thermal parts are still 





burg, Indiana, and Jamestown, New York. Climate control components 
were made beginning in 1988 in Hamilton, Ohio, initially as a joint 
venture	with	Chrysler’s	Acustar	division.	Valeo	took	over	several	GM	
plants in Rochester, New York, that made motors for climate control, 





vigorous, and in good health.” 
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Denso Corp. 
Denso Corp. was Toyota’s in-house electrical and radiator maker 
until 1949. Known as Nippondenso until 1996, Denso became Japan’s 
largest supplier and third-largest supplier worldwide (after Robert 
Bosch	and	Delphi)	in	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Toyota	
still owned one-fourth of Denso and accounted for one-half of sales in 
2007 (Denso Corporation 2007).
Denso entered the U.S. auto parts industry in 1971 to sell after-
market	air	conditioners	for	Japanese	cars.	Its	firs 	U.S.	manufacturing	
facility, which opened in 1984 in Battle Creek, Michigan, made air con-
ditioners. It has since become the largest supplier of original equipment 
air conditioners worldwide and has held a leading position in engine 
cooling. 
CalsonicKansei North America Inc. 
Nissan’s former in-house thermal system supplier, CalsonicKansei, 
was the third-largest thermal system supplier in North America, behind 
Valeo	and	Denso	(CalsonicKansei	2004).	CalsonicKansei	was	formed	in	
2001 through the merger of Calsonic Corp. and Kantus Corp. Calsonic, 
known until 1988 as Nihon Radiator Manufacturing Co., produced ra-
diators	beginning	in	1938,	and	added	muffler 	in	1954,	heaters	in	1955,	
and air conditioners in 1966. Kantus, originally Kanto Seiki Co., was 
established	 in	1956	 to	make	speedometers	 licensed	from	 the	German	
company	VDO	and	the	British	company	Smiths.	The	company	claimed	
to	be	Japan’s	firs 	modular	supplier—a	front-end	module	that	combined	
the radiator, condensers, grille, and other heat-exchange components 
with headlights. 
Behr GmbH. 
Europe’s second-leading European thermal systems supplier behind 
Valeo,	Behr	supplied	most	German	carmakers	with	radiators	from	the	
firs 	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	onward.	Car	heaters	were	added	in	
1949 and air conditioners in 1957. Behr started producing air condition-
ers in the United States in 1974 in what was then a remote location of 
Fort	Worth,	Texas.	Engine	cooling	was	added	in	North	America	in	1993	
through a joint venture with Cummins Engine. Acquisition of Daim-
lerChrysler’s Dayton, Ohio, Thermal Products plant in 2002 tripled 
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Behr’s U.S. presence and gave it 10 percent of the U.S. engine cooling 
and climate control market.
Exhaust Module Suppliers
The exhaust module carries gases through pipes from the engine to 
the rear of the vehicle, where they are discharged into the air. At the en-
gine end, the exhaust gases are carried from the combustion chambers 
through the exhaust manifold, a pipe usually made of cast iron bolted 
to the cylinder head.
Before being discharged through the tailpipe, the exhaust gases pass 
through	a	muffler,	which	deadens	the	loud	noise	that	would	result	from	
the escape of the gases by reducing the otherwise very high pressure level. 
A catalytic converter, which reduces pollutants in the exhaust gases, is 
attached	to	the	exhaust	line	between	the	exhaust	manifold	and	muffler.
The distinctive challenge of shipping exhaust modules is readily 
visible	in	a	fina 	assembly	plant.	Whereas	most	parts	arrive	in	tightly	
packed crates, exhaust pipes arrive delicately hung on racks or laid-out 
in	large	coffins 	As	a	result,	the	distribution	of	exhaust	module	produc-
tion	has	been	similar	to	that	for	fina 	assembly	plants.	Production	of	the	
individual exhaust-related parts has been clustered in the Midwest. 
The largest suppliers of exhaust modules in the United States into 
the	 twenty-firs 	century	 included	ArvinMeritor,	Tenneco	Automotive,	
Faurecia,	and	Benteler	Automotive.
ArvinMeritor 
One of the largest U.S.-owned suppliers, ArvinMeritor Inc., formed 
by merger of Arvin Industries Inc. and Meritor Automotive Inc. in 2000. 
Meritor, spun off from Rockwell International in 1997, was a leading 
manufacturer of axles and other chassis components (see Chapter 11). 
Arvin’s predecessor, Indianapolis Air Pump Co., founded in 1919 by 
Q.	G.	Noblitt,	started	making	what	would	become	its	core	product	(muf- 
flers 	 in	1927.	Richard	Arvin	patented	 the	company’s	 firs 	successful	
product, a car heater, in 1920. ArvinMeritor cobbled together “a collec-
tion of assets without many compelling synergies,” according to UBS 
analyst Robert Hinchliffe (Sherefkin 2004).
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Tenneco Automotive 
Tenneco Automotive was spun off in 1999 from Tenneco Inc. Its 
primary automotive parts activity derived from a 1967 acquisition of 
Walker Manufacturing, a major supplier of exhaust and emissions con-
trol devices founded in 1888 in Racine, Wisconsin, originally to make 





Europe’s	 leading	 exhaust	 components	 supplier,	 Faurecia,	moved	
into third place in the United States after it acquired AP Automotive 
Systems	Inc.	in	1999.	GM	played	a	central	role	in	nursing	Faurecia	to	
the front ranks of U.S. suppliers, primarily in seating (see Chapter 7). 
“In	what	analysts	say	was	an	unusual	move,	GM	(in	1998)	passed	over	
industry exhaust system giants Tenneco and Arvin and asked a consor-
tium	of	three	suppliers	(Faurecia,	AP	Automotive,	and	Magneti	Marelli)	
to	make	exhausts.”	Faurecia	gave	GM	“another	supplier	in	North	Amer-
ica	and	GM	wants	more	competition,”	according	 to	 industry	 analyst	
Craig	Cather	(Sherefkin	1999a).	Similarly,	GM	added	Faurecia	as	a	seat	
supplier in 1999 in order to add competition (see Chapter 7).
Benteler Automotive 
Benteler Automotive has claimed to be the world’s largest family-
owned	supplier.	Founded	as	an	ironmonger	shop	in	Germany	in	1876	by	
Carl Benteler, three generations of the family have followed in manage-
ment. Benteler produces an eclectic mix of metal components, includ-
ing exhaust manifolds and other exhaust components at two plants in 
the United States. The company also produces chassis and body struc-
tural components in the United States.
Transmission Parts Suppliers
Transmission parts suppliers are also clustered in the Midwest. 
Like engine parts, drivetrain parts have been made in the Midwest in 
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part because of the combination of historical proximity to inputs and 
customers. 
Most drivetrain suppliers have been small companies not included in 
the Automotive News list of the top 150 suppliers. The leading U.S. sup-
plier of transmission parts historically was BorgWarner Automotive.
BorgWarner Automotive 
BorgWarner Automotive was founded in 1928 through the merger 
of the leading clutch producer Borg & Beck with the leading indepen-
dent	 transmission	 supplier	Warner	Gear.	When	manual	 transmissions	
predominated in the United States, into the 1950s, BorgWarner supplied 
75 percent of the U.S. clutch market. As automatic transmissions took 
over in the 1950s, BorgWarner was the leading supplier of torque con-
verters. The company also supplied complete automatic transmissions 
to	Ford,	Studebaker,	and	London’s	famous	black	taxis.
Into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	the	company	has	shifted	its	focus	from	
transmissions to engine components. Its largest product segment has 
become the turbocharger, which increases the amount of air and fuel 
injected	into	the	engine.	Early	in	the	twenty-firs 	century,	components	
such as the turbocharger started to receive increasing attention from 
automakers in North America because they were expected to produce 
cleaner	and	more	fuel	efficien 	vehicles.
INTERNATIONAL CARMAKERS POWERTRAIN
International carmakers that assemble vehicles in North America 
have begun to produce some of their engines and transmissions in North 
America. However, many also continue to be imported from Japan (see 
Chapter 13). In addition, Toyota and Nissan have outsourced many of 
their transmissions.
International Carmakers Powertrain Plants
Most vehicles assembled in North America by Toyota, Honda, Nis-
san, and Subaru have been equipped with engines produced in North 
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America. A smaller share of transmissions has been made in the United 
States. The international carmakers, especially Honda, have added to 
the clustering of powertrain plants in the southern part of the Midwest. 
However, much of international powertrain production has been located 
in	the	South,	especially	Kentucky	and	Tennessee	(see	Figures	3.1	and	
3.2). 
Japanese-owned engine plants 
Toyota’s initial North American production facilities that opened 
during	 the	1980s	 in	Georgetown,	Kentucky,	and	Cambridge,	Ontario,	
were designed as relatively self-contained campuses, including engine 
plants	adjacent	 to	fina 	assembly	plants.	Georgetown	produced	major	
powertrain components and assembled the best-selling Camry models, 
and Cambridge was similarly set up for the Corolla model.
As Toyota began to assemble a wider variety of models in North 
America,	new	engine	plants	were	added	 in	Buffalo,	West	Virginia,	 in	
1998 and in Huntsville, Alabama, in 2003. Neither engine plant was 
adjacent	to	a	fina 	assembly	plant.	Huntsville	supplied	truck	engines	to	
Toyota’s truck assembly plant in Princeton, Indiana, whereas the Buffalo 
plant produced engines primarily for Toyota’s widening array of lower 
volume	car	models	 that	were	assembled	at	Georgetown.	The	distance	
from the engine plant to the nearest assembly plant was virtually identi-
cal in both cases, approximately 280 miles, or about a half-day’s drive. 
Toyota’s strategy of sprinkling engine and assembly plants across 
the	southern	United	States	was	heavily	influence 	by	labor	availability	
concerns.	Difficultie 	with	 findin 	a	sufficientl 	 large	pool	of	skilled	
labor	within	commuting	distance	of	its	Georgetown	complex	induced	
Toyota to disperse its powertrain and assembly operations several hun-
dred	miles	east	 to	West	Virginia,	west	 to	southern	Indiana,	and	south	
to Alabama, well beyond the central Kentucky labor market area—al-
though they did not go north to Ohio or Michigan.
Honda tied its engine plant locations more closely to its assembly 
plants.	The	company’s	initial	North	American	fina 	assembly	complex	
opened during the 1980s in Marysville and East Liberty, Ohio, and re-
ceived its engines from a facility that opened in 1985 in Anna, Ohio, 
40 miles northwest. (That facility is Honda’s largest auto engine plant 
worldwide, producing nearly 1.2 million engines annually.) Similarly, 
Honda’s assembly plant that opened in Lincoln, Alabama, in 2003 re-
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ceives its engines from a nearby facility that opened at about the same 
time.
Nissan’s Powertrain Assembly Plant in Decherd, Tennessee, pro-
duced engines for its two U.S. assembly plants in Smyrna, Tennes-
see (70 miles to the north), and Canton, Mississippi (400 miles to the 
southwest). Subaru started building engines at its Lafayette, Indiana, 
complex in 2002, 13 years after assembly operations began in the same 
complex. Mazda did not operate a U.S. engine plant, but it did assemble 
some	vehicles	in	the	United	States	with	engines	produced	by	Ford.	




Michigan, located in southeastern Michigan, has been a prominent ex-
ample of the continued viability of the Midwest for powertrain produc-
tion.	GEMA’s	Web	site	offered	the	following	reason	for	the	site	selec-
tion: “It is located near several large industrial-based manufacturing 
centers with thousands of tech-savvy workers to choose from. The re-
gion boasts many technological resources. It has easily accessible trans-
portation routes. And it’s a family-friendly community, offering a full 
array	of	lifestyle	enhancing	experiences”	(GEMA	2007).	
The	GEMA	plant	in	Michigan,	currently	one	of	fiv 	plants	among	
the three partners, was built to specialize in the production of four-cyl-
inder engines for entry-level and lower value models sold by the three 
carmakers. Highly capital intensive and lean, the plant did quickly go 
to the top of the list of most productive powertrain plants in the United 




ganized into teams. Three sets of teams work four 10-hour shifts per 
week, for a total of 120 hours of production per week, compared to a 
total of 80 hours per week generated in the traditional scheduling of two 
sets	of	fiv 	8-hour	shifts	per	week.
Japanese-owned transmission plants 
Of the three leading Japanese-owned carmakers, only Honda has 
produced nearly all of its own transmissions. Moreover, Honda has 
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been largely able to meet demand for transmissions at its U.S. assembly 
plants and has imported relatively little from Japan.
Honda Transmission Manufacturing of America (HTM) has pro-
duced transmissions in Bellefontaine and Russells Point, Ohio, and in 
Tallapoosa,	Georgia.	The	Ohio	plants	were	originally	opened	in	1982	
by the Honda-controlled Bellemar Parts Industries to supply Honda’s 
nearby	Marysville	and	East	Liberty	fina 	assembly	plants	with	a	vari-
ety of parts, including seats, tire assemblies, exhaust systems, catalytic 
converters, and brake and fuel lines. Honda’s U.S. transmission pro-
duction was initially in its Anna, Ohio, engine plant. Bellemar became 
a subsidiary of American Honda and shifted production to transmis-
sions in 1996. Transmission components were made at Bellefontaine, 
and transmissions were assembled at Russells Point. The components 
formerly made there were subsequently sourced to other suppliers. In 
2006	Honda	opened	a	plant	 in	Georgia	 to	supply	 transmissions	 to	 its	
Lincoln, Alabama, assembly plant, 60 miles west. 
Toyota and Nissan joined Honda in opening transmission produc-
tion facilities in the United States during the late 1990s, Toyota in Buf-
falo,	West	Virginia,	and	Nissan	in	Decherd,	Tennessee.	Toyota	and	Nis-
san both combined transmission with engine production in the same 
facility. 
Transmissions Outsourced by Japanese Carmakers
Toyota and Nissan, in contrast to the other leading carmakers, have 
met much of their transmission needs from independent suppliers. Not 
surprisingly, the world’s two largest independent transmission produc-
ers, Aisin World and Jatco, have become the principal suppliers for 
Toyota and Nissan. 
Aisin 
One of the world’s 10 largest suppliers, Aisin is the second-larg-
est Japanese-owned supplier after Denso in both worldwide and North 
American sales. Aisin is 24.5 percent owned by Toyota Motor Corp. 
and is closely tied to Toyota’s keiretsu network. Two-thirds of Aisin’s 
sales	are	to	Toyota.	Aisin	is	one	of	the	most	diversifie 	of	the	world’s	
very large suppliers. Powertrain components have accounted for about 
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half of Aisin’s sales. Body and chassis components make up most of the 
other half. 
The relationship between Toyota and Aisin is typical in that neither 
does the carmaker totally control its supplier, nor is the supplier com-
pletely independent of the carmaker. “Consequently, the Toyota suppli-




in other industries because outside business almost always generated 
higher	profi 	margins”	(Womack,	Jones,	and	Roos	1990).	
Aisin supplied transmissions to Toyota primarily from a facility in 
Durham, North Carolina. Other transmissions were imported from Ja-
pan. Aisin also produced a wide variety of other parts in the United 
States, primarily for Toyota, including brakes, body parts, and sensors. 
Its 17 U.S. automotive parts production facilities in 2007 included six 
in Indiana and three in Illinois.
Jatco 
Challenging Aisin as the world’s leading independent producer of 
complete transmissions was Jatco. It may be the largest supplier and 
should have been included in the Automotive	News rankings of top 150 
North American and top 100 world suppliers, but it is not. This exclu-
sion may result from Jatco being regarded as a Nissan captive rather 
than truly independent. 
Jatco was created in 1970 jointly by Nissan and Mazda, but Mazda 
sold its stake in 1999 to Nissan, which in turn combined it with its own 
transmission unit. Mitsubishi Motors turned over its transmission op-
erations to Jatco in 2002, in exchange for a minority ownership in the 
supplier. Nissan accounted for 59 percent of Jatco sales in 2005 and 
Mitsubishi for 14 percent (Treece 2005). In addition to Nissan, Mazda, 
and Mitsubishi, Jatco also supplied complete transmissions to BMW, 
Isuzu,	 Jaguar,	Subaru,	Suzuki,	and	Volkswagen	 (Treece	2001).	 Jatco	
operated a transmissions plant in Aguascalientes, Mexico. Rather than 
produce transmissions in the United States, Jatco has imported them 
from Japan.
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OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
The future health of powertrain suppliers in southeastern Michigan 
and throughout the Midwest depends, like much of the motor vehicle 
industry, on the future health of the Detroit 3 carmakers. However, pow-
ertrain production in the region may more easily weather market shifts 
among carmakers. Powertrain production has been strongly embedded 
in	the	Midwest,	as	firm 	depend	on	proximity	to	iron	and	steel	inputs,	
powertrain assembly customers, and skilled labor.
In the longer run, carmakers and parts suppliers have been scram-
bling to produce viable alternatives to the internal combustion engine. 
Hybrid	 electric	vehicles	 rapidly	gained	market	 share	during	 the	 firs 	
decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	and	fuel	cell	vehicles	were	lurking	
around the corner.2 
A fuel cell produces electricity by separating a hydrogen molecule 
into a positively charged proton and a negatively charged electron. The 
proton	flow 	through	a	membrane	while	the	electron	flow 	through	an	
external circuit from an anode to a cathode, creating electricity. A cata-
lyst on the cathode side of the membrane facilitates recombining of the 
hydrogen ions with oxygen to form water.
The principal challenge with fuel cell technology has been storage 
and delivery of the hydrogen. “[Y]ou don’t have a hydrogen pipeline 
coming to your house, and you can’t pull up to a hydrogen pump at your 
local	gas	station”	(Nice	and	Strickland	2007).	A	further	difficult 	has	
been	dependency	on	platinum,	a	costly	and	finit 	resource,	to	coat	the	
membrane. A key hurdle on the path to mass production has been the 
development of a supply base. “Manufacturing capacity for the batter-
ies is limited because the technology required is relatively new. There 
are very few suppliers in the world that not only know how to put bat-
tery cells together but also how to manufacture them.”3
GM	 and	 Toyota	 have	 backed	 away	 from	 fuel	 cells,	 expressing	
“doubts about the viability of hydrogen fuel cells for mass production 
in	the	near	term	.	.	.	Daimler	AG	[however]	expects	to	begin	producing	
fuel-cell cars in limited quantities in 2010,” according to its chief exec-
utive	Dieter	Zetsche	(Taylor	and	Spector	2008).	Because	fuel	cell	vehi-
cles	were	not	ready	for	mass	production	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	centu-
ry, carmakers needed an immediate strategy to reduce fuel consumption 
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and lower emissions. Hybrid electric vehicles, combining a gasoline 
engine with an electric motor, moved into the lead as the quickest and 
least expensive way to make progress. Consumer-oriented publications 
like Consumer	Reports and Car & Driver warned their readers that hy-
brids	were	unlikely	 to	 achieve	 advertised	 fuel	 efficienc 	under	most	
driving conditions, and higher purchasing and operating costs were not 
likely to be recouped during the life of the vehicle. Nonetheless, sales of 
hybrids increased in the United States from 85,000 in 2004 to 338,851 
in 2007; 50 hybrid models were expected to account for 1 million sales 
in the United States in 2010 (Chew 2005; Truett 2005).
Much of the success at pushing hybrids in the United States came 
from Toyota. Competitors charged that Toyota was selling hybrids at a 
loss to tout itself as an environmentally friendly company. But this was 
exactly the point for Toyota: when consumers demanded more fuel- 
efficien 	and	environmentally	friendly	vehicles,	they	would	look	firs 	at	
Toyota’s products. As a result, other carmakers were forced to allocate 
scarce resources to developing their own hybrids instead of developing 
possibly more viable long-term solutions like fuel cells. 
During 2007, when it decided on the major engineering issues for 
the third generation of the Prius, its best-selling hybrid car, Toyota took 
a more cautious approach than other carmakers regarding the feasibility 
of using lithium ion batteries and producing a plug-in version (White 
2007). Toyota’s cautiousness despite being the market leader in hybrid 
vehicles illustrated the uncertainties associated with a technology wide-
ly considered as transitional.
Fuel	cell,	hybrid,	and	other	alternative	 fuel	 technologies	are	des-
tined to shake up the motor vehicle industry in the long run. In the 
firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	the	large	powertrain	and	elec-
tronics suppliers were jockeying to obtain leading roles in supplying 
hybrid components in the short term and fuel cell components in the 
long run. Suppliers of components such as alternators were scrambling 
to cope with obsolescence of their products in an alternative fuel world. 
As is often the case with new technologies, small start-up companies 
were positioned to be early innovators in producing alternative fuel 
components. 
Then there was the question of who would take the lead in hybrid 
technology	R&D.	To	advance	its	Chevrolet	Volt	hybrid,	GM	awarded	
two battery development contracts to independent suppliers in 2007:
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• A joint venture between Cobasys LLC, a suburban Detroit maker 
of nickel-metal hydride batteries, and its partner, A123 Systems 
of Watertown, Massachusetts. 
• A joint venture between two large auto parts makers, Johnson 
Controls	 and	 French	 battery-maker	 Saft	 Group	 SA	 (LaReau	
2007).
On	the	other	hand,	when	it	failed	to	fin 	reliable	suppliers	of	hybrid	
technology, Toyota gained leadership by investing in its own research 
efforts and obtained several patents on key hybrid technology. 
In	the	early	twenty-firs 	century,	it	was	uncertain	whether	carmakers	
like Toyota would continue to design and produce most of their engines 
with new technologies or whether suppliers would be the principal 
source. And if the responsibility were outsourced, would new compa-
nies evolve into major powertrain suppliers or would already-existing 
large Tier 1 suppliers prevail either through in-house creation of tech-












course, the bottom line, [Martinrea Chief Executive Officer]




The system of the motor vehicle most responsible for the Midwest’s 
continued—if diminished—leadership in parts production is the exte-
rior. Major exterior modules include the body, frame, and bumpers. 
More than two-thirds of all exterior parts were made in the Mid-
west	 (Figure	4.1).	Especially	 likely	 to	be	made	 in	 the	Midwest	were	
the bulkiest exterior modules, notably bodies and bumpers (Table 4.1). 
Even manufacturers of small exterior parts, such as grilles and hard-
ware, were overwhelmingly clustered in the Midwest.
Proximity to both raw materials and customers explained the Mid-
west’s attraction for suppliers of the bulkier stamped exterior parts. The 
principal input into stamping exterior parts was steel, which was pro-
duced primarily at Midwestern mills. Suppliers also sought to minimize 
the	 cost	 and	distance	of	 shipping	 stamped	 exterior	parts	 to	 the	 fina 	
assembly plants because they are relatively bulky and fragile, and of 
relatively low value. 
STAMPING OF BODY PARTS
The	body	drop	is	perhaps	the	most	entertaining	station	at	a	fina 	as-
sembly	plant.	Stamped,	welded,	and	painted	bodies	are	finall 	married	
to the powertrain. To casual visitors, the bewildering complexity of mo-
tor	vehicle	assembly	finall 	starts	to	make	sense	when	the	vehicle	takes	
shape at the body drop.
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The	body	drop	was	the	most	widely	photographed	and	filme 	fea-
ture	of	Ford’s	revolutionary	moving	assembly	line	at	Highland	Park	a	
century ago. The attraction then as now was partly the dramatic visual 
image. At Highland Park, the body drop had the added value of taking 
place along an exterior wall of the plant, where early twentieth-century 
cameras could obtain much better quality images than possible inside. 
Bodies	built	on	 the	upper	floor 	at	Highland	Park	were	slid	down	an	
outside	chute	and	attached	to	chassis	built	on	the	firs 	floo 	and	rolled	
outside under the chute.
Some	bodies	are	still	dropped	onto	chassis,	but	these	are	confine 	to	
larger trucks. Most light vehicles are now built through so-called unit-
ized construction, which involves welding the frame of front, rear, and 
side rails into an underbody. Top and side frames are then welded to the 
underbody to form a shell. This is one of the most automated steps in 
Figure 4.1  Location of Exterior Supplier Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other 
sources.
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fina 	assembly,	with	most	welding	done	by	robots.	Hood,	trunk,	door,	
and fender panels arrive at the body build-up area ready for hanging 
on the shell. Panels are stamped or pressed from sheets of steel, alumi-
num, or plastic at stamping facilities operated by the carmakers or by 
independent suppliers. The built-up body, known as “body-in-white,” 
subsequently goes to the paint shop.
Carmakers have been more reluctant to outsource body build-up 
and painting stampings than other components because of the high cap-
ital cost associated with these two operations. Stamping operations, es-
pecially purchase of stamping dies, have represented 10 percent of the 
cost of a new vehicle program (Child 1996). The paint shop has been 
even	more	expensive,	accounting	for	one-third	of	the	cost	of	a	fina 	as-
sembly plant. Stamping has been kept in-house because accurate stamp-
ing of large panels has been critical to meet the tight tolerance required 
in today’s assembly of vehicles, and therefore to vehicle quality. 
Outsourcing of exterior components has been increasing in the 
twenty-firs 	century.	The	chief	reason	has	been	a	proliferation	of	body	
styles, many designed for low-volume models. Because carmakers can-
Table 4.1  Exterior Parts Plants in the Midwest
Exterior part Number of plants  % in Midwest
Body 260 75.0 
Body molding 57 75.4 
Roofs and body panels 127 76.4 
Doors 76 72.4 
Frame 70 62.9 
Bumpers and fascia 79 72.2 
Exterior trim 286 64.9 
Door hardware 108 65.7 
Labels and exterior decals 37 64.9 
Grills	and	luggage	racks 35 74.3 
Windshield washers 35 54.3 
Mirrors 32 59.4 
Hardware 21 71.4 
Other body parts 479 62.8 
Total exterior 1,156 66.7 
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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not justify the high cost of dies to produce body panels for limited pro-
duction models, they have turned to independent suppliers. 
Exterior parts other than body panels are also more likely to be out-
sourced. The bumper, once stamped in-house or purchased as a stand-
alone part, is now outsourced as part of a larger front-end or rear-end 
module	called	a	fascia.	Glass	and	coatings	have	always	been	a	principal	
responsibility of independent suppliers.
In-House Stamping
The Detroit 3 operated 27 stamping plants in the United States in 
2008,	including	13	by	GM,	10	by	Ford,	and	4	by	Chrysler.	These	facili-
ties have a contemporary layout and modern equipment, but beneath the 
surface are remnants of their heritage from the era of vertical integra-
tion. Many of them are “full-sized” free-standing body stamping plants, 
but some are integrated with an assembly plant. The Detroit 3 also oper-
ated	two	stamping	facilities	in	Ontario	and	fiv 	in	Mexico.
The Detroit 3 stamping plants are clustered along the southern 
Great	Lakes	(Figure	4.2).	Twelve	of	the	27	are	located	in	southeastern	
Michigan, six in northern Ohio, and two in central Indiana. Three others 
are not all that far away in Buffalo, New York, and Belvidere and Chi-
cago	Heights,	Illinois.	Outliers	are	the	GM	facilities	in	Fairfax,	Kansas;	
Spring	Hill,	Tennessee;	and	Wentzville,	Missouri;	and	a	Ford	stamping	
plant in Louisville, Kentucky. Most stamping plants were built shortly 
after World War II, including eight in the 1950s; four in the 1960s; and 
three each in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1980s. One plant each was also 
built in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1970s. Plants typically occupied roughly 
2 million square feet and employed 1,000 to 2,500 workers.
Historically, a stamping plant was dedicated to meeting the need for 
bodies	at	a	nearby	fina 	assembly	plant.	At	Ford’s	Rouge	complex,	for	
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Most Detroit 3 stamping plants are now “stand-alone” facilities 
rather	than	tied	to	supplying	a	specifi 	assembly	plant.	Consequently,	
they now compete with each other to obtain the right to make particu-
lar body parts and ship them to multiple assembly plants. Division of 
responsibility among Detroit 3 stamping plants is thus by type of part 
rather	than	by	model	or	platform.	For	example,	among	Chrysler	facili-
ties in 2004, truck hoods and fenders were stamped at the Warren plant, 
truck	roofs	and	floo 	pans	at	the	Twinsburg	plant,	and	car	panels	at	the	
Sterling	Heights	plant.	In	the	early	twenty-firs 	century,	Ford’s	Torrence	
Avenue assembly plant received front and rear doors from both Chicago 
Heights and Buffalo.
Figure 4.2  Location of Stamping Plants Owned by Carmakers
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources. 
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GM stamping 
GM’s	stamping	operation	is	a	legacy	of	its	relationship	with	Fisher	








assembly plant opened in 1947. 
Fisher	generated	its	own	set	of	suppliers	during	the	1920s.	It	bought	
controlling	 interest	 in	National	 Plate	Glass	Company	 and	Ternstedt	
Manufacturing Company, which made body parts such as window 
cranks.	Because	 early	bodies	were	made	of	wood,	Fisher	 controlled	
nearly 250,000 acres of timberland, mostly in Michigan, Louisiana, and 




Guide	Division	 in	 1990.	The	 division	was	 renamed	Delphi	 Interior	





facturing operations in 2005.
Five	of	the	surviving	Fisher	facilities	(located	in	Indianapolis;	Flint;	
Lordstown and Parma, Ohio; and Spring Hill, Tennessee) did stamping, 
one	 (in	Flint)	made	dies,	and	 fiv 	 (in	Marion,	 Indiana;	Grand	Blanc,	
Grand	Rapids,	and	Pontiac,	Michigan;	and	Mansfield 	Ohio)	did	both	
stamping and die-making. Stamping plants in Lansing, Michigan, and 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were closed in 2006 and 2007. Stamping 
plants	are	adjacent	to	assembly	plants	at	Fairfax,	Kansas;	Oshawa,	On-
tario;	and	Wentzville,	Missouri.	GM’s	two	stamping	facilities	in	Mex-
ico, at Ramos Arizpe and Silao, are inside assembly plants.
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Ford stamping
Ford	characteristically	concentrated	nearly	all	stamping	operations	
at the Rouge complex during the 1930s. Bodies were stamped in what 




Rouge after World War II. Stamping facilities were placed near long-
standing	 fina 	assembly	plants	 in	Buffalo	and	Chicago,	as	well	as	 in	
Walton	Hills,	part	of	Ford’s	emerging	postwar	components	production	
center in the Cleveland area. Two other stamping plants were added 
in the 1960s and 1970s in Woodhaven in the Detroit–Toledo corridor, 
as well as adjacent to assembly plants in Dearborn, Louisville, and 
Wayne.
Ford’s	 substantially	 downsized	 Rouge	 complex	 still	 includes	 a	
stamping plant. Though a modernized operation, the Dearborn stamp-
ing plant is one of the Rouge’s clearest relics of an earlier era because 
steel comes in at one end from the adjacent, independently owned steel 
mill, and doors and hoods come out at the other end destined for the 
adjacent	fina 	assembly	plant.	Ford’s	stamping	facility	 in	Hermosillo,	
Mexico, was part of an assembly plant.
Chrysler stamping
Chrysler did not own a car body stamping facility until 1953, when 
it purchased its principal supplier Briggs Manufacturing Co. Estab-
lished in 1908 by Walter Owen Briggs, the body maker emerged as the 
largest	surviving	independent	supplier	during	the	1920s	once	Ford	and	
GM	started	making	their	own.
Briggs survived by selling to the smaller carmakers that lacked in-
house body-making capabilities, including Chrysler. Briggs’s Mack 
Avenue stamping plant in Detroit, originally built in 1916 by the Michi-
gan Stamping Co., produced bodies for Chrysler’s Plymouth division, 
which	had	a	fina 	assembly	plant	two	miles	west	on	Mt.	Elliott	Avenue.	
In 1926 Briggs acquired LeBaron Carrossiers Inc., which became the 
source of bodies for Chrysler’s luxury cars.
Walter Briggs was well-known in Detroit after he purchased the 
Detroit Tigers baseball team in 1935. The team’s ballpark was known 
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as	Briggs	Field	between	1938	and	1961,	when	the	name	was	changed	
to Tiger Stadium.
Meanwhile, Chrysler opened stamping plants adjacent to its truck 
assembly plant in Warren in 1949 and its car assembly plants in Sterling 
Heights and Belvidere, Illinois, in the 1960s. The company also opened 
a stamping plant in Twinsburg, outside Toledo, in 1957 and continued 
to make bodies at Briggs’s Mack Stamping plant until closing it in 1979 
during its near brush with bankruptcy.1 Briggs remained in business 
manufacturing plumbing supplies until it was sold to Cerámicas Indus-
triales in 1997. Chrysler also operated two stamping plants in Mexico 
(Toluca and Saltillo) and one in Canada (Brampton).
Japanese stamping facilities
Japanese-owned carmakers had six stamping facilities in the Unit-
ed States and one in Canada in 2008. Toyota had two stamping plants 
at	its	Georgetown,	Kentucky,	complex,	as	well	as	one	in	Long	Beach,	
California. Honda had two stamping facilities adjacent to its two Ohio 
assembly plants. Mitsubishi had one adjacent to its Normal, Illinois, as-




The leading independent suppliers of exterior modules, including 




revenue from exterior components of any supplier. 
Magna International
Canada’s largest parts maker has become the only supplier to be a 
major	player	in	as	many	as	four	of	the	fiv 	main	parts	systems	(all	but	
electronics). It has also been a pioneer in providing integrated modules, 
as well as in assembling entire vehicles on behalf of carmakers. Magna 
is a technology leader in the body segment. It has pioneered hydroform 
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grated to Canada from Austria in 1954, founded Magna’s predecessor, 
Multimatic	Investments	Limited,	in	1957.	Multimatic’s	firs 	automotive	
contract	was	to	supply	GM	with	metal	brackets	for	sun	visors.	Multi-
matic merged with defense contractor Magna Electronics Corporation 
in 1969 and adopted the Magna International name four years later. 
Aerospace and defense operations were sold in 1981, leaving Magna as 
an automotive specialist.
Stronach imposed a strong personality on Magna. The centerpiece 
was what he called a “Corporate Constitution,” which he announced in 
1971,	based	on	what	he	called	a	“Fair	Enterprise”	management	philoso-
phy.	The	“Corporate	Constitution”	specifie 	the	distribution	of	profit 	
among employees, management, charities, and research and develop-
ment.	For	example,	“ten	percent	of	Magna’s	profi 	before	 tax	will	be	
allocated to employees. These funds will be used for the purchase of 
Magna shares in trust for employees and for cash distributions to em-
ployees, recognizing length of service” (Magna International 2007). 
Shareholders would get 20 percent, management 6 percent, charities 2 
percent,	and	research	and	development	7	percent	of	the	profits
In order to concentrate on his love for horse racing, Stronach turned 
over control of Magna International to his daughter, Belinda Stronach, 
who became CEO in 2001 and president in 2002. She left the company 
in 2002 to pursue political ambitions but returned in 2007. Stronach 
adopted decentralized management for Magna, including so-called 
groups for each of the major systems. An Executive Strategy Com-
mittee coordinated the groups. Decentralization was pushed further in 
the late 1990s by spinning off groups into independently traded pub-
lic companies. Magna wanted to avoid becoming one of what it called 
the “lumbering dinosaurs” by creating “a smaller, more focused and 
more entrepreneurial company,” according to Don Walker, CEO of In-
tier (Armstrong 2004a). Top managers were considered more likely to 
remain with the company if they received ownership stakes in the new 
pieces,	although	Magna	retained	ultimate	financia 	control.
The arrangement proved short-lived, and Magna reacquired the 
three spun-off companies in 2005 because it discovered that Japanese 
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carmakers preferred dealing with a single supplier. Magna president 
Mark Hogan said, “It got a little confusing as to who to deal with” 
(Armstrong 2004a).
Magna has a reputation for being perhaps the most publicity-shy of 
all of the major suppliers. Seemingly straightforward information, such 
as	 the	address	of	 its	plants,	 is	difficul 	 to	extract	 from	 the	company.	
Even	Ontario	government	official 	have	difficult 	getting	a	handle	on	
the company’s operations.
The company had 236 manufacturing facilities worldwide in 2007, 
including 52 in the United States and 61 in Canada. Eighteen of the U.S. 
facilities were in Michigan, primarily those producing interior parts. 
Body stamping facilities were more likely to be outside the Midwest. 
Martinrea (Budd)
In the early 1900s, bodies were made primarily of wood. White ash 
was most preferred, with oak, beech, teak, pine, and elm also common. 
Timber took 10 years to properly season, and it took many weeks for 
skilled craft workers to fashion coaches. “[By the late 1930s,] there 
were only a few sticks of wood left in the passenger job. To all intents 
and purposes, you might say that wood, as far as passenger jobs were 
concerned, was discontinued.”2
Philadelphia furniture maker Hale & Kilburn, then the dominant 
producer	of	steel	seats	for	trains,	was	credited	with	producing	the	firs 	
steel car body, for the 1912 Hupmobile. Hale & Kilburn’s general man-
ager	Edward	Budd	 set	up	his	own	 fir 	 in	1912	 to	produce	 steel	car	
bodies.	“[T]rue	revolution	came	with	Edward	G.	Budd,	founder	of	The	
Budd Co., who invented and patented the all-steel car body in 1912” 
(Winter 1996).
To prove that steel bodies were stronger and therefore safer than 
wood ones, Budd staged outrageous publicity stunts during the 1910s. 
An elephant sitting on top of a Budd body did not crush it, even when 
the doors were opened and closed. Probably the most spectacular stunt 
was driving a Dodge with a Budd steel body off a cliff. After rolling 
over several times, the car was still drivable, and the driver emerged 
uninjured.
Low-volume luxury brands such as Packard and Peerless were early 
adopters	of	Budd’s	steel	body.	The	firs 	large	order	came	in	1914	from	
Dodge Brothers, which was then in the process of converting from the 
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nation’s largest parts supplier to a high-volume carmaker. Dodge paid 
Budd	$42	per	body	and	$2	for	each	set	of	fenders	(Hyde	2005,	p.	81).
Ford’s	decision	to	purchase	Budd	steel	bodies	in	1917	was	a	criti-
cal step in speeding up Model T production. The principal constraint in 
increasing assembly speed had been the time needed to paint the body. 
Paint applied to a steel body at a high temperature dried in a few hours, 
whereas varnish took two weeks to dry on a wood body. 
Edward	Budd	(1870–1946)	and	Henry	Ford	(1870–1947)	were	con-
temporaries and allegedly developed a personal relationship through 
the	years,	and	Ford	wrote	in	his	newspaper,	The Dearborn Independent, 
that Budd was “a high-class, Christian gentleman. Just the type of man 
I would like to see in the manufacturing world. There are too few men 
like Budd to me.” However, Budd (the man or the company) is never 
mentioned	in	Allan	Nevins’s	exhaustive	history	of	Henry	Ford	and	the	
firs 	half-century	of	 the	Ford	Motor	Company	 (Nevins	1954;	Nevins	
and Hill 1957, 1962).
More generous in citing Budd is the most authoritative history 
of Dodge (the brothers and the company; Hyde [2005], p. 79): “The 
Dodge Brothers automobile was not merely another mid-range offering 
on the market but an innovative product because it incorporated all-
steel	bodies	supplied	by	the	Edward	G.	Budd	Manufacturing	Company	
of Philadelphia. Dodge Brothers developed an innovative, cooperative 
relationship with Budd in the process.”
Budd was also credited with developing unitized body construc-
tion during the 1930s, three decades before it was widely adopted. By 
then, though, the car body business had declined sharply, as a result 
of Depression-era cutbacks and in-house body-making. Beginning in 
1934, Budd devoted its attention to what became its best-known prod-
uct, stainless steel passenger railroad cars, especially the Pennsylvania 
Railroad’s streamliner trains.




ThyssenKrupp sold its U.S. stamping operations in 2006 to the little- 
known Canadian company Martinrea International Inc. Martinrea was 
formed in 2002 by former leaders of Magna’s metal-forming unit Cos-
ma International. Not coincidentally, Martinrea’s corporate philosophy 
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was modeled on Magna, including an Employee Bill of Rights. Martin-
rea	CEO	Fred	Jaekel	said	“[I]t	would	be	an	honour	to	be	called	‘Magna	
Jr.’” (Keenan 2006). 
Before the ThyssenKrupp Budd acquisition, Martinrea was a com-
pany	with	3,000	employees	and	$500	million	in	revenues	worldwide.	It	
had one U.S. stamping facility, in Corydon, Indiana, which had opened 
in 2005. The addition of the ThyssenKrupp stamping facilities tripled 
revenues, doubled the number of employees worldwide, and increased 
the number of U.S. plants from 1 to 14.
Tower
The starting point for putting together a body is the frame, con-
structed of steel members welded or riveted together, usually in the 
shape	of	a	rectangle	with	crosspieces,	sometimes	in	an	X-shape.	Front	
and rear portions of the rectangle are rounded up to provide clearance 
over axles and suspension. The frame must be very rigid, in order to 
provide support and alignment for the body and powertrain, which are 
bolted to it.
A.O. Smith was the dominant frame supplier for much of the twenti-
eth century. As with a number of leading chassis suppliers, Milwaukee- 
based A.O. Smith predated the motor vehicle industry by producing 
wood frames for carriages beginning in 1874. Through such innova-
tions as using pressed steel and automatic riveting, A.O. Smith captured 
two-thirds of the market in 1901 and produced 10,000 frames a day.
A.O. Smith’s dominance as a frame supplier diminished after car-
makers adopted unibody construction for cars and some trucks begin-
ning in the 1960s. Unibody construction involved welding a frame to a 
body shell. Welding the two together gave a vehicle greater structural 
rigidity and made it less likely to shake and rattle. As a frame special-
ist, A.O. Smith found itself competing with systems integrators (e.g., 
Magna) who could provide an entire unibody. By 1997 A.O. Smith had 
diversifie 	into	nonautomotive	sectors,	including	water	heaters,	electric	
motors,	fibe glass	pipe	and	fittings 	and	glass-lined	storage	tanks,	which	
generated higher returns on investment, so it sold its Automotive Divi-
sion to Tower Automotive.
Tower Automotive was formed in 1993 when Minneapolis-based 
holding	company	Hidden	Creek	Industries	spent	$83	million	for	R.J.	
The Body Builders   95
Tower Co., a small machine shop that had started in 1874 to repair met-
al farm implements. As a result of acquisitions like A.O. Smith, Tower 
was able to offer a wide variety of structural body components made 




provided Nissan with fully assembled frames for Nissan’s pickup 
trucks, while Nissan continued to assemble frames itself for its sport 
utility vehicles with rails supplied by Tower. The relationship deepened 
at Nissan’s second U.S. assembly plant in Canton, Mississippi, which 
receives	complete	frames	within	minutes	of	being	needed	on	the	fina 	
assembly line from the nearby Tower plant in Madison. 
During the 1990s Tower followed a strategy of globalization through 
acquisitions,	as	well	as	expanded	product	lines.	Sales	rose	from	$167	
million	in	1994	to	$2.2	billion	in	2000.	Tower	took	on	debt	expecting	
that the acquisitions would produce synergies and growth. However, 
the company was unable to integrate its many capital-intensive busi-
nesses.	It	was	not	able	to	cover	its	fixe 	costs,	and	Tower	entered	Chap-
ter 11 in 2005. Two years later, the company emerged from bankruptcy 
by	selling	most	of	its	assets	to	the	private	equity	fir 	Cerberus	Capital	
Management, which acquired Chrysler the same year (Sherefkin 2007a; 
Walsh 2007).
PAINTING THE BODY: CAPTURING A MOOD
Henry	Ford’s	 famous	epigram,	“People	can	have	 the	Model	T	 in	
any color—so long as it’s black,” captured the distinctive appeal of the 
Model	T	during	the	1910s.	The	firs 	Model	T’s	produced	between	1909	
and 1913 and the last ones produced in 1926 and 1927 were painted 
bright colors, but the 15 million produced in between came only in 
black. 
Painting had been the most time-consuming step in early car mak-
ing.	Typically,	 fiv 	coats	were	painted	by	hand	with	a	brush.	Before	
each coat was applied, the body had to be sanded and varnished, and 
after each coat, the body took several days to dry. Altogether painting 
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took 18 days, during which time the body had to be stored in a dust-free 
location (Yanik 1993). 
The	painting	process	is	still	relatively	elaborate	and	expensive.	First,	
a primer layer is applied to steel and plastic components to smooth out 
irregularities and imperfections and to improve resistance against chip-
ping. Primers may be tinted to reduce the amount of paint needed. A 
basecoat	 layer	provides	most	of	 the	 coloring,	 and	 the	 fina 	 clearcoat	
layer provides most of the protection. A tricoat layer of micas, alumi-
num	flakes 	or	other	pigments	may	be	added	between	the	basecoat	and	
clearcoat	 to	obtain	a	more	complex	metallic,	speckled,	 flat 	or	 three- 
dimensional appearance.
Many body parts are now painted by electrocoating, which is “an 
organic coating method that uses electrical current to deposit paint onto 
a part or assembled product” (Electrocoat Association 2007). The body 
parts are electrically charged, then immersed in a bath consisting of 
80–90 percent oppositely charged deionized water and 10–20 percent 
resin and pigments. Plastic bumpers and other exterior body parts are 
coated with adhesion promoters, such as conductive resins and chlo-
rinated	polyolefi 	(CPO),	to	chemically	bond	the	paint	fil 	to	plastic	
parts in injection molding machines. The paint particles are attracted 
to	the	metal	or	plastic	surface,	neutralized,	and	baked	into	a	film 	The	
charged particles adhere to the electrically grounded surfaces until they 
are heated and fused into a smooth coating in a curing oven. 
Use of powder coating is increasing in part because of environmen-
tal regulations (Powder Coating Institute 2007). Conventional paint sol-
vents discharge into the air during the drying process, but powder coat-





pliers through the history of the U.S. motor vehicle industry. A prede-
cessor	of	PPG	was	closely	associated	with	Ford’s	early	 success,	and	
DuPont	was	closely	associated	with	GM’s	early	success.	
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PPG
The	 source	of	Ford’s	black	enamel	paint	was	 the	early	 twentieth	
century’s	 leading	 automotive	 paint	 supplier,	 a	 predecessor	 of	 PPG	
known as Ditzler Brothers. Peter Ditzler, who had been providing paint 
for	carriages	since	1880,	 joined	with	his	brother	Fred	 to	open	an	au-
tomotive	paint	shop	in	1902.	Their	firs 	automotive	customer	was	the	
newly	 formed	Cadillac	Auto	Company	 in	1902,	and	Ford	 followed	a	
year later. 
The Ditzlers sold the business to T.W. Conner and Associates in 
1913,	 just	as	 the	company	was	expanding	production	 to	meet	Ford’s	
increasing	demand	for	black	enamel.	When	Ford	belatedly	introduced	
colors	 for	 the	Model	T	 in	1926,	Ditzler	was	 the	paint	 supplier.	PPG	
purchased the Ditzler Color Company in 1928. 
PPG	 transferred	Ditzler’s	operations	 in	1964	 from	Detroit	 to	 the	
Forbes	Varnish	Co.	 facility	 in	Cleveland.	 Forbes,	 founded	 in	 1907,	
originally produced automotive varnishes, but it switched to industrial 
coatings	during	the	1920s.	PPG	acquired	Forbes	in	1947	and	made	the	
Cleveland facility its principal automotive coatings center.
DuPont
General	Motors	passed	Ford	 as	 the	 leading	 car	 seller	during	 the	
1920s	 in	part	by	offering	brightly	painted	 cars.	General	Motors	Re-
search	Laboratories,	under	 the	 leadership	of	Charles	F.	Kettering,	es-
tablished a Paint and Enamel committee in 1921 to develop colorful 
fast-drying paint. The committee collaborated with DuPont, which then 
held	a	controlling	financia 	interest	in	GM.




tion. Black gunpowder was the only product produced by DuPont until 
1880. Pierre S. du Pont (1870–1954), the fourth generation of the fam-
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du	Pont	became	GM	president	and	his	brother	 Irénée	succeeded	him	
as president of DuPont Corporation. The DuPont Corporation, with 
ownership	of	one-third	of	GM	stock,	rescued	the	carmaker	from	near	
bankruptcy	by	imposing	its	then-innovative	financia 	management.	The	
close relationship between the two companies eventually attracted the 
attention	of	federal	antitrust	prosecutors,	who	file 	suit	in	1949.	Eight	
years later the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against DuPont, and the com-
pany	finalize 	the	disposal	of	its	GM	shares	in	1961.
DuPont developed colorful fast-drying paint during the early 1920s 
through application of nitrocellulose, which it had been using to make 
smokeless gunpowder. DuPont chemists, working with cellulose mo-
tion	picture	fil 	in	1920,	produced	a	thick	lacquer	that	was	durable	and	
quick	drying	and	could	be	colored.	Trying	to	prevent	fil 	from	blowing	
up or turning to goo, the chemists found that a batch of cellulose, acci-
dentally left in a drum for three days, turned to light-brown syrup. This 
“syrup”	became	Viscolac	and	was	sold	beginning	in	1921	as	a	fast-dry-
ing lacquer for toys and other small objects.
GM	engineers	 found	 that	Viscolac	dried	 too	 fast	 for	use	on	cars,	
but after two years of experiments in collaboration with DuPont, a suit-
able lacquer called Duco was produced. Duco reduced the amount of 
time	needed	for	drying	from	several	weeks	to	two	hours.	The	firs 	car	
painted	with	Duco	was	GM’s	1924	Oakland,	available	in	a	light-blue	
color called True Blue. 
Paint Colors: Changing Fashion
Color has no impact on a vehicle’s performance, and consumers 
claim in surveys that color is not an important consideration in their 
purchase decisions. Yet the paint shop is the most expensive portion of 
an assembly plant—one-half billion dollars per assembly plant—and a 
color is the most commonly selected adjective when people are asked 
to describe their vehicles. 
Early cars were painted bright primary colors using India enamel 
paint that lacked durability and faded when exposed to the sun. Henry 
Ford’s	black-only	policy	captured	the	public	imagination	as	one	of	his	
many strategies to keep the price of the Model T low. So-called Japan 
black enamel (ground pigment in linseed oil) was the only type of paint 
that dried quickly enough to keep up with the moving assembly line 
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that	Ford	installed	in	1914.	Black	dried	faster	than	other	colors	because	
of the chemical composition of the pigment and resins. To paint other 
colors	on	1,000	cars	a	day,	Ford	would	have	had	to	set	aside	20	acres	of	
covered dust-free space to dry the bodies between coats (Yanik 1993). 
Lost in Model T mythology is the reality that all but a handful of luxury 
cars were also being painted black for the same reason.
Forecasting	colors	 that	will	appeal	 to	consumers	 is	a	high-stakes	
science,	not	an	art.	The	Color	Marketing	Group	 is	an	organization	of	
1,100 color designers, and about 50 of them work in the auto industry. 
Members meet twice a year to forecast the colors that will be featured 
in manufacturing and services during the next few years.
The motor vehicle industry is often one fashion trend late, according 
to	G.	Clotaire	Rapaille,	founder	of	Archetype	Discoveries	Worldwide,	a	
consumer	research	fir 	that	advises	carmakers	on	what	colors	to	paint	
vehicles. In the clothing industry, colors are decided a few months in 
advance, but in the motor vehicle industry, with its relatively long lead 
time, colors must be decided several years in advance. Popular clothing 
colors often appear on motor vehicles several years later, by which time 
clothing designers have moved on to other colors. “Colors represent the 
mood of the time,” according to Rapaille. But motor vehicle designers 
run the risk that colors may not match the national mood by the time 
they are introduced (Hakim 2004).
Drab colors of the economically austere 1930s and 1940s gave 
way to two-toned pastels of turquoise, aqua, pink, and coral during the 
1950s. The social turbulence of the 1960s was accompanied by vehicles 
that were painted lively orange, lemon yellow, candy apple red, and 
yellow-green. Muted grey and black tones marked the calmer 1970s, 
and bright reds and blues accompanied the go-go 1980s. The prosper-
ous 1990s brought elegant gold and copper, as well as environmentally 
aware dark greens (Hakim 2004; Krebs 1997; Sawyers 1993). The som-
ber mood after the attacks on September 11, 2001, increased demand 
for black, white, gray, silver, and beige.
DuPont	and	PPG	have	long	tracked	color	preferences.	They	agree	
that silver has been the most popular color in the United States during 
the	firs 	decade	of	 the	 twenty-firs 	century,	having	displaced	green	 in	
2000. Silver has also been the most popular color throughout the world 
during the period. The two paint suppliers also agree that white, black, 
red, and blue follow silver in popularity. However, they don’t agree on 
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the market share: silver had 24 percent market share in 2006 according 
to	PPG	and	only	19	percent	according	to	DuPont.	
FROM BUMPERS TO FASCIA
The bumper arguably delivers the biggest bang for the buck of any 
component. A several-hundred-dollar component can save the motorist 
thousands of dollars in repair costs. The bumper also provides suppliers 
with one of the principal entries into the body sector of the industry. Ac-
cording to Harbour Consulting, the percentage of bumpers outsourced 
by the Detroit 3 increased from 27 percent in 2000 to 56 percent in 2007 
(Wortham 2007a).
Today’s bumper typically includes a reinforcement bar made of 
steel,	aluminum,	or	fibe glass	sheathed	in	a	TPO	(thermoplastic	olefi 	
elastomer) cover. Polypropylene foam or plastic “eggcrate” honeycomb 
is packed between the bar and cover to cushion the impact. Bumpers 
account for one-fourth to one-third of the motor vehicle industry’s pur-
chases of plastics.
During the 1920s thin metal bumper strips attached to the front 
and rear of the body became standard equipment on cars. As the name 
implied, the original purpose of the bumper was to reduce damage to 
the vehicle from inevitable encounters with parked cars, pedestrians, 
and other hazards on increasingly congested streets. After a bump, re-
placing a crumpled metal strip was easier and cheaper than repairing 
a dented body. Elaborately shaped three-dimensional chrome bumpers 
were	added	as	decoration	to	complement	the	aggressive	tail	fin 	of	the	
1950s. Turn signals, parking lights, and back-up lights were sometimes 
placed inside bumpers that wrapped around headlamps and taillights in 
the designs from the 1960s.
An Important Safety Feature
The bumper evolved from decoration to a safety feature during the 
1970s.	The	impetus	was	the	correction	of	a	fatal	fla 	in	the	Ford	Pinto:	
at least 59 people died from explosions of Pinto fuel tanks crushed in 
accidents between the rear bumper and axle. 
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The	1972	Motor	Vehicle	Information	and	Cost	Saving	Act	required	
the	National	Highway	Traffi 	Safety	Administration	 (NHTSA)	 to	set	
bumper standards that yielded “the maximum feasible reduction of 
costs	to	the	public,	taking	into	account	the	cost	and	benefit 	of	imple-
mentation, the standard’s effect on insurance costs and legal fees, sav-
ings in consumer time and inconvenience, and health and safety consid-
erations.” Beginning in 1972, the NHTSA required bumpers to protect 
the fuel tank, headlamps, and other body and safety features during 
front-end impacts of 5 mph and rear-end impacts of 2.5 mph. The rear-
end standard was raised to 5 mph in 1979. Bumper standards reached 
historically high levels between 1980 and 1982, when the bumpers 
themselves also had to withstand damage in 5 mph impacts. 
Regulations have been less stringent since 1983. Bumpers must 
protect cars from front and rear impacts of 2.5 mph, but the bumpers 
themselves may now be damaged. The NHTSA defended the relaxation 
as consistent with the intent of the 1972 law. The new standard contrib-
uted to fuel economy because it allowed carmakers to reduce average 
bumper weight from 85 pounds in 1982 to 72 pounds in 1983. How-
ever, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which tests damage to 
bumpers	at	5	mph,	claimed	that	the	lower	standard	added	$1,000	to	the	
average vehicle repair cost. 
As truck sales soared in the 1990s, the lack of compatibility between 
car and truck bumpers was heavily criticized by the insurance industry 
and consumer groups. The bumper on a truck is designed with high 
clearance—allegedly for off-road capability. It is higher off the ground 
than the bumper of a car. As a result, in a collision a truck bumper would 
override a lower car bumper, telescoping the front end of the car back 
into	the	passenger	compartment.	Voluntary	standards	adopted	by	nearly	
all motor vehicle producers, effective in 2009, reduced incompatibility 
in one of two ways: either by lowering the truck’s bumpers and frame 
rails to the level of cars or by attaching a steel bar called a blocker beam 
to the truck frame at the same level as car bumpers.
The bumper is playing an increasingly important role in vehicle ap-
pearance. Carmakers are designing the front bumper to be integrated 
with the grille and headlamps into a front-end module and the rear bum-
per to be integrated with the trunk and taillights into a rear-end module. 
These integrated front and rear modules are sometimes called fascia in 
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the United States, although the British use the term fascia to describe 
the interior cockpit combining the instrument panel and dashboard.
Volkswagen’s	 turn-of-the-century	 New	 Beetle	 was	 regarded	 as	
a prototype—it had front- and rear-end modules integrating bumper, 
fascia, and lights supplied by Plastic Omnium. Bumpers may also in-
tegrate electronic systems that assist with parking and maintaining a 
safe	distance	in	traffic 	“‘We	feel	very	much	that	front-end	modules	are	
the future,’ says Plastic Omnium President Marc Szulewicz. Although 
some carmakers will initially produce the modules in-house, ‘long term 
they will certainly begin to outsource them’” (Chew 2003). 
Carmakers have outsourced bumper production to a number of 
component-specifi 	specialists	who	are	not	major	players	in	provision	
of other components. The bumper accounts for a major expense, ac-
counting for several billion dollars in annual OEM sales. Consequently, 





the company name. The product line was expanded in the 1960s to in-
clude truck bumpers. The company remained a small family-owned 
operation until it was sold in 1980 to Shahid Khan, a native of Paki-
stan, who started working there in 1970 as an engineering student at 
the	University	of	 Illinois.	Khan	 left	Flex-N-Gate	 in	1978	 to	start	his	
own bumper company, but he returned two years later as CEO and sole 
owner.	Under	Khan,	 revenues	 increased	 from	$17	million	during	 the	
1990s	to	$1	billion	in	2006.	Its	19	U.S.	factories	as	of	2007	were	heav-
ily clustered in the Midwest, including six in Michigan, four in Illinois, 
and three in Indiana. 
Meridian Automotive Systems 
Meridian Automotive Systems originated as the American Bumper 
and Manufacturing Co. in Ionia, Michigan. Its largest bumper customer 
has	been	Ford	trucks	and	sport	utility	vehicles.	Meridian	grew	rapidly	
during the late 1990s through acquisitions, but it entered Chapter 11 
in 2005, citing the high price of plastic resin. The company emerged 
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from	Chapter	11	a	year	later,	with	financia 	restructuring	provided	by	
a	consortium	of	private	equity	firms 	Like	Flex-N-Gate,	it	had	19	U.S.	
manufacturing facilities in 2007, including seven in Michigan and six 
in Indiana.
Plastech Engineered Products 
Plastech Engineered Products was one of the largest minority-owned 
Tier	1	 suppliers	 and	 the	 second-largest	minority-owned	plastics	 fir 	
in	the	United	States,	behind	Sigma	Plastics	Group.	The	company	was	
founded in 1988 when Julie N. Brown acquired a small plastic molding 
plant in Caro, Michigan. Like Meridian, Plastech grew rapidly during 
the 1990s through acquisitions, the largest of which was the United 
Screw and Bolt Co. in 1997. Although a major OEM bumper supplier, 
Plastech’s most rapid expansion came as a Tier 2 supplier of interior 
trim to Johnson Controls (see Chapter 7). Its three dozen facilities in the 
United States were also heavily clustered in the Midwest, including 18 
in Michigan and nine in Ohio. 
In	2008,	Plastech	file 	for	Chapter	11	bankruptcy	protection.	“[L]ike	
virtually all parts suppliers in Detroit’s automotive ecosystem, Plastech 
has been caught between rising production costs and falling demand for 
the products in which its parts are used” (McCracken 2008).
OUTSOURCING COMPLETE EXTERIOR MODULES
The pioneering effort to outsource integrated exterior modules was 
the Chrysler assembly plant in Toledo, Ohio. Chrysler opened the Tole-
do Supplier Park in 2006 to supply exterior modules, as well as chassis 
modules,	ready	for	installation	at	the	adjacent	Jeep	fina 	assembly	plant.	
The	bodies	moved	by	conveyors	from	the	Supplier	Park	to	the	fina 	as-
sembly line minutes before they were needed, and “Chrysler will have 
inspectors in the suppliers’ plants and has the right to reject assemblies 
that don’t meet quality standards” (Jewett 2004).
Hyundai Mobis subsidiary Ohio Module Manufacturing Co. was 
given responsibility for assembling “rolling” chassis. The term rolling 
refers to the fact that the chassis, which includes wheels, axles, and 
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powertrain, could literally be rolled on tires from the supplier shop to 
where	it	was	needed	on	the	fina 	assembly	line.	
South Korea’s largest supplier, Mobis, was already delivering roll-
ing chassis to Kia’s plant in Hwasung, Korea. Mobis was part of the 
Hyundai chaebol through interlocking ownership. Hyundai owned 60 
percent of Kia, which in turn owned 16.2 percent of Mobis, which in 
turn owned 13.2 percent of Hyundai. Mobis had no North American 
manufacturing operations when it won the Jeep contract. But Mobis 
expected to rank among the world’s top 10 suppliers by 2010 as an 
ultra-low-cost supplier. 
In awarding the contract to Mobis, DCX passed over Toledo’s 
hometown supplier of rolling chassis, Dana. In the throes of Chapter 11 
proceedings, Dana was caught asleep at the switch in its own backyard 
(see Chapter 11 in this volume; Chang and Chappell 2004). 
German-based	Kuka	Roboter	GmbH	was	given	 responsibility	 for	
welding bodies in a 250,000-square-foot body shop, with an annual ca-
pacity of 150,000. Europe’s leading manufacturer of industrial robots, 
Kuka had no experience as an auto parts manufacturer. Its previous auto 
industry work was building equipment for body shops and assembly 
lines and helping Chrysler design minivan seats that folded into the 
floo .	
Outsourcing	Toledo’s	paint	shop	proved	more	difficul 	for	Chrysler.	
The	contract	was	 firs 	awarded	 to	Durr	 Industries,	which,	 like	Kuka,	
was	a	German	company	with	experience	in	providing	equipment	rather	
than parts. Durr planned and built paint shops, as well as cleaning and 
filtratio 	 systems.	After	 two	months,	Chrysler	dropped	Durr	as	paint	
supplier,	citing	an	unspecifie 	contract	impasse	(Connelly	2004).
Haden International was next to be given responsibility for the To-
ledo paint shop. Haden, too, had no experience as a parts supplier. It had 
developed air pollution abatement and wastewater removal programs 
for	GM’s	Arlington	and	Spring	Hill	assembly	plants	and	water	 recy-
cling	programs	at	Toyota’s	Georgetown	and	Chrysler’s	Detroit	assem-
bly plants. The British-based company was founded in 1816 by brothers 
George	and	James	Haden.	It	was	best	known	in	the	United	States	for	
acquiring	Carrier	(the	air	conditioning	firm 	in	1970.	Palladium	Equity	
Partners LLC gained controlling interest in Haden in 2001. 
Four	months	before	production	began,	in	2006,	Haden	“vanished,”	
and its managers “disappeared” from the site. Haden also walked away 
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from	 contracts	 to	 remove	 paint	 sludge	 at	Toyota’s	 plant	 in	George-
town	and	Ford’s	plant	in	Wayne;	to	complete	a	renovation	of	the	New	
United Motors Manufacturing Inc., California, paint shop; and to treat 
wastewater	at	Georgetown.	Financial	problems	were	blamed	(Chappell	
2006a,b; Nussel 2006). 
Chrysler assumed responsibility for liens against Haden held by 
subcontractors at Toledo and placed its own employees in the paint 
shop.	Former	Haden	employees	at	Toledo	formed	a	new	company	 to	
continue to do business with Chrysler. 
Replacing Haden as paint shop manager in 2006 was Magna Steyr, 
a subsidiary of Magna International. Despite Chrysler’s original inten-
tions, Magna Steyr does not have an equity interest in the Toledo Sup-
plier Park.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES 
Most exterior suppliers appear likely to remain in the Midwest. As 
was the case with powertrain, the exterior sector of the parts industry 
has been heavily clustered in the Midwest because of a similar combi-
nation of proximity to inputs and to customers. 
Even	more	so	 than	 the	powertrain,	 the	exterior	 is	difficul 	 to	ship	
long distance. Body panels and fascia are bulky and fragile and, com-
pared	 to	 the	powertrain,	 are	 lower	 in	value.	Furthermore,	 carmakers	
have retained much of the body stamping work as a core competency. 
At the same time, some exterior production will drift out of the Mid-
west, again for the same reason as powertrain, namely for proximity to 
foreign-owned assembly plants further south within Auto Alley. 
The supplier that may make a particularly strong contribution to the 
future geography of exterior parts production is Magna International’s 
Magna Steyr division. Magna Steyr did not even have a U.S. production 
facility until 2005, when it opened a paint shop adjacent to Chrysler’s 
Toledo assembly plant. Magna Steyr at the time was a major supplier in 
Europe and was set to become one in the United States as well.
Magna International acquired Magna Steyr, then known as Steyr-
Daimler-Puch, in 1998. Steyr-Daimler-Puch was created in 1934 
through	the	merger	of	Steyr-Werke	AG	and	Austro	Daimler	Puchwerke	
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AG.	 Steyr	Werke’s	 predecessor	was	 established	 in	 1864	 near	 Steyr,	
Austria, to make armaments. Puchwerke’s predecessor was established 
in	1899	near	Vienna	to	make	bicycles	and	merged	in	1928	with	a	Daim-
ler body supplier. 
From	its	core	competency	of	making	bodies,	Magna	Steyr	expanded	
into so-called contract assembly, that is, producing entire vehicles for 
carmakers such as Chrysler and Daimler. Magna Steyr assembled niche 
vehicles that were sold in volumes too low to be economic for car-
makers to assemble themselves, such as convertibles or an American- 
style Chrysler minivan for the European market. Magna Steyr was also 
contracted to assemble vehicles whose sales exceeded capacity of the 
carmakers’ own assembly plants. In 2007, Magna Steyr assembled a 
quarter of a million vehicles at its Austrian plant, including 10 different 
models for four carmakers.
Magna Steyr made no secret that it wanted to build a similar plant 
in the United States. “Do we see potential for a North American as-
sembly plant for (subsidiary) Magna Steyr? Absolutely,” stated Magna 
president Mark Hogan (Sherefkin 2007b). “Steyr came within a hair of 
using	that	design	for	such	a	plant	in	the	U.S.,”	said	[Manufacturing	Vice	
President Wolf-Dietrich] Shulz. He said that “earthmoving equipment 
was on the ground” at a site somewhere in the South, ready to break 
ground for a U.S. vehicle project. The project was canceled at the last 
minute (Chappell 2006c). 
When Chrysler was sold to Cerberus in 2007, one of the unsuc-
cessful suitors was Magna. Magna Steyr’s experience with assembling 
entire vehicles and producing modules in Toledo, as well as its position 
as Chrysler’s leading supplier, made it a credible candidate, but ana-
lysts have been skeptical of Magna Steyr’s ability to bring the European 
model to the United States. “Magna Steyr has hit a wall . . . [It] has 
concluded that it has a problem: To grow, big changes are necessary” 
(Sherefkin	2007b).	The	firs 	challenge	was	efficiency 	to	build	10	dif-
ferent	models	for	four	carmakers,	Magna	Steyr	had	to	provide	fiv 	as-
sembly lines, six body shops, and two paint shops.
The second challenge was excess capacity in carmakers’ own assem-
bly plants. “European contract manufacturing is under pressure. That’s 
because excess capacity at many automakers is making them take back 
production	previously	outsourced”	(Meiners	2007).	Finally,	according	
to Harbour and Associates President Ron Harbour, as carmakers have 
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become	more	efficient 	they	“don’t	have	to	outsource	those	low-volume	
cars anymore” (Sherefkin 2007b). 
Notes
 1. The City of Detroit purchased the closed stamping plant in 1982 but had to un-
dertake an expensive hazardous materials clean-up operation at the site during 
the 1990s. Chrysler used the site to construct a new engine plant, which opened 
in	1998	to	supply	engines	for	the	Jeep	Grand	Cherokee,	assembled	one-half	mile	
south at the company’s new Jefferson Avenue assembly plant.
	 2.	 Walter	Nelson,	manager	of	Ford’s	Iron	Mountain,	Michigan,	lumber	operations,	







The supply base of today’s carmakers is structured like a pyramid. 
On top of the pyramid is the carmaker. Below the carmakers are a small 
number of Tier 1 suppliers that sell parts directly to carmakers. Tier 1 
suppliers in turn purchase materials from Tier 2 suppliers, who pur-
chase from Tier 3 suppliers, and so on down the supply chain. 
Tier 1 suppliers and carmakers have different perspectives on the 
motor	vehicle	industry	than	do	lower-tier	suppliers.	For	example,	is	a	
motor vehicle essentially an aggregation of several thousand parts, or is 
the whole greater than the sum of the parts? Carmakers favor the holis-
tic view. A motor vehicle is greater than the sum of the individual parts 
because	 it	 is	 ultimately	 define 	 and	 distinguished	 primarily	 through	
such features as performance, handling, and styling. Large Tier 1 sup-
pliers, responsible for integrating modules and systems, reinforce this 
holistic perspective.
The perspective of lower-tier suppliers is fundamentally opposite. 
They are in the business of building a motor vehicle one part at a time. A 
smoothly	performing	engine	depends	on	tight-fittin 	pistons	and	valves	
and on well-built brackets and hinges. An attractively styled interior 
depends	on	tight-fittin 	doors	and	mirrors	and	on	well-built	latches	and	
knobs.
Enthusiast magazines such as Car & Driver and	Motor	Trend rein-
force holistic perspectives in their reviews and commentaries. The qual-
ity of an engine is characterized by overall performance in speed and 
acceleration, and the quality of the interior is characterized by harmoni-
ous integration of materials and controls. On the other hand, consumer 
surveys such as those by J.D. Power and Associates and Consumers 
Union reinforce a particularistic perspective. Quality is measured by 
aggregating	 the	 frequency	with	which	dozens	of	specifi 	 items	cause	
trouble in particular vehicles.
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Ultimately, of course, a motor vehicle is both an aggregation of 
thousands of individual parts and something greater than the sum. The 
fundamental challenge—and opportunity—for lower-tier suppliers de-
rives from differences with carmakers and Tier 1 suppliers concerning 




• Lower-tier suppliers are much more numerous than Tier 1 suppli-
ers; major Tier 1 suppliers number in the dozens, whereas lower-
tier suppliers number in the thousands.
• Leading databases do not distinguish between Tier 1 and lower-
tier suppliers. 
• Lower-tier suppliers may make objects with multiple uses, not 
just for use in motor vehicles. 
• Some lower-tier suppliers provide commodities and raw materi-
als from which other suppliers actually fashion the parts. 
•	 Suppliers	rarely	fall	100	percent	into	only	one	tier,	so	classific -
tion is a case-by-case determination based on the tier occupied 
by most of a supplier’s customers. It is even possible for a sup-
plier to operate some of its plants as Tier 1 plants and others as 
lower-tier plants.
Leading	data	sources	do	not	permit	straightforward	 identificatio 	
of a supplier’s tier. In the case of a publicly traded company, the an-
nual	report	and	Form	10-K	may	name	the	major	customers	and	share	of	
business if it is more than 10 percent. But most lower-tier suppliers are 
privately owned and therefore do not reveal this information. 
The	U.S.	Census	of	Manufactures	classifie 	about	one-sixth	of	all	
suppliers	 as	 “other”	 or	 “NEC”	 (not	 elsewhere	 classified) 	 Similarly,	
the database developed for this book, derived from ELM International, 
classifie 	one-sixth	of	all	suppliers	as	providing	so-called	generic	parts,	
such as brackets, clamps, and fasteners. Another one-sixth of all sup-
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pliers are allocated to “miscellaneous” categories within particular sys-
tems, such as “miscellaneous engine components.” Based on all avail-
able information about individual plants, it is likely that most of the 
companies making “generic” parts are lower-tier suppliers, but this is 
not a certainty. 
Characteristics of Lower-Tier Suppliers
A walk through a typical lower-tier supplier plant reveals little that 
looks like a contribution to putting together a motor vehicle. Oddly 
shaped parts are cut or pressed and perhaps several of the pieces are 
screwed or welded together to form another unfamiliar shape.
The motor vehicle industry includes several thousand lower-tier 
suppliers, most of which are unfamiliar even to carmakers, let alone to 
the	wider	public.	Given	this	arithmetic,	summarizing	the	characteristics	
of the many thousands of lower-tier suppliers is a formidable challenge. 
Nevertheless,	this	chapter	attempts	to	do	so.	We	fin 	that	a	typical	lower- 
tier supplier is:
• owned by a single individual or family, rather than by a publicly 
traded	corporation.	The	current	owner	is	often	not	the	firs 	gen-
eration of the family involved in the business. Like other small 
businesses,	a	lower-tier	supplier	reflect 	the	values	and	priorities	
of the owner.
• a small business, with an average workforce of less than 200 
housed in a single facility. In comparison, the 150 largest sup-
pliers in 2007 averaged 11 U.S. plants with 300 employees per 
plant. Annual sales for lower-tier suppliers are likely to be in the 
millions of dollars, whereas they are in the billions of dollars for 
the larger Tier 1 suppliers.
• a specialist in a small number of manufacturing processes, such 
as stamping or cutting. Compared with large Tier 1 suppliers and 
carmakers,	these	firm 	possess	a	limited	number	of	capital-inten-
sive presses of a particular size or dies of a particular shape. The 
distinctive	 features,	 assets,	 and	quirks	of	 these	 specifi 	pieces	
of equipment, though, are understood in detail. Equipment con-
strains the variety of products.
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• too small to have a professional sales force. Instead, it hires sales 
representatives, or the owner may do the job.
•	 sited	in	a	specifi 	community	because	“the	founder	lived	here.”	
Other	communities	might	now	prove	more	profitable 	but	even	
leaving aside the high capital cost of relocation, lower-tier sup-
pliers	are	 rarely	 footloose	 firm 	chasing	 tax	breaks.	 Instead,	 it	
is more likely to be rooted in the owner’s hometown through 
sports, religion, and other community programs.
• feeling pressure from its Tier 1 customers to invest in Mexico, 
China, and other low-wage countries. Despite strong community 
roots, lower-tier suppliers are being urged to produce overseas in 
order	to	help	Tier	1	firm 	reduce	costs.	Some	lower-tier	suppliers	
have gone along, but most have preferred to stay put.
•	 located	in	the	Midwest	(Figure	5.1).	More	than	three-fourths	of	
plants making brackets, clamps, hinges, fasteners, screws, nuts, 
bolts, and washers were in the Midwest (Table 5.1). Bearings, 
seals, and gaskets were less likely to be made there. Overall, 
more	than	two-thirds	of	plants	classifie 	as	“generic”	in	our	da-
tabase were in the Midwest.
Although	it	is	difficul 	to	say	that	any	single	lower-tier	supplier	can	
be considered typical of the thousands, we can offer some good ex-
amples of lower-tier suppliers.
Table 5.1  Plants Producing Generic Parts in the Midwest
Generic	parts Number of plants % in Midwest
Fasteners 118 81.4
Screws, nuts, bolts, and washers 124 79.8 
Brackets, clamps, and hinges 186 78.0 
Bushings, gears, housing, plugs,  
and springs
258 65.5 
Seals and gaskets 204 52.9 
Bearings 60 36.7 
Other generic parts 394 64.5 
Total generic 1,344 66.4
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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Oakwood Group
The	Oakwood	Group	produces	metal	speaker	grilles	and	plastic	im-
pact absorbers for vehicle interiors. Large Tier 1 interior suppliers such 
as	Johnson	Controls	and	Lear	were	its	major	customers.	Francois	Audi	
founded the company in 1945, and his son succeeded him as presi-
dent. The company employed 221 at manufacturing facilities in Taylor, 
Michigan. 
Mid-American Inc. 
Mid-American supplies molded thermoplastic parts used in the 
engine, chassis, and body. Other products include valve shafts, valve 
lift guides and assemblies, chain tensioners and guides, air shock and 
fittin 	 assemblies,	 structural	 braces,	 compression	 caps,	 and	 coolant	
Figure 5.1  Location of Plants That Supply Generic Parts
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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fittings 	Major	Tier	1	customers	for	 these	products	have	 included	JCI	
and Bosch. The company has also made window latch assemblies for 
Guardian	Industries.	Mid-American	is	a	minority-owned	fir 	with	180	
employees and established in 1972 in Jackson, Michigan.
Shane Steel Processing Inc. 
Shane prepares steel before it is used to manufacture engine com-
ponents (e.g., valves) and chassis components (e.g., stabilizer and tor-
sion bars). Shane detects defects in the steel, and straightens, grinds, 
and	shears	steel	bars	to	standards	demanded	by	parts	makers.	Founded	
in	1949,	Shane	employs	80	at	 its	 facility	 in	Fraser,	Michigan.	Tier	1	
customers have included Collins & Aikman, Dana, Delphi, Lear, and 
Siemens.
LARGE LOWER-TIER SUPPLIERS
Although most lower-tier suppliers are small, a handful are large 
corporations. A lower-tier supplier may have grown large by specializ-
ing in producing large volumes of standardized parts, such as bearings, 
brackets,	and	latches.	Other	large	lower-tier	firm 	are	suppliers	of	com-
modities and materials, such as steel and plastic. The distinctive skill 
demonstrated by these large suppliers is the ability to be the low-cost 
manufacturer of particular “generic” parts.
Some of the large “generic” parts suppliers were Tier 1 suppliers 




company to move to a lower tier. Some large suppliers have deliberately 
positioned themselves at a lower tier, thereby escaping the not-always-
desirable spotlight focused by carmakers on their Tier 1 suppliers.
Large Bearings Suppliers
Bearings are “the invisible heroes inside many mechanical devices” 
(Nice 2007). Bearings reduce the friction that would otherwise result 
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when one surface slides against another surface. In motor vehicles, bear-
ings play an especially important role in the transmission and wheels. 
Ball bearings, the most common and oldest type of bearing, con-
sist of metal balls sandwiched between two ring-shaped liners called 
races. The smooth steel balls, loosely restrained and separated in a cage, 
are able to roll with minimal friction in a tight space carved out of the 
smooth metal surfaces of the two races. Ball bearings were found to be 
of limited use in motor vehicles, however, because they could not sup-
port a heavy load.
Carmakers turned instead to roller bearings, in which cylinders 
rather than balls are sandwiched between two races. A cylinder can 
withstand a heavier load than a ball because weight is spread out over 
a line rather than a single point. Transmissions most commonly have 
a variation of a roller bearing that is called a roller thrust bearing and 
is placed between the gears and the rotating shafts. Wheels most com-
monly have another variation, the tapered roller bearing, which is coni-
cally rather than cylindrically shaped.
Timken Co. 
Four	of	the	75	largest	suppliers	in	the	United	States	in	2007	special-
ized in bearings. The leading U.S. supplier of roller bearings through 
the century-plus history of motor vehicle production has been Timken 
Co. Henry Timken, a St. Louis carriage builder, patented the tapered 
roller bearing in 1898 and one year later, at the age of 68, founded Tim-
ken Roller Bearing Axle Co. to make axles equipped with tapered roller 
bearings. Timken moved the company from St. Louis to Canton, Ohio, 
in 1901, to be near both its primary customers (the rapidly growing mo-
tor vehicle industry) and its principal input (steel).
Axle and bearings businesses were separated in 1909, with Timken 
Roller Bearing Co. remaining in Canton and Timken-Detroit Axle Co. 
relocating to Detroit. To control the supply and quality of steel for the 
bearings, Timken added a steel production facility to its Canton com-
plex in 1916. 




Timken supplied 80 percent of the roller bearings in the U.S. motor ve-
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hicle industry. Timken remains the largest bearing supplier in the United 
States, with one-sixth of the market, but it has fallen to sixth place in 
worldwide sales. The company’s Web site claims that its market share 
has	declined	because	carmakers,	especially	Ford,	have	insisted	on	hav-





of the U.S. market. Timken’s three chief bearings competitors in the 
U.S. market are Japanese-based.
NSK. Short for Nippon Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha, NSK is credited 
with	producing	the	firs 	ball	bearings	in	Japan	in	1916.	NSK	became	a	
major bearings supplier in the United States when it acquired Hoover 
Ball and Bearing in 1975. The breakup of Hoover also gave Johnson 
Controls its start in the seat business during the 1980s (see Chapter 7).
NTN Bearings. NTN Bearings, according the company’s Web site, 
entered the bearings business through happenstance: “In 1922 a Swedish 
vessel carrying a cargo of bearings sank in Kobe harbor. The bearings 
were auctioned off by the insurance company and the successful bidder 
was Mr. [Noboru] Niwa. This turned out to be a bonanza, and with the 
profit 	Mr.	Niwa	purchased	three	foreign-made	grinding	machines.	He	
installed them in the Nishizono Ironworks, asking Mr. [Jiro] Nishizono, 
a wizard at technology, to study bearing manufacturing technology” 
(NTN Bearing Corporation 2007).
Niwa and Nishizono accounted for the two “N’s” in the NTN ac-
ronym. The “T” came from Niwa’s trading company, Tomoe Trading 
Co., which sold the Swedish cargo, presumably originally produced by 
NSK.	NTN	acquired	Federal-Mogul’s	ball	bearing	division	in	1996.	
Koyo Corp. Koyo Corp. was founded in Osaka to make bearings 
in 1921. The company began producing bearings in the United States 
in South Carolina in 1973. The company, one-fourth owned by Toyota, 
was merged with Toyoda Machine Works in 2005.
Supplying the Suppliers   117
Large Metal-Forming Suppliers
Large Tier 2 suppliers of metal parts, such as brackets and shafts, 
remain heavily clustered in the Midwest. Proximity to iron and steel 
inputs as well as carmakers and Tier 1 powertrain suppliers makes a 
Midwest location important for these suppliers. Two leading examples 
are Illinois Tool Works and Metaldyne.
Illinois Tool Works 
Founded	in	1912	by	Chicago	financie 	Byron	L.	Smith	to	manufac-
ture gears and metal-cutting tools, Illinois Tool Works (ITW) became a 
manufacturer of thousands of different types of fasteners, latches, and 
other generic automotive parts. A few of the company’s products, such 
as door handles and seat latch releases, may be recognizable parts of 
motor vehicles, but the overwhelming majority of its nuts, screws, and 
clips are not.
ITW has gained a reputation on Wall Street for its unconventional 
corporate structure: it is decentralized into several hundred highly au-
tonomous operating units, including a couple of dozen that focus on 
motor vehicle parts. Conventional Wall Street wisdom is that extreme 
decentralization increases overall corporate overhead because each unit 
replicates some of the same functions. In rebuttal, ITW claims that high 
profi 	margins	have	been	generated	by	its	distinctive	“80/20”	manage-
ment system.
ITW operating units are required to rank products, customers, and 
suppliers from largest to smallest. Invariably, 80 percent of revenues are 
generated by 20 percent of customers and 20 percent of products, and 
80 percent of materials are obtained from 20 percent of suppliers. Unit 
managers are told to pay attention primarily to the top 20 percent of 
customers, products, and suppliers, and minimize reliance on or discard 
altogether the remaining 80 percent. An operating unit may not increase 
gross	revenues	and	profit 	until	it	has	increased	the	rate	of	return	at	cur-
rent level of sales through “80/20.”
The Detroit 3 have encouraged ITW to step up as a larger, more 
prominent Tier 1 supplier, but ITW has declined. Tier 1 suppliers are 
under a great deal of pressure (e.g., letting in unions) that lower-tier 
suppliers can escape. By adding engineered parts that require skilled la-
bor, a lower-tier supplier can have more leverage up the supply chain. 
118   Klier and Rubenstein
As the company name implies, ITW has most of its automotive 
plants in Illinois, especially in Chicago’s outer suburbs. Most of the 
remainder are in Wisconsin. 
Metaldyne 
Metaldyne is a leading supplier of sintered powder metal compo-
nents for powertrains and chassis, including wheel spindles, steering 
knuckles, hub assemblies, engine dampers and covers, and differential 
and transfer cases. In 2006 the company merged with Japanese com-
petitor Asahi Tec.
Metaldyne illustrates the blurred distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 
2 suppliers. The company sold 38 percent of its output to Tier 1 sup-
pliers,	such	as	Dana,	Delphi,	International,	Magna,	TRW,	and	Visteon.	
As a Tier 3 supplier, Metaldyne has sold wheel hubs to Tier 2 supplier 
Timken, which has incorporated them with bearing units before sending 
them to a Tier 1 supplier.
Carmakers accounted for 62 percent of Metaldyne sales in 2006, 
and the company expected to gain more Tier 1 business as carmak-
ers outsourced the manufacture of more powertrain parts. In 2003, for 
example, Metaldyne acquired a metal forging facility in New Castle, 
Indiana, from its largest customer, Chrysler. Metaldyne’s annual report 
(2006,	p.	6)	stated,	“Currently,	OEMs	satisfy	a	significan 	portion	of	
their metal forming and assembly requirements with in-house produc-
tion and assembly of purchased components. We [at Metaldyne] believe 
that, as OEMs seek to outsource the design and manufacture of parts, 
they will choose suppliers with expertise in multiple metal processing 
technologies and the ability to design, engineer and assemble compo-
nents rather than supply independent parts.”
Metaldyne has maintained most of its facilities in the Midwest, no-
tably “saving” the former Chrysler New Castle plant from closure by 
acquiring it and negotiating a more competitive contract with the union. 
At the same time, Metaldyne has been especially proactive at initiating 
production activities in China.
Other metal-forming suppliers
Other large metal-forming suppliers produce a wide variety of ge-
neric parts that are sold primarily to Tier 1 customers.
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Gecom.	 Gecom	 is	 the	 acronym	 for	 Greensburg	 Equipment	 and	
Components	Manufacturing,	which	was	opened	in	1987	in	Greensburg,	
Indiana,	by	the	Japan-based	Mitsui	Kinzoku	Company.	Gecom	special-
izes in closure components such as latches, brackets, and other metal 
hardware.	Gecom	has	been	 the	principal	 supplier	of	 closure	 compo-
nents to Japanese-owned assembly plants in the United States. A major 
boon to the company’s fortunes came when Honda selected the same 
community for a new assembly plant in 2007.
Gecom’s	growth	has	 illustrated	a	challenge	for	some	suppliers	of	
“generic”	parts.	For	Gecom,	the	lowly	latch	has	become	an	electronic	
component. Embedded in latches are electronics that automatically lock 
and unlock doors, open gates remotely, protect the vehicle from theft, 




century. The company produced parts such as cases and hubs from duc-
tile iron castings and bearing caps and pump bodies from gray iron cast-
ings. All of the facilities were heavily clustered in the Midwest.
Intermet.	 Founded	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 to	 produce	 ductile	
iron castings, Intermet supplies arms, brackets, covers, cases, housings, 
and shafts for steering, suspension, and powertrain. Its largest Tier 1 
and Tier 2 customers have included Delphi, Metaldyne, Siemens, TRW, 
and	Visteon.	The	company’s	dozen	plants	were	generally	outside	 the	
Midwest,	 including	 fiv 	 in	 the	South	and	 three	 in	Missouri.	 Intermet	
file 	for	Chapter	11	protection	in	2004,	blaming	the	rising	cost	of	scrap	
steel, and it emerged two years later as a private company. 
Large Nonmetal Suppliers
Large lower-tier suppliers that make parts from materials other than 
metal are much less likely to be located in the Midwest. Three examples 
are	ABC	Group,	Foamex	International	Inc.,	and	Tomkins.
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ABC Group 
ABC	Group	has	been	the	third-largest	Canadian-owned	parts	maker	
behind Magna and Linamar. ABC, founded in 1974, has claimed to be 
the number one plastic blow molder. Principal products have included 
interior parts for instrument panels, seats, and trim, as well as exterior 
parts for bumpers, running boards, spoilers, and trim. The company 
supplied the North American market primarily from plants in Canada. 
Foamex International Inc. 
The leading supplier of polyurethane foam for cushions, headlin-
ers,	backrests,	armrests,	and	headrests,	Foamex	was	established	in	1983	








The third-largest British-owned supplier in North America, Tom-
kins specialized in rubber and polyurethane belts for powertrains. It was 
the largest supplier of transmission belts. Started in 1925 as a buckle 
and fastener manufacturer, Tomkins became a major U.S. parts supplier 
and	the	leading	rubber	parts	supplier	when	it	acquired	U.S.-based	Gates	
Rubber	Co.	 in	 1996.	Gates	 traced	 its	 origins	 to	 1911	when	Charles	
Gates	acquired	Colorado	Tire	and	Leather	Co.,	which	made	steel-stud-
ded leather bands that were fastened to car tires to extend their mileage. 
Gates	became	a	specialist	in	synchronous	timing	belts	and	V-belts.
LEADING SUPPLIERS OF COMMODITIES
Iron and steel are the most important commodities used in motor 
vehicles, accounting for nearly two-thirds of a car’s weight in the early 
twenty-firs 	century.2 Plastics and aluminum are a distant second and 
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third, respectively, in materials used by carmakers and suppliers (less 
than 10 percent each), but both are gaining on steel in terms of overall 
motor vehicle content.
Iron and Steel
The motor vehicle industry buys much more iron and steel than any 
other material and is the largest customer of the iron and steel industry. 
“[B]y	far	 the	most	 influentia 	material	during	 the	auto	 industry’s	firs 	
100 years was steel” (Winter 1996). Approximately 24 percent of steel 
produced in the United States was destined for motor vehicles in 2005 
(Schnatterly n.d.).
Iron was used to make early engines, but steel was not used in large 
quantities until the 1920s, when open wooden carriages were replaced 
with enclosed bodies. Iron and steel content per vehicle rose from 1,500 
pounds in 1918 to 3,500 pounds during the 1950s. The weight dropped 
to	2,600	pounds	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century	(Sherefkin	2006a).
Steel is rolled into a thin product through either hot rolling or cold 
rolling. Motor vehicle producers rely primarily on hot rolled steel for 
chassis components, such as brake drums, wheels, and suspensions; 
body components, such as cross and side members, roof frames, pillars, 
and doors; and drivetrain components, such as transmissions, differen-
tials,	gearboxes,	and	clutches.	Because	of	its	appealing	surface	finish 	
cold rolled steel is commonly used to stamp the hood, roof, fender, and 
door panels.
Although the motor vehicle and steel industries have been closely 
associated for a century, the relationship between them has often been 
uneasy. Carmakers have reduced steel content in favor of substitute ma-
terials,	notably	plastic	and	aluminum.	For	their	part,	the	steel	industry,	
unlike other suppliers, has been independent and powerful enough to 
stand up to carmakers.
The fundamental divergence of interests between the two industries 
has been the price of steel. Essentially, low steel prices are good for 
carmakers and parts suppliers and bad for steelmakers, whereas high 
steel prices have the reverse effect. Policies such as tariffs and quotas 
on foreign imports designed to protect U.S.-based steel producers may 
limit the supply of steel and drive up prices, thereby harming U.S.-
based carmakers and parts suppliers. Conversely, open market policies 
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may lower the cost of steel for the U.S. motor vehicle industry, but they 
expose the U.S. steel industry to foreign competition. 
Of the world’s six largest steel companies, only Arcelor Mittal 
owned	mills	in	the	United	States	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	The	oth-
er	 five—Nippon 	Posco,	JFE,	Tata,	and	Shanghai	Baosteel—were	all	
based in Asia and have concentrated on the rapidly growing markets in 
China, India, and other Asian countries.
In	 the	 early	 twenty-firs 	 century,	 four	 steelmakers	 accounted	 for	
one-half of sales to the U.S. motor vehicle industry: Arcelor Mittal, AK 
Steel, U.S. Steel, and Severstal. One-fourth was supplied through small-
er steelmakers and minimills. The remaining one-fourth was imported.
Arcelor Mittal 
The world’s leading producer by a wide margin, Arcelor Mittal was 
probably the most compelling story in the steel industry in the late twen-
tieth	and	early	twenty-firs 	centuries.	Mittal	was	the	brainchild	of	one	
man, and it remained a family-run business while becoming the world’s 
largest steelmaker. In 2006 Mittal consolidated its number one position 
by acquiring Luxembourg-based Arcelor, Europe’s leading steelmaker 
and the second-leading steelmaker worldwide.
Founder,	 firs 	CEO,	and	 firs 	chairman	of	 the	board,	Lakshmi	N.	
Mittal was a native of India and son of the owner of a small steel mill 
in Calcutta. Mittal’s wife ran an Indonesian subsidiary, his son was 
on the board of directors, and other family members held leadership 
positions. 
Mittal	Steel	and	its	predecessor	LNM	Group,	founded	in	1976,	spe-
cialized in turning around steel mills viewed as underperforming under 
previous	management.	Government	 privatization	 programs	were	 the	
source of several mills.
Mittal entered the U.S. market when its subsidiary Ispat Interna-
tional acquired Inland Steel Company in 1998. Inland, founded in 1893, 
became a major supplier of automotive steel from its Indiana Harbor 
Works integrated steel mill located in East Chicago, Indiana. The Indi-
ana Harbor plant supplied about 10 percent of the steel used in motor 
vehicle production and 5 percent of the total U.S. steel market.
Mittal became the leading steel supplier to the U.S. motor vehicle 
industry	when	it	acquired	International	Steel	Group	(ISG)	in	2004.	ISG	
had been formed only two years earlier and had grown rapidly by res-
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cuing several prominent U.S. steel companies from bankruptcy. The 
financia 	backing	came	from	the	equity	investment	fir 	W.L.	Ross	&	
Co., and leadership from president and CEO Rodney Mott, previously 









Steel Corp. (J&L) and Republic Steel Corp.
J&L	was	established	by	Benjamin	Franklin	Jones	and	James	Laugh-
lin in 1853 in Pittsburgh to produce iron. J&L secured a prominent pres-
ence along the banks of the Cuyahoga River in 1942 by acquiring Otis 
Steel Co., which was founded by Charles A. Otis in 1852, also original-
ly	an	iron	forger	and	the	firs 	U.S.	fir 	to	make	steel	in	an	open-hearth	
furnace in 1873. Republic Steel, founded in 1899 in Youngstown, ex-
panded rapidly during the 1920s and 1930s to become the third-lead-
ing	steelmaker	in	the	United	States.	In	2003,	ISG	took	over	Bethlehem	
Steel Co., which was the nation’s second-leading steelmaker behind 
U.S. Steel when it declared bankruptcy in 2001. Bethlehem, founded 
in 1857 as Saucona Iron Works in South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, had 
the newest large-scale integrated steel mill in the United States, built 





AK was smaller than its competitors in overall production, but it 
held a leading position in supplying the motor vehicle industry. The 
company sold a higher percentage of its output to carmakers than have 
the other major steelmakers, although the percentage was declining rap-
idly	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century.	
AK was established in 1989 as a joint venture between U.S. steel-
maker Armco Steel (the “A” in the company name) and Japanese steel-
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maker Kawasaki Steel Corp. (the “K”). Armco began as the American 
Rolling Mill Co. in Middletown, Ohio, in 1899. Kawasaki, Japan’s 
third-largest steelmaker and world’s tenth-largest, was incorporated as 
a company independent of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. in 1950. 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries began in 1878 as a shipyard company and 
expanded during the twentieth century to encompass other transporta-
tion equipment and machinery as well as steel. AK acquired its one-
time parent Armco in 1999.
AK’s	largest	customers	were	GM	and	Ford,	but	its	principal	com-
petitive advantage was with Japanese-owned carmakers. Toyota bought 
nearly all of its steel from AK, and other Japanese carmakers were com-
fortable dealing with another Japanese-managed company in the United 
States. AK’s largest integrated mill, Armco’s former home base in Mid-
dletown, Ohio, was located further south and closer to Japanese-owned 
assembly plants than competitors’ mills. AK’s other integrated mill at 
Ashland, Ohio, was near Honda’s central Ohio complex.
U.S. Steel 
U.S. Steel was created in 1901 when the nation’s second-largest 
steel	 producer,	 J.P.	Morgan’s	Federal	Steel	Co.,	 acquired	 the	 largest	
steel	producer,	Andrew	Carnegie’s	Carnegie	Steel	Co.	Faced	with	fierc 	
competition from Morgan and a desire to devote full attention to philan-
thropy,	Carnegie	agreed	to	sell	his	steel	company	for	$480	million,	the	
largest transaction in American industrial history at the time. U.S. Steel 
immediately became the dominant U.S. steel producer, accounting for 
two-thirds of production in 1900. 
U.S.	Steel’s	principal	operations	have	been	in	Gary,	Indiana,	a	city	





Although no longer the monopoly of a century ago, U.S. Steel has 
remained the largest steelmaker in the United States. The company has 
been less heavily invested than competitors in the automotive industry, 
which accounted for only about 14 percent of its sales.
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Severstal 
Russia’s largest steelmaker, Severstal, has not been widely recog-
nized	as	a	major	producer	of	steel	in	the	United	States.	With	$1.8	billion	
in sales in 2006, Severstal was the fourth-largest supplier of steel to the 
U.S. auto industry, holding 8 percent of the market (Severstal 2006, p. 
45). The company was incorporated in 1993 through the restructuring 
of Cherepovets Steel Mill, which had been created by the Soviet Union 
in 1940.
Severstal’s U.S. facility was probably the motor vehicle industry’s 
best-known integrated steel mill—the one originally built by Henry 
Ford	as	part	of	the	River	Rouge	complex	in	Dearborn.	In	2004,	Sever-
stal	acquired	the	bankrupt	Rouge	Industries	Inc.,	which	Ford	had	set	up	
as an independent company in 1989. 
Other sources of steel 
More than one-fourth (28 percent) of steel used by U.S. carmak-
ers in 2006 was imported (AK Steel 2006). Carmakers and other large 
purchasers of steel typically have not negotiated direct purchases from 
overseas. The principal channel by which foreign steel enters the United 
States is through service centers. Service centers purchase bulk quanti-
ties	of	steel	from	both	domestic	and	foreign	sources	and	perform	finis -
ing operations, such as cutting, shearing, and grinding, that otherwise 
would have to be done by the parts makers. The construction, electron-
ics, shipbuilding, and aerospace industries have also been major cus-
tomers of steel service centers.
Some automotive steel comes from intermediate processors, such 
as	Shiloh	Industries.	Founded	as	a	tool	and	die	company	in	1950,	Shi-
loh	sold	$600	million	worth	of	steel	products	 to	 the	auto	 industry	 in	
2005. Shiloh manufactured blanks, which are two-dimensional shapes 
cut	 from	 flat-rolle 	 steel.	 Shiloh	 cleaned,	 coated,	 trimmed,	 and	 cut	
steel into shapes that carmakers could stamp into body panels, such 
as doors and fenders. Blanks were also sent to suppliers to stamp seat 
frames, bumpers, frames, rails, and other interior, exterior, and chassis 
components. 
Minimills have captured one-fourth of the overall U.S. steel market. 
Less expensive than integrated mills to build and operate, minimills 
can locate near their markets where their main input—scrap metal—is 
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widely available. Because the motor vehicle industry utilizes primarily 
fla 	steel	products,	it	is	not	a	major	direct	purchaser	of	steel	from	mini-
mills, although some steel produced at minimills is purchased indirectly 
through service centers. The largest minimill company, Nucor, has not 
made steel for motor vehicles and asserts that it cannot be done by a 
minimill. The primary use of minimill steel in the auto industry has 
been for wiring.
ThyssenKrupp,	Germany’s	leading	steel	producer,	entered	the	U.S.	
market by constructing a mill in Mobile, Alabama, scheduled to open in 
2010. “Proximity to automakers and their suppliers was a key factor in 
ThyssenKrupp’s decision to build in the South” (Wortham 2007b).
Despite these alternatives, the number of sources of steel in the 
United	States	has	become	too	small	for	carmakers’	comfort.	“GM	once	
negotiated with nine steel makers. Now just four major integrated steel 
mills are at the table today” (Sherefkin 2006a). Carmakers have tradi-
tionally negotiated simultaneously with three steel producers during the 
engineering phase before awarding contracts for actual manufacturing. 
A savvy steelmaker would submit designs that, if adopted, placed it in 
a strategic advantage when manufacturing contracts were issued. How-
ever, as the number of steelmakers willing to play the game declined, 
carmakers could no longer count on getting three independent designs 
and bids.
Plastics
The average plastic content per passenger vehicle increased from 
150 pounds (6 percent of total vehicle weight) in 1988 to 250 pounds (9 
percent) in 1997 and to 300 pounds (11 percent) in 2007. Plastic com-
ponents	accounted	for	$11	billion,	or	5	percent	of	the	overall	supplier	
industry,	in	2000	(Flanagan	2001;	Miller	2005).
Leading suppliers of plastic products to carmakers and suppliers 
have	been	BASF	Corp.	and	Dow	Automotive,	each	with	about	$600	
million in annual North American motor vehicle sales in 2005. The mo-
tor vehicle industry has accounted for only about 10 percent of overall 
sales	at	both	companies.	BASF	has	been	 the	world’s	 largest	supplier	
of plastics to the motor vehicle industry and Dow the largest in North 
America.
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BASF 
BASF	has	supplied	the	motor	vehicle	industry	primarily	with	sty-
renes and polyurethanes used for molding plastic parts. Because of its 
ability	to	withstand	high	thermal	and	mechanical	stresses,	BASF	plastic	
has been used in the engine, including camshaft timing gears, engine 
covers,	air	intake	modules,	oil	filte 	housings,	and	cylinder	head	cov-
ers. Several fuel line components have been molded from plastic, and 
electrical components have also been encased in plastic. In other sys-
tems,	BASF	plastic	has	been	used	to	make	gearshifts	for	the	drivetrain,	
steering	columns	for	the	chassis,	and	headlamp	reflector 	for	the	body.	
BASF	has	also	 supplied	chemicals	 to	 the	motor	vehicle	 industry,	 in-
cluding	antifreezes,	brake	fluids 	and	coatings.	
Badische	 Anilin-	 &	 Soda-Fabrik	 AG	 (BASF)	 was	 founded	 by	
Friedrich	Engelhorn	in	1865	to	produce	dyes	from	coal	tar.	The	com-
pany became heavily involved in developing fuels, synthetic rubber, 
and	coatings	for	motor	vehicles	during	the	1920s.	BASF	merged	with	
Hoechst,	Bayer,	and	others	into	I.G.	Farbenindustrie	AG	in	1925,	but	
the companies were separated again in 1952. The company had about 
40 plants in the United States, specializing in particular segments, such 
as coatings, polyurethanes, styrenes, or chemicals, but none was exclu-
sively devoted to motor vehicle production.
Dow 
Dow Automotive has been a small piece of Dow Corporation. It 
employed only 1,500 of the company’s 46,000 employees. Dow Au-
tomotive has supplied plastics, plastic parts, adhesives, and sealants to 
carmakers and suppliers. Products have included polypropylene, ny-
lon, ABS, polycarbonate, SAN, crystalline polymers, thermoplastic 
urethanes,	 adhesive	 films 	 engineering	plastic	blends	 (like	PC/ABS),	
polyurethane, and vinyl ester resins. 
Dow Chemical Co. was incorporated in 1897 by Herbert H. Dow 
to manufacture bleach. Dow Automotive was formed in 1988 as a busi-
ness group and became a separate industry-focused business unit in 
1999.	As	with	BASF,	Dow	has	been	organized	 into	several	operating	
segments, such as chemicals, hydrocarbons and energy (called oil & 
gas	at	BASF),	agriculture,	plastics,	and	so-called	performance	plastics	
(which includes motor vehicle parts).
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Compared	with	BASF,	Dow	has	focused	more	on	interior	trim,	such	
as instrument panels, knee bolsters, glove boxes, and airbag covers. It 
has also supplied body trim, panels, and lighting surrounds, as well as 
electrical, cooling, and fuel systems for the engine.
Only two Dow plants have been devoted primarily to automotive 
parts, and both are located in the Midwest—in Hillsdale, Michigan, and 
Kankakee, Illinois. Dow Chemical has maintained 34 other manufac-
turing facilities in North America.
Aluminum
Aluminum was the third most used material in vehicles in 2000, and 
its use was growing the fastest. The amount of aluminum in an average 
car increased from 90 pounds in 1977 to 236 pounds in 2005 and to 




century. Nonetheless, aluminum was being used more because it has 
been the most effective way to cut vehicle weight and therefore im-
prove	fuel	economy.	Fascia,	fenders,	hoods,	doors,	and	trunks	of	higher	
priced vehicles have been molded from aluminum rather than plastic.3
The major supplier of primary aluminum and fabricated aluminum 
products to carmakers and suppliers has been Alcoa Inc. Alcoa’s prede-
cessor, Pittsburgh Reduction Co., was established in 1888 to produce 
pure aluminum. The company’s name was changed to Aluminum Com-
pany of America in 1907.




segment made chassis components, such as subframes, cradles, knuck-
les, brackets, control arms, and other suspension parts. The Alcoa Cast 
Auto Wheels segment, as the name implies, was a major supplier of 
aluminum wheels. The Alcoa Automotive segment supplied aluminum 
bodies for niche vehicles, as well as body parts such as hoods, tailgates, 
van doors, radiator enclosures, and engine cradles.
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REDUCING PRICE WHILE RAISING VALUE
Tier 1 suppliers, who are the principal focus of this book, have re-
garded lower-tier suppliers as necessary, but very junior, partners in the 
motor vehicle production process. Carmakers have viewed lower-tier 
suppliers as even more marginal to their core operations. Lower-tier 
suppliers,	providers	of	generic	bin	parts,	manufactured	to	specifications 	
have been seen as answerable only to price. Low price has not been 
merely the most important consideration in negotiations with lower-tier 
suppliers—it has usually been the only consideration.
Lower-tier suppliers have few direct contacts with carmakers be-
cause they work primarily with Tier 1 suppliers. The exception is com-
panies that are both Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. By necessity, they work 
both directly with carmakers as Tier 1 suppliers and indirectly with car-
makers through their Tier 1 customers. Despite—or perhaps because 
of—their relatively limited direct contact with carmakers, lower-tier 
suppliers hold especially outspoken opinions on the behavior of the De-
troit 3. Systematic differences are seen between doing business with the 
Detroit 3 and with international carmakers. In short, the Detroit 3 are 
characterized	as	specification 	oriented,	whereas	international	carmak-
ers are results oriented.
By	specification 	oriented,	lower-tier	suppliers	are	referring	to	two	
particular	characteristics	of	Detroit	3	purchasing.	First,	the	perception	
is widespread among lower-tier suppliers that the Detroit 3 care only 
about price. Before lower-tier suppliers are called, a Tier 1 supplier has 
already made a pricing commitment to a carmaker. A lower-tier sup-
plier must provide a price quotation quickly to the Tier 1 supplier, then 
engineer and produce the part within the set price. 
Lower-tier suppliers are being asked to participate more in the de-
sign and engineering of integrated modules and systems. But because 
they are manufacturing only a small piece of the system or module, they 
feel that they are the last in the industry to know about new product 
development—barely in advance of the general public. As a result, they 
claim to receive information too late in the process to be able to identify 
cost savings before a design is frozen.
For	their	part,	carmakers	and	Tier	1	suppliers	feel	they	need	to	in-
trude into the performance of lower-tier suppliers because of quality 
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control issues. Lower-tier suppliers are held accountable for quality 
through “traceability.” Every part is bar-coded at each stage in the pro-
duction process. A steel part, for example, can be traced back to the heat 
treatment at the steel mill.
Lower-tier suppliers see themselves as performing a very different 
role in the production process. They believe that carmakers and Tier 1 
suppliers have become primarily assemblers and marketers, while shed-
ding engineering capabilities they once possessed. Carmakers and Tier 
1 suppliers once had more knowledge of mechanical engineering than 
lower-tier suppliers, but they now allegedly have less.
Lower-tier suppliers believe that they are being asked to design and 
engineer individual parts that carmakers and Tier 1 suppliers no longer 
actually know how to make. This loss of knowledge, lower-tier suppli-
ers allege, stems from decisions by carmakers and suppliers to employ 




Delphi started outsourcing stamping. Stamping equipment was moved 
out of Delphi facilities into Tier 2 suppliers. As an independent com-
pany, Delphi owned the stamping dies, but the dies were actually made 
and used by Tier 2 suppliers. Theoretically, Delphi could pull the dies 
from the suppliers, although it never did.
Delphi no longer has the knowledge to use the dies because it no 
longer employs knowledgeable mechanical engineers. Lower-tier sup-
pliers view Delphi’s gap in knowledge of dies as a money-making op-
portunity—the longer a die lasts and the fewer times it must be refur-
bished,	the	more	profitabl 	it	is.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Lower-tier suppliers believe that they are now the guardians of two 
critical types of knowledge about manufacturing. Lower-tier suppliers 
assert that they are being asked to make the parts that are too complex 
for carmakers and Tier 1 suppliers given their diminished engineering 
expertise. Lower-tier suppliers claim that they know how to design indi-
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vidual parts to perform assigned duties. They understand how parts be-
have in real-world conditions, depending on choice of material, shape, 
and size. The hard-to-make parts are allegedly being passed down the 
supply chain: the lower the tier, the harder the part is to make. 
Second, lower-tier suppliers believe that only they understand the 
manufacturability of an individual part, in other words the relationship 
between the process and the product. Because a particular product is 
made on a particular machine, sensitive product design is based on 
understanding the mechanics and tolerance of the machine on which 
the product will be made. Lower-tier suppliers claim that, because of 
their knowledge of manufacturability, they are called in—belatedly—
to solve costly production problems that are too detailed for carmak-
ers	and	Tier	1	suppliers	to	address.	For	example,	Tier	1	suppliers	may	
not be considering how new stronger lightweight metals behave when 
pressed into shapes, or how dies and presses operate when lubricated 
with different liquids.
Lower-tier suppliers report that they are often brought into the pro-
duction process to solve a problem caused by an inferior part that an-
other company supplied at a lower price. The challenge for lower-tier 
suppliers is to convince carmakers and Tier 1 suppliers that their manu-
facturing expertise can add value in the production process and that 
they should not be regarded merely as sources of generic parts. 
Notes
	 1.	 Bo	Andersson,	GM	worldwide	purchasing	chief,	referring	to	the	plant	closure	of	
Tier 3 supplier Chatham-Borgstena Automotive Textiles in Sherefkin (2005).
 2. The average vehicle weighed 3,927 pounds and contained 2,419 pounds of steel, 
or 61.6 percent, in 2005 (American Iron and Steel Institute 2007) .
 3. Aluminum’s penetration has increased from 39 kg (3 percent) in 1976 to about 







How Close Is Close Enough?
Parts	plants	are	 like	planets	 revolving	around	a	star,	 the	 fina 	assembly	
plant. Some parts plants are arrayed in very tight orbits within a few miles of 
an assembly plant, whereas others are in wide orbits thousands of miles away; 
most lie between these two extremes. This section of the book explores three 
key elements of the auto industry’s producer–supplier networks: the tightness 
of the collection of orbits around the various assembly plants, the distinctive 
character of suppliers orbiting most closely around assembly plants, and the 
physical ties facilitating movement of parts within networks.
Parts	production	and	 fina 	assembly	operations	are	among	 the	most	co-
located	industry	pairs	in	the	United	States	(Ellison	and	Glaeser	1997).	Colo-
cation has long been of interest to both economists and geographers. Alfred 
Marshall argued in 1920 that businesses localize in response to a number of 
factors, including capturing technological spillovers, achieving a greater vari-
ety and lower costs of intermediate inputs, and pooling labor markets to pro-
mote a larger and deeper supply of workers.
Colocation is a distinctive feature of many “bulk-gaining” products. A 
bulk-gaining product weighs more or takes up a greater volume than its inputs, 
whereas a bulk-reducing product weighs less or takes up less volume than its 
inputs. Bulk-gaining products are more likely to be made near their customers 
because shipping costs tend to be less for the relatively compact inbound parts 
than	for	the	relatively	bulky	outbound	finishe 	goods.	Conversely,	bulk-reduc-
ing products are more sensitive to the location of inputs. 
Motor vehicle assembly is a classic example of a bulk-gaining industry 
because	finishe 	vehicles	are	much	bulkier	than	the	sum	of	their	parts.	Conse-
quently,	fina 	assembly	plants	are	located	primarily	to	minimize	transportation	
costs to customers. Parts that are bulky, awkward, and fragile, and therefore 
more expensive to ship (e.g., seats and bumpers), are more likely to be made 
near	the	customer	(the	fina 	assembly	plant)	to	minimize	shipping	costs.
Some carmakers have constructed relatively tight networks of suppliers 
around their assembly plants, with a high percentage of parts plants less than a 
one-day drive away, whereas others have preferred looser networks. Underly-
ing the development of closely linked networks of suppliers and carmakers 
has been the widespread adoption of just-in-time (JIT) delivery in the auto 
industry.	Carmakers	now	require	that	parts	arrive	at	their	fina 	assembly	plant	
shortly before needed rather than far in advance. 
As a result, suppliers have been forced to locate facilities in places where 
JIT	delivery	to	a	fina 	assembly	plant	is	feasible.	However,	JIT	delivery	does	
not	mean	 that	 suppliers	must	 be	 immediately	 next	 door	 to	 fina 	 assembly	
plants. The distance from parts plants to the assembly plant “node” actually 
can be divided into three groups: those within a one-hour driving radius, those 
within a one-day radius, and those further than one day away. 
The tightness of the network of suppliers around an assembly plant de-
termines its regional economic footprint. That is important because states 
and	localities	often	provide	large	sums	to	attract	fina 	assembly	plants.	These	
subsidies	have	been	justifie 	because	they	are	said	to	attract	not	only	a	fina 	
assembly plant but a large number of parts plants as well. Some of these fore-
casts may have been overstated because they got the geography wrong.
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The Closely Linked Supply Chain
Kia has told Georgia officials that it envisions only five or six 
new	supplier	plants	being	necessary	to	support	the	Georgia	
auto	plant (Chappell 2006d).
U.S. assembly plants together receive 2 billion pounds worth of 
parts per day in 20,000 shipments, some from nearby and some from 
the other side of the planet (Cottrill 2000; Penske Logistics 2007). In an 
industry characterized by colocation, physical proximity is mutually re-
inforcing. Assemblers prefer to have multiple suppliers located nearby 
to ensure reliable delivery of parts. Suppliers in turn prefer to have sev-
eral assembly plants within a day’s drive of their operations. 
Lean production has sought to root out and eliminate waste wher-
ever it exists in the production process. One of the most striking ex-
amples of a wasteful practice in mass production has been the stockpil-
ing	of	parts	in	the	fina 	assembly	plants.	Parts	would	be	piled	high	and	
crammed	into	every	corner	of	the	shop	floo .	
The	parts	 that	piled	up	 in	 the	fina 	assembly	plants	may	not	have	
been needed in actual production for some time—if at all. At the end of 
the	model	year,	leftover	parts	would	be	thrown	away.	Ford’s	Chester,	
Pennsylvania, assembly plant was said by David Halberstam (1986) to 
have “dumped thousands and thousands of useless parts into the nearby 
Delaware River . . . The people in Chester joked that you didn’t have to 
swim the Delaware, you could walk across on the rusted parts of 1950 
and	1951	Fords.”
Lean production has changed these wasteful practices. Not every 





shortly before they are needed on the assembly line. The burden of 
making JIT work has fallen primarily on the suppliers. Helper and Sako 
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(1995) found that the practice of making more frequent deliveries of 
smaller batches has resulted in some increase in stockpiling at supplier 
companies.
Does	the	application	of	JIT	influenc 	where	supplier	plants	locate	
relative to their assembly plant customers? One would expect tighter 
operational linkages with suppliers to lead to tighter physical linkages 
between assembly and supplier plants. Yet only some parts must be pro-
duced	within	an	hour	of	the	fina 	assembly	plant	to	meet	JIT	delivery	re-
quirements. Suppliers of such parts needed to relocate their production 
facilities. Chapter 7 highlights the seat, the most prominent example 
of	a	part	that	is	invariably	produced	within	an	hour	of	a	fina 	assembly	
plant. JIT production, however, does not require all parts makers to lo-
cate	that	close	to	a	fina 	assembly	plant.	For	most	parts,	being	within	
one	day’s	driving	distance	from	an	assembly	plant	is	sufficient 	Other	
parts can be made even further away and still reach the assembly plant 
when needed because the availability of a well-developed transporta-
tion infrastructure in combination with state-of-the-art logistics servic-
es allows production facilities to be closely linked operationally even 
though physically they can be quite far apart from one another. 
JUST-IN-TIME PRODUCTION
The production of seats illustrates how tight today’s linkages be-
tween assembly and supplier plants can be. At the seat-making plant, 
action	is	triggered	when	the	fina 	assembly	plant	sends	a	fax	or	e-mail	
outlining the schedule of seats needed for the next 10 days. A second 
communication pinpointing the precise moment when each seat is 
needed arrives only eight hours in advance of actual delivery. 
The	detailed	communication	 from	 the	 fina 	assembly	plant	docu-
ments	not	merely	 the	specifi 	vehicles	 that	will	be	assembled	during	
the day but, even more importantly, the order in which they will be 
built. The seat plant subsequently has to put together various styles 
of seats from leather, foam, frame, and wiring in accordance with the 
assembler’s	specifi 	needs.	After	a	hundred	or	so	seats	have	been	pro-
duced—sufficien 	to	keep	the	fina 	assembly	line	rolling	for	a	couple	of	
hours—they are loaded onto a truck in “backward” order; that is, the 




The concept of JIT, which was pioneered in postwar Japan as a 
survival strategy, has been one of the foundations of lean production 
(Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). “Supply chain managers have two 
primary	goals:	 reduce	 inventory	and	avoid	delays.	For	years,	 just-in-
time delivery has been the preferred method for meeting those goals” 
(Haight 2004). “[A] 1991 survey conducted by Advanced Manufactur-
ing resulted in a PriceWaterhouseCoopers white paper that found that 
92 percent of manufacturers believe that just-in-time delivery by key 
suppliers is now a critical success factor” (Pescon [2001] cited in Polito 
and Watson [2006]).
Under lean production, parts do not arrive where needed along 
the	fina 	assembly	 line	until	shortly	before	 installation	 in	 the	vehicle.	
Related to the implementation of JIT has been a considerable change 
in the relationship between assemblers and suppliers. In the past car-
makers relied on hierarchical coordination of information and control 
over technology within their own company to solve the complex task 
of manufacturing cars. Now, in order to allow for JIT to achieve its full 
potential, tight organizational and informational linkages are extended 
outside a plant’s boundaries to include its suppliers and their operations, 
and possibly their suppliers in turn (Klier 1995). 
Aided by widespread use of information technology to track parts 
and orders, JIT has become the standard for carmakers, as well as for 
other manufacturers and retailers. According to this approach, the vari-
ous operations within the assembly plant are linked with one another so 
as	to	expedite	the	process	of	fillin 	orders.	The	underlying	principle	of	
JIT production is to reduce the time from when an order for a product is 
placed	until	the	finishe 	product	is	shipped	to	the	customer.	Such	link-
ages now extend to an assembly plant’s supply base, ideally connecting 
the entire supply chain. 
For	parts	makers,	JIT	starts	with	an	order	from	a	carmaker.	Instead	
of producing according to a preset schedule, suppliers operate accord-
ing	to	a	so-called	pull	system,	in	which	the	flo 	of	materials	through	the	
various stages of production is triggered by what is needed in the next 
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stage,	 and	ultimately	by	 the	 customer.	For	 carmakers,	maintaining	 a	
continuous	and	tightly	controlled	flo 	of	parts	allows	for	flexibl 	modi-
ficatio 	of	production	changes	in	the	demand	for	the	fina 	product.1
To	capture	 the	 financia 	advantages	of	 JIT,	 suppliers	have	devel-
oped production techniques that reduce inventory. As a result of lower 
inventory inside a plant, problems affecting production quality such as a 
faulty machine tool will become apparent more quickly. In addition, the 
production process itself can be continuously improved. Implementing 
JIT therefore can improve a plant’s production quality. 
Prior to JIT, the traditional supply chain of the Detroit 3 automakers 
was characterized by the carmaker procuring most parts and compo-
nents	 from	 their	own	parts	divisions.	For	parts	 sourced	 from	outside	
companies, the Detroit 3 typically dealt directly with several thousand 
independent supplier companies. Contracts with suppliers were bid on 
spec and typically ran no longer than a year. After one year they were 
put up for bid again and typically awarded to the lowest bidder for the 
next year.
Under JIT, contracts between assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers tend 
to be longer term, covering the life of a particular model. Carmakers 
directly interact only with a handful of Tier 1 suppliers responsible for 
entire subsystems or modules, who in turn procure parts and services 
from their own suppliers to deliver a highly integrated part to the as-
sembly line. Many of these suppliers have also taken on research and 
development functions. A number of carmakers have set up so-called 
supplier	support	organizations	to	help	improve	the	efficienc 	of	opera-
tions at their suppliers.
To help their suppliers master the challenges of JIT, Japanese car-
makers have created a disciplined system of delivery time periods. They 
also deliberately smooth their production schedules to avoid big spikes 
in demand. Suppliers in turn are encouraged to ship only what is needed 
at the time. 
Challenges in JIT Delivery
JIT has proven an effective tool for improving a manufacturer’s 
bottom line, but it is not without its challenges. Pescon ([2001] cited 
in	Polito	and	Watson	 [2006])	 identifie 	 fiv 	major	constraints	 in	JIT:	 
1) customer-driven and economic conditions, such as raw material price 
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fluctuations 	2)	logistics	and	interruption	in	the	supply	chain	as	a	result	
of, for example, labor disputes and natural disasters; 3) organizational 
culture	conflict 	with	JIT,	such	as	piecework	rather	than	hourly	wages;	
4)	intractable	accounting	and	financ 	practices;	and	5)	slow	adoption	of	
JIT because of resource constraints on small suppliers.
In the auto industry, the second constraint has been especially im-
portant.	Chapter	8	specificall 	addresses	the	logistics	aspect	of	the	sup-
ply chain. Even the most carefully made plans are subject to myriad un-
controllable factors—labor issues, equipment failure, political unrest, 
and severe weather (Haight 2004). 
A tightly linked supply chain has proven vulnerable to labor dis-
putes.	In	1998,	for	example,	the	UAW	struck	GM	parts	plants	in	Michi-
gan	 that	were	 the	 sole	 suppliers	of	 such	parts	as	 spark	plugs,	 filters 	
fuel pumps, and instrument clusters. Loss of output quickly fed through 
the company’s entire supply chain and essentially shut down the vast 
majority of its North American production facilities in less than two 
weeks. Absent JIT, larger buffer stocks of these parts would have been 
able to better insure against the strike-related loss of output.
The	most	significan 	political	factor	constraining	logistics	has	been	
the need to move parts across international borders. Large amounts of 
material and components are crossing into the United States from Can-
ada and Mexico (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 13). If trucks 
experience delays crossing the Canadian and Mexican borders, it can 
be	difficul 	to	meet	JIT	requirements.	
Canada’s Ontario auto-producing center is within one day’s driv-
ing distance of most U.S. assembly plants, and parts plants in Windsor 
are within one hour of Detroit assembly plants. Conversely, Ontario 
assembly plants are within one day’s drive of most U.S. parts plants. 
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the issue of the security of the 
Canada–U.S. border became suddenly much more visible. Commerce 
between Michigan and Canada halted when the United States closed all 
of	its	borders	for	fiv 	days.
Under normal conditions, assembly plants in Detroit set the same 
delivery schedules for suppliers regardless of whether they are locat-
ed in Michigan or Ontario, essentially treating the border as invisible. 
Though	traffi 	delays	at	the	two	Detroit	River	border	crossings	are	com-
mon occurrences, the complete shutdown of trade after 9/11 was un-
precedented. Thousands of parts shipments required at U.S. assembly 
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plants were then stuck at the border. Assembly plants on the Detroit side 
of the border scrambled to maintain production without parts that rou-
tinely arrived from the supplier base in southwestern Ontario. To main-
tain deliveries from Canadian suppliers after the border was closed, 
U.S. companies ferried Canadian-built components on barges across 
the	Detroit	River,	with	the	tacit	approval	of	immigration	officials
Beyond the immediate impact of 9/11, the border has remained a 
serious logistics issue for Canadian suppliers. “Some Canadian com-
panies have responded by lengthening delivery schedules or setting up 
warehouses across the border to stockpile parts” (The	Economist	2008, 
p. 40).
Particularly acute has been congestion on the Ambassador Bridge 
from	Windsor	into	Detroit.	Goods	carried	on	the	Ambassador	Bridge—
primarily auto parts—account for one-fourth of the value of all trade 
entering the United States from Canada. The only other border crossing 
in the Detroit area, the Detroit–Windsor Tunnel, is too narrow to ac-
commodate large trucks. Otherwise, the nearest border crossing is the 
Blue Water Bridge between Sarnia, Ontario, and Port Huron, Michigan, 
about 60 miles north of Detroit.
Two	engineering	problems	have	hampered	traffi 	entering	the	Unit-
ed	States	on	 the	Ambassador	Bridge.	First,	 the	Canadian	 side	of	 the	
bridge has not been directly linked to the country’s high-speed road 
network. Route 401, the principal expressway through Ontario’s auto-
motive production corridor, terminates 5 miles from the bridge. Dur-
ing peak delivery times, trucks face considerable delays in stop-and-go 
traffi 	through	the	streets	of	Windsor.	
Second, once on the Ambassador Bridge, truckers often face fur-
ther delay because of backups at the U.S. customs and immigration sta-
tion on the Detroit side. Large corporations making frequent deliveries 
have expedited clearance through special bays, but the bridge itself has 
only one lane entering the United States, so during peak periods, trucks 
designated for expedited clearance may be caught in a backup on the 
bridge itself, intermingled with vehicles subject to more intense scru-
tiny and therefore unable to maneuver to their special clearance lane on 
the U.S. side.
Compounding the challenge of adding capacity from Canada to 
Michigan is the fact that the Ambassador Bridge is privately owned 
by Manuel J. (Marty) Moroun, through the U.S.-based Detroit Interna-
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tional Bridge Company and its Canadian subsidiary Canadian Transit 
Co. Both the State of Michigan and Moroun have proposed building a 
new bridge across the Detroit River (Davey 2007). 
Similarly, on the border between the United States and Mexico, ma-
terial moves more easily out of the United States than into it. Movement 
of material south from the United States to Mexico has been relatively 
straightforward.
Northbound has been another matter. “Notwithstanding the free-
doms	of	NAFTA,	Mexican	law	requires	that	all	domestic	over-the-road	
shipments be handled by Mexican carriers” (Bowman 2000). The north-
bound	Laredo	crossing	has	proved	especially	notorious.	“Veterans	of	
U.S.–Mexico trade have long complained of the punishing delays that 
trucks experience in crossing the border, especially at Laredo. Compet-
ing with armies of passenger cars, and depending on the attitude of 
customs	official 	toward	a	particular	shipment,	they	may	take	hours	or	
even	several	days	to	reach	the	broker	on	the	other	side.	A	busy	day	find 	
trucks backed up for several miles” (Bowman 2000).
NETWORKS OF SUPPLIERS AND ASSEMBLERS
Data for each of the 4,268 supplier plants in the United States, 
Canada,	and	Mexico	identifie 	in	this	study	included	the	names	of	the	
carmakers that served as customers for the products. Some suppliers 
shipped exclusively to one carmaker, but most had multiple custom-
ers per plant. Networks of suppliers could be constructed around the 
fina 	assembly	plants	of	each	of	the	carmakers.	These	networks	can	be	
depicted through maps of suppliers surrounding the assembly plants of 
individual carmakers.
Distances between suppliers and assembly plants were calculated as 
straight-line distances between the respective coordinates of the plants’ 
Zip	codes.	Due	to	the	presence	of	an	excellent	road	network,	straight-
line distances rather accurately approximate travel times (Klier 1995, 
2000). The principal limitation in constructing the networks is that the 
database shows customers by name of the carmaker rather than address 
of	the	assembly	plant.	For	example,	a	parts	maker	located	in	Ypsilanti,	
Michigan,	might	 report	 its	 customers	 as	Ford	 and	Mitsubishi.	 If	 the	
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customer operates only one assembly plant in the United States (like 
Mitsubishi),	 then	 the	address	of	 the	parts	plant’s	customer	 is	 identifi-
able and the distance between the parts plant and the assembly plant 
can	be	computed.	When	this	database	was	constructed,	fiv 	companies	




The three largest Japanese-owned carmakers—Honda, Nissan, and 
Toyota—all had more than one U.S. assembly plant at the time this 
database was created. Nonetheless, networks of suppliers around their 
assembly plants could be constructed in all three cases.
Honda started operating its Marysville, Ohio, assembly plant in 
1982 and built a second one in 1989 three miles away in East Liberty; 
because the two were so close to each other, it did not matter for this 
analysis which one was the customer for a particular supplier. Honda’s 
assembly plants in Lincoln, Alabama, which opened in 2003, and in 
Greensburg,	Indiana,	which	opened	in	2008,	were	too	new	to	affect	the	
database.
Nissan	 built	 its	 firs 	U.S.	 assembly	 plant	 in	 Smyrna,	Tennessee,	
in 1983 and added a second assembly plant in 2001 in Canton, Mis-
sissippi, which was also too new to affect this study. Similarly, at the 
time of this study, Toyota had one assembly complex, with two lines, 
in	Georgetown,	Kentucky.	Toyota	added	plants	 in	Princeton,	 Indiana	
(2001); San Antonio, Texas (2006); and Tupelo, Mississippi (2008). 
Again, however, these were too new for the database. Toyota’s joint 
venture	assembly	plant	with	GM	in	Fremont,	California,	was	identifie 	
separately in the database as NUMMI (New United Motors Manufac-
turing Inc.). Honda and Toyota also built assembly plants in Ontario 
during the 1980s, Honda in Alliston and Toyota in Cambridge. Toyota 
added another Ontario plant in Woodstock in 2008.
The Detroit 3 together operated about 30 U.S. assembly plants at 
the time of this study, so the data did not permit construction of indi-
vidual supplier networks for each of the assembly plants. The exception 
was	GM’s	Saturn	division,	which	was	identifie 	by	parts	makers	as	a	
customer	distinct	from	the	rest	of	GM,	and	at	the	time	of	this	study,	the	
vast majority of Saturns were produced at the assembly plant in Spring 
Hill, Tennessee.
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The Key Networks
Each of the network maps presented in this section of the book 
has included three concentric circles drawn around an assembly plant. 
These circles represented quartiles of the distance from the suppliers to 
the assembly plant. The closest one-fourth of all suppliers to that car-
maker were located within the inner circle, the next closest fourth were 
between the inner and middle circle, the third closest quartile were be-
tween	the	middle	and	the	outer	circle,	and	the	fina 	quartile	were	beyond	
the outer circle. In other words, one-half of suppliers were within the 
middle circle and three-fourths within the outer circle. Thus, the radius 
of the middle circle represents the median distance for shipment of parts 
to the particular assembly plant.
Mitsubishi, for example, had one-fourth of its parts suppliers lo-
cated within 245 miles of its assembly plant in Normal, Illinois. Most 
of these suppliers were in Illinois, Indiana, western Michigan, and west-
ern Ohio. Another one-fourth of the suppliers were between 245 and 
337 miles from Normal, primarily in southeastern Michigan, central 
Ohio, and Kentucky. Three-fourths of suppliers were within 557 miles 
of Normal, with the additional suppliers coming primarily from eastern 
Ohio	and	Ontario	(Figure	6.1).	The	median	distance	from	the	Mitsubi-
shi plant for all suppliers was thus 337 miles.
For	 carmakers	with	more	 than	one	 assembly	plant	 in	 the	United	




placed in southeastern Michigan because the area was home to about 
one-half of their U.S. assembly plants in 2007.
Honda’s supplier network
Honda,	 the	 firs 	 Japanese	 carmaker	 to	 assemble	 vehicles	 in	 the	
United States, put together a supplier base clustered tightly in west-
ern Ohio, near its Marysville and East Liberty assembly plants, which 
were constructed 3 miles from each other on opposite sides of a disused 
test vehicle track acquired from the State of Ohio. Most of the engines 
destined for Marysville and East Liberty were made in Anna, Ohio, 35 
miles west of the assembly complex. Transmissions came from a plant 
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in Russells Point, Ohio, 25 miles west. Seats were made 30 miles east of 
the	complex	by	Honda	affiliat 	TS	Tech	in	Reynoldsburg,	Ohio.
In 2006 the company announced the construction of an engine plant 
near its Alliston, Ontario, assembly facility. That move made available 
much needed production capacity at its Anna, Ohio, engine plant, sup-
porting the construction of a new assembly plant in eastern Indiana to 
open in 2008.
One-fourth of Honda’s North American suppliers were within 149 
miles, one-half within 288 miles, and three-fourths within 449 miles 
(Figure	6.2).	Thus,	around	three-fourths	of	Honda	suppliers	were	within	
one day’s drive of Marysville and East Liberty. “[A]s trucking costs 
rise, the idea of moving some suppliers closer to Honda’s property ‘is 
beginning	 to	make	more	 financia 	 sense.’”2 Yet, even though Honda 
had one of the tightest supplier networks, only 2 percent of its inde-
Figure 6.1  Location of Mitsubishi’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final 
Assembly Plant in Normal, Illinois
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other sources.
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pendently owned suppliers were located within 60 miles of the western 
Ohio assembly plant complex. JIT has not meant “right next door” for 
Honda.
Two decades after arriving in Ohio, Honda decided to build its third 
U.S. assembly plant in Lincoln, Alabama, 40 miles east of Birmingham. 
The Ohio supplier plants lay 700 miles to the north, well beyond the 
one-day delivery range. Consequently, Honda constructed a second set 
of facilities in the Deep South. An engine plant was placed in the same 
Lincoln campus with the assembly plant. Transmissions came from Tal-
lapoosa,	Georgia,	60	miles	 to	 the	east,	 just	across	 the	Alabama	 state	
line. TS provided seats from Boaz, Alabama, 50 miles to the north. 
Honda’s Deep South facilities were not expected to induce a large 
number of suppliers to locate new facilities in their immediate vicinity. 
Figure 6.2  Location of Honda’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final Assembly 
Plants in Marysville and East Liberty, Ohio
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other sources.
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“Most of Honda’s suppliers operate factories nearer to Honda’s older 
assembly plants in central Ohio and Ontario. Although Honda used 620 
North American Tier 1 suppliers, only about 20 operated near its Ala-
bama plant” (Chappell 2004c). 
Honda’s limited commitment to the Deep South was revealed in a 
response to a reporter’s question, “Will we see another wave of [Honda] 
supplier	plants	coming	into	Georgia?”	Honda’s	answer	was,	“No,	not	
really. We will continue to make transmissions in Ohio. Transmission 
manufacturing is such a capital-intensive operation that it probably 
wouldn’t make sense for our suppliers to invest in two locations to sup-
port us.”3
Toyota’s supplier network
Toyota’s network of suppliers was not as spatially clustered as 
Honda’s. The heart of Toyota’s U.S. network was tied to a 300-mile 
east–west stretch of I-64 between its assembly plant in Princeton, Indi-
ana,	and	its	powertrain	plant	in	Buffalo,	West	Virginia.	A	second	300-
mile north–south corridor extended south from I-64 to an engine plant 
in Huntsville, Alabama, and an assembly plant in Tupelo, Mississippi 
(to open in 2009). Near the intersection of the two corridors, in central 










nio assembly plants received some of their engines from the Huntsville 
plant. Thus, in 2007 approximately
•	 40	percent	of	Toyota’s	engines	were	made	adjacent	to	fina 	as-
sembly plants;
• 15 percent were shipped about 300 miles north (from Alabama to 
Indiana);




ginia to California); and
•	 15	percent	were	shipped	across	the	Pacifi 	from	Toyota	facilities	
in Japan.
In other words, Toyota eschewed Honda’s strong preference for 
close spatial linkage between assembly and powertrain sources. Where-
as nearly all of Honda’s powertrain needs were produced within an hour 
or	so	of	fina 	assembly	operations,	Toyota	triaged	its	captive	powertrain	
supply base into roughly equal portions by distance. A bit more than 
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other 
sources.
Figure 6.3  Location of Toyota’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final Assembly 
Complex in Georgetown, Kentucky
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one-third	 of	Toyota	 engines	were	 delivered	 to	 fina 	 assembly	 plants	
within one hour, one-third within one day, and one-third in more than 
one day.
Like Honda, Toyota had only 2 percent of its suppliers positioned 
within one hour of assembly plants. The notable exception, as always, 
was the seat assembler. Most of the seats were shipped to Toyota’s 
Georgetown	 assembly	 plant	 from	Nicholasville,	Kentucky,	 25	miles	
away, and to the Princeton assembly plant from Lawrenceville, Illinois, 
35 miles away.
By assembling vehicles in California, Texas, and Baja, Toyota 
stretched its supply chain wider than other carmakers. The NUMMI 
joint venture in California, opened in the early 1980s, could be regarded 
as Toyota’s preliminary investigation for testing the ability to conduct 
lean	production	in	North	American	factories.	Separated	by	the	Pacifi 	
Ocean from Japanese suppliers and by several thousand miles from the 
U.S. parts production center, NUMMI has depended on especially com-
plex logistics arrangements.
With 80 percent of its parts sourced east of the Mississippi, NUMMI 
relied on a number of parts consolidation centers. Parts suppliers shipped 
their output to one of these centers, located in El Paso, Memphis, Chi-
cago,	and	Detroit.	From	there	the	parts	were	transported	to	the	assembly	
plant. This system allowed the assembly plant inventory to be no larger 
than four hours (Ward’s	Automotive	Reports 1997). The Baja plant did 
not add much additional weight to the Southwest in Toyota’s footprint 
because it produced only a small number of pickup trucks from little 
more than knocked-down kits.
The decision to build an assembly plant in Texas, though, could not 
be	dismissed	as	an	anomaly.	Toyota	official 	justifie 	the	location	for	
marketing reasons. What better way to establish credentials as a sell-




the “tyranny” of geography—the additional costs of shipping parts into 
Texas and shipping out assembled vehicles, which was at least several 
hundred dollars per vehicle. If Toyota did not absorb the penalty, then it 
would fall to its suppliers, haulers, or customers or all of the above. 
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Detroit 3 supplier networks
Differences are immediately visible in the distribution of the sup-
plier networks of the Detroit 3 and of Japanese-owned carmakers. The 
Detroit 3 networks contained more suppliers, were more tightly clus-
tered around assembly plants, and were located further north.
The	supplier	networks	of	Chrysler,	Ford,	and	GM	were	nearly	iden-
tical	(Figures	6.4,	6.5,	and	6.6,	respectively).	One-fourth	of	the	suppliers	
to each of the Detroit 3 were located within approximately 135 miles of 
Detroit, essentially southern Michigan with the addition of small por-
tions of western Ontario and northern Ohio. One-half of all suppliers 
were	within	275	miles	of	Detroit,	encompassing	the	Great	Lakes	region	
between Milwaukee and Buffalo, as well as the auto-producing por-
tion of Ontario. Another one-fourth of suppliers were located between 
275 and 613 miles away, extending primarily into the South. The most 
distant one-fourth of Detroit 3 suppliers were widely scattered, with the 
largest number in Mexico.
Suppliers	 to	GM’s	Saturn	brand	were	 identifie 	 separately	 in	 the	
database for this project. Saturn’s supplier network was scattered over a 
much larger area than was the case for other Detroit 3 assembly plants. 
Relatively few suppliers chose to locate close to Saturn’s Tennessee as-
sembly plant. The circle encompassing one-fourth of Saturn suppliers 
had	an	extremely	 large	 radius	of	321	miles	 (Figure	6.7).	One-half	of	
Saturn suppliers were within 482 miles, and three-fourths within 559 
miles.	Saturn	used	many	suppliers	based	in	the	Great	Lakes	that	did	not	
choose to add facilities in Tennessee to be near Saturn. With most of 
its suppliers located more than one day away, Saturn had to depend on 
logistics operations to meet JIT requirements.
Comparing Networks by Location
Networks of suppliers around assembly plants located in the Deep 
South could be compared to those located in the Upper South and Mid-
west. Differences—and similarities—among the networks illustrate 
fundamental features underlying the geography of carmaker–supplier 
linkages. 
The four Deep South assembly plants for this comparison were 
BMW in South Carolina, Mercedes-Benz in Alabama, and Nissan and 
Saturn	in	Tennessee.	Five	assembly	plants	in	the	Upper	South	and	Mid-
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west were Honda in Ohio, AutoAlliance (Mazda) in Michigan, Mitsubi-
shi in Illinois, Subaru in Indiana, and Toyota in Kentucky. 
The	fiv 	Upper	South	and	Midwest	assembly	plants	were	relatively	
old, having all been opened during the 1980s (Table 6.1). Three of the 
four Deep South plants were opened more recently, in the 1990s. This 
reflecte 	the	southern	drift	of	the	U.S.	motor	vehicle	industry,	which	is	
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.
The	nine	fina 	assembly	plants	had	a	mean	of	425	suppliers	and	a	
median	of	340.	The	fiv 	Upper	South	and	Midwest	plants	had	a	mean	
of 457 suppliers, 19 percent more than the average of 385 for the four 
southern plants. The three best-selling brands—Toyota, Honda, and 
Nissan—had a much higher mean of 692 suppliers. Assembly plants 
that produced fewer vehicles had correspondingly fewer suppliers. 
Figure 6.4  Location of Chrysler’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final 
Assembly Plants in Southeastern Michigan
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other sources.
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Five	more	assembly	plants	were	added	 to	 the	analysis	of	 suppli-
ers located within a one-day drive, including three in the Upper South 
and Midwest (Honda and Toyota in Ontario and Toyota in Indiana) and 
two in the Deep South (Honda in Alabama and Nissan in Mississippi). 
The	average	median	distance	from	the	14	fina 	assembly	plants	listed	
in Table 6.2 to each of their several hundred suppliers was 440 miles. 
In other words, half of the suppliers were located beyond 440 miles, 
which is just within the 450-mile industry standard for the distance a 
truck can cover in one day. The average median distance to suppliers 
was considerably less from the eight Upper South and Midwest plants 
than from the six Deep South ones, 317 miles from the eight northern 
plants compared with 602 miles from the six southern ones. Median 
distance from the eight Upper South and Midwest assembly plants to 
Figure 6.5  Location of Ford’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final Assembly 
Plants in Southeastern Michigan
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other sources.
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Figure 6.6  Location of GM’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final Assembly 
Plants in Southeastern Michigan
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other 
sources.
their suppliers ranged from 238 miles for AutoAlliance to 372 miles for 
Toyota/Indiana.	For	the	six	Deep	South	plants,	the	median	ranged	from	
497 for Saturn to 776 for Nissan Mississippi. 
The supply base of the Upper South and Midwest assembly plants 
was much more likely than the Deep South ones to be located within 
the one-day driving range of 450 miles. All eight of northern plants had 
between 60 percent and 75 percent of their supplier base located within 
450 miles. Together they averaged 68 percent. Incidentally, all eight of 
the assembly plants were also located within 450 miles of Detroit. The 
six Deep South assembly plants had an average of just under one-third 
of	their	suppliers	within	450	miles,	with	figure 	ranging	from	14	to	41	
percent.
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Results were different for the percentage of suppliers within 60 
miles, or roughly within a one-hour driving distance, of the various as-
sembly plants (Table 6.3). The 60-mile distance was chosen to capture 
plants that locate close enough to allow multiple daily deliveries using 
the same truck. On average, only 5 percent of suppliers were located 




cantly between the two groups of assembly plants. The six Deep South 
plants together had 6 percent of their suppliers within one hour, whereas 
the eight Upper South and Midwestern ones had 4 percent. The actual 
count was also virtually identical: an average of 21 parts plants were 
Figure 6.7  Location of Saturn’s Suppliers Relative to Its Final Assembly 
Plant in Spring Hill, Tennessee
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other 
sources.
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within 60 miles of the 8 Upper South and Midwest assembly plants and 
19 were within 60 miles of the 6 Deep South ones. 
The variation in percentage and number of suppliers within 60 miles 
fluctuate 	much	more	within	groups	than	between	them.	Nine	assembly	
plants had less than 5 percent of suppliers and two had about 15 percent. 
The number of suppliers within 60 miles ranged from 48 for AutoAl-
liance to 3 for Mitsubishi and Toyota/Indiana. That AutoAlliance had 
the highest number of suppliers located within a 60-mile radius was not 
surprising, because the plant is located in southeastern Michigan, just 
south of Detroit, surrounded by the highest concentration of supplier 
plants anywhere in the country. 
The location of suppliers by country was similar across networks 
(Table 6.4). Honda and Toyota both had assembly operations in Canada, 
hence their elevated share of suppliers based in Ontario. By the same 
token, Nissan had a large share of Mexican suppliers due to its greater 
Table 6.1  Location, Year Opened, and Number of Suppliers for Selected 
Assembly Plants
Carmaker       State Year opened
Number of 
suppliers
Upper South and Midwest 
AutoAlliance Michigan 1987 336
Honda Ohio 1982 667a
Mitsubishi Illinois 1987 335
Subaru Indiana 1989 340
Toyota Kentucky 1987 606b
Deep South
BMW South Carolina 1994 158
Mercedes-Benz Alabama 1997 234
Nissan Tennessee 1983 803c
Saturn Tennessee 1990 346
a Honda’s suppliers to its Alabama and Ontario assembly plants are included in the 
Ohio total.
b Toyota’s suppliers to its Indiana and Ontario assembly plants are included in the Ken-
tucky total.
c Nissan’s suppliers to its Mississippi assembly plant are included in the Tennessee 
total.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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footprint there. Nissan’s North American supplier network was large 
because it included a sizeable number of suppliers based in Mexico. 
With	the	exception	of	Volkswagen,	Nissan	was	the	only	“foreign”	au-
tomaker that has a notable presence in Mexico, where it operates two 
assembly plants. 
Data for suppliers around the NUMMI plant were also examined. 
As the only remaining assembly plant in California, far from the heart 
of the U.S. auto industry, median distance to suppliers was 2,007 miles, 
much higher than for any other assembly plant. Only 6 percent of 
NUMMI’s	suppliers	were	within	450	miles,	and	only	fiv 	suppliers,	or	
2.5 percent of its total, were within 60 miles. 
Table 6.2  Suppliers within One Day’s Driving Distance of Selected 
Assembly Plants
Carmaker   State or province




Upper South and 
Midwest
317 68
AutoAlliance Michigan 238 71
Honda Ohio 268 75
Mitsubishi Illinois 342 65
Subaru Indiana 282 69
Toyota Kentucky 321 73
Honda Ontario 369 62
Toyota Indiana 372 66
Toyota Ontario 345 64
Deep South 602 29
BMW South Carolina 523 41
Mercedes-Benz Alabama 688 23
Nissan Tennessee 505 35
Saturn Tennessee 497 39
Honda Alabama 621 22
Nissan Mississippi 776 14
Mean 440 51
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Close linkage between an assembly plant and its network of suppli-
ers	is	crucial	for	efficien 	operation	in	the	contemporary	environment	
of	lean	inventory	with	JIT	delivery.	For	most	suppliers,	close	linkage	
means a physical location within a one-day delivery range of the as-
sembly plant. Regardless of whether an assembly plant is located in 
the	Great	Lakes	or	the	southern	portion	of	Auto	Alley,	roughly	three-
fourths of its suppliers will be situated within one day.
At the same time, close linkage does not mean suppliers must locate 
next door to the assembly plant. In fact, few suppliers are within a one-
Table 6.3  Suppliers within One Hour’s Driving Distance of Selected 
Assembly Plants





within 60 miles 
(%)
Upper South and 
Midwest
21 4
AutoAlliance Michigan 48 14
Honda Ohio 29 4
Mitsubishi Illinois 3 1
Subaru Indiana 7 2
Toyota Kentucky 11 2
Honda Ontario 34 5
Toyota Indiana 3 1
Toyota Ontario 35 6
Deep South 19 6
BMW South Carolina 26 17
Mercedes-Benz Alabama 22 9
Nissan Tennessee 13 2
Saturn Tennessee 8 2
Honda Alabama 20 3
Nissan Mississippi 23 3
Mean 20 5
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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hour drive of an assembly plant. Invariably, the seat supplier will be 
within the one-hour radius, as are some stamping and trim shops.
That most suppliers are within one day but not within one hour is 
critical	to	local	government	attempts	to	entice	new	plants.	Government	
subsidies	exceeding	$100,000	per	 job	 for	 fina 	assembly	plants	have	
been	justifie 	because	of	the	multiplier	effect:	each	new	assembly	job	
generates several new supplier jobs. However, most of the new supplier 
jobs are destined for political jurisdictions other than the one enticing 
the	fina 	assembly	plant.	
Especially challenging for the future of tightly linked networks of 
carmakers	and	suppliers	is	the	globalization	of	supply	chains.	With	fina 	
assembly plants in the United States receiving more than one-fourth of 
their components from other countries—as discussed in Chapter 13—
JIT has become harder to sustain when it is stretched around the world. 
Table 6.4  Mexican and Canadian Suppliers to Selected Assembly Plants





Upper South and 
Midwest
AutoAlliance Michigan 9.8 6.0
Hondaa Ohio 10.6 6.8 
Mitsubishi Illinois 9.3 3.6
Subaru Indiana 7.1 5.0
Toyotab Kentucky 10.1 6.4 
Deep South
BMW South Carolina 1.9 13.9
Mercedes-Benzc Alabama 8.1 31.2
Nissand Tennessee 4.0 32.0
Saturn Tennessee 9.8 2.6
a Honda’s suppliers to its Alabama and Ontario assembly plants are included in the 
Ohio total.
b Toyota’s suppliers to its Indiana and Ontario assembly plants are included in the Ken-
tucky total.
c The Mercedes network includes a number of Chrysler suppliers, some of which are 
located in Mexico.
d Nissan’s suppliers to its Mississippi assembly plant are included in the Tennessee 
total.
SOURCE: Adapted by authors from ELM International database and other sources.
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“How do suppliers maintain JIT delivery when weeks are added to a 
delivery cycle that previously was measured in hours or days? ‘Current 
automotive supply chains were built around just-in-time production and 
very	short	lead	times,’	notes	Mark	Bünger,	senior	analyst	at	Forrester	
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. ‘When these companies start 




 2. Larry Jutte, Honda of America Manufacturing senior vice president and general 
manager of parts and procurement, quoted in Chappell (2005d).
 3. Larry Jutte, Honda of America Manufacturing senior vice president and general 




Seat Supplier Right Next Door
Automakers	encouraged	Tier	1s	to	get	big	enough	to	handle	





The previous chapter showed that three-fourths of parts plants are 
located	within	a	one-day	drive	of	 the	 fina 	assembly	plants,	but	only	
a few were within a one-hour drive. Invariably, one of the handful of 
parts plants within the one-hour radius of the assembly plant is a seat 
supplier.
Finding	 seat	 suppliers	very	near	 fina 	 assembly	plants	derives	 in	
part from the economic geography of seat production. A vehicle seat 
comprises three principal components. The frame, which is mainly 
metal, provides the basic skeleton for the seat and transfers the load to 
the body of the vehicle. The padding is primarily polyurethane foam 
molded to shape. The external skin is cut from fabric, leather, or vinyl 
and sewn to shape. 
A	 finishe 	 seat	occupies	a	much	greater	volume	 than	 the	 sum	of	
these individual inputs. Thus, like other bulk-gaining products, seats 
will	normally	be	produced	most	efficientl 	near	the	customer.	A	seat	is	
fragile as well as bulky, and it comes in a rather large number of variet-
ies	for	a	given	model.	So	 long-distance	shipping	of	a	finishe 	seat	 is	
much	more	difficul 	and	expensive	than	long-distance	shipping	of	the	
constituent parts of a seat.
The distinctive organization of this sector of the auto industry has 
also	 favored	 especially	 tight	 colocation	 with	 fina 	 assembly.	A	 low	
value-added component that was considered peripheral to the vehicle’s 
performance	or	profit 	the	seat	was	one	of	the	firs 	parts	that	the	Detroit	
3 carmakers outsourced to independent suppliers and placed on JIT de-
livery	to	fina 	assembly	plants.	Clearing	out	the	massive	inventory	of	
cushions,	frames,	and	covers	from	Detroit	3	fina 	assembly	plants	was	
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the most visible harbinger of JIT delivery during the 1980s. Japanese-
owned carmakers in the United States outsourced seats from the start.
Also contributing to the distinctive geography of seat production 
has been the consolidation of the sector into a handful of major sup-
pliers. An assembly plant obtains most if not all its seats from a single 
source, and the supplier in turn typically dedicates a single facility to 
producing seats for that assembly plant. 
The	fate	of	an	assembly	plant	determines	the	fate	of	a	seat	plant.	For	
example,	assembly	plant	closures	by	GM	 in	Atlanta	and	by	Chrysler	
in Newark, Delaware, resulted in the closure of nearby Lear seat-mak-
ing plants. By the same token, to support Honda’s assembly plant in 
Greensburg,	Indiana,	which	opened	in	2008,	TS	Tech,	Honda’s	primary	
seat supplier in North America, opened a new plant in 2008, just 45 
miles away in New Castle, Indiana. This colocation recalls the pattern 
used during the era of vertical integration, when the Detroit 3 carmakers 
typically located a stamping facility near each assembly plant to supply 
it with bodies (see Chapter 4).
The seat may play a less central role than other systems in vehicle 
performance, but the powertrain, chassis, and electronics perform their 
functions largely unseen, and the exterior catches the eye of motorists 
only	fleetingl 	as	they	get	in	and	out	of	the	vehicle.	It	is	while	sitting	
in the interior that the driver most experiences the convenience of a 
modern vehicle, and the passenger experiences its comfort. In addition 
the interior is one of the most self-contained parts of the vehicle, so it is 
relatively easy to isolate it for outsourcing.
As a result, the interior has been the portion of the vehicle where 
producer–supplier relations have been most transformed. “The process 
of outsourcing entire modules to Tier 1 suppliers and delegating respon-
sibility for the design and subcontracting has probably gone furthest in 
interiors	and	seats”	(Van	Biesebroeck	2006,	p.	209).	A	handful	of	com-
panies stand ready, willing, and able to supply carmakers with entire in-
teriors	ready	to	snap	into	place	on	the	fina 	assembly	line.	Other	interior	
suppliers, including some of the industry’s largest, have been relegated 
to Tier 2 status, shipping much of their output to the three interior sup-
pliers rather than directly to carmakers. Consequently, the interior has 
been the most rationalized sector of the auto supplier industry. It is also 
the least globalized—both of the leading interior suppliers in the United 
States are U.S.-based.
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IT ALL STARTED WITH SEATS
Nowhere is the name Johnson or Lear visible inside a motor ve-
hicle;	 it	 is	Ford	or	Toyota	stamped	on	 the	steering	wheel,	 instrument	
panel, and doorpost. Yet Johnson Controls Inc. (JCI) and Lear Corp. 
deserve as much credit as the carmakers for the look and feel of the pas-
senger compartment. These two interior specialists have ranked among 
the largest suppliers in North America. 
In contrast with many of the other leading North American suppli-
ers, which are venerable survivors from the early days of the automo-
tive industry, these two large interior suppliers rose to prominence much 
more recently. Neither Lear nor JCI has a long history in the automotive 
industry: Lear entered the parts business in 1964 and JCI in 1978. Both 
grew rapidly during the late twentieth century by being in a position to 
respond to carmakers’ demand for JIT delivery of complete seats ready 
to	install	on	the	fina 	assembly	line.	Into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	they	
evolved from mere “suppliers” to “integrators” of interiors. 
The lowly seat made an unlikely candidate to spearhead a revo-
lution in producer–supplier relations. The seat was an afterthought 
through	 the	 firs 	 century	 of	 motor	 vehicle	 production.	 For	 its	 firs 	
Model	A	 in	1903	Ford	spent	a	mere	$16	per	vehicle	(representing	4	
percent of production costs) on seats, which were cushions purchased 
from body builder C.R. Wilson to cover wooden slats (Table 2.1). In 
2006, the seat represented 30 to 40 percent of the total interior cost 
(Lear Corporation 2006, p. 7).
Replacement of open carriages with enclosed passenger compart-
ments in the 1920s generated demand for more substantial seats. Mini-
mally structured sofas, not unlike those typically found in the living 
rooms	of	modest	American	homes,	were	chopped	down	to	fi 	the	more	
limited space and installed in cars. Most new car buyers bought after-
market covers to protect the seats from wear and tear as well as throw a 
dash of style and color over the drab gray factory-delivered surface.
GM’s	 empire	within	 an	 empire,	 Fisher	Body	 division,	 produced	
most	of	GM’s	seats,	mainly	in	the	same	Flint	plant	where	the	famous	
1937 sit-down strike forced the company to recognize the UAW union. 
Ford	naturally	made	most	of	its	seats	inside	its	sprawling	Rouge	com-
plex. Chrysler too made most of its seats in Michigan. To manufacture 
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seats, the Detroit 3 purchased most of the parts from multiple sources 
through annual contracts awarded by price.
When the Detroit 3 started to demand delivery of complete seats on 
a JIT basis during the 1980s, the numerous suppliers of frames, cush-
ions, and covers were thrown into disarray. To deliver complete seats, 
suppliers once content to specialize in one seat-related component had 
to	figur 	out	how	to	get	the	other	components—by	acquiring	competi-
tors, setting up new facilities, or subcontracting to specialists. And to 
assure	JIT	delivery,	a	seat	supplier	had	 to	build	a	fina 	seat	assembly	
plant	adjacent	to	the	customer’s	fina 	assembly	plant.	The	required	in-
vestment and risk proved too much for most seat makers.
Left standing from the shakeout were JCI and Lear; each controlled 
roughly	40	percent	of	the	North	American	market	during	the	firs 	decade	
of	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Magna	International	(discussed	in	Chapter	
4) had about 10 percent of the North American seat market, and several 
foreign-based	companies	divided	the	rest.	For	both	JCI	and	Lear,	sup-
plying	seats	represented	a	significan 	departure	from	long-standing	core	
competencies in other industrial sectors. Both had esoteric connections 
to the early motor vehicle industry, but these connections were unre-
lated to making seats.
The JCI–Lear battle for the seat market turned into the auto indus-
try’s version of the nuclear arms race (a rump race?). Never mind alter-
native fuels, variable transmissions, and electronic suspension, billions 
were poured in researching the derriere of the American motorist (it’s 
getting larger). What better opportunity was there to envelop the Ameri-
can motorist in more comfort? With the market long since cornered, 
seat makers have had to search for new ways to add content. Cavernous 
minivans and sport utility vehicles have offered especially fertile terri-
tory	for	suppliers	to	configur 	endless	seating	permutations.	
Sofa-style “bench” seats have long given way to what were origi-
nally called “bucket” seats. No longer can a tired motorist (or amorous 
couple) stretch out across a bench—each passenger is now individually 
wrapped up inside a self-contained “captain’s chair.” Seats are being 
shaped to be more ergonomic, and the addition of headrests and child 
supports make them safer. Materials are more durable, waterproof, stain 
resistant, and breathable. Thinner seats leave room to stuff yet more 
features into the interior.
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Ultimately, though, the seat supplier battle between JCI and Lear 
has been waged largely on trim, colors, and other cosmetic features. An 
executive at one of the two dominant seat suppliers, unable to restrain 
his enthusiasm for the company’s newest seat, apologized that the spe-
cifi 	features	had	to	remain	secret,	although	assurance	was	given	that	
the new seat would “shock and awe” the authors, not to mention the 
American public, when it was unveiled.
Lear: From Jets to Seats
The name Lear is probably most widely recognized as a brand of 
small jet airplanes, and in fact, inventor and entrepreneur William Lear 
(1902–1978)	 started	 the	 firs 	 company	 bearing	 his	 name	 during	 the	
1930s	to	fi 	planes	for	use	by	executives.	Lear	Inc.	grew	rapidly	during	
World War II as a supplier of electronic aviation guidance to the mili-
tary. Unable to convince his business partners to invest in the up-and-
coming but still economically risky passenger jets, Bill Lear sold his 
interest in Lear Inc. in 1959. The company merged with Siegler Corp. 
three years later to form Lear Siegler, Inc., a major defense contractor 
during	the	Vietnam	War.
Bill Lear went on to create Learjet in 1962. The Wichita, Kansas, 
company soon became the leading supplier of corporate jets to execu-
tives	and	other	wealthy	individuals	who	could	afford	a	private	and	fle -
ible	alternative	to	scheduled	airlines.	He	sold	Learjet	in	1967	to	Gates	
Rubber Co., by coincidence also a major automotive parts supplier at 
the time. After several more transfers, Learjet became a division of 
Québec-based Bombardier Aerospace. 
Bill Lear was restless. He would develop an innovative consumer 
product with high-tech electronics by the standards of the time, estab-
lish a company to manufacture it, sell his interest in the company a 
few years later, and then repeat the cycle with a fresh idea. Prior to his 
work in aviation, he was an early contributor to the development of car 
radios.	He	patented	 the	 firs 	workable	car	 radio	 in	1922,	and	 formed	
the Radio Wire and Coil Co. to build them. He assigned the patent two 
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Lear Siegler expanded rapidly during the 1960s in a variety of sec-
tors, many unrelated to defense work. One of the more obscure of its 47 
divisions and subsidiaries was American Metal Products, a producer of 
metal	tubes,	founded	in	1917	in	Detroit	by	Frederick	Matthaei	(1892–
1973). Aircraft companies bought some of them, but its largest custom-
ers	during	the	1920s	were	Ford	and	GM,	which	shaped	the	metal	tubes	
into seat frames. American Metal added Chrysler and several automo-
tive	parts	makers	as	customers	during	the	1930s,	exceeded	$1	million	
sales	 for	 the	 firs 	 time	 in	1939,	and	expanded	 from	18	employees	 in	
1917 to 900 in 1941. When it was acquired by Lear Siegler in 1964, 
American Metal had become the largest independent supplier of parts 




ing, which was incorporated as Lear Siegler Seating Corp. About 30 of 
the seating division’s managers acquired the company a year later and 
took the company public, on the New York Stock Exchange, in 1994.




Seating of America, with Japanese supplier NHK Spring Co., to sup-
ply	seats	to	Subaru’s	Lafayette	assembly	plant,	from	nearby	Frankfort,	
Indiana. 
Johnson Controls: From Thermostats to Seats
JCI similarly originated as a manufacturer of a product unrelated 
to the auto industry, in this case, the thermostat. Warren S. Johnson, a 
professor at the State Normal School in Whitewater, Wisconsin (now 
University of Wisconsin Whitewater), invented the electric room ther-
mostat in 1883. With a group of Milwaukee investors, he incorporated 
Johnson Electric Service Co. in 1885 to manufacture, install, and ser-
vice	 automatic	 temperature	 regulation	 systems	 for	 office 	 and	 other	
nonresidential buildings. The company was renamed Johnson Controls 
in 1974.
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Johnson developed other products during the late nineteenth cen-
tury, including beer carbonators, steam couplers for trains, and push-
button toilets. The company also built some cars and trucks during the 
firs 	decade	of	the	twentieth	century.	After	Johnson’s	death	in	1911,	the	
company concentrated solely on nonresidential temperature controls. It 




JCI became an original equipment interior parts supplier in 1985 
when	it	bought	Ferro	Manufacturing	Corp.	and	Hoover	Universal,	Inc.	
Ferro,	a	privately	held	company	founded	in	1915,	made	car	door	latch-
es, window regulators, seat tracks, and recliners. 
The key acquisition was Hoover Precision Products Inc., founded in 
1913 by Leander J. Hoover in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to make steel balls 
for the automotive industry. Hoover became a seat supplier through ac-
quisition of Universal Wire Spring Inc., which made seat springs, in 
1960,	and	Stubnitz	Greene	Corp.,	which	made	seat	frames	and	molded	







Products Division was sold in 1990 to Japanese bearing-maker NSK. 
JCI did retain its original thermostat business.
JCI’s Joint Ventures
JCI grew in part through acquiring Chrysler’s seat operations in 
1994, but it could not keep pace with Lear’s torrid buying spree. In-
stead, JCI fueled much of its expansion through several joint ventures 
with Japanese suppliers and minority-owned U.S.-based suppliers.
JCI’s	 firs 	 joint	venture,	 called	Trim	Masters,	was	 established	 in	
1987 with Toyota keiretsu Araco Corporation to supply seats to Toy-
ota’s U.S. assembly plants. Araco remained in the shadow of JCI until 
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2004,	when	 it	became	part	of	Toyota	Boshoku	Co.	Following	 in	 the	
footsteps	of	other	Toyota	keiretsu	firm 	Aisin	and	Denso,	Toyota	Bo-
shoku emerged as a major interior integrator and competitor to JCI in 
the	early	twenty-firs 	century	(see	Outlook	and	Uncertainties	at	the	end	
of the chapter). 
Trim Masters had seat assembly plants in Nicholasville, Kentucky, 
to	 serve	Toyota’s	Georgetown	assembly	plant,	and	 in	Lawrenceville,	
Illinois, to serve Toyota’s Princeton assembly plant. The joint venture 
also had facilities to cut and sew leather, cloth, and vinyl in Harrods-
burg	and	Leitchfield 	Kentucky;	Muncie,	Indiana;	and	Torreon,	Mex-
ico. Trim Masters also did injection molding and vacuum forming for 
door trim at Bardstown, Kentucky, and Modesto, California, as well as 
Lawrenceville.
The Lawrenceville plant, which supplied Toyota, became entangled 
in a complex web of ownership. Trim Masters sold the plant in 2001 
to a newly formed company named Automotive Technology Systems. 
Trim Masters—itself a joint venture between JCI and Araco—retained 
49 percent ownership in the new company. Majority control passed to 
Ernie	Green	Industries,	Inc.
Why	Ernie	Green?	With	Ernie	Green	holding	majority	control,	Au-




League between 1962 and 1968. 
The one-time football star claimed that his success at selling to Japa-





Production System principles. 
Ernie	Green	Industries,	founded	in	Dayton,	Ohio,	started	supplying	
Honda	with	plastic	wheel	covers	in	the	early	1990s.	Honda	asked	Green	
to acquire and run a troublesome plastics supplier and repaid the favor 
in 1999 with a large contract to supply front and rear suspensions to its 
Marysville and East Liberty assembly plants. Honda had been making 
the components at its Anna, Ohio, engine plant, and wanted to devote 
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more plant space to engine production. With no experience producing 
that	component,	Ernie	Green	Industries	official 	spent	a	year	observing	
how Honda made suspensions before opening a parts plant in Marion, 
Ohio	 (Chappell	2001).	Sourcing	parts	 from	Ernie	Green	gave	Honda	
an opportunity to increase purchases from minority-owned suppliers. 
More	than	half	of	Ernie	Green’s	$636	million	sales	in	2003	comprised	
original	 equipment	 to	 Honda.	 GM	 and	 Toyota	 were	 also	 important	
customers.
To supply Nissan’s Smyrna, Tennessee, assembly plant, JCI set 
up a 50–50 joint venture in nearby Murfreesboro with Nissan keiretsu 
Ikeda	Bussan	Co.	When	Nissan,	under	the	leadership	of	Carlos	Ghosn,	
severed many of its keiretsu links, JCI bought out Ikeda’s half of the 
Murfreesboro joint venture. In 1996 JCI created a third joint venture, 
called Bridgewater Interiors, with Epsilon, LLC to produce seats and 
other interior components. Because Epsilon was minority owned, the 
joint	venture	was	also	certifie 	as	minority	owned.	Bridgewater	sup-
plied seats to Honda’s truck plant in Lincoln, Alabama. 
The joint ventures gave JCI a strong tactical advantage in the seat 
market. The Detroit 3, under pressure to increase sourcing through mi-
nority-owned suppliers, could buy seats from Bridgewater. And the 
leading Japanese transplants, reluctant to deal with a heavily unionized 
purely “American” company like Lear, could still source seats to JCI 
indirectly. One-third of JCI’s North American sales were being gener-
ated	by	transplant	business	into	the	twenty-firs 	century.	“The	thing	that	
jumps out about Johnson Controls is their broad customer base . . . They 
do probably the best job of any American company with the new do-
mestics, especially the Japanese transplants.”1 Only one-third of JCI’s 
sales went to the Detroit 3 in 2006, compared to 61 percent for rival 
Lear (Merrill Lynch 2007, pp. 71, 74).
Other Seat Suppliers
To increase competition, the Detroit 3 encouraged new entrants into 
the seating business. “The car companies are uncomfortable having just 
two choices in global seating suppliers.”2 Especially uncomfortable has 
been	GM,	 still	hoping	 for	 a	 return	 to	 the	good	old	days	of	multiple	
sourcing	and	annual	competitive	bidding.	Magna	International,	Faure-
cia, and TS Tech hold most of the market not held by JCI and Lear.
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Magna International
Magna International was the third leading seat supplier in the Unit-
ed States, with 10 percent of the market (see Chapter 4). Magna became 
a major seat supplier in 1996 when it acquired Douglas & Lomason, the 
fifth-la gest	seat	maker	at	the	time.
Faurecia
Faurecia	 was	 Europe’s	 leading	 seat	 maker	 and	 third	 worldwide	
behind	Lear	and	JCI.	Faurecia	was	created	when	French	seating	spe-
cialist	Bertrand	Faure	 acquired	Ecia,	 a	 former	PSA	Peugeot	Citroën	
captive	that	had	been	spun	off.	Bertrand	Faure	had	already	entered	the	
U.S.	market	through	a	joint	venture	with	Japanese	supplier	Fuji	Kiko	
Co. called Dynamec, Inc., which made seat reclining devices and seat 
adjusters	at	a	plant	in	Walton,	Kentucky.	GM	encouraged	French	seat	
maker	Faurecia	 to	enter	 the	North	American	market	by	awarding	 it	a	
contract in 1999 to deliver fully assembled seats for its high-volume 
Chevrolet Malibu beginning in 2004.
Faurecia	may	 have	 expanded	 too	 quickly	 in	North	America.	 Its	
North	American	operations	lost	$108	million	in	2006,	fueled	by	poor	
initial contracts that failed to adjust for the rising cost of steel and res-
ins. After opening 14 new facilities in North America in three years, 
Faurecia	had	 to	put	further	growth	on	hold.	“You	can’t	build	a	castle	
on quicksand. We’ve got to throw some cement into the quicksand pool 
before we continue,” was the picturesque way its North American presi-
dent James Orchard put it in 2007 (Wortham 2007c).
TS Tech
Honda’s principal seat supplier, TS Tech, was founded in 1954 as 
the	seat	division	of	Teito	Fuhaku	Kogyo	Corp.	The	division	was	made	
an independent company in 1960 and was known as the Tokyo Seat 
Co. until 1997 when it changed its name to TS Tech Ltd. TS initially 
made	seats	for	motorcycles,	Honda’s	firs 	product	 line.	In	addition	 to	
seat	assembly	plants	near	Honda’s	Alabama,	 Indiana,	and	Ohio	 fina 	
assembly plants, TS Tech has set up Tri-Con Industries to stamp seat 
frames and TS Trim Industries to make foam, seat covers, and other seat 
components. TS Tech and Bridgewater split the seat contract at Hon-
da’s Lincoln, Alabama, truck plant. TS Tech also built a dedicated seat 




Overall, seats are less likely than most components to be made in 
the Midwest. Half of seat parts are made in the Midwest (Table 7.1). 
The	distribution	of	seat	plants	closely	resembles	that	of	fina 	assembly	
plants, as expected given the especially high degree of colocation be-
tween the two.
The overall share of seat plants in the Midwest has also been low-
ered by the fact that plants of nonmetal parts do not depend on Midwest 
sources of steel. Covers and padding in particular have been sourced to 
plants in the South along with the majority of the U.S. textile and furni-
ture industries (see the next section).
Lear Plant Locations
Lear operated 29 seat-making facilities in 2006, including 12 in 
Michigan; 4 in Missouri; 3 in Indiana; 2 each in Alabama and Ohio; and 
1 each in Delaware, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Wisconsin (Lear Corporation 2006, p. 18). A number of the Michigan 





Table 7.1  Interior Parts Plants in the Midwest
Type of plant Number of plants % in Midwest
Seats and seat components 269 49.4
Headliners, carpeting, sound deadeners 234 56.0
Interior door panels 136 63.2
Handles, mirrors, labels, pedals 95 78.9
Dashboard 86 60.5
Miscellaneous	and	not	specifie 350 64.6
Total interior 1,170 60.1
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database.
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and Arlington, Texas, received seats from Lear in the same communi-
ties.	Ford’s	Chicago	assembly	plant	and	GM’s	Lordstown,	Ohio,	as-
sembly plant received seats from Lear facilities in nearby Hammond, 
Indiana, and Warren, Ohio, respectively.
JCI Plant Locations
JCI had 34 seat-related plants in 2006, including seven in Michigan; 
four	each	in	Kentucky	and	Ohio;	three	in	Tennessee;	two	each	in	Geor-
gia, Missouri, and Texas; and one each in Alabama, California, Illinois, 
Indiana,	Louisiana,	Mississippi,	New	Jersey,	Oklahoma,	Virginia,	and	
Wisconsin. As with Lear, the JCI seat plant distribution closely followed 
fina 	assembly	plant	distribution,	with	the	addition	of	plants	primarily	in	
the Midwest to produce seat parts.
THE REST OF THE INTERIOR
Suppliers have used the term “trim” to refer to the portions of the 
interior other than seats. The interior trim sector struggled much more 
than	 the	seat	sector	 in	 the	early	 twenty-firs 	century.	While	seat	sup-
pliers were able to add value to their product, interior trim suppliers 
faced the opposite trend. Trim became an increasingly low-cost prod-
uct driven by commodity prices. Interior trim suppliers tried to survive 
through	involvement	of	equity	investment	firm 	motivated	entirely	by	
squeezing costs from the production process, but not all succeeded. 
Interior Trim Modules
Interior trim consists of four principal modules: dashboard, door 
panels,	 floo 	cover,	and	headliner.	 Interior	 trim	also	 includes	 smaller	
hardware such as handles, labels, and pedals. 
The dashboard houses the gauges that are supplied by electronics 
specialists, who are responsible for adding most of the value to this 
component (see Chapter 14). The dashboard was originally a metal 
plate that separated the passengers from the engine. By the 1930s, the 
plate was being stamped into a decorative shape. Since the late twen-
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tieth century, the dashboard has been made of softer plastic to protect 
occupants in a crash.
Early doors were little more than slats of wood hinged to one pil-
lar and latched to another. Today’s doors are quite different. They are 
more	like	sandwiches	with	different	“bread”	on	each	side	of	the	filling 	
The outer side of the sandwich is usually stamped from metal. The in-
ner side was also once stamped from metal with bits of fabric glued 
to it. Now, the inner side of the door is typically molded from plastic, 
such	as	thermoplastic	olefi 	(TPO).	Between	the	inner	and	outer	door	
panels are acoustical and restraint systems, as well as locks, regulators, 
speakers, adjusters, wiring, and other electronic components mounted 
on steel or plastic carriers.
As with other interior components, door panels were once con-
structed	at	fina 	assembly	plants	but	are	increasingly	shipped	as	com-
plete modules. A full door module (a level 3, in industry vernacular) 
includes inner door trim panel, hardware, glass, and outer body panel. 
Painted door structures arrive at a module manufacturer’s plant, where 
latches, regulators, glass, electronics, soft trim, and other parts are at-
tached. In North America, about 8 percent of front doors, 11 percent of 
rear doors, and 33 percent of rear liftgates were delivered as modules 
by outside suppliers in 2001. The leading supplier of door modules, 
with	40	percent	of	the	world	market,	was	Brose	Fahrzeugteile	GmbH	
(Broge 2002).





Headliners	and	 floorin 	have	played	 leading	 roles	 in	making	 the	
passenger compartment quieter. Allowing some outside noise to reach 
the interior was traditionally regarded as a necessary safety feature, per-
mitting drivers to listen for horns, emergency sirens, squealing brakes, 
skidding	tires,	and	other	evidence	of	traffi 	and	road	hazards.	Keeping	
out exterior noise became increasingly important as American motor-
ists chose instead to listen to music and chat on cell phones. “When 
a consumer test drives a car, they notice how quiet it is in the com-
partment.”3 “The traditional way to make a car quiet was to determine 
where noise was coming in and then stick enough engineered weight 
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between the listener and the noise to stop the sound. The problem is that 
that ties your noise performance directly with the weight. In a world 
where we’re looking at composites and aluminum bodies, I’d have to 
put back in all that weight they just took out of the body.”4
Headliners and carpets were made of woven fabric for most of the 
twentieth	century.	Carpet	could	be	 laid	directly	on	 the	floo ,	whereas	
headliner fabric was glued to a foam backing that was in turn glued to 
the roof. Woven fabrics suitable for the home did not hold up well under 
the rougher conditions of the motor vehicle. Headliners sagged when 
intense summer sun heat melted the glue. Mats were placed on top of 
the carpets to protect them from dirt and punctures.
Nonwoven fabric became popular in Europe and Japan during 
the 1990s and in North America a decade later. Nonwoven headliners 
were	made	of	polyester	fiber 	locked	together	through	a	process	known	
as needle-punch technology. They were also made of a composite of 
porous	materials	 like	 foam,	 fibers 	synthetics,	and	cotton	 (Armstrong	
2004b). The foam base was no longer needed, thereby making nonwo-
ven fabric cheaper, lighter, and more durable than woven fabric (Kisiel 
1996). 
Faced	with	demand	for	a	quieter	passenger	compartment,	 leading	
headliner and carpeting suppliers became acoustical systems suppliers. 
An acoustical expert could ensure that each component contributed to 
the desired overall sound and noise conditions. Acoustics once sourced 
piecemeal have been purchased from single suppliers with expertise in 
balancing materials in the various components to achieve the desired 
overall effect (Wilson 2002a).
Interior parts other than seats are more likely than average to be 
produced	 in	Michigan	 and	other	Midwest	 states	 (Figure	7.1).	About	
one-third of these interior plants have been located in Michigan and 
another one-third elsewhere in the Midwest (Table 7.1). 
Struggling Interior Trim Suppliers 
Suppliers of these various interior parts have struggled. Of the two 
largest U.S.-owned suppliers of interior parts other than seats in 2006, 
one (Dura) entered Chapter 11, and the other (Collins and Aikman) 
went out of business.
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Collins & Aikman
The leading supplier of interior components other than seats at the 
beginning	of	the	twenty-firs 	century	was	Collins	&	Aikman	Corpora-
tion	(C&A).	It	accounted	for	one-half	of	the	seat	fabric	and	floorin 	and	
one-fourth of the headliners in 2004. It was also the largest supplier of 
dashboards, with one-third of the market, and the second-largest suppli-
er of door panels, with one-sixth of the market. The company claimed 
to be supplying parts for 90 percent of the vehicles assembled in the 
United States. Yet, in 2005, it was bankrupt. 
C&A’s	predecessor,	G.L.	Kelty	&	Co.,	was	founded	in	1843	by	Gib-
bons L. Kelty as a window shade shop in New York City. Kelty’s neph-
ew	Charles	M.	Aikman	joined	the	fir 	as	a	partner	in	1870	and	bought	
half ownership after Kelty’s death in 1889. The other half was owned 
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International database and other 
sources.
Figure 7.1  Interior Parts Plants
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by	William	G.	Collins.	The	two	formed	Collins	&	Aikman	in	1891,	with	
Aikman as president and Collins as secretary and treasurer. The retail 
business was closed in the late nineteenth century in order to specialize 
in heavy upholstery-type fabrics. 
Management of C&A for most of the twentieth century came from 
two	generations	of	the	McCullough	family.	Willis	G.	McCullough,	who	
started at C&A as a salesman, rose through the ranks to serve as presi-
dent from 1929 until his death in 1948, and his son Donald served as 
president from 1961 until his death in 2000. The McCulloughs trans-
formed C&A into an automotive-oriented manufacturer beginning in 
the 1920s with seat and headlining fabric. Motor vehicle fabric account-
ed for 75 percent of C&A business when civilian production was halted 
during World War II. 
C&A diluted its motor vehicle focus when it acquired several car-
peting	and	wall	covering	firm 	during	the	1960s	and	1970s.	In	response	
to increased outsourcing, C&A sold off most of its nonautomotive busi-
nesses during the 1990s. Motor vehicle parts increased from 59 percent 
of C&A revenues in 1994 to 96 percent in 1999. 
C&A was bought in 1986 by Wickes Companies, a conglomerate 
with interests in furniture, home improvement stores, and women’s 
clothing.	 Private	 equity	 fir 	 Heartland	 Industrial	 Partners	 acquired	
C&A in 2001. One of Heartland’s founders, David A. Stockman, be-
came chairman of the board of C&A in 2001 and CEO in 2003. 
Stockman had been elected to Congress in 1976 at age 29. His ar-
ticulate advocacy of supply-side economics gained him appointment as 
director	of	 the	Offic 	of	Management	and	Budget	(OMB)	from	1981	
to 1985. After resigning from OMB, he became a managing director at 
Salomon Brothers, Inc., and an original partner and a senior managing 
director	of	the	Blackstone	Group,	before	setting	up	Heartland	in	1999,	
in part because of Blackstone’s reluctance to invest in C&A.
Heartland struggled to achieve the cost savings promised in its 
many	acquisitions,	especially	at	C&A,	which	lost	$35.6	million	in	2001.	
Stockman took over as CEO in 2003, and immediately cut 14 percent 
of the workforce in a bid to reduce losses. However, the company had a 
very high exposure to the Detroit 3, and it was highly leveraged. When 
the	company	ran	into	trouble	refinancin 	its	debt,	it	was	forced	to	fil 	
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2005. Stockman was forced to 
resign as CEO and was charged with falsifying information about the 
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company’s	perilous	financia 	condition.	After	auctioning	off	or	closing	
down its operations, C&A went out of existence in 2007.
Dura Automotive Systems
Dura was the leading supplier of interior control components, such 
as seat adjusters, gear shifters, parking brakes, pedals, cables, and steer-
ing columns. The company also produced glass components, door mod-
ules, and exterior trim. 
Dura was formed in 1990, when the Minneapolis-based holding 
company Hidden Creek Industries acquired Wickes Dura Automotive 
Hardware	and	Mechanical	Components	division	from	New	York	fina -
cial	 investment	fir 	Wasserstein	Perella.	The	founder	and	 firs 	chair-
man of Hidden Creek was S.A. (Tony) Johnson, an 18-year veteran of 
Cummins	Engine	Co.	He	was	also	president	and	chief	executive	office 	
of	Onan	Corp.	from	1981	to	1985	and	chief	operating	office 	of	Pentair,	
Inc. from 1985 to 1989. 
In addition to Dura, Hidden Creek operated three other parts mak-
ers:	 Automotive	 Industries,	 J.L.	 French	 Automotive	 Castings,	 and	
Tower Automotive. Johnson “kept costs low at his operating companies 
through a centralized management team of just 10 people” (Sherefkin 
2006b).	However,	French	and	Tower	joined	Dura	in	seeking	bankrupt-
cy protection, and Automotive Industries was sold to Lear, where it 
formed the basis of a struggling interior trim segment of Lear’s interior 
integration strategy. “All four [Hidden Creek parts-making] companies 
illustrated	 the	grow-at-all-costs	 roll-up	 strategy	used	by	 financier 	 in	
the 1990s to win more Detroit 3 outsourcing business. Typically the 
strategy involved investors who made serial acquisitions of parts sup-




from Lear Corp.’s decision to take in-house the seat adjusters Dura man-
ufactured . . . Most of Dura’s business was with the Detroit 3 carmak-
ers, but one-fourth was with other tier one suppliers, especially Lear, 
its	third	leading	customer	behind	GM	and	Ford.	However,	Dura	found	
itself in competition with Lear. Instead of buying seat tracks from Dura 
for	GM	vehicles,	Lear	started	making	them	itself”	(Sherefkin	2006b).
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INTERIOR SYSTEMS INTEGRATORS
At	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-firs 	century	sourcing	an	integrated	
interior from a single supplier appeared very attractive to carmakers. 
A single supplier could ensure that the main interior modules were de-
signed	as	a	harmonious	whole	and	fi 	together	well.	Fibers	for	seat	cov-
ers, headliners, and carpets could be obtained from the same batch and 
colored together, as could plastic and wood trim on the door panels and 
cockpit. 
The importance of the interior for comfort and convenience, rather 
than for performance, seemed to make it especially appropriate for out-
sourcing as a single integrated module to a single supplier. An attractive 
interior	must	blend	materials	harmoniously,	match	 colors	 closely,	 fi 	
pieces snugly, arrange controls conveniently, and provide ergonomics 
suitably. Expertise in creating and building interiors has less to do with 
advanced engineering than with coordination of hundreds of parts. This 
seemed a suitable job for an integration specialist.
JCI and Lear were the two principal suppliers to emerge as interior 
integrators	into	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Their	strategy	was	implement-
ed by way of numerous acquisitions during the 1990s.
Interior Integration at JCI
JCI’s	major	acquisition	was	Prince	Corp.,	the	sixty-first-la gest	parts	
supplier	at	the	time,	with	$425	million	in	North	American	OEM	sales	at	
the time of the acquisition in 1996. Prince was founded in 1965 by Ed-
gar Prince in Holland, Michigan, to make machine tools and auto parts. 
Under Edgar Prince’s long-time leadership, the company remained ex-
tremely insular. All seven of its U.S. manufacturing facilities as well as 
research	and	corporate	office 	were	 in	Holland,	Michigan.	The	com-
pany had a minimal presence overseas other than one plant in Mexico, 
and	it	did	not	even	maintain	a	sales	offic 	in	the	Detroit	area.
Prince made headliners, door panels, and other individual interior 
components, such as consoles, grab handles, visors, armrests, and stor-
age compartments. The Prince acquisition gave JCI the ability to supply 
all	fiv 	major	interior	systems	except	instrument	panels.	Adding	Prince	
increased JCI’s share of the U.S. headliner market, for example, from 9 
percent to 21 percent.
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Edgar Prince gave only one authorized media interview, around 
1980, and vowed never to speak on the record again because he felt he 
had	been	misquoted	(Gardner	1996).	After	he	died	in	1995,	his	widow	
Elsa	briefl 	ran	the	company	and	then	sold	it	within	a	year	to	JCI.	The	
machine tool business, Prince Machine, was sold in 2000 to Italy-based 
Idra Presse, and the combined company known as IdraPrince became 
the world’s largest supplier of die casting equipment.
Despite its insularity, Prince had a reputation for innovation, such 
as buttons on the sun visor that open garage doors and enable security 
systems. Prince claimed to hold more patents than any other parts sup-
plier except one—JCI—which was thus its most logical merger partner. 
JCI gave Prince considerable autonomy and maintained the corporate 
office 	and	technology	center	as	well	as	the	manufacturing	facilities	in	
Holland.
To make instrument panels, JCI established a joint venture with 
Japanese manufacturer Inoac Corp. in 1996. The joint venture produced 
instrument panels and other interior components under the name Inter-
tec Systems, LLC, at a plant in Bardstown, Kentucky. 
Interior Integration at Lear
Lear made 14 major acquisitions between 1995 and 1999. The three 
most	significan 	acquisitions	in	Lear’s	transformation	from	seat	supplier	
to interior integrator were Automotive Industries Holding Inc. (AIHI) 
in 1995, Masland Corp. in 1996, and United Technologies Automotive 
(UTA) in 1999. The AIHI, Masland, and UTA acquisitions gave Lear 
the ability to produce all major interior components. 
AIHI was an interior door panel specialist with 8,000 employees 
at 14 U.S. and 8 foreign manufacturing facilities. The acquisition also 
brought Lear capabilities in armrests, center consoles, sun visors, pack-
age shelves, and other interior molded trim.
Masland Corp., acquired in 1996, was a leading manufacturer of 
carpeting, acoustical products, and luggage compartment trim. It was 
the	fifty-fifth-l gest	supplier	 in	1996,	with	$500	million	 in	sales	and	
3,000	employees.	Founded	in	1866	by	Charles	H.	Masland	to	make	tex-
tiles, the company produced automotive carpet beginning in 1922 with 
the	Ford	Model	T.	UTA	had	been	 the	automotive	division	of	United	
Technologies Corp. (UTC). 
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UTC’s predecessor, United Aircraft and Transport Corp., was cre-
ated	in	1929	through	the	merger	of	several	pioneering	aviation	firms 	
including Pratt and Whitney, which made aircraft engines; Sikorsky, 
which made helicopters; and Boeing Airline & Transport, which made 
airplanes	and	offered	 scheduled	 service.	Federal	government	opposi-
tion to consolidation of airlines with manufacturers resulted in division 
of United into three companies in 1934: United Air Lines Transport 
(predecessor of United Airlines), Boeing Airplane Co. (manufacturer 
of airplanes), and United Aircraft Co. (manufacturer of engines and 
helicopters). 
United Aircraft changed its name to United Technologies Corp. in 
1975 when it began to diversify away from aircraft production through 
such acquisitions as Otis Elevator in 1976 and Carrier heating and air 
conditioning in 1979. UTC was one of the largest motor vehicle sup-
pliers during the 1990s, but the sector accounted for only 10 percent of 
the	company’s	total	sales	and	an	even	lower	share	of	profit 	when	it	was	
sold to Lear. 
System Integration in Reverse?
JCI and Lear may be ready, willing, and able to supply entire interi-
ors, and a few such orders were received from the Detroit 3. But early in 
the	twenty-firs 	century	carmakers	pulled	back	and	hesitated	to	continue	
single sourcing of entire interiors. 
Despite	clear	benefit 	of	efficienc 	and	quality	 in	having	a	single	
supplier, carmakers were reluctant to turn over so much authority to a 
single supplier, fearing loss of control in the development and manu-
facturing	processes.	“[T]hey	[GM	officials 	are	re-examining	their	total	
interiors strategy . . . They have said they want to increase their involve-
ment in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 sourcing decisions and relationships.”5 
Consequently, carmakers have taken back control over interior design 
and	selection	of	Tier	2	suppliers	of	interior	components.	“GM	believes	
it can more effectively control costs and quality by bringing more work 
in-house”	(Van	Biesebroeck	2006,	p.	209).
Forced	 to	 sell	 components	 and	modules	one	 at	 a	 time,	 the	 large	
interior	integrators	have	struggled	to	make	each	portion	of	their	firm 	
profitable 	In	particular,	the	interior	trim	segment	has	proved	less	profi -
able than the seat assembly segment, calling into question the business 
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model	of	interior	integration.	This	has	dragged	down	profit 	for	the	en-
tire companies and forced them into cutbacks (Bowens and Sedgwick 
2005). 
Lear	felt	a	“severely	negative	impact”	on	its	financia 	position	(Mer-
rill Lynch 2007). As a result, the company shed its low value-added in-
terior trim portion of the business. Collins & Aikman decided to auction 
itself	off	when	it	could	not	come	up	with	a	profitabl 	business	plan	that	
would have allowed it to emerge from Chapter 11.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Regardless of the structure of the interior sector, seat plants in a JIT 
production environment continue to be located within 60 miles of an as-
sembly plant. This relationship holds for every assembly plant in North 
America. It is driven by the bulkiness of seats and the large number of 
variations in seats for a given car model.
What is in play, however, is the future role of interior suppliers. As 
the Detroit 3 have backed away from commitments to interior integra-
tors, market leader Toyota has moved in the opposite direction. In 2004 
Toyota Boshoku, through the merger of several Toyota keiretsu com-
panies, became Toyota’s interior integrator. In its 2006 annual report, 
the company described itself as “an automotive systems supplier that 
considers the automobile’s interior space in its totality, including seats, 
door trim, headliners and carpets (but excluding instrument panels). It 
integrates everything from conceptualization through product develop-
ment, design, procurement and production” (Toyota Boshoku 2005, 
p.	3).	Given	its	high	dependency	on	a	single	customer,	the	fate	of	Toy-
ota Boshoku as a systems integrator was tied to the future of Toyota. 
As Toyota was growing rapidly, Toyota Boshoku was likely to do so 
as well. 
The wildcard in the restructuring of the interior sector has been pri-
vate equity investors, which were especially active in investing in the 
motor	vehicle	parts	 sector	during	 the	 firs 	decade	of	 the	 twenty-firs 	
century. Starting in 2005, Wilbur Ross, a self-made billionaire turned 
private equity investor, created International Automotive Components 
(IAC), designed to be “an interiors powerhouse in North America 
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and	abroad	through	the	select	purchase	of	financiall 	troubled	assets”	
(Barkholz 2007a). IAC’s rationale was one of scale, not of systems in-
tegration. Prominent among its assets were interior trim plants formerly 
operated by Collins & Aikman and Lear (Snavely 2007a). The company 
quickly became one of the world’s 40 largest suppliers. Instrument pan-
els and door panels were responsible for more than half of IAC’s sales 
(International Automotive Components 2007). 
Notes
 1. Donald Montroy, CSM Worldwide analyst, quoted in Wernle (2005c).
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The task of connecting the complex chain that links parts makers 
with	fina 	assembly	plants	has	been	outsourced	to	logistics	specialists.	
Transport management is not a core competence of either carmakers or 
parts suppliers. With widespread diffusion of just-in-time delivery, de-
mand for pinpoint timing of several hundred daily deliveries per assem-
bly plant has exceeded the capabilities of carmakers and suppliers, many 
of	whom	traditionally	relied	on	hand-drawn	production	flo 	charts.	So	
logistics specialists now sort out scheduling and hauling of parts from 
lower tier to higher tier suppliers and from suppliers to assemblers. 
“Logistics is a key foundation of our production system,” accord-
ing	to	Glenn	Uminger,	who	was	general	manager	of	logistics	at	Toyota	
Motor Manufacturing North America Inc. in 2004, “because if we don’t 
move	material	efficientl 	and	in	small	lots	we	might	lose	many	of	the	
benefit 	 our	 production	 system	 principles	 stand	 for”	 (Terreri	 2004).	
“Logistics” is most simply “having the right thing, at the right place, at 
the right time,” according to Logistics	World	magazine	(2008).	For	all	
of its vaunted production system, Toyota was still sorting out delivery 
routes with “plastic and crayons” in 2001, according to Uminger (Shea 
2001).
“[M]anufacturing gurus” effectively assume that the economic 
universe revolves around manufacturing . . . Those evaluating the 
economy and the future without the manufacturing bias typically 
see quite a different economic universe. The “supply chain” uni-
verse would seem to provide an alternative concept to the “manu-
facturing” universe—a universe where manufacturing is simply 
viewed as a link in the worldwide supply chain that includes all of 
the activities required to supply worldwide need. (McKee 2004a)
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3PLS: MOVING THE FREIGHT AND MANAGING THE CHAIN
Logistics are provided by specialists known as third-party logistics 
(3PL) providers. A 3PL is an outsourced provider that manages all or a 
significan 	part	of	an	organization’s	logistics	requirements	and	performs	
transportation, location, and sometimes product consolidation activities 




to 10.4 percent in 1995 and 9.9 percent in 2006. A sharp decline in 
inventory, as noted in Chapter 6, has accounted for most of the decline 
(Andel 2007; Wilson 2007).
The distinctive contribution of 3PLs in the production process 
has been to arrange two types of services for their customers: freight 
management	 and	 supply	 chain	management.	 Freight	management	 is	
arrangement of shipment of goods either through direct ownership of 
transport companies or through negotiations with other carriers. Sup-
ply chain management is coordination of pickup, storage, and delivery, 
often on a just-in-time basis.
In the logistics industry freight management is known as asset-based 
service because it involves the physical transfer of the goods. Supply 
chain management is known as non-asset-based service because it in-
volves	the	flo 	of	information	about	the	goods.	According	to	O’Reilly	
(2006), 46 percent of 3PLs were asset based in 2006, 19 percent were 
non-asset based, and 37 percent were both (O’Reilly’s numbers totaled 
more than 100 percent). “Asset-based providers tout their investment 
in equipment, and the control they can leverage in coordinating trans-




The physical transfer of goods requires two types of tangible as-
sets. One is transportation equipment, including trucks, trains, ships, 
and airplanes, for hauling the goods from one place to another. The 
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it increasingly irksome to manage rising fuel expenses, capacity and 
truck driver shortages, and equipment costs . . . reducing transportation 




tion for the remainder (Wilson 2007).
Passage of the Motor Carrier Act in 1980 substantially deregulat-
ed the trucking industry, enabling subsequent changes in the structure 
of the industry. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 had given authority to 
regulate the trucking industry to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
which had been regulating railroads since 1887. “ICC regulation re-
duced	competition	and	made	trucking	inefficien 	.	.	.	Truckers	with	au-
thority to carry a product, such as tiles, from one city to another often 
lacked authority to haul anything on the return trip” (Moore 2002). 
The regulatory environment made it virtually impossible for a 
trucking	fir 	 to	add	a	new	route	except	 in	 the	rare	circumstance	 that	
no	competitor	opposed	it.	“The	result	was	often	bizarre.	For	example,	
a motor carrier with authority to travel from Cleveland to Buffalo that 
purchased another carrier or the carrier’s rights to go from Buffalo to 
Pittsburgh was required to carry goods destined for Pittsburgh through 
Buffalo, even though the direct route was considerably shorter. In some 
cases carriers had to go hundreds of miles out of their way, adding many 
hours or even days to the transport” (Moore 2002). The 1980 Motor 
Carrier Act eliminated most restrictions on destinations that a carrier 
could serve, commodities that could be carried, and routes that could 
be used. 
In the deregulated environment, trucking companies are offer-
ing three basic types of runs: dedicated contract carriage, less-than-
truckload shipments, and milk runs. Dedicated contract carriage and 
less-than-truckload shipments were updated versions of long-standing 
forms	of	shipping.	A	moving	van	completely	fille 	with	the	contents	of	
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an old house and completely unloaded at a new house is an example 
of a dedicated contract carriage. A mattress delivered from a furniture 
store that shares space with other furniture destined for other homes is 
an example of a less-than-truckload shipment.




in trucks that it has owned and operated. Less-than-truckload, though, 
has become less common in the motor vehicle industry than in the past 
because it has been superseded by the milk run.
A milk run or common carrier route is a routine trip involving stops 
at many places. A milk run visits a large number of suppliers on a recur-
ring predictable schedule, such as the same time every day or week. It 
is	more	efficien 	than	less-than-truckload	for	small	batch	delivery.	Once	
limited to picking up routine parts from smaller suppliers, the milk run 
has become an important tool in just-in-time delivery because smaller 





The Detroit 3 traditionally took direct responsibility for most of 
their warehousing operations. Parts made in Michigan were stored until 
a	 sufficientl 	 long	 train	of	 fully	 loaded	boxcars	was	 ready	 to	be	put	
together for shipment to a branch plant. In the trucking era, distribution 
centers still play an important role, although parts come and go more 
quickly.	GM	ranked	fift 	in	the	United	States	in	2004	in	square	footage	
of privately or exclusively owned warehouse space, with 24 million 
square feet, behind UPS, Wal-Mart, Target, and Sysco.
Among	logistics	firms 	DHL	has	been	by	far	the	largest	owner	of	
public or shared warehouse space, with 73 million square feet in 2005. 
Second-place UPS Supply Chain Services had 28 million square feet, 
which was counted separately from UPS delivery service’s 78 million 
square feet (McKee 2004b). Warehousing accounts for about 10 percent 
of all logistics expenditures, small compared with the actual hauling of 
Delivering	the	Goods			185
the goods, but production costs increase as inventory sits on the shelf of 
a warehouse. Therefore traditional warehousing is being replaced with 
cross-docking operations. 
Cross-docking represents the physical receipt of goods and their 
immediate transfer to the next onward phase without the goods ever 
being brought into inventory. The 3PL operating the cross-docking fa-
cility unloads deliveries from multiple sources, sequences the parts, and 
delivers	them	to	the	appropriate	locations	along	the	fina 	assembly	line	
as	needed.	For	example,	deliveries	into	Toyota’s	assembly	plant	do	not	
come directly from each of the company’s 500 parts suppliers. Instead, 
parts	are	firs 	shipped	from	suppliers	to	one	of	eight	crossdocks.	Upon	
arrival, products delivered from suppliers are unloaded and quickly re-
packed for delivery to an assembly line.
According	to	Glenn	Uminger,	“Crossdocks	accumulate	shipments	
from a region. Those shipments then get split according to plant require-
ments and are shipped directly from the crossdock to the plant . . . The 
crossdocks are located where we need them, based on volume” (Terreri 
2004). Most parts sit at a Toyota crossdock for less than six hours, none 
for more than 12 hours. Parts are packaged in small standardized boxes 
that	fi 	together	like	Legos	to	facilitate	transfer	from	the	crossdocks	to	
the assembly plant. 
Toyota no longer includes the term “inventory” in its corporate vo-
cabulary—material	flow 	continuously	into	its	assembly	plants,	just	as	
it does into competitors’ plants operated on a just-in-time basis. Instead, 
Toyota	refers	to	heijunka,	or	level	flo ,	as	the	key	concept	in	its	produc-
tion system concerning the movement of parts from its suppliers to its 
assembly	plants.	Reflectin 	Toyota’s	evolving	view	of	materials	han-
dling, Mr. Uminger’s job title changed from assistant general manager 
for production control in 2001 to general manager of logistics in 2004 
(Shea 2001).
Supply Chain Management
The process of planning for the movement of all materials, funds, 
and	related	information,	from	pickup	of	raw	materials	to	delivery	of	fi -
ished products, is called “supply chain management” (Logistics	World	
2007). “The supply chain is an integral part of the entire manufacturing 
process.”2
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To explain the purpose of supply chain management, 3PLs like to 
use diagrams. Typically, a “before” diagram shows a customer, such as 
a	fina 	assembly	plant,	at	the	center,	connected	to	many	freight	haulers.	
The	“after”	diagram	instead	places	the	3PL	fir 	at	the	center,	connected	
to many freight haulers at one end and the customer at the other end.
Penske	Logistics,	hired	by	Ford	 in	1999	as	 its	 lead	 logistics	pro-
vider,	described	the	inefficien 	logistics	arrangements	that	it	inherited	
from	Ford:	
Penske	 Logistics	 began	 its	 relationship	 with	 Ford	 in	 1996	 as	
lead	 logistics	provider	 (LLP)	 for	Ford’s	 assembly	plant	 in	Nor-
folk,	Virginia.	At	 the	 time,	 each	 of	 Ford’s	 20	North	American	
assembly plants managed its own logistics operations. A decen-
tralized approach provided total control of logistics at the plant 
level, but presented costly redundancies in materials handling and 
transportation. 
Under the plant-centric approach, suppliers would make multiple 
deliveries of the same parts to different plants. A supplier would 
pick up a small load, deliver it to one plant, pick up another small 
load of the same parts and deliver it to another plant. Carriers with 
half-empty trucks would often cross routes with each other en 
route to the same plant. (Penske Logistics 2007)
At	a	Ford	assembly	plant,	“it	was	not	uncommon	on	any	day	to	have	
22 different trucks arriving at the same part source to make pick-ups for 
22 different locations” (Shister 2005). Aside from being highly inef-
ficient 	this	design	allowed	for	excessive	inventory	and	storage	costs	at	
the plant level.
To better facilitate supply chain management, a 3PL plans the dis-
tribution network for a carmaker, optimizing routes across its plants 
to	minimize	flee 	size	and	mileage.	The	3PL	rarely	does	all	of	its	own	
hauling and some do none, so individual carriers are hired, presumably 
at favorable rates given the large scale of freight hauling being pur-
chased by the 3PL. Information technology plays a key role in manag-
ing logistics and supply chain functions, including processing orders, 
inventory management, forecasting and planning, warehouse manage-
ment, transport management, and tracking. Systems keep track of parts 
and provide visibility for each one from production to delivery. 
Tight inventory control is crucial within a lean production process. 
Management of in-line sequencing typically begins with broadcasts 
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from the assembly plant listing which cars are soon to move onto the 
assembly line and what components or subassemblies are required and 
in what order. “‘What we have noticed is that the time requirements 
of the broadcasts keep getting shorter and shorter,’ according to Pen-
ske Logistics senior vice president-automotive Ed Cumbo. ‘We used to 
sometimes have four hours, but today it is mostly 90 minutes’” (Mur-
phy 2004).
In	accordance	with	principles	of	heijunka,	Toyota	identifie 	12	de-
livery times during an eight-hour work shift, 40 minutes apart from 
each	other.	The	company	specifie 	the	quantity	of	each	part	needed	dur-
ing each of the 12 deliveries. A typical two-shift daily operation there-
fore has 24 available delivery slots. “How we use those 24 order slots 
depends	on	the	supplier,	the	volume,	the	distance	and	the	efficiencies, 	
according to Mr. Uminger (Terreri 2004).
Ideally, equal quantities of the part could be delivered each time, 
but that is not always possible. In some cases, the line may be running 
at a faster or slower speed during the various 40-minute periods, or the 
mix	of	specifi 	models	coming	down	the	line	may	vary.	In	other	cases,	
the nature of the part itself may not be amenable to 40-minute delivery 
intervals. In response to changing volume demand, Toyota can shift the 
number of daily deliveries of a particular part to any number that will 
divide into 24.
The Detroit 3 have tried to emulate the Toyota system, but they 
have some catching up to do. “In regard to supply-chain management, 
the Big Three U.S. automakers have publicly adopted some version of 
lean manufacturing and JIT logistics. Our [Liker and Wu] data showed, 
however, that there was still room for improvement. The same suppli-
ers had much leaner operations within their plants and in their logistics 
when serving Japanese customers” (Liker and Wu 2000, p. 92).
Leading Motor Vehicle 3PLs
As	3PL	services	have	expanded	rapidly,	firm 	have	been	consolidat-
ing	 into	 fewer	 larger	 firms 	Worldwide,	 the	 largest	3PL—DHL—had	
$31	billion	 in	 revenue	 in	2006,	and	 the	next	 four	combined	had	$44	
billion. 
Four	of	the	world’s	fiv 	largest	3PLs	in	2007	were	European	owned:	
DHL, Kuehne + Nagel International, Schenker, and Panalpina. UPS, 
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based	 in	 the	United	States,	was	 the	only	non-European	 fir 	 to	crack	
the	top	five
History, empire and exports helped create the large European 3PLs 
. . . [The top European 3PLs] have been leading forwarders and 
transportation management 3PLs in Europe for decades . . . Euro-
pean	countries,	which	have	always	had	significantl 	more	cross-
border	 traffic 	have	 relied	more	on	outsourcing	 than	Americans,	
especially since World War II . . .
Over the last few years nearly every company in Europe has been 
able to take some advantage of the free movement of goods across 
borders. This shift has been good for the large European 3PLs, 
but cultural differences still prevent centralization of operations 





of	 the	 five—DH 	 and	UPS—are	 also	 ranked	 among	 the	 fiv 	 largest	
3PLs	worldwide	in	2007.	CEVA,	Penske,	and	Ryder	were	the	world’s	
eighth,	 fourteenth,	and	 fifteent 	 largest,	 respectively	 (Armstrong	and	
Foster	2007).
Ryder
The largest 3PL serving the U.S. auto industry has been Ryder Lo-
gistics. The company was started in 1933 by James A. Ryder in Miami, 
Florida,	with	one	 truck.	Ryder	was	 the	 largest	hauler	of	 finishe 	ve-
hicles in the United States when it decided to get out of the business 
of	directly	 running	 its	own	 trucks.	The	 company	 sold	Ryder	Freight	
System in 1989, the One Way Consumer Truck Rental division in 1996, 
and the Automotive Carrier division in 1997. 
Instead, Ryder has concentrated on arranging hauling for its custom-
ers, as well as leasing and renting vehicles. The acquisition of a logis-
tics management company, LogiCorp, in 1994 made Ryder the leading 
provider of inbound logistics in the U.S. automotive industry. “Ryder 
doesn’t drive trucks or move packages, they manage information: pro-
curement support, carrier relationships and performance, freight billing, 
auditing, and payment, and negotiate rates for transportation” (Konicki 
2001). 
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Ryder’s relationship with Chrysler has been particularly strong:
[Chrysler] outlines for Ryder the network surrounding a particular 
physical location, including what will be built at that location, the 
preferred supplier sources, rate structures, available equipment, 
and densities. Ryder then designs a proposed logistics network de-
tailing when certain trucks will be loaded at a particular supplier, 
the departure time of these trailers from the supplier, when parts 
will be delivered at a particular plant, and when that truck will be 
unloaded. (Terreri 2004)
For	GM,	Ryder	has	optimized	 the	 logistics	network	and	manages	
inbound	 freight	 at	Saturn’s	Spring	Hill	 fina 	 assembly	 plant.	Penske	
manages the work inside Saturn’s logistics optimization center, while 
Ryder manages the milk runs from suppliers to the center as well as 
shuttles	from	the	center	to	the	fina 	assembly	plant	one	mile	away.	
Penske
The other leading U.S.-owned auto industry 3PL has been Penske 
Logistics, a subsidiary of Penske Truck Leasing, the largest truck rental 
and	 leasing	company	 in	 the	United	States.	Founder	Roger	S.	Penske	
was well known as a successful race-car driver during the 1950s and 
1960s, then as sponsor of a successful NASCAR racing team after retir-
ing as a driver in 1965. Penske also acquired new-car dealerships and 
parts suppliers.
The	major	work	of	Penske	Logistics	has	been	with	Ford.	As	de-
scribed earlier in the chapter, Penske created, implemented, and oper-
ated a centralized logistics network for handling all inbound materials 
handling	at	Ford’s	assembly	and	stamping	plants.	
Penske trained more than 1,500 suppliers on a uniform set of pro-
cedures and logistics technologies. Carriers were required to follow 
routes set by Penske and to pick up and deliver within 15 minutes of 
schedule. Loads were tracked through satellite communications and en-
gine monitoring systems on all trucks. Shipments were consolidated 
at 10 Order Dispatch Centers (ODCs). World	Trade	Magazine named 
Ford	Manufacturer	of	the	Year	for	Global	Supply	Chain	Excellence	in	
2005. The award cited a 15 percent reduction in plant inventory and a 
clearer understanding of the variation in freight costs among individual 
plants and carriers (Shister 2005).
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UPS
Third	among	U.S.-owned	firm 	in	the	auto	industry	was	UPS	Sup-
ply Chain Solutions. The company was the largest U.S.-based 3PL 
overall, and it was ranked fourth internationally in 2007. UPS created 
a	Logistics	Group	in	1993	to	provide	supply	chain	management	and	an	
Automotive	Services	unit	within	its	Logistics	Group	in	2000.	Logistics	
accounted	 for	only	$8	billion	of	 the	company’s	$48	billion	 revenues	
in 2006, with the bulk generated by package delivery. UPS has been 
a	highly	recognizable	brand	in	the	United	States	for	its	flee 	of	brown	
package delivery trucks.
The company, originally known as American Messenger Co., was 
founded in Seattle, Washington, in 1907, by 19-year-old James E. 
Casey.	Messages	telephoned	to	the	company’s	offic 	were	delivered	by	
Casey’s	brother	George	and	several	other	teenagers	on	foot	or	bicycle.	
As the messenger business declined, the company refocused on pack-
age delivery, especially for retailers. Large department stores in Seattle 
were the company’s major clients. The company also delivered special 
delivery	mail	in	the	Seattle	area	for	the	Post	Office 	
UPS expanded beyond Seattle during the 1920s, but growth was 
hindered by federal and state regulations prohibiting common carrier 
competition	with	the	Post	Office 	Interstate	Commerce	Commission	au-
thority was needed for each state border that was crossed, and each state 
had to authorize the movement of packages within its borders. Packages 
often had to be transferred between several carriers before they reached 
their	fina 	destinations.	UPS	battled	federal	and	state	regulators	for	two	
decades beginning in the 1950s for the right to carry packages across 
state	lines.	Not	until	1975	did	UPS	become	the	firs 	package	delivery	




renamed the logistics operations of TNT. Apollo shed underperforming 
contracts, standardized processes worldwide, and integrated divisions, 




The predecessor of TNT was Thomas Nationwide Transport, found-
ed in 1946 by Ken Thomas to provide express delivery service in Aus-
tralia. A logistics division set up in the United Kingdom in 1985 became 
the motor vehicle industry’s largest 3PL during the 1990s.
TNT started logistics services in North America during the 1980s 
and became a major player when it acquired logistics provider CTI LO-
GISTX	in	2000	from	rail	and	shipping	company	CSX	Corporation.	CTI,	
originally Customized Transportation Inc., was established in 1981 and 
became a subsidiary of CSX in 1993. 
TNT was acquired in 1996 by the Netherlands postal service Konin-
klijke PTT Nederland (KPN), which had been privatized by the Dutch 
government seven years earlier. Until the holding company for TNT 
Logistics	and	Royal	TPG	Post	was	sold	 to	Apollo,	 it	was	 the	 largest	
private employer in the Netherlands. 
DHL
DHL was the world’s largest 3PL in 2006, with revenues twice as 
high as the second largest 3PL. When it was created in 1969, DHL ini-
tially specialized in international air express. It was named for the ini-
tials of the three founders, Adrian Dalsey, Larry Hillblom, and Robert 
Lynn.	DHL	was	sold	to	the	German	post	offic 	Deutsche	Post	World	in	
2002, and it became the largest 3PL when it acquired the British-based 
logistics	fir 	Exel	in	2005.
Exel in turn had become the leading 3PL through a 2000 merger 
of	 two	 venerable	British	 firms 	National	 Freight	Company	Ltd.	 and	
Ocean Steam Ship Company. National had moved into contract logis-
tics using Exel as a brand name in 1989. Ocean, founded in 1865, was a 
freight	forwarding	firm 	originally	(as	the	name	suggested)	by	sea.	Exel	
“was made from two British companies meant to be merged together. 
[National’s] contract logistics and [Ocean’s] freight forwarding have 
complemented	each	other	well”	(Foster	and	Armstrong	2004).	Exel’s	
distinctive contribution to auto industry logistics had been leadership in 
developing supplier parks in Europe (see below). 
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COORDINATING AND MANAGING LOGISTICS
“The utter lack of coordination among 3PLs, carriers, parts suppli-
ers and OEMs is a modern equivalent of the Tower of Babel story.”3 
Difficultie 	 include	 the	 following:	 inadequately	 developed	 company	
networks,	insufficientl 	define 	tasks	and	responsibilities	within	com-
pany networks, slow implementation of optimization activities because 
of	poor	information	and	coordination	management,	and	difficultie 	in	
calculating and allocating cost and savings between partners (European 
4PL Research Club n.d.). “Each car manufacturer has its own system 
and each logistics provider has its own system. If you’re a supplier that 
does 70 percent of your business with one OEM then that’s great. If 
you are ArvinMeritor or Robert Bosch and you are doing business with 
everybody, then all of a sudden you are working with seven, eight dif-
ferent systems to do the same thing.”4
Two basic strategies have emerged to organize the complexities of 
logistics. One has been to add another layer of logistics management: 
in other words, to manage the managers. The other has been to add an-
other layer of physical facilities: in other words, the staging areas.




A 4PL addresses the challenges of coordinating multiple 3PLs 
“through the integrative approach of designing, coordinating, and con-
trolling agile supply networks. The decisive task of the 4PL provider 
is to embrace the process integration of single, independent companies 
in an overall concept with the objective of enhancing the quality and 
efficienc 	of	the	value	chain	and	thereby	unlocking	competitive	advan-
tage” (European 4PL Research Club n.d.).
A 4PL is different from a 3PL because it plans, steers, and controls 
the	 flo 	of	 information	 and	 capital,	not	 just	material,	 in	 accordance	
with	a	client’s	long-term	strategic	objectives	(Figure	8.1).	The	essence	
of a 4PL is integrating information management with coordination of 
multiple 3PLs. A 4PL does not actually supply the underlying logistical 
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services, a job still reserved for 3PLs. “The rise of 4PLs stems in part 
from the fact that outsourcing is now a global endeavor. The manage-
ment and integration of dispersed logistics players—each bound by lo-
cal variations in language, currency, trade law, and so on—is an enor-
mous	undertaking.	 In	hiring	a	4PL,	an	enterprise	must	 fin 	a	partner	
that understands its special logistics needs, one that can share in the 
risks	and	rewards	of	reinventing	a	significan 	portion	of	 its	business”	
(Schwartz 2003).
A 4PL needs IT capabilities, including Web-based capabilities, so 
that it can manage each logistics participant throughout the supply 
chain, as well as control inventory and shipments. Armed with this ca-
pability and information from each link in the supply chain, the 4PL can 
optimize inventory, transportation, and warehousing.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the Hoyer Web site (http://www.hoyer-group 
.com/logistikE/html/3pl4pl.html).
























parties of the supply
chain in conjunction
with e-Business
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The leading IT provider of 4PL services was Accenture, formerly 
Andersen Consulting, which actually trademarked the term “4PL” in 
1996.	Accenture	define 	4PL	as	“an	 integrator	 that	assembles	 the	re-
sources, capabilities and technology of its own organization or other or-
ganizations to design, build, and run comprehensive supply-chain solu-
tions” (Bumstead and Cannons 2002). According to Accenture associate 
partner James W. Moore, “The key thing that is happening in the supply 
chain is that time now is often more important than geography,” and 
management of time is an IT skill. “The core value offered by 4PLs is 
in	managing	and	integrating	the	flo 	of	information	between	hundreds	
of outsourced supply chain partners and the enterprises that employ 
them. ‘4PLs manage other 3PLs and transportation carriers to execute 
the work and oversee the solution design and performance of those enti-
ties that work for them,’ states Tom McKenna, senior vice president of 
logistics engineering at Penske Logistics” (Schwartz 2003).
Leading 3PLs have questioned the need for an additional player. 
They argued that putting another layer in the supply chain raised costs 
without adding value. Haulers claimed that consultants created the 4PL 
concept simply to siphon off an ongoing revenue stream from the 3PLs. 
The larger 3PLs were ready and able to provide the coordination servic-
es, which they preferred to call “logistics integrator” or “lead logistics 
provider,” both terms that have been around for a long time (Hoffman 
2000).
The term “4PL” itself has rankled 3PLs, as it was trademarked, and 
by	an	IT	fir 	to	boot.	Ryder	CEO	Gregory	Swienton	said,	“I	hate	the	
term 4PL. I even hate the term 3PL. We say ‘lead logistics’” (Arm-
bruster 2002b). Other 3PLs “deftly hijacked the new 4PL term to give 
them license to move into other higher margin areas of the supply-
chain” (Bumstead and Cannons 2002). 
Vascor	and	Vector	have	been	the	leading	4PLs	associated	with	the	
U.S.	motor	vehicle	industry.	The	two	were	created	by	Toyota	and	GM,	
respectively,	 specificall 	 to	coordinate	 their	complex	 logistics.	How-
ever, because of widespread hostility to the term among the 3PL com-
munity,	neither	Vascor	nor	Vector	has	been	referred	to	as	a	4PL.
Vascor, Toyota’s 4PL






and specialized primarily in freight handling and warehousing within 
Japan. APL, originally American President Lines, was created in 1848 
to	carry	passengers	on	the	S.S.	California	from	New	York	to	San	Fran-
cisco	for	the	gold	rush.	The	company	established	the	firs 	trans-Pacifi 	
route between the United States and China in 1867. APL was acquired 
in	1997	by	the	much	smaller	NOL	Group,	founded	in	1968	as	Neptune	









vice providers to get parts into the plants on a just-in-time basis. Routes 
have been structured precisely to get seats, interior trim, and other parts 
from suppliers or sequencing centers to plants in accordance with pro-
duction	schedules.	Vascor	assigned	routes	to	partner	carriers,	schedules	
less-than-truckload	shipments,	and	organizes	intermodal	transfers.	Giv-
en the need for a precise timetable of truck arrivals at the plant because 
of sequencing, global positioning systems have been used to track the 
milk-run	fleet 	If	a	driver	encountered	an	“exception”—that	is,	is	run-
ning	 late—Vascor	 immediately	 informed	a	 large	number	of	people	at	
Toyota (Terreri 2004).
Vector, GM’s 4PL
Vector	was	established	 in	2000	 to	 run	GM’s	 supply	chain	 in	 the	
United States. Controlling interest was originally held by Menlo World-
wide, a leading 3PL that was founded in 1990. 
CNF,	originally	Consolidated	Truck	Lines,	combined	several	Port-
land, Oregon, freight companies that were acquired in 1929 by Leland 
James. A decade later, to provide his freight company with suitable 
trucks,	James	established	Freightways	Manufacturing	Co.,	later	known	
as	Freightliner	Corp.	CNF	became	a	leading	international	freight	for-
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warder specializing in heavy air cargo, especially after acquiring Emery 
Air	Freight	Corp.	in	1989.	Menlo	Logistics	was	established	in	1990	to	
meet distribution services beyond traditional trucking and air freight.
CNF	spun	off	its	original	trucking	operations	into	a	separate	com-
pany	 in	 1996.	Viewed	 as	 uncompetitive,	 saddled	with	 a	 high	wage	
unionized workforce, the spun-off freight hauler declared bankruptcy 
in	2002.	CNF	was	 restructured	 around	Emery	Worldwide	 air	 freight	




ects	 to	move	 from	GM	 staff	over	 to	Vector	 (Bumstead	and	Cannons	
2002).	Vector’s	firs 	accomplishment	was	a	redesign	of	GM’s	Logistics	
Inbound Material Network to reduce the aggregate travel of all inbound 
carriers by 44 million miles in 2004. At 6.2 miles per gallon per truck, 
the	reduction	saved	7	million	gallons	of	diesel	fuel	and	$59	million.
GM	bought	out	Menlo	in	2006	and	brought	Vector	in-house.	“GM	
apparently came to the conclusion that managing inbound supply chain 
operations had become a core competency that it wanted to manage 
itself”	(Armstrong	and	Foster	2007,	p.	32).
Staging Deliveries
Carmakers have also addressed the complexities associated with the 
frequency and volume of deliveries to their assembly plants through 
establishment of satellite facilities, including supplier parks and distri-
bution centers. These facilities are not warehouses storing large inven-
tories of not-yet-needed parts. Rather, they move parts quickly from 
suppliers	 to	 fina 	assembly	 in	a	 logical	sequence	 that	can	be	handled	
more smoothly in a building dedicated to the purpose rather than inside 
the	fina 	assembly	plant.
Supplier parks
A supplier park is a campus containing a number of suppliers situ-
ated	 in	close	proximity	 to	a	fina 	assembly	plant.	In	Europe,	supplier	




ness of southern Spain and northern England from Europe’s supplier 
base	influence 	the	decision	to	establish	supplier	parks	there.	Supplier	
parks have also been opened in developing countries like India, where 
poor	roads	make	just-in-time	delivery	difficult 	and	utilities	such	as	wa-
ter and electricity are hard to get.
In	the	United	States,	Ford	opened	the	firs 	full-fledge 	supplier	park	
in	Chicago.	Ford	has	been	assembling	cars	at	its	Torrence	Avenue	plant	
located on the far South Side of Chicago, on the banks of the Calumet 
River, since 1924. As production of the Taurus car neared the end of its 
run	at	the	Chicago	assembly	plant,	Ford	official 	weighed	their	options.	
On	the	plus	side,	the	plant	had	a	productive	workforce	amenable	to	fle -
ible work rules, and a local government willing to do what it would take 
to	keep	the	plant	open.	On	the	other	hand,	the	plant	was	Ford’s	oldest	
and	faced	severe	logistics	challenges.	Ultimately,	Ford	decided	to	retool	
the plant for new models. 
Logistics issues would be addressed by opening a supplier park ad-
jacent	to	the	assembly	plant.	Ford’s	Chicago	supplier	park	would	be	de-
signed	to	reduce	shipping	costs	and	inventory,	to	allow	more	flexibilit 	
to changes in production mix, and to more quickly identify (and solve) 
quality problems.
Ford	began	talking	with	local	government	official 	about	the	sup-
plier park idea in 1999. A deal was announced a year later. A supplier 
park was to be located on a contaminated site, formerly occupied by 
Republic	Steel,	adjacent	to	the	Torrence	Avenue	assembly	plant.	Ford’s	
real	estate	arm,	Ford	Land,	chose	CenterPoint	Properties	Trust,	the	larg-
est owner and developer of industrial property in Chicago, to manage 
the	supplier	park	and	to	entice	Ford	suppliers	to	lease	space	there.
Naturally, local government incentives were forthcoming. Ulti-
mately,	the	city	of	Chicago	and	state	of	Illinois	split	about	evenly	$100	
million in roadway improvements, including the relocation of Torrence 




ing (Kachadourian 2000; Mayne 2002).
Initially attracted to the supplier park were nine suppliers, a mix of 
large	and	small.	Five	 large	 tenants	 included	Brose	Automotive,	Plas-
tech	Engineered	Products,	Tower	Automotive,	Visteon,	and	ZF	Group.	








Two smaller suppliers attracted to the supplier park were Sander-
son, which supplied stampings, and Summit Polymers, which supplied 
plastic parts. The ninth original tenant, Conau-Pico, was not actually a 
parts supplier; rather it was the largest supplier of automation equip-
ment for assembly plants.
For	all	of	the	hype	about	the	supplier	park,	the	most	important	com-
ponents still arrived at the Chicago assembly plant through conventional 
sources.	Engines	and	transmissions	came	from	Ford’s	powertrain	facili-
ties	in	Ohio.	Stampings	came	from	Ford’s	1940s-era	Chicago	Heights	
facility, 10 miles south of the assembly plant. Lear Corp., as was its 
custom,	built	its	own	seat	plant	one-half	mile	from	the	Ford	assembly	
plant and supplied headliners and other interior parts from a facility in 
Hammond, Indiana, 5 miles away. 
Ford	reported	 that	 the	average	distance	materials	had	 to	be	 trans-
ported to the Chicago assembly plant declined from 457 miles for Tau-
rus production to 121 miles for the new models (Mayne 2002). The 
figur 	was	probably	 the	 average	distance	 traveled	by	 the	600	 trucks	
arriving each day at the assembly plant, and was not weighted by value 
or weight of the individual components. 
Did	Ford’s	Chicago	supplier	park	represent	the	wave	of	the	future?	
Two Automotive	News headlines two months apart equivocated 
• “Automakers See Payoffs in Supplier Parks” (August 5, 2002), 
and
• “Automakers Are Divided on Supplier Parks” (October 7, 2002).
The	firs 	article,	complete	with	a	sketch	of	the	then-future	Chicago	
supplier park that inevitably bore little resemblance to the completed 
complex,	emphasized	Ford’s	perspective.	“Besides	improving	logistics	
itself and the cost to ship, it provides the ability to sequence directly 
to	the	assembly	plant	door,”	according	to	Roman	Krygier,	then	Ford’s	
group vice president of manufacturing and quality. “Quality gets a sig-
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nifican 	improvement	because	you	don’t	have	a	long	pipeline,	and	re-
sponse	 to	change	 is	much	better.	 It’s	hard	 to	mention	all	 the	benefit 	
because what you really do is link the supplier” (Wilson 2002b).
Two months later, Automotive	News reported, “Supplier parks—the 
concept of housing major suppliers next to assembly plants—aren’t 
quite working out as planned.” Toyota and Honda in particular did not 
seem especially fond of the supplier park concept. “Toyota developed 
an electronic version of its kanban, or card, reordering system that ad-
justs	to	shopping	time	from	more	distant	suppliers	to	smooth	the	flo 	
of parts.” And Honda has relied on a crossdock system (Cullen 2002). 
In other words, if Toyota and Honda already managed their inbound 
freight	efficientl ,	what	value	would	a	supplier	park	add	for	them?	The	
fact	that	Ford	did	not	roll	out	supplier	parks	across	its	North	American	
assembly operations supported the second point of view.
Supplier parks have been implemented, however, by a number of 
assembly facilities located at the southern end of Auto Alley, such as 
Toyota’s truck plant in San Antonio and Nissan’s assembly plant in 
Mississippi. If an assembly facility is at the fringe of or actually outside 
Auto Alley, a supplier park is a way to make up for the lack of a well-
developed regional supply base.
A different model of bringing a select group of suppliers close to 
the assembly line has been put into place at Chrysler’s Toledo assembly 
plant. Here a small number of strategic suppliers have been brought into 
the assembly plant (see Chapter 11).
Distribution centers
Distribution centers are being built as staging areas to facilitate the 
timely	arrival	of	parts	at	fina 	assembly	plants.	Carmakers	now	require	
delivery of parts not merely on a just-in-time basis, but more important-
ly, in the correct sequence. Rather than just-in-time, this trend has been 
called just-in-sequence. In order to meet these requirements, the line 
between supplier and logistics provider sometimes gets erased. State-
of-the-art distribution centers perform a number of so-called sequenc-
ing and kitting operations. The value added consists not in producing 
parts but in getting them ready to be sent to the assembly line in the 
right order of the available variations. A sequencing and kitting opera-
tion can also include unpacking and prepping parts for assembly. An 
example is plants that put tires on wheels (not producing either of these 
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two parts). A small company named T&W Assembly in 2005 supplied 
all the three Mississippi-based assembly plants from three dedicated 
distribution centers with tires and wheels.
Carmakers	tell	suppliers	what	specifi 	vehicles	will	be	built	on	which	
days. “The suppliers then determine what assemblies to make—interior 
dashboards, for instance—produce them, then sequence delivery in the 
exact order of the manufacturing production run” (Harrington 2007). 
A distribution center (DC) may serve a single assembly plant or it 
may serve multiple assembly plants. “A 3PL may pick up material from 
nearby suppliers, crossdock it, split out what’s going to the local OEM 
plant, and load the rest on a truck for delivery to another DC or plant,” 
according	to	Vascor	vice	president	Jim	Brutsman	(Harrington	2007).
Just-in-time	meant	 frequent	deliveries	 from	 suppliers	 to	 fina 	 as-
sembly plants in small batches. Just-in-sequence has meant moving 
larger batches less frequently from suppliers to distribution centers and 
then moving small batches more frequently from distribution centers 
to	fina 	assembly	plants.	“Instead	of	a	3PL	delivering	to	an	assembler	
from a supplier 16 times a day, it may go to the supplier twice a day, 
bring the materials to the DC, then move from there 16 times to the 
OEM plant.” This arrangement trades transportation costs for distribu-
tion center costs (Harrington 2007). 
According	to	another	Vascor	vice	president,	Dan	Greenberg,
The	plant	still	receives	the	same	16	deliveries,	but	the	external	flo 	
makes more economic sense. If, for example, the 3PL moves ma-
terial from a supplier 100 miles away from the OEM, a roundtrip 
runs 200 miles. Delivering 16 times a day equals 3,200 miles.
If, on the other hand, the 3PL moves material from the supplier 
twice a day in larger quantities, and puts the shipments in a distri-
bution center close to the OEM’s plant, travel distance is reduced 
to 400 miles. (Harrington 2007)
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Efficien 	logistics	is	the	thread	that	holds	together	all	of	the	changes	
in producer–supplier relations outlined in this book. It has made feasi-
ble the business model by which carmakers outsource most of the value 
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of the vehicle to independent suppliers. Large modules can arrive at the 
fina 	assembly	line	ready	for	installation	moments	before	needed,	elimi-
nating costly inventory. “Clearly, logistics outsourcers are using 3PL 
partnerships to strategically shift the way they approach and manage 
their supply chains. It’s no longer simply a matter of cutting costs or ac-
cessing capacity. 3PLs and their customers are digging deeper into the 
supply chain to look at how they can apply technology to business pro-
cesses—beginning with suppliers and inbound product movement—to 
reduce inventory, match available capacity to demand, and streamline 
costs in a more organic way” (O’Reilly 2006).
Thanks	 to	 efficien 	 logistics,	 the	network	of	 suppliers	 around	 an	
assembly plant described in Chapter 6 can be rather loose. Suppliers 
do not have to be bunched up in the immediate vicinity of an assembly 
plant, competing for the same labor supply and infrastructure invest-
ment. The most important unit of delivery time is one day, not one hour, 
thanks	to	efficien 	logistics.	
The challenge for carmakers is that they have outsourced logistics 
to companies that, with some exceptions, do not have historic ties to the 
auto industry. In other words, 3PLs know computers and spreadsheets, 
but how well do they know seats and engines? Even more challeng-
ing for carmakers will be integrating parts sourced from China into the 
supply chain. To date, China has been the source of a small but grow-
ing percentage of components used in the United States. As carmakers 
stretch their supply chains around the globe, many are seeking help 
from large 3PL providers.
[S]ourcing and manufacturing in China ties up an additional six 
weeks’ worth of capital while goods are in transit. It is vital that 
companies stay on top of where that inventory is at any point in 
time	and	be	able	to	make	decisions	to	keep	the	supply	chain	flo -
ing. Lead logistics 3PLs have the state-of-the-art systems, the 
web-based track-and-trace interfaces, and the event management 
capability needed to manage these long, risky supply chains. The 
next tier of 3PLs below the Top 25 does not yet have these systems 
or these abilities. A big differentiator between the major-league 
3PLs and everyone else is the ability to spend the money and build 
this	systems	capability.	(Foster	and	Armstrong	2004)
The challenge for suppliers is somewhat different. Because they 
ship to more than one carmaker, they must work with more than one 
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3PL.	The	 benefit 	 they	 have	 been	 receiving	 in	 streamlined	 delivery	
schedules have been at least partially offset by the costs they have in-
curred in having to learn the distinctive practices of several 3PLs. “The 
one-stop shop philosophy is no longer as practical as it once was. Busi-
nesses	have	less	flexibilit 	with	only	one	3PL,	particularly	when	plan-
ning contingencies or shifting in and out of markets. Having multiple 
logistics providers also gives companies greater leverage to benchmark 
performance, which in turn holds 3PLs accountable for meeting ex-
pected service requirements” (O’Reilly 2006).
Despite initial claims that the arrival of just-in-time production 
would considerably tighten the physical linkages between assemblers 
and their suppliers, we observe a rather loose geographical connection 
of the supply chain. Key to this development is the availability of a 
well-developed transportation infrastructure. In combination with the 
use of logistics services, it allows production facilities to be closely 
linked operationally without having to be physically close. 
Notes
	 1.	 Bill	Naples,	 transportation	manager,	Ford	Customer	Service	Division,	Livonia,	
quoted in Terreri (2004). 
 2. Tim Connearney, materials director for Saturn, quoted in Terreri (2004).







Shifting Fortunes along Auto Alley
When	GM,	Ford,	and	Chrysler	controlled	more	than	90	percent	of	the	U.S.	
auto industry as “the Big Three,” southeastern Michigan was the center of auto 
manufacturing, research, and administration, and “Detroit” was a one-word 
term that encompassed the totality of the U.S. auto industry. At the peak of 
their dominance during the 1950s, the Big Three employed more than 400,000 
people in Michigan. As described in earlier chapters, parts suppliers even more 
than carmakers were clustered in Michigan.
As the Big Three—now more accurately referred to as the Detroit 3—lost 
market share to foreign-owned carmakers, “Detroit” became shorthand for the 
declining	remnants	of	the	industry	still	in	the	hands	of	GM,	Ford,	and	Chrys-
ler. Michigan auto industry employment declined about 6 percent per year 
during	the	early	twenty-firs 	century.
Despite Michigan’s decline, at a national scale the U.S. auto industry 
remains very highly clustered in a small portion of the country. More than 
three-fourths of auto industry jobs and facilities are packed into an area that 
comprises only 2 percent of the land of the United States.
The auto-producing area has a distinctive shape: a narrow corridor rough-
ly 700 miles long and often less than 100 miles wide through the interior of the 
United	States	between	the	Great	Lakes	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	The	spine	of	
the corridor is formed by two north–south interstate highways, I-65 and I-75, 
which run within 100 miles of each other for the most part. East–west inter-
states including I-40, I-64, and I-70 form ladders connecting the two north–
south routes. The corridor is commonly referred to as Auto Alley.
Interstate	65	runs	1,000	miles	between	Gary,	Indiana,	near	Lake	Michi-
gan,	and	Mobile,	Alabama,	near	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	The	Auto	Alley	portion	
of I-65 passes through Indianapolis, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky; Nashville, 
Tennessee; and Birmingham, Alabama. Interstate 75 runs 2,000 miles between 
Sault	Ste.	Marie	in	Michigan’s	Upper	Peninsula	and	Fort	Lauderdale,	Florida.	
Within	Auto	Alley,	I-75	passes	through	Detroit	and	Flint,	Michigan;	Toledo,	
Dayton, and Cincinnati, Ohio; Lexington, Kentucky; Knoxville and Chatta-
nooga,	Tennessee;	and	Atlanta,	Georgia.	
Seven hundred miles south of Michigan, Alabama was one of the poor-
est states in the country for much of the twentieth century. Per capita income 
and car ownership rates were 50 percent lower in Alabama than in Michigan 
in	1950.	Investment	in	all-new	and	expanded	factories	totaled	$35	million	in	
Alabama	 in	1952	 compared	with	$218	million	 in	Michigan,	 and	manufac-
turing	wages	 totaled	$700	million	 in	Alabama	compared	with	$6	billion	 in	
Michigan.
This section examines reasons for the industry’s clustering in Auto Alley 
between Alabama on the south and Michigan on the north. Michigan remains 
a major center of automotive production, but most of the industry’s growth 
of late has been further south. As a result, Alabama was tied with Illinois and 
Indiana for fourth place in number of assembly plants in 2007, behind only 
Michigan, Ohio, and Missouri.
The	firs 	chapter	of	this	section	describes	the	emergence	and	current	struc-
ture of Auto Alley. The nature of the parts produced as well as the national-
ity	of	 the	 supplier	 company	 influenc 	 specifi 	 locations	within	Auto	Alley.	
Chapters 10 and 11 describe the pull towards the southern end of Auto Alley 
for several types of parts, including tires and glass (Chapter 10) and chassis 
(Chapter 11). 
Chapter 12 explains how labor was the principal factor underlying the 
relative attractiveness of the southern end of Auto Alley as the location of 
choice for new assembly plants and parts suppliers. Of critical importance has 
been the difference between the northern and southern ends of Auto Alley in 
labor relations, especially the role of unions.
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Emergence of Auto Alley
To be honest, five years ago, I didn’t even know where 	
Alabama	was,	much	less	think	that	I	would	be	living	there.1
Auto Alley became the home of the U.S. auto industry primarily 
because of transport costs. The most critical transport factor for car-
makers	 is	 the	cost	of	shipping	vehicles	from	fina 	assembly	plants	 to	
customers. Because assembled vehicles are bulky and fragile and tie up 
a lot of capital, it is imperative that they be delivered to customers as 
quickly as possible. 
At	 firs 	glance,	 the	optimal	 location	 for	an	assembly	plant	would	
be the point that minimizes the aggregate travel to all of its custom-
ers throughout the United States, as well as Canada and Mexico. Each 
model would have its own optimal location, depending on the particu-
lar	distribution	of	its	customer	base.	For	a	vehicle	with	a	similar	mar-
ket share in every region of the country, the optimal location would 
probably be near the center of U.S. population, which is currently in 
Missouri. 
In reality, Missouri is west of the optimal location, because the cost 
per	mile	of	shipping	vehicles	is	not	uniform.	For	vehicles	that	leave	the	
assembly plant by truck, delivery that takes more than one day adds 
considerable cost. If overnight travel is required, the vehicles may as 
well be loaded on trains, which have a much higher cost per mile than 
trucks for short distances but a lower cost per mile for long trips. So the 
optimal location for an assembly plant is actually the point that maxi-
mizes the number of customers who can be reached within a one-day 
drive.	For	most	carmakers,	that	optimal	location	is	somewhere	in	Auto	
Alley	(see	Figure	9.1).
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Figure 9.1  Close-up of Auto Alley
NOTE: Empty boxes denote cities.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International and other sources.
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BEFORE AUTO ALLEY
The geographical arrangement of motor vehicle production in the 
United	States	has	changed	 three	 times.	The	firs 	geographical	change	
took place around 1900 and the second around 1910. The third geo-
graphic shift, which resulted in the creation of the modern Auto Alley, 
began about 1980.
When commercial production began in the 1890s, most motor vehi-
cles were produced in the Northeast, between Boston and Philadelphia. 
Most customers for early vehicles were also in the Northeast, which 
was the wealthiest, most populous, and most densely built-up region in 
the United States at the time. 
When the industry was still in its infancy, most motor vehicle pro-
duction	shifted	to	southeastern	Michigan	during	the	firs 	decade	of	the	
twentieth century. By 1913, 80 percent of U.S. motor vehicle production 
was concentrated in the area. As explained earlier in the book, Michi-
gan had already been established as the center of production for key 
components, notably gasoline engines and carriage bodies. Production 
also clustered in Michigan because venture capital was more readily 
available there than it was from the staid banks of Wall Street.
Between the 1910s and 1980s, most parts were produced in Michi-
gan, but carmakers opened branch assembly plants (that is, assembly 
plants producing the same models as a plant in the Midwest) elsewhere 
in the United States, near big cities, such as Los Angeles and New York. 




parts suppliers have been located within Auto Alley. Branch assembly 
plants	elsewhere	in	the	country	have	been	closed.	Facilities	have	been	
located in various places within Auto Alley, depending on the particular 
needs and priorities of the company.
Branch Assembly Plants
Between the two world wars, the Detroit 3 made most of their parts 
in Michigan and shipped them to branch assembly plants around the 
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country.	Ford	pioneered	construction	of	branch	assembly	plants	as	part	
of its strategy of minimizing Model T production costs in order to re-
duce its selling price and make it affordable for most Americans.
Ford’s	brilliant	firs 	sales	manager,	Norval	Hawkins,	proposed	“es-
tablishment of assembling plants all over the world, and shipping in 
knockdown condition from the plant in Detroit the pieces and parts that 
went to make up this car.” Hawkins “spent six weeks in loading, un-
loading	and	reloading	freight	cars	to	fin 	out	just	how	they	could	pack	
the	stuff	in	.	.	.”	(Goodenough	1925,	p.	183).	He	eventually	determined	
that the equivalent of 26 vehicles could be shipped in knocked-down 
form in railroad cars in the same space as seven or eight fully assembled 
ones (Dodge et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1927). 
Ford’s	 firs 	branch	assembly	plant	was	opened	 in	Kansas	City	 in	
1912.	By	1917,	Ford	was	assembling	identical	Model	T’s	in	30	loca-
tions,	including	Highland	Park,	Michigan.	Ford	embarked	on	a	second	
wave of construction of branch assembly plants during the 1920s, in-
cluding several at new locations, as well as larger, more modern re-
placements	for	most	of	the	ones	built	only	a	decade	earlier.	Ford’s	all-
time high of 32 branch assembly plants was reached in 1925 (Ruben-





shipped them by rail to the branch assembly plants. Parts purchased 
from suppliers, notably bodies and tires, were shipped directly to the 
branch assembly plants rather than through Highland Park. Railroad 
companies charged between second- and sixth-class rates to ship parts, 
much lower than the rate charged for assembled vehicles, which was 





at 10 branch assembly plants and a combination of Buick, Oldsmobile, 
and Pontiac models at seven branch assembly plants.2 At a U.S. Senate 
hearing	in	1956,	GM	official 	displayed	maps	showing	the	boundaries	
of the market areas surrounding each branch assembly plant, as well 
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as	financia 	data	explaining	the	attraction	of	the	branch	assembly	plant	
model.3
Smaller carmakers emulated the branch assembly plant model to a 
lesser extent. Before and after World War II, Chrysler maintained three 
branch assembly plants in addition to four “home” plants in the Detroit 
area. The Los Angeles area, home to an especially large and growing 
car market, had nine branch assembly plants in the 1950s, including two 
each	owned	by	Ford	and	GM	and	one	each	by	Chrysler,	Nash,	Kaiser-
Frazer,	Studebaker,	and	Willys-Overland.	By	 the	1990s,	all	nine	had	
been closed (Rubenstein 1992, pp. 95–96).
The branch assembly plant model worked as long as a carmaker 
was producing a variety of trim and body styles on a single platform 
for national distribution. When it controlled half of the U.S. market in 
the	1950s,	GM	had	only	three	platforms,	each	differing	only	slightly	in	
size. Each branch assembly plant was thus producing the same vehicles 
for	 regional	distribution.	Thus,	a	Chevrolet	or	Ford	 sold	 in	 southern	
California would have been assembled in Los Angeles, and one sold in 
the Southeast would have been assembled in Atlanta.
Parts: East–West Auto Alley
For	most	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 parts	 plants	 that	were	 not	 in	
Michigan were arrayed in a 700-mile east–west corridor between up-
state New York and southeastern Wisconsin along the southern rim of 
Lakes	Ontario,	Erie,	and	Michigan.	This	southern	Great	Lakes	region,	
which also included the northern portions of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, 
had been home to numerous automotive pioneers during the late nine-
teenth century, before the industry clustered in southeastern Michigan. 
Two examples discussed in Chapter 10 are the tire industry in Akron 
and the glass industry in Toledo.
As the Big 3 expanded production after World War II, they sited 
many	of	their	new	parts	plants	in	southern	Great	Lakes	states	other	than	
Michigan. They were attracted by a combination of proximity to raw 
materials—steel mills were also clustered in the region (see Chapter 
5)—and to customers in the Detroit area. By locating outside Michigan, 
the new parts plants were less likely to compete against existing parts 
plants for skilled labor in a tight market.




new parts plants in Ohio, including three each for engines and drive-
trains, and one each for stamping, casting, and electrical accessories. 
Ford’s	vice	president	of	operations	D.S.	Harder,	in	charge	of	selecting	
new	plant	sites,	stated	that	“taxes	were	a	consideration	in	Ford’s	move	
to Ohio” (Rubenstein 1992, p. 104). 
GM	had	more	parts	plants	than	did	Ford	in	Great	Lakes	states	other	
than	Michigan	during	 the	 interwar	years.	GM	parts	 centers	 included	
several communities in upstate New York, northern New Jersey, north-
ern	Indiana,	and	Ohio.	The	leading	center	for	GM	parts	production	out-
side of Michigan was Dayton, Ohio. 
Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company (later shortened to 
Delco)	made	its	firs 	product	for	the	auto	industry	in	1909,	an	electric	
starter	that	eliminated	the	difficul 	and	dangerous	task	of	hand-crank-
ing the engine. As part of William C. Durant’s wheeling and dealing, 




brakes, air conditioners, and steering wheels.
A 1940 economic geography book delineated a “Central Automo-
bile District” that encompassed southeast Michigan, northwest Ohio, 
and	northeast	Indiana	(Colby	and	Foster	1940,	cited	in	Ballert	1947).
Three-fourths of the nation’s motor vehicle employment was clustered 
in this district, including one-half in the Detroit area and one-fourth 
in the rest of the area. Michigan had 60 percent of all parts employ-
ment (Detroit City Plan Commission 1944, p. 5, cited in Ballert 1947). 
Most of the remaining one-fourth was found in the rest of the so-called 
American Manufacturing Belt between the Atlantic Coast and Lake 
Michigan.




one of the world’s largest and employed 22,000 workers who produced 
2,000 cars a day. With information from Buick’s purchasing depart-
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ment,	Henrickson	 identifie 	 the	origin	of	50	 leading	parts,	 including	
bodies,	carburetors,	mufflers 	spark	plugs,	wheels,	tires,	engine	mounts,	
and	 fan	belts.	Suppliers	 included	plants	owned	by	GM	and	by	 inde-
pendent companies. He also compared Buick City’s 1951 supplier base 
with	that	of	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	when	Buick	was	
founded. 
Buick	 suppliers	 during	 the	 firs 	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	
were spread out through the Northeast from Massachusetts, Rhode Is-
land, Connecticut, and New Jersey on the east and through Pennsylva-
nia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin on the west. After 
gaining control of Buick in 1904, Billy Durant enticed key suppliers to 
move	to	Flint.	As	a	result,	Buick	City’s	suppliers	during	the	1950s	were	
more concentrated in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio than a half-century 
earlier.




in Chapter 6. However, the appearance of similarity is somewhat de-
ceiving. Today, a distance of 450 miles represents a one-day driving 
radius for a truck, but in 1951, when most deliveries were by rail, it 
would have taken more than one day because of time lost loading and 
unloading. 
Buick’s 1951 suppliers within the 450-mile radius were arrayed in 
an	east–west	configuratio 	along	the	southern	Great	Lakes.	The	creation	
of	an	east–west	supply	base	along	the	southern	Great	Lakes	after	World	
War II resulted in a sharp decline in auto industry jobs in Michigan. In 
just four years, between 1954 and 1958, the percentage of U.S. motor 
vehicle jobs located in Michigan declined from 53 percent to 43 per-
cent. Michigan’s share of U.S. motor vehicle employment thus declined 
most	sharply	not	in	the	twenty-firs 	century,	but	a	half-century	earlier.	
The vehicle systems most likely to relocate outside Michigan were 
the engine and drivetrain. Independent suppliers of powertrain parts 
followed their Detroit 3 customers out of Michigan and into adjacent 
southern	Great	Lakes	states.	The	legacy	of	Detroit	3	investment	in	the	
Midwest after World War II continues to shape the geography of pow-
ertrain	parts	production	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	
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During	 the	 early	 twenty-firs 	 century,	Michigan’s	 auto	 job	 losses	
were tied to vertical disintegration and declining fortunes of the Detroit 
3 carmakers. In contrast, after World War II, Michigan’s losses were 
linked to an increase in vertical integration and the strengthening of the 
Detroit 3. Also varying between the two time periods has been the des-
tination of jobs leaving Michigan. After World War II, parts production 
moved from Michigan to other Midwest states, but in the early twenty-
firs 	century,	it	moved	from	Michigan	to	the	South.
Figure 9.2  Buick City Suppliers, 1951
SOURCE: Henrickson (1951).
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THE NORTH–SOUTH AUTO ALLEY
The term Auto	Alley	was	firs 	employed	to	refer	to	investment	deci-
sions made by Japanese carmakers during the 1980s. When they de-
cided	 to	build	assembly	plants	 in	 the	United	States,	at	firs 	known	as	
transplants,	 Japanese	 firm 	 for	 the	most	part	 shunned	Michigan	 and	
the	adjacent	Great	Lakes	area.	Auto	Alley	was	also	called	the	kanban 
highway, after the Japanese word for just-in-time.
The southern drift of the U.S. auto industry has occurred in three 
distinct	periods.	First,	during	 the	1980s,	new	plants	were	 located	pri-
marily between southern Ohio and central Tennessee. A second wave 
of new plants built during the 1990s was centered on the southernmost 




Auto Alley First Appears
The Ohio River runs 981 miles from the Monongahela and Al-
legheny rivers at Pittsburgh to the Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois. 
During the nineteenth century, the Ohio divided free states from slave 
states.	 In	 the	 twenty-firs 	century,	 the	Ohio	River	divides	Auto	Alley	
into two portions. North of the river lies the auto industry’s traditional 
Midwest auto-producing region, centered on southeastern Michigan 
and portions of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin along the south-
ern	Great	Lakes.	As	recently	as	1979,	only	5	of	55	U.S.	assembly	plants	
were	located	in	Auto	Alley	south	of	the	Ohio	River	(Figure	9.3).	Since	
then, a new center of automotive production has emerged south of the 




United States, beginning in 1982. Ardently wooed by Ohio governor 
James Rhodes, at a time when most American politicians shunned Jap-
anese manufacturers, Honda built an assembly plant in Marysville, a 
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few miles west of the Columbus bypass. Although a rural location not 
traditionally associated with motor vehicle production, the Marysville 
site did not appear to represent a sharp break with the industry’s long-
standing Midwest orientation.
It was the second Japanese carmaker that represented the dramatic 
break with past location patterns. Nissan was also recruited heavily by 
Governor	Rhodes	 and	 came	 close	 to	 joining	Honda	 in	Ohio.	But	 in	
1983, Nissan went to Smyrna, Tennessee, a tiny community with no 
ties to the auto industry in a region with limited ties to the auto indus-
try	(nearby	Nashville	had	a	Ford	glass	plant).	As	a	result	of	what	was	
then an extremely remote location, the Nissan plant was farther than the 
typical assembly plant from its supplier base (see Chapter 6).
Figure 9.3  Light Vehicle Assembly Plants in the United States and 
Canada, 1979
NOTE: Projections made to 2009 are based on manufacturers’ announced plant open-
ings and closings as of March 2008.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the	Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook database.
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state’s only Japanese-run assembly plant. Diamond-Star, the original 
name of a Mitsubishi–Chrysler joint venture, went to Normal, Illinois.
Toyota	was	responsible	for	fillin 	 in	 the	gap	between	Nissan	and	
the	other	transplants	and	clearly	set	the	pattern	of	southern	drift	(Figure	
9.4). As the best-selling and most successful of the Japanese carmakers, 
Toyota	moved	more	slowly	than	its	competitors.	When	it	finall 	decided	
to	build	its	own	fina 	assembly	plant	in	the	United	States,	Toyota	locat-
Figure 9.4  Light Vehicle Assembly Plants in the United States and 
Canada, 1990
NOTE: Black stars represent new plants that opened between 1979 and 1990; replace-
ment plants are not shown as new. Projections made to 2009 are based on manufactur-
ers’ announced plant openings and closings as of March 2008.
SOURCE: Adapted by authors from the Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook database.
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ed	in	the	small	town	of	Georgetown,	near	Lexington,	Kentucky,	in	the	
middle of the nation’s most famous horse farms in bluegrass territory.
The Detroit 3 also contributed to the creation of Auto Alley during 





Meanwhile, the Big 3 had ended the branch plant system in the 
1960s when they started to produce models of varying sizes that could 
not be assembled on the same line. Assembly plants that once distrib-
uted vehicles to a regional market were converted to production of one 
or two specialized models for sale throughout the United States and 
Canada. Coastal assembly plants were closed because the cost of ship-
ping from them to customers throughout the continent was much higher 
than it was from assembly plants in Auto Alley. 
Parts plants
The data that inform our analysis (see Chapter 1) provide us with 
information on the start-up year for most of the supplier plants we ob-
served operating in 2006. Therefore we can make inferences regarding 
the geographic pattern of plant openings for these plants. A decade be-
fore the arrival of the Japanese carmakers, the South had already started 
to	 lure	parts	plants.	During	 the	1970s	GM	opened	10	parts	plants	 in	
the South. These plants primarily produced electrical components and 
powertrain	parts	that	did	not	require	highly	skilled	workers.	GM	hoped	
(in vain) to pay lower wages and avoid unions (see Chapter 12). Eigh-
teen percent of parts plants we observed in 2006 opened during the 
1970s in the South, compared to only 9 percent of those that opened 
prior to that (Table 9.1).
Within	 the	South,	 the	Carolinas	and	Georgia	attracted	 the	 largest	
number of parts plants through the 1970s. The pattern was set primarily 
by	European	parts	makers,	especially	French	and	German,	who	came	to	
regard the southeast coast as the most accessible for trade.
The southern gain during the 1970s was only partially at the ex-
pense of the Midwest. The Midwest as a whole had 66 percent of parts 
plants prior to 1970 and 57 percent of those that opened during the 
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1970s; the rest of the country, excluding the South, stayed at 25 percent 
through the 1970s (Table 9.1).
The percentage of parts plants locating in the South increased from 
18 percent during the 1970s to 23 percent during the 1980s. More sig-
nifican 	was	 the	shift	 in	 the	 location	of	plants	within	 the	South,	from	
the Atlantic coast to Auto Alley. Two-thirds of parts plants located in 
the South during the 1980s went to Kentucky or Tennessee, the two 
principal states at the southern end of Auto Alley, compared to only 45 
percent during earlier decades.
Changes were also occurring within the Midwest prior to the emer-
gence of Auto Alley. Michigan’s share of the nation’s parts plants in-
creased during the 1970s, whereas the other four states of the region 
declined. The Detroit 3’s Michigan stronghold was not yet under attack. 
However, during the 1980s, the pattern reversed. Michigan’s share of 
new parts plants declined from 32 percent to 20 percent, whereas the 
other four Midwest states increased from 25 percent to 35 percent. 
The increasing share of parts plants in the upper South (Kentucky 
and Tennessee) and lower Midwest (Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio) during 
the 1980s matched the distribution of new assembly plants. As Japanese 
carmakers started production in these regions, suppliers followed.
Auto Alley Pushes into the Deep South
Auto Alley pushed farther southward during the 1990s. After the 
initial period of Japanese investment during the 1980s, a several-year 
Table 9.1  Percentage Distribution of Parts Plants by Decade of Opening
Location
Before 
1970 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–06 Total Number
Midwest 65.6 57.4 55.5 51.7 26.5 58.2 1,463
South 9.2 18.0 22.8 29.8 61.4 19.1 481
Other 25.1 24.7 21.7 18.5 12.0 22.6 569
Total number 1,010 373 604 443 83 100 2,513
NOTE: This table presents information on the start-up year of supplier plants that were 
observed	 in	2006.	The	Midwest	 is	define 	as	Indiana,	Illinois,	Michigan,	Ohio,	and	
Wisconsin;	the	South	is	define 	as	Alabama,	Georgia,	Kentucky,	Mississippi,	and	Ten-
nessee; and other is everywhere else. Columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from ELM International and other sources.
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gap occurred before the arrival of a second wave of foreign-owned as-
sembly plants. During the 1990s, the southern end of Auto Alley was 
extended	from	central	Tennessee	nearly	to	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	(Figure	
9.5).
Spearheading the second period of Auto Alley investment were the 
two	German-owned	 luxury	car	companies,	BMW	and	Daimler-Benz.	
Both companies opened assembly plants in the United States during the 
1990s	to	produce	sport	utility	vehicles	specificall 	aimed	at	the	Ameri-
can	market.	BMW	became	 the	firs 	carmaker	 to	assemble	vehicles	 in	
South Carolina, a state that had already attracted a number of major 
Figure 9.5  Light Vehicle Assembly Plants in the United States and 
Canada, 2009
NOTE: Black stars represent new plants that opened or were scheduled to be opened 
between 1990 and 2009; replacement plants are not shown as new. Projections made 
to 2009 are based on manufacturers’ announced plant openings and closings as of 
March 2008.
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the	Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook database. 
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European	suppliers.	 In	 the	big	picture,	 though,	BMW’s	Greer,	South	
Carolina, plant remained on the edge of Auto Alley investment.
The	Mercedes-Benz	plant,	on	the	other	hand,	was	the	firs 	of	what	
would prove to be a stampede into the Heart of Dixie. When it selected 
a	plant	site	 in	 rural	Vance,	near	Tuscaloosa,	Alabama,	 in	1993,	Mer-
cedes-Benz was regarded as having made a questionable decision. The 
company would be entrusting its luxury brand to a state with one of the 
poorest and least skilled workforces, in a location well south of what 
was then the southern end of Auto Alley in central Tennessee.
Following	Mercedes-Benz	in	short	order	into	Alabama	were	Honda	
and	Hyundai.	Kia	went	a	few	miles	east	across	the	state	line	into	Geor-
gia. Nissan and Toyota located just to the west in Mississippi.
For	 their	part,	 the	Detroit	3	no	 longer	built	new	assembly	plants,	
except to replace older ones in nearby communities. Closures continued 
to	be	aimed	at	coastal	plants	that	had	escaped	the	firs 	round	of	cutbacks	
a	decade	earlier.	As	it	happens,	Ford	and	GM	both	pulled	out	of	Georgia	
not long before Kia announced plans to enter the state. 
The southern end of Auto Alley received 30 percent of new parts 
plants during the 1990s, a further increase from the 1980s. The northern 
end continued its decline, attracting 52 percent, slightly less than dur-
ing the 1980s (Table 9.1). Within the South, Kentucky and Tennessee 
continued to increase their share of all new parts plants, to 17 percent of 
the national total. Within the Midwest, Michigan increased its share of 
new parts plants from 20 percent during the 1980s to 23 percent during 
the 1990s, whereas the other four states declined from 35 percent of the 
national share to 28 percent. The gradual change in supplier plant geog-
raphy	observed	since	1970	changed	drastically	in	the	firs 	few	years	of	
the	twenty-firs 	century.	While	Table	9.1	only	shows	83	plant	openings	
between 2000 and 2006, 61 percent of them occurred in the South, with 
the Midwest garnering only 27 percent. Nearly half of all plants opened 
south of Tennessee.4
Infilling within Auto Alley
The extension of Auto Alley into the Deep South in the last years 
of	the	twentieth	century	left	site	selection	official 	of	international	car-
makers	and	suppliers	struggling	to	identify	fresh	sites	in	the	twenty-firs 	
century. Should they pick sites rejected in earlier site selections or ex-
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plore	outside	Auto	Alley?	Rejected	sites	had	risky	flaws 	but	abandon-
ing Auto Alley could add punishing charges to the logistics bill.
Through	most	of	the	firs 	two	periods	of	investment	in	Auto	Alley,	
the rule of thumb had been one international assembly plant per state. In 
order of opening, Honda picked Ohio, Nissan Tennessee, NUMMI Cal-
ifornia, Mazda Michigan, Mitsubishi Illinois, Toyota Kentucky, Subaru 
Indiana, BMW South Carolina, and Mercedes-Benz Alabama. 
The	state	“captured”	by	a	carmaker	influence 	the	location	of	key	
suppliers.	For	example,	Toyota	 suppliers	clustered	 in	Kentucky	even	
though	 the	 carmaker’s	 Georgetown	 assembly	 plant	 could	 be	 easily	
reached from southern Ohio. What Kentucky gained on its north side, it 
lost on the south side, as Nissan suppliers stayed on the Tennessee side 
of the state line rather than stray into southern Kentucky.
The one-international-plant-per-state pattern had a logical basis. 
International carmakers were reluctant to compete with each other for 
qualifie 	workers,	subsidies,	tax	breaks,	and	training	programs.	It	was	
also politically astute: each time international carmakers entered a new 
state,	they	expanded	the	list	of	public	official 	sympathetic	to	their	dis-
tinctive needs and priorities. 
But by the late 1990s, international carmakers had run out of states 
in Auto Alley. Yet they still had some fresh states to pick off: Nissan 
went	to	Mississippi,	Kia	to	Georgia,	and	Toyota	to	Texas.	The	two	re-
maining unclaimed states—Arkansas and Louisiana—were both brand-
ed	 as	having	unattractive	political	climates,	and	 into	 the	 twenty-firs 	
century Louisiana carried the added burden of the bungled response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Consequently, international carmakers were forced 
to look for sites in states already occupied by a competitor. 
The principal objective when entering a previously selected state 
was	to	avoid	competing	for	labor.	The	supply	of	qualifie 	labor	is	rela-
tively scarce in Auto Alley, especially the southern end, a function of 
both	low	population	density	and	average	educational	attainment.	Fur-
thermore, carmakers have discovered that their workers are willing to 
commute longer than the national average of 24 minutes to obtain good, 
high-paying	jobs	in	the	fina 	assembly	plants;	one-hour	commutes	are	
not uncommon at plants in the rural portions of Auto Alley. 
To locate potential plant sites within Auto Alley, carmakers there-
fore start by eliminating sites within two hours of existing assembly 
plants. Two hours represents the sum of the one-hour commuting range 
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of the proposed plant plus the one hour from the existing one. Carmak-
ers	 then	calculate	 if	 the	proposed	site	has	a	sufficientl 	 large	pool	of	
labor surrounding it. A total population of 200,000 within the one-hour 
radius has been the minimum for carmakers to consider. 
Toyota’s consideration in 2007 of sites for an assembly plant illus-
trated	the	process	of	infillin 	within	Auto	Alley.	According	to	press	re-
ports,	Toyota	was	considering	fiv 	sites:	Marion,	Arkansas;	somewhere	
in western North Carolina; Alamo and Chattanooga, Tennessee; and a 
fift 	unnamed	site	(Shirouzo	2007).	A	map	of	Auto	Alley	shows	that	all	
four	named	finalist 	were	outside	a	50-mile	radius—corresponding	to	
the one-hour commuting range—surrounding all of the existing assem-
bly	plants	(Figure	9.6).
In	 the	end,	Toyota	selected	Tupelo,	Mississippi,	perhaps	 the	 fift 	
unnamed site. Tupelo was also beyond a 50-mile radius of existing as-
Figure 9.6  Labor Markets around Assembly Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the	Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook database.
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sembly	plants	(Figure	9.6),	including	the	one	already	operated	by	Nis-
san in Canton, Mississippi.
Toyota and Honda also located new assembly plants in portions of 
Indiana beyond the labor market area of the existing international plant 
operated by Subaru in Lafayette. Toyota went to the far southwestern 
corner of the state and Honda to the far southeastern corner. Honda 
and	Hyundai	also	selected	sites	in	Alabama,	a	state	firs 	staked	out	by	
Daimler.
The other location strategy, to look outside Auto Alley, had been 
employed only once as of 2007. That was Toyota’s decision to build an 
assembly	plant	near	San	Antonio,	Texas.	A	quarter-century	earlier,	GM	
had considered sites in Texas for its Saturn plant but rejected them after 
calculating	that	freight	charges	would	be	$400–$500	higher,	primarily	
because haul-away drivers would have to stop overnight more often 
(Rubenstein	1992).	Toyota	justifie 	the	choice	on	the	basis	of	Texas	be-
ing the world’s largest market for full-sized pickup trucks, which were 
to be built at the Texas assembly plant. 
Three Decades of Auto Alley 
The	seven	southern	states	of	Alabama,	Georgia,	Kentucky,	Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee together had 7 
percent of all transportation sector employment in 1972. Thirty years 
later, the region’s share had grown to 16 percent (Cooney and Yacobucci 
2005). The South’s growing importance can be seen in both assembly 
and supplier plants.
Assembly plants
In 1979, the United States had 55 assembly plants, 34 in Auto Alley 
and 21 elsewhere. By 2009, the number in Auto Alley was scheduled to 
increase to 43 while the number elsewhere declined to seven.
In	1979,	only	fiv 	of	 the	55	assembly	plants	were	 in	what	would	
become the southern portion of Auto Alley. Two were in Louisville, 
only a few miles south of the Ohio River boundary between the “Mid-
west” and “South.” The other three, in Atlanta, were relics of the Big 3’s 
branch plants that once served customers in the Southeast. The Midwest 
portion of Auto Alley (including the St. Louis area) had 29 assembly 
plants.
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Twenty-one of the 55 assembly plants were outside Auto Alley in 
1979.	Ten	were	in	the	Northeast,	fiv 	in	California,	and	six	elsewhere	
in the interior of the country, including three in Kansas City. Of the 48 
fina 	assembly	plants	scheduled	to	operate	in	the	United	States	in	2009,	
only	8	were	outside	Auto	Alley	 (Figure	9.5).	The	Northeast	declined	
from 10 to 1 assembly plant, and California declined from 5 to 1. In-
terior	locations	outside	Auto	Alley	had	the	remaining	five 	two	each	in	
Texas and the Kansas City area and one in Louisiana—all relatively 
close locations to Auto Alley.
Within Auto Alley, the number of assembly plants in the South in-
creased from 5 to 13 between 1979 and 2009. The number in the Mid-
west increased by 1 to 30.
Supplier plants
The	South’s	rise	in	importance	can	also	be	seen	in	parts	plants	(Fig-
ure 9.7). At the time of this study, 67 percent of the parts plants in the 
South were new (i.e., they opened between 1980 and 2006), compared 
with only 40 percent in the Midwest and 39 percent in the rest of the 
United States. Conversely, only 19 percent of the parts plants in the 
South in operation in 2006 had opened before 1970, compared with 45 
percent of those in the Midwest and elsewhere in the United States. 
Parts plants have headed south in part to be with their customers, the 
fina 	assembly	plants.	The	distribution	of	fina 	assembly	plants	within	
the United States has changed sharply since the 1970s, and so has the 
distribution of parts plants.
The	 southerly	 drift	 observed	 for	 fina 	 assembly	 plants	 does	 not	
necessarily mean that parts plants were expected to locate in similar 
fashion. Chapter 6 showed that three-fourths of parts plants are located 
within one-day delivery of their customers, but only 5 percent are locat-
ed within one hour. The cost advantage in shipping assembled vehicles 
to the national market enjoyed by Auto Alley compared with the rest of 
the	United	States	applies	to	most	locations	within	Auto	Alley.	From	To-
ledo to Huntsville, at opposite ends of Auto Alley, most assembly plants 
can be reached within a one-day drive. So why have parts plants headed 
south? Some have followed their customers, but many parts plants have 
been moving south for their own reasons.
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Nationality of southern suppliers
Leading the move southward within Auto Alley have been foreign-
owned parts suppliers. In the Midwest, 76 percent of the parts plants 
were owned by U.S.-based companies and 24 percent by foreign-based 
companies. In the South, only 57 percent of the parts plants were U.S.-
owned	and	44	percent	were	foreign	owned.	Foreign	ownership	was	es-
pecially high in South Carolina and Kentucky.
Otherwise stated, the Midwest had 58 percent of U.S.-owned plants 
and only 44 percent of foreign-owned ones. The South had 36 percent 
of foreign-owned ones and only 20 percent of U.S.-owned plants.
A map of Auto Alley shows the north–south split between U.S.-
owned and foreign-owned plants opened in the United States between 
1980 and 2006. U.S.-owned plants cluster in the Midwest and foreign-
owned ones in the South. The two groups overlap in southern Ohio and 
Indiana	(see	Figure	9.8).
Figure 9.7  Distribution of Motor Vehicle Parts Plants Opened 
      (a) Before 1980 and                                   (b) Since 1980
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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Figure 9.8  Ownership of Parts Plants, 2006
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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Parts	makers	 based	 in	Germany	 and	 Japan	were	 responsible	 for	
most	of	 the	 southern	drift.	Companies	based	 in	Germany	 and	 Japan	
each owned nearly one-fourth of all of the foreign-owned parts plants 
in	the	United	States,	but	they	each	accounted	for	two-fifth 	of	all	parts	
plants	 in	 the	South.	Japanese-	and	German-owned	parts	makers	both	




BMW. Japanese-owned plants favored Kentucky and Tennessee, home 
to	 fina 	 assembly	 plants	 of	 Japan-based	Toyota	 and	Nissan,	 respec-
tively.	Japanese-	and	German-owned	parts	plants	also	 favored	differ-
ent	locations	within	the	Midwest.	German-owned	companies	were	far	
more likely to select Michigan, whereas Japanese-owned companies 
preferred Indiana.
Canadian-	 and	 British-based	 firm 	 together	 owned	 another	 one-
fourth of the foreign-owned parts plants in the United States. Michi-
gan	had	two-fifth 	of	the	Canadian-owned	parts	plants,	a	much	greater	
concentration in the home state of the “American” auto industry than 
even	U.S.-owned	parts	plants.	British-owned	 firm 	were	more	 likely	
than other nationalities to be located outside Auto Alley. One-fourth of 
British-owned	firm 	were	in	Michigan,	a	level	comparable	with	U.S.-
owned	firms 	but	the	rest	of	the	Midwest	had	a	lower	than	average	num-
ber	of	British-owned	 firms 	and	 the	percentage	 in	 the	South	was	not	
much	higher	than	it	was	for	U.S.-owned	firms
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
The clustering of the U.S. motor vehicle industry in Auto Alley 
during the late twentieth century appeared likely to continue into the 
twenty-firs 	century.	 In	 their	 struggles	 to	 survive,	 the	Detroit	3	were	
likely to shed more of their excess capacity, placing the last surviving 
coastal plants at risk.
As the Detroit 3 pulled back to their Midwest base in Michigan 
and adjacent Midwest states at the northern end of Auto Alley, foreign-
owned carmakers were set to continue their expansion, primarily in the 
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southern end of Auto Alley. The result was likely to be a greater rift 
within Auto Alley between a growing foreign-dominated south and a 
declining Detroit 3–dominated north. 
Notes
 1. Andreas Renschler, Mercedes-Benz U.S. International CEO, quoted in Chappell 
(1998).
		2.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 seven	branch	 assembly	plants,	GM	 also	maintained	 “home”	
plants	for	the	exclusive	assembly	of	Buick	in	Flint,	Oldsmobile	in	Lansing,	and	
Pontiac in Pontiac, a relic of the origin of these divisions as independent carmak-
ers	during	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	(Rubenstein	1992).
 3. U.S. Senate Automobile Marketing Practices. Washington: Congressional docu-
ments, 1956, p. 895, cited in Rubenstein (1992, pp. 87–88).
 4. Klier and McMillen (2008) show that the supplier plants that opened in the south-
ern end of Auto Alley tend to follow a location pattern similar to the plants that 
have	preceded	 them	 in	 the	 region.	They	 fin 	 location	 choices	of	 auto	 supplier	
plants to be well explained by a small set of variables: good highway access and 










Ohio has long been the second-leading motor vehicle production 
state behind Michigan. The state has accounted for about 15 percent of 
total	U.S.	motor	vehicle	employment,	parts	plants,	and	fina 	assembly	
plants.	Unlike	its	Great	Lakes	neighbor	to	the	north,	Ohio	increased	(at	
least slightly) its share of the national totals during the late twentieth 
and	early	twenty-firs 	centuries.
Ohio’s second-place position has partly been a legacy of Detroit 
3 investment. As discussed in Part 1 of the book, the Detroit 3 built 
numerous powertrain and stamping facilities in Ohio, especially after 
World War II. Despite cutbacks and closures, the Detroit 3 combined 
still directly employed 42,298 in 22 Ohio facilities in 2006 (Ohio De-
partment	of	Development	Offic 	of	Strategic	Research	2006).
The Detroit 3 decline has been largely offset in Ohio by growth 
in Japanese-owned production facilities. Honda of America employed 
12,200 at its two assembly plants and three powertrain plants in Ohio 





Ohio’s initial ascendancy in motor vehicle production came prior to 
the emergence of the Detroit 3, let alone Japanese carmakers. During 
the 1890s, the state had its share of pioneer carmakers, such as Alexan-
der Winton, Henry Joy, and William Packard. Had venture capital been 
as readily available in Ohio in 1900 as it was in Detroit, Cleveland or 
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Cincinnati could have emerged as the center of automotive production 
(Rubenstein 1992, p. 41; Smith 1970, p. 31; Wager 1975, p. xiii).
Instead, Ohio became the center for production of two key parts: 
tires and glass. U.S. tire production concentrated in the northeastern 
Ohio city of Akron and glass in the northwestern city of Toledo. Just as 
Detroit became known as Motor City, Akron became Rubber City and 
Toledo	became	Glass	City.	
Tires and glass have shared similar positions in the auto industry:
• They are the two largest and most visible parts not made of 
metal.
• Applications and key technology breakthroughs predated the 
auto industry.
• Tires and glass are relatively self-contained and freestanding 
portions of the vehicle and are less integrated with other parts.
• They have been regarded by carmakers as not essential to their 
core competency.
• They have consistently been outsourced to independent suppli-
ers, even at the height of vertical integration (with the exception 
of	Ford,	which	once	made	glass).
The U.S. motor vehicle industry continues to depend on U.S.-made 
tires	and	glass	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Neither	of	these	large,	bulky,	
low value-added parts is amenable to overseas outsourcing. But few tire 
and glass facilities remain in Ohio. As with Detroit, heavy dependence 
on one industry left both Akron and Toledo vulnerable to global shifts, 
especially globalization of ownership. 
RISE AND FALL OF RUBBER CITY
Tire manufacturers may be the best-known suppliers among the 
broader public. Alone among suppliers, the tire maker emblazons its 
name in four places on the exterior of the vehicle, often in much bolder 
lettering than the name of the vehicle itself. Because of heavy advertis-
ing,	the	Michelin	Man	and	the	Goodyear	Blimp	are	familiar	icons	even	
to people with no interest in motor vehicles.
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Consumers typically purchase new sets of tires several times during 
the	lives	of	their	motor	vehicles	and	replace	fla 	ones	periodically	(al-
though much less frequently than in the past). Above all, the purpose of 
the round rubber tire is understandable to even the most mechanically 
challenged individuals who have no comprehension of how the rest of 
a motor vehicle operates.
Hundreds of companies made tires in the United States during the 
1910s and 1920s. As the tire became a low-cost, high-quality, long-last-
ing commodity, with little differentiation among competitors, suppliers 




Rubber Co. (Deutsch 1999; Miller 1996).
The variety of tires produced by the four large companies has pro-
liferated as each company has tried to match the precise performance 
needs of the carmakers’ wider variety of vehicle offerings. The big four 
tire companies have retained brand names of acquired companies that 
were already familiar to consumers. Brand names have also been used 
to distinguish between “premium” and “standard” tires, as well as be-
tween original equipment and aftermarket tires. Premium tires typically 
are	firs 	to	get	such	innovations	as	run-fla 	capability.
Reflectin 	 the	globalization	of	 the	 tire	 industry,	Bridgestone/Fire-
stone	had	 its	headquarters	 in	 Japan,	Continental	 in	Germany,	Good-
year	in	the	United	States,	and	Michelin	in	France.	Goodyear	held	about	
one-third of the North American original equipment tire market, and 
Michelin had one-fourth. Within the United States, all four produce at 
facilities that are clustered in the South.
Tires: Where the Rubber Meets the Road
The	word	“rubber”	firs 	became	a	popular	term	in	England	in	the	
late eighteenth century to refer to a substance used to erase or rub out 
something written with a lead pencil, what Americans later called an 
eraser. Europeans called the substance caoutchouc, adapted from words 
heard by explorers in the Western Hemisphere, possibly from the Maï-
nas in Peru or the Tupi in Brazil.
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Charles	 Goodyear,	 a	 bankrupt	 Philadelphia	 hardware	 merchant,	
is said to have become obsessed with rubber experiments during the 
1830s. Rubber—the distinctive gummy elastic material isolated from 
the	milky	flui 	or	latex	of	various	plants—was	known	in	the	West	In-
dies and Central America at least since 1600 BCE, and rubber balls 
were seen by the earliest European explorers of the region. 
Goodyear	mixed	 raw	 rubber	with	 sulfur	 to	create	an	elastic	 sub-
stance resistant to heat and cold. The process was later called vulcani-
zation,	named	for	the	Roman	god	of	fir 	and	metalworking.	Until	then,	
rubber’s usefulness had been severely limited by its tendency to melt 
in	summer	heat	and	become	brittle	in	winter	cold.	Goodyear	had	tried	
mixing latex with various drying agents such as magnesia, quicklime, 
and nitric acid, before stumbling by accident in 1839 on the successful 
combination. 
British histories of rubber allocate partial credit for successful vul-
canization	experiments	to	Thomas	Hancock.	Given	samples	of	Good-
year’s vulcanized rubber in 1842, Hancock was able to replicate the 
process in a masticator machine he had invented to mix rubber with 
other materials. More importantly, Hancock made a commercial suc-
cess	of	rubber,	whereas	Goodyear’s	rubber	obsession	left	him	broke	and	
frequently	in	jail	for	inability	to	repay	debts.	He	died	in	1860,	$200,000	
in debt, having failed to either defend his vulcanization patent from 
pirates or invest in successful manufacturing applications.
With the rapid growth of the motor vehicle industry into the twen-
tieth century, the tire became the principal use for natural rubber. Sixty 
percent of rubber was used to make tires in 2000, the remainder for 
components in motor vehicles, as well as in aircraft, appliances, medi-
cal equipment, and electrical and electronic devices. Synthetic rubber, 
developed in the 1930s, accounted for 50 percent of the rubber content 
in tires in 1950 and 60 percent in 2000.
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U.S. Rubber
U.S. Rubber Company was founded in Naugatuck, Connecticut, in 
1892	by	Charles	R.	Flint	and	held	three-fourths	of	the	U.S.	market	for	
rubber boots and shoes during the 1890s. As motor vehicle production 
expanded, the company was the early market leader because it owned a 
patent on a “clincher,” in which rubber beads held in place by air pres-
sure “clinched” the rim (Epstein 1928). The Clincher Tire Association, 
controlled by U.S. Rubber, required tire makers to pay for a license to 
use the “clincher,” which was the most common method of attaching 
the tire to the rim.
This	monopoly	had	the	beneficia 	effect	of	forcing	standardization	
of tire sizes in the United States. But it kept tire prices high in the early 
years	of	motoring.	Consumers	 in	1910	paid	$30	 to	 replace	each	 tire	
on	a	small	car	like	the	Ford	Model	T,	$50	per	tire	for	a	medium-sized	
car,	and	$80	per	tire	for	a	large	car.	Because	tires	lasted	less	than	3,000	
miles, owners were paying more for replacement tires than for the car 
itself. 
U.S. Rubber lost its dominant position when the Akron-based com-
panies developed better methods of securing the tire to the rim. The use 
of cord increased the life of a tire to 13,000 miles in 1920 and reduced 
the	price	of	a	tire	to	$15.	U.S.	Rubber	remained	the	largest	tire	maker	
outside	Akron	and	GM’s	principal	 tire	supplier	during	 the	1920s	and	







their joint acquisitions, the Hudson Rubber Co. After the business failed 
twice,	Morris	refused	to	invest	further	in	it	unless	Goodrich	moved	the	
operation west, away from competitors.
Goodrich’s	 search	 for	 a	 suitable	 location	 brought	 him	 to	Akron,	
where he found enthusiastic investors, so he opened a rubber factory 
in	Akron	in	1871.	Goodrich	began	supplying	pneumatic	tires	in	1896	
to Cleveland-based Alexander Winton, maker of one of the best-selling 
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A. Seiberling, the son of an Akron businessman. Seiberling selected the 
name	to	honor	the	inventor	of	vulcanization,	but	Charles	Goodyear	had	
no connection with the company named for him nearly 40 years after 
his	death.	Goodyear	Tire	initially	produced	bicycle	and	carriage	tires,	
made	its	firs 	motor	vehicle	tire	in	1899,	and	passed	U.S.	Rubber	as	the	
world’s largest tire maker during the 1910s.
Early tires were made of stiff woven fabric glued to the wooden 
wheel rim. The ride was much too jarring for passengers, and the wheel 
broke	frequently.	Goodyear	employee	P.W.	Litchfiel 	applied	for	a	pat-
ent in 1903 covering the two principal elements of the contemporary 
tire: an outer portion made of rubber called the tread and an inner casing 
made of belts (bands of cords or plies) wrapped around a bead (steel wire 
shaped	in	a	hoop).	Litchfield 	a	chemical	engineer,	worked	at	Goodyear	
for more than a half-century, including as president (1926–1930) and 
chairman (1930–1956).
The smooth rubber tread on early car tires provided little traction. 
Goodyear	Tire	was	credited	with	firs 	cutting	grooves	in	the	hard	tread	
surface to improve traction in 1908. The concept of wrapping cords 
around a bead evolved from a process to stretch fabric invented for 
the clothing industry by New York businessman Alexander Strauss in 
1894. In 1911 Philip Strauss, treasurer of the Hardman Tire & Rubber 
Co., applied his father’s process to making a tire by reinforcing a hard-
ened rubber tube with fabric. Cords were originally made of cotton, and 
synthetic	fiber 	such	as	nylon	and	rayon	were	introduced	during	World	
War II.
Overextended	 in	 the	 recession	 that	 followed	World	War	 I,	Frank	
Seiberling	lost	control	of	Goodyear	in	1921	to	New	York	bankers	Dil-
lon, Read and Co., which also took over Dodge at about the same time. 
Forced	out	of	Goodyear,	Seiberling	started	the	Seiberling	Rubber	Com-
pany in 1922 in Barberton, Ohio, near Akron, and it became the coun-
try’s seventh-largest tire maker. He remained its chairman until retiring 
in 1950 at the age of 90.
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Goodyear’s	well-known	 symbol,	 the	blimp,	derived	 from	a	com-
pany interest in aviation dating back to the 1920s. It gained patents 
from	 the	German	company	Zeppelin	 in	1924	 to	build	airships	 in	 the	
United	States	and	built	its	firs 	(the	Pilgrim)	in	1925.	Goodyear	painted	
its	name	on	 the	 side	of	 the	blimp	 and	 fle 	 it	 around	 the	 country	 to	
promote	aviation	as	well	as	the	tire	brand.	Goodyear	built	300	airships,	
mostly during the 1940s and 1950s for military surveillance and aerial 
photography, and sold the Aerospace division in 1986.
Firestone
Harvey	S.	Firestone	sold	buggies	 in	Columbus,	Ohio,	 from	1890	










for a license to build cars, and the Clincher Tire Association rejected 
Firestone’s	 application	 to	make	 tires.	 Instead	 of	 clinchers,	Firestone	
secured	the	tire	tightly	to	the	wheel	by	riveting	plates	and	bolts.	Ford	
tested	Firestone	 tires,	decided	 they	were	superior	 to	 the	clincher,	and	








Ohio’s leading department store chain. 
General	was	more	diversifie 	than	Akron’s	other	leading	tire	mak-
ers, with interests in radios, aviation, plastics, and chemicals. The com-
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pany began producing original equipment tires in 1955, primarily for 
GM.
Impact on Akron 
Propelled by booming tire production, Akron was the fastest-grow-
ing city in the United States during the 1910s. It grew from an isolated 
Midwestern	 town	of	69,067	 (eighty-firs 	 largest	 in	 the	United	States)	
in 1910, best known as a manufacturing center for Quaker Oats, to the 
Rubber Capital of the World, with a population of 208,435 (thirty-sec-
ond largest) in 1920. 
At its peak in 1920, Akron had 60,000 workers employed in the 
tire	plants,	and	it	was	home	to	the	four	of	the	fiv 	largest	tire	suppliers:	
Goodyear,	Goodrich,	Firestone,	and	General.	Akron	was	more	domi-
nated by a single industry than any other large city in the country, even 
Detroit, which “merely” doubled in population from 1910 to 1920.
The	 founders	of	 the	major	 tire	 companies—Firestone,	Goodrich,	
O’Neil, and Seiberling—were known as Akron’s “rubber barons.” They 
built or bequeathed the city’s parks, museums, and hospitals, as well as 
neighborhoods	for	their	workers	with	such	names	as	Goodyear	Heights	
and	Firestone	Park.	Seiberling	was	probably	 the	“rubber	baron”	with	
the most impact on Akron, in part because he outlived the others. After 
his death, Seiberling’s home (Stan Hywet Hall) became Akron’s lead-
ing tourist attraction.
Tire Makers Abandon Akron
Akron’s decline as the center of U.S. tire production came in two 
waves.	First,	Akron’s	Big	4	tire	makers	opened	factories	elsewhere	in	
the United States, especially during the 1960s. The location decisions 
were motivated by labor cost considerations; the tire makers were in the 
vanguard of looking south for cheaper labor. Three of Akron’s four lead-
ing tire makers were then sold to foreign companies during the 1980s.
When	General	closed	 its	 last	 tire	plant	 in	Akron	 in	1982,	 the	city	
that had been synonymous with rubber and tire production through the 
twentieth century was left without any active tire plants. 
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Brothers Edouard and André Michelin founded the company bear-
ing	 their	 name	 in	Clermont-Ferrand,	France,	 in	 1889.	The	 company	
entered the tire business two years later when a cyclist asked for help 
in repairing an English-made tire that was glued to the wheel rim. Mi-
chelin started making tires for bicycles in 1891, for horse-drawn car-
riages in 1894, and for motor vehicles in 1895. 
Michelin made two particularly important contributions to tire 
technology.	First	was	the	demountable	tire,	which	Michelin	patented	in	
1891. The practicality of an easy-to-change tire was quickly established 
when the winner of the 1891 Paris–Brest–Paris bicycle race, Charles 
Thery, was the only competitor to use it. Michelin’s other important in-
novation during the 1890s was the pneumatic tire. However, it did not 
perform well in early races, so it was not adopted by carmakers until 
the 1910s.
The	pneumatic	 tire—an	air-fille 	rubber	“balloon”	or	 tube	placed	
between the fabric and the rim—had been originally patented by a Scot-
tish engineer, Robert W. Thomson, in 1845, only a few years after vul-
canization. But no practical ideas existed at the time for actually using 
it, and the patent expired. Another Scot, John B. Dunlop, living in Bel-
fast, Ireland, equipped his son’s tricycle with tires made by pumping air 
into thin rubber sheets covered with fabric. Dunlop secured a patent for 
this version of the pneumatic tire in 1888, and it was quickly adopted 
for most bicycles. Dunlop himself had no connection to the tire maker 
bearing his name because he sold the idea of making pneumatic tires to 
Harvey du Cross Jr., who founded Dunlop Tyres in 1888.
Michelin’s	domination	of	the	French	tire	market	was	solidifie 	by	
distinctive marketing. To promote motoring, in 1900 the company com-
piled	and	gave	away	a	Red	Guide	that	rated	hotels	in	France	and	pro-
vided street plans for many towns that were so detailed and accurate 
that they helped the Allied army during World War II. During the 1920s, 
the	Red	Guide	dropped	advertising,	added	restaurant	reviews,	and	was	
sold in bookstores rather than given away. The company produced road 
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maps beginning in 1910 and sightseeing information guides beginning 
in	1926,	which	became	known	 as	Green	Guides	beginning	 in	1938.	
Bibendum,	better	known	in	the	United	States	as	the	Michelin	Man,	firs 	
appeared in 1898. 
Michelin patented the radial tire in 1946. Most tires at the time were 
bias-ply, with body or carcass cords arranged diagonally to the center 
line of the tread. Better quality bias tires also wrapped around the di-
agonal body cords an outer layer of belt or crown cords arranged in a 
herringbone pattern. Radial tires also had belt cords arranged in a her-
ringbone pattern, but the inner body cords were arranged at right angles 
to the center line of the treads rather than diagonally.
The radial tire provided better handling than the bias-ply tire, es-
pecially at high speeds and around corners. By placing the body cords 
at	 right	angles,	 the	 sidewalls	on	 radial	 tires	could	 flex 	whereas	 they	
remained stiff on bias-ply tires. As a result, the radial tire tread main-
tained a larger surface contact with the road during turns. 
Radials were popular in Europe by the 1960s, but they faced resis-
tance in the United States because they produced a stiffer and noisier 
ride. However, the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the use of radi-
als in the United States because they yielded higher gas mileage than 
bias-ply	tires.	When	U.S.	firm 	were	slow	to	introduce	competitive	ra-
dial tires during the 1970s, Michelin grabbed a much larger share of the 
U.S. market. 
Michelin opened four tire plants in South Carolina and one in Ala-
bama during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The company also retained 
fiv 	plants	inherited	from	Uniroyal,	including	two	in	Alabama	and	one	
each	in	Indiana,	Oklahoma,	and	Virginia.
Japan’s tire competitor: Bridgestone
In	1988	Firestone	was	sold	to	Japanese-based	Bridgestone,	which	
outbid	Italian	tire	maker	Pirelli	for	it.	The	Firestone	acquisition	made	
Bridgestone the world’s largest tire maker.
Bridgestone	Tire	Co.	was	 Japan’s	 firs 	 tire	 company,	 founded	 in	
1931 by Shojiro Ishibashi, who had been producing traditional rub-
ber-soled footwear known as tabi since 1923. Ishibashi called the tire 
company Bridgestone, because his own surname literally meant stone-
bridge in Japanese. He transposed the syllables to produce a corporate 
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name	similar	to	Firestone,	which	he	admired.	Bridgestone	became	Ja-
pan’s largest tire maker in 1953.
Although	Ford	Motor	Co.	bought	some	of	its	tires	from	other	sup-
pliers,	and	Firestone	sold	some	of	its	tires	to	other	carmakers,	the	two	
companies conducted a disproportionately high percentage of business 





Firestone’s	downfall	 in	 the	United	States	 followed	 its	 inability	 to	
compete	 in	 the	 radial	 tire	market.	The	National	Highway	&	Traffi 	
Safety	Administration	implicated	Firestone	“500”	radial	tires	in	41	fa-
talities.	Although	Firestone	never	agreed	that	the	tires	were	defective,	it	
agreed to recall 14.5 million of them in 1978 due to tread separation.
The	 century-long	 close	 relationship	 between	 Ford	 and	 Firestone	
came	to	an	end	in	2001,	when	Ford	Explorers	equipped	with	Firestone	
Wilderness AT tires rolled over following tread separation, resulting in 
271 deaths. Bridgestone argued that the Explorer’s design made it prone 





tires declined 40 percent in the year after the dispute (Akron	Beacon	
Journal	2000).	For	its	part,	Ford	offered	to	replace	the	6.5	million	tires	
on all of its vehicles. Still, Explorer sales dropped rapidly from their 
peak	in	2000—as	did	Ford	stock.	With	the	overall	quality	of	tires	gener-
ally	very	high,	the	Ford	Explorer’s	problem	with	Firestone	Wilderness	
tires was especially devastating.
Through	the	merger,	Bridgestone	inherited	Firestone	plants	in	De-
catur, Illinois; Wilson, North Carolina; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and 
LaVergne,	Tennessee.	Under	Bridgestone	leadership,	the	only	northern	
plant, Decatur, was closed, whereas new southern facilities were added 
in	Graniteville,	South	Carolina,	and	Morrison,	Tennessee.	Only	a	token	
facility was retained in Akron to produce a handful of tires for race 
cars.
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carriages and bicycles, as well as other rubber products. Continental 
was	the	firs 	German	company	to	manufacture	pneumatic	tires	for	bi-
cycles in 1892, then for motor vehicles in 1898. The company even 
emulated	Michelin	by	publishing	a	popular	road	atlas	in	German,	be-
ginning in 1907.





Uniroyal’s European operations in 1979, and then tire makers elsewhere 
in Europe, including Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Sweden, 
during the 1980s and 1990s.
Continental held a small share of the U.S. market until 1987, when 
it	 acquired	General	Tire,	 the	 third-largest	U.S.	 tire	maker.	The	 com-
bined company held 14 percent of the U.S. tire market in 2000. Con-




The U.S. survivor: Goodyear
Goodyear	was	 the	world’s	 largest	 tire	and	 rubber	 company	 from	
the 1920s until overtaken by competitors’ mergers during the 1980s. 
Goodyear	purchased	Kelly-Springfiel 	Tire	Co.	in	1935	in	order	to	of-




in an unsuccessful takeover attempt; to fend off the effort, the company 
made a tender offer for the shares the following year that strapped it 
financiall 	and	compelled	it	to	sell	noncore	divisions	and	close	plants.
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Goodyear	reclaimed	the	title	of	world’s	largest	tire	producer	in	1999	
by acquiring a controlling interest in Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ja-
pan’s	second-largest	and	 the	world’s	fifth-la gest	 tire	maker.	The	alli-
ance	gave	Goodyear	the	right	to	use	the	Dunlop	name,	which	Sumitomo	
had acquired in 1986.
The	company’s	major	tire-making	facilities	were	in	Gadsden,	Ala-
bama; Topeka, Kansas; Lawton, Oklahoma; Statesville, North Caroli-
na;	Union	City,	Tennessee;	and	Danville,	Virginia.	The	Gadsden	plant	
was	one	of	the	firs 	parts-making	facilities	in	Alabama	when	it	opened	
in 1929. Corporate headquarters and research facilities were retained in 
Akron but not production facilities.
Faced	with	the	loss	of	the	rubber	plants,	Akron	attracted	400	compa-
nies involved in polymer research and production during the late 1990s. 
With 35,000 employees, the polymer plants did not completely replace 
all of the jobs lost in the rubber plants, but the new jobs were better paid 
and	demanded	more	skills	than	the	old	jobs.	A	key	to	attracting	firm 	
involved in polymer technology was creation of the Edison Polymer 
Innovation Corporation in 1984 and a School of Polymer Science and 
Engineering at the University of Akron.
RISE AND FALL OF GLASS CITY
Glassmaking	is	an	ancient	art—Egypt	became	a	center	of	glass	pro-
duction in the second millennium BCE, and knowledge of glassmaking 
diffused	through	Europe	during	the	Roman	Empire.	Glass	was	blown,	
pressed, and drawn into many shapes, primarily household objects such 
as	plates,	bowls,	goblets,	and	bottles.	Venice,	the	center	of	glassmaking	
in medieval Europe, specialized in decorative glass as well as house-
hold objects.
Rolling	molten	glass	into	thin	fla 	sheets	was	a	difficul 	craft,	limit-
ing the use of windows prior to the nineteenth century. Because win-
dows were expensive, the number found in a house was a good indica-
tor of the owner’s wealth. The square footage of windows in a house 
was a common measure for calculating property taxes, so to lower 
their taxes, homeowners reduced the size of their windows. Large ex-
panses of windows were limited to important public structures, notably 
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churches, where (tax exempt) brightly colored stained glass windows 
were installed.
Early motor vehicles were open carriages without windshields. 
Wearing goggles was the driver’s principal protection against dirt and 
mud. A glass windshield was introduced as an extra-cost option on 
luxury	vehicles	 in	1904.	The	 firs 	windshields	consisted	of	 two	hori-
zontal panes of glass connected by hinges. The top half could be tipped 
open for an unobstructed view when the bottom half was completely 
splattered. 
The surface area of glass increased rapidly during the 1920s, when 
the enclosed compartment replaced the open carriage as the predomi-
nant	body	style.	Glass	was	now	needed	for	the	rear	and	side	windows	of	
the passenger compartment, not just for the front windshield. Consumer 
acceptance of closed body vehicles had been slowed by fear of being 
injured in an accident from shattered glass. The introduction of lami-




tic) did not shatter when he accidentally dropped it. British inventor 
John C. Wood introduced Triplex in 1905, a “sandwich” that prevented 
shattering by cementing a layer of celluloid between two pieces of glass. 
Two decades later, the process was applied to motor vehicle glass.
Toledo’s Glassmakers
Glass	manufacturers	clustered	in	Toledo	during	the	late	nineteenth	
century, a decade before the start of commercial motor vehicle produc-
tion.	Glassmakers	were	firs 	attracted	to	Toledo	by	proximity	to	critical	
inputs.	They	solidifie 	their	leadership	through	proximity	to	the	increas-
ingly important customer base in Detroit, only 50 miles to the north.
Three materials account for 99 percent of inputs into glassmaking: 
silica	 sand,	 soda	ash,	and	 limestone	 (dolomite).	Glass	manufacturers	
did not wish to incur the expense of long-distance shipping of a ubiqui-
tous resource like sand, and in the nineteenth century, the sandy soil of 
northwest Ohio seemed to offer an abundant source of silica, which is 
the most important of the three inputs. But “impurities made this source 
unsatisfactory shortly after the turn of the century,” so Toledo glass-
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makers instead brought in silica from Ottawa, Illinois, by rail. Soda ash 
was obtained from northeastern Michigan. Only limestone was mined 
locally in northwestern Ohio (Ballert 1947, p. 190).
As glassmaking was transformed from a handicraft to an industrial 
process in the late nineteenth century, access to low-cost energy be-
came especially important. Toledo sat atop what at the time appeared 
to	be	an	unlimited	fiel 	of	natural	gas—the	largest	in	the	northeastern	
United	States.	 “A	 survey	of	 fift 	 [Toledo]	glass	plants	 [published	 in	
1937] showed twenty-three indicating fuel as the most important fac-
tor for locating their industries” (Lezius 1937, cited in Ballert 1947, 
p. 188). Compared with coal, the principal energy source at the time, 
natural	gas	proved	to	be	a	more	efficient 	lower-cost	means	of	providing	
the heat needed to keep glass molten. “By the end of the [nineteenth] 
century, this supply largely was exhausted and many glass factories in 
the smaller communities south of Toledo moved to new sources of fuel. 
Toledo, however, retained her glass industry, though natural gas had to 
be	piped	from	increasingly	distant	fields 	(Ballert	1947,	p.	188).
Toledo’s	 three	 leading	 glass-making	 firm 	 in	 1900	were	 Libbey	
Glass	 Company	 (originally	 New	 England	 Glass	 Company),	 Toledo	
Glass	Company,	and	Edward	Ford	Plate	Glass	Company.	
New	England	Glass	was	 founded	 in	East	Cambridge,	Massachu-
setts, in 1818, to produce blown, pressed glass for household products, 
as well as engraved glass. Edward Drummond Libbey (1854–1925), 
who had succeeded his father William L. Libbey as manager in 1883, 
relocated the business to Toledo in 1888, along with 100 workers, to 
escape	labor	unrest.	The	company	name	was	changed	to	Libbey	Glass	
in 1892. Into the twentieth century, Libbey was the leading producer of 
glass tableware.
Toledo	 Glass	 was	 incorporated	 in	 1895	 by	 Michael	 J.	 Owens	
(1859–1923),	who	had	been	one	of	 the	 firs 	hired	at	 the	new	Libbey	
plant in 1888 and was promoted after three months to supervisor. In 
1899 Owens created a glass-blowing machine that made mass produc-
tion of glass bottles possible. Through growth and acquisitions, Owens 
was the world’s largest glass company in 1929.
Recognizing the growing market for windows, Owens and Libbey 
together	organized	 a	 fir 	 in	1916	 to	make	 fla 	glass.	Libbey-Owens	
Sheet	Glass	Company	(“Sheet”	was	later	dropped	from	the	name)	be-
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gan	production	 in	1917	 in	a	plant	 in	Charleston,	West	Virginia,	near	
Owens’s birthplace in Mason County.
Toledo’s other major late-nineteenth-century glassmaker, Edward 
Ford	 Plate	 Glass	 Company,	 also	 had	 out-of-town	 origins.	 The	 Star	
Glass	Works	was	founded	in	1867	in	New	Albany,	Indiana,	on	the	Ohio	
River,	near	Louisville,	Kentucky,	by	John	Baptiste	Ford	(1811–1903),	
his sons Edward (1843–1920) and Emory, and his cousin Washington 
C.	DePauw.	When	 the	New	Albany	venture	 failed,	 the	Fords	 started	
New	York	Plate	Glass	Company	in	Creighton,	Pennsylvania,	18	miles	
up	the	Allegheny	River	from	downtown	Pittsburgh,	in	1880.	The	Fords	
left	 the	Creighton	fir 	 in	1897	because	of	a	dispute	over	distributor-
ships. Edward headed west for Toledo, where he started construction on 
a plant in 1898 and began production in 1899. 
Ford	built	the	fla 	glass	plant	in	Rossford,	on	the	opposite	bank	of	
the Maumee River from Toledo. Rossford became a company town for 






houseware side, Owens acquired Libbey in 1935.
Toledo’s important function in the glass industry has brought it 
the	 title	of	“Glass	Capital	of	America”	and	“Glass	Center	of	 the	
World.” Such illustrious phrases rightfully are deserved, although 
in terms of actual production the word “capital” perhaps is better 
chosen than is “center,” for although four of the country’s lead-
ers	in	the	glass	industry	have	their	executive	office 	and	research	
laboratories in Toledo [in 1947], two of the group have all of their 
production elsewhere. (Ballert 1947, p. 187)
The Big 3 in World Glass
Toledo	still	calls	 itself	 the	Glass	City,	and	 the	city’s	 football	sta-
dium	is	named	the	Glass	Bowl.	But	most	of	the	automotive	glass	pro-
duction has moved elsewhere. As in Akron, globalization hit Toledo in 
the	1980s;	L-O-F	was	acquired	by	the	British	glassmaker	Pilkington	in	
1985, leaving none of the surviving U.S.-owned glassmakers based in 
Toledo.
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Two	trends	have	favored	globalization	of	the	glass	industry.	First,	
demand for auto glass has grown relatively rapidly, not only because of 
increased worldwide vehicle production but also because the amount of 
glass	per	vehicle	has	increased.	Glass	usage	has	increased	as	a	means	
of reducing vehicle weight and as a styling trend. In a typical vehicle, 
roughly 3 percent of weight is now devoted to glass, compared to 2 
percent in the 1970s. The best-selling midsized sedans had 20 percent 
more	 glass	 in	 2006	 than	 they	 did	 20	 years	 earlier	 (NSG/Pilkington	
2006, p. 28).
Second, carmakers have increasingly demanded complete “glazing 
systems”	rather	than	pieces	of	glass.	Glazing	systems	“use	innovative	
finishin 	 technologies,	such	as	encapsulation	or	extrusion,	which	en-
hance the vehicle’s styling and in certain cases, aerodynamics, as well 
as	adding	functionality	.	.	.”	(NSG/Pilkington	2006,	p.	28).	Much	of	the	
value added in glazing systems is to integrate tinting that reduces solar 
glare	(NSG/Pilkington	2006,	p.	29).	Glass	suppliers	also	have	responsi-
bility for design and assembly of modules such as tailgates that include 
wipers,	 latches,	 and	 hinges,	 as	well	 as	 glass	 (NSG/Pilkington	 2006,	 
p. 28). 
Motor	vehicles	consume	about	10	percent	of	the	world’s	fla 	glass.	
Windows for buildings account for 70 percent of demand, and interior 
applications such as mirrors account for the remaining 20 percent.
World	production	of	automotive	glass	into	the	twenty-firs 	century	
was dominated by three companies based in Europe and Japan: Asahi 
Glass	Company,	Saint-Gobain	Group,	and	NSG/Pilkington.	The	three	
held 65 percent of the world automotive glass market in 2006, up from 
49	 percent	 in	 1992	 and	 63	 percent	 in	 1998	 (NSG/Pilkington	 2006,	 
p. 25). 
Asahi
Asahi, Japan’s largest glassmaker, was founded in 1907 by Toshiya 
Iwasaki, the second son of the second president of the original Mitsubi-
shi Corporation. The company started supplying the auto industry in 
1956, and it ranked as the world’s largest auto glass supplier into the 
twenty-firs 	century.
Asahi	 started	U.S.	production	 in	1985	 through	AGC	Automotive	
(originally	AP	Technoglass),	a	joint	venture	with	PPG	Industries.	The	
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two companies had already come together in 1966 in a joint venture 





earlier,	 in	1665,	by	 Jean-Baptiste	Colbert	 (1619–1683),	Louis	XIV’s	
powerful contrôleur général. The combined company, known simply 
as	the	Glass	Factory,	produced	mirrors	for	the	Royal	Court	at	Versailles	
and pioneered innovative industrial processes that enabled it to domi-
nate European glass production for several hundred years.
Saint-Gobain	began	to	make	automotive	glass	for	French	cars	dur-
ing	the	1930s,	and	it	entered	the	U.S.	market	as	a	GM	supplier	during	the	
1990s. The company was better known in the United States for supply-
ing glass to the rail industry, including the Acela high-speed northeast 
corridor	trains,	the	New	York	City	subway,	and	the	Las	Vegas	monorail.	
Saint-Gobain	also	supplied	the	glass	for	the	pyramid	designed	by	I.M.	
Pei as the entry into the Louvre museum in Paris. Half of the company’s 
revenues come from materials other than glass, including insulation, 
building materials, pipes, containers, ceramics, and abrasives.
NSG/Pilkington
Pilkington’s origins date from efforts orchestrated by the British 
government	to	reduce	Saint-Gobain’s	domination	of	the	European	mar-
ket.	The	British	Cast	Plate	Glass	Company	was	 established	 in	1773	
with	 financia 	 backing	 from	 the	 British	 government.	 The	 company	
constructed a large factory at Ravenhead, where it started producing 
Britain’s	firs 	plate	glass	in	1786.	
A	competitor,	St.	Helens	Crown	Glass	Company,	was	founded	near	
Ravenhead	 in	 1826,	 finance 	 by	 three	 local	 families—William	 and	
Richard	Pilkington,	Peter	Greenall,	and	James	Bromilow.	The	company	
was	renamed	Greenall	&	Pilkington	in	1829,	then	Pilkington	Brothers	
when the one family became the sole investor in 1849. 
Pilkington entered the twentieth century as Britain’s sole producer 
of	 fla 	glass	after	acquiring	 its	competitors,	 including	 the	Ravenhead	
facility	in	1901.	Pilkington	remained	a	privately	held	fir 	until	1970,	
and a family member ran the company until 1992. 
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Pilkington’s operations were merged in 2007 with those of Nippon 
Sheet	Glass	Co.,	the	second-largest	Japanese	glassmaker	behind	Asahi.	
Nippon acquired 10 percent of Pilkington in 2000 and increased its 
stake to a controlling interest in 2006. Completing the circle to Toledo, 
when Nippon was established in 1918, it produced glass with technol-
ogy	from	Libbey-Owens-Ford.







Glass Products (Ford Motor Company)
Glass	Products	was	 formed	 in	 2007	 through	 acquisition	 of	Ford	
Motor	Company’s	glass	plants.	That	ended	Ford’s	involvement	in	mak-
ing glass, an activity that had began with the company’s founder. Henry 
Ford’s	obsession	with	controlling	raw	materials	played	a	major	role	in	
the decision, especially when glass proved expensive and hard to obtain 
during and after World War I (Nevins and Hill 1957, p. 230). Even at the 
height	of	vertical	integration,	Ford	was	the	only	automaker	producing	
its own glass.




as “a Tulsa-based private investor and experienced business leader with 
a strong record of success in the natural gas industry, logistics, and 
medical	facility	management”	(Ford	Motor	Company	2007).
Platinum (PPG)
Before	 he	 left	New	York	 Plate	Glass	Company,	 John	 Ford	 had	
changed	its	name	to	the	Pittsburgh	Plate	Glass	Company	(PPG)	in	1883.	
PPG	was	 the	firs 	commercially	successful	producer	of	plate	glass	 in	
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the United States and became the leading independent supplier outside 
Toledo	during	 the	early	 twentieth	century.	PPG	was	 the	second-lead-
ing supplier of glass to the U.S. auto industry in 2007, although glass 
accounted for only one-fourth of revenues; more than half came from 
paint and coatings (see Chapter 4).
In	2007,	PPG	sold	its	glass	business	to	Platinum	Equity,	a	private	
equity	group.	PPG	chose	to	focus	on	its	coatings	sector,	which	it	consid-
ered to have better earnings prospects than glass (Nussel 2007).
As	 for	Toledo,	NSG/Pilkington	 continued	 to	operate	 the	Toledo-
area glass plant at Rossford, but other than that, the four leading U.S. 
glass	suppliers	were	firml 	entrenched	elsewhere	in	Auto	Alley:	
•	 Asahi’s	 firs 	U.S.	 plant	was	 opened	 in	 1986	 at	Bellefontaine,	
Ohio, to supply windshields to Honda’s Marysville assembly 
plant 20 miles away, and a second plant was opened in 1989 at 
Elizabethtown,	Kentucky,	75	miles	 from	Toyota’s	Georgetown	




•	 Platinum	produced	OEM	glass	at	 fiv 	U.S.	 facilities	 in	Evans-
ville, Indiana; Evart, Michigan; Crestline, Ohio; and Creighton 
and Tipton, Pennsylvania.
•	 NSG/Pilkington	 had	 facilities	 in	 Lathrop,	 California;	 Ottawa,	
Illinois; and Laurinburg, North Carolina; as well as Rossford, 
Ohio. 
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Ballert’s 1947 dissertation concluded that Toledo would remain at 
the center of the country’s motor vehicle production. Among the rea-
sons for this conclusion were the following four (Ballert 1947, p. 184):
 1) The automobile companies and the producers of parts and 
equipment are mutually dependent upon one another, and this 
provides a deterrent to the dispersion of the industry.
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	 2)	 The	ubiquitous	unionism	in	the	automotive	industry	nullifie 	
any reason for moving to obtain cheaper labor.
 3) There is continued availability of skilled and semiskilled 
labor.
 4) Toledo has a central position with respect to assembling raw 
materials and distributing the goods produced.
The future of Toledo’s motor vehicle glass production seemed es-
pecially assured in 1947. “Continued prominence in the glass industry 
appears to be assured for Toledo, both from the standpoint of produc-
tion and administration . . . Transportation costs are important for these 
bulky items, and Toledo is located excellently with respect to the market 
for such products, especially safety glass for automobiles.” When this 
was	written	in	1947,	Libbey-Owens-Ford	was	the	sole	supplier	of	glass	
to	GM	and,	along	with	PPG,	supplied	85	percent	of	the	safety	glass	in	
the United States (Kennedy 1941, cited in Ballert 1947).
Toledo has in fact remained an important center for motor vehicle 
production. Sixty parts suppliers are located in northwest Ohio, includ-
ing 16 in Lucas County where Toledo is located. Motor vehicles have 
been assembled in Toledo since the nineteenth century, most recently 
at an assembly plant opened for Jeep production in 2001. Toledo is 
even attempting to reinvent itself by leveraging its deep roots in the 
glass industry in light of rising demand for alternative energies (Carlton 
2007). 
On the other hand, Summit County, where Akron is located, had 
only two remaining suppliers in 2007, one making wheels and the oth-
er plastic parts. Akron has moved on to become a center for polymer 
production.
The experiences of Toledo and Akron show that communities at the 
northern end of Auto Alley face an increasing challenge in retaining 
suppliers. Locations further south offer greater proximity to the plants 






Chassis Suppliers Move 
South in Auto Alley
When	kids	draw	airplanes,	they	draw	wings;	cars,	they	draw	
wheels.1
The chassis makes a vehicle safe to drive and provides passengers 
with a comfortable ride. Because the undercarriage of the vehicle is 
largely invisible, motorists generally don’t know who has made the 
components, and they generally don’t care. Unlike the powertrain, 
chassis	performance	rarely	influence 	buying	decisions.	And	unlike	the	
interior	and	exterior,	chassis	styling	rarely	influence 	buying	decisions.	
Encouraged by the “invisibility” of the chassis, carmakers have long 
outsourced key chassis components to strong independent suppliers.
Major chassis modules include brakes, driveline, fuel handling, 
steering, suspension, and wheels. The wheels are connected to the pow-
ertrain by the driveline and to the operator of the vehicle by the steer-
ing. In the absence of a suspension system, every rough spot in the 
road would transmit an intense shock through the car, making the ride 
unpleasant at low speed and intolerable at high speed.
Although	 the	various	chassis	modules	must	fi 	 together	and	func-
tion harmoniously, they do not have to be produced in the same place. 
The	chassis	has	been	the	main	“battleground”	system	in	the	twenty-firs 	
century over the future geography of the U.S. auto industry. Overall, 56 
percent of chassis plants were in the Midwest in 2006, a smaller per-
centage than any other system except electronics. But not every chas-
sis supplier has been equally likely to leave the Midwest. The regional 
distribution has varied both among types of chassis modules and among 
leading suppliers within each chassis module.
One-fourth of all chassis parts were made within 158 miles of De-
troit, one-half within 366 miles, and three-fourths within 642 miles 
(Figure	11.1).	These	distances	are	 larger	 than	 those	of	 all	other	 sys-
tems except electronics (see Chapter 14). The makers of parts such as 
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wheels, brakes, and suspensions have been sensitive to price pressures 
and have relocated production to places with lower labor costs. Imports 
of chassis parts have risen especially rapidly (see Chapter 13).
The six major chassis modules could be placed into three groups 
based on geographic distribution (Table 11.1). More than 60 percent of 
the plants making driveline and steering parts were still in the Midwest 
in 2006. On the other hand, suppliers of wheel and fuel handling parts 
were most likely to move southward in Auto Alley. Between these two 
were brake and suspension suppliers.
The probability of production remaining in the Midwest or moving 
to	the	southern	end	of	Auto	Alley	has	been	influence 	in	part	by	the	na-
ture of the part. Relatively bulky and fragile parts have been more likely 
to remain in the Midwest, whereas low-cost commodities have moved 
south in Auto Alley. The probability of the Midwest retaining or losing 
Figure 11.1  Location of Chassis Components Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources. 
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production	has	also	been	 influence 	by	competitive	pressures	among	
leading suppliers of particular modules. 
HANGING ON IN THE MIDWEST
Nearly two-thirds of plants making driveline and steering parts 
were located in the Midwest in 2006. The driveline and steering mod-
ules are closely linked to the powertrain modules, which are produced 
primarily in the Midwest, as described in Chapter 3. The Midwest has 
also remained the center for producing these parts because the leading 
suppliers	have	been	U.S.-owned	firm 	with	roots	in	the	region.
Driveline Parts Suppliers
Key driveline components are the axles and drive shaft (or propel-
ler shaft). The axles hold the wheels in place and drive them forward 
or backward. The drive shaft, which connects the transmission output 
shaft with the axles, permits the axles and wheels to move up and down 
on	an	uneven	surface	while	 the	 transmission	remains	fixe 	 to	 the	ve-
hicle frame.
The drive shaft is a hollow steel tube that absorbs the vertical move-
ment of the axle at one end without affecting the rigid transmission out-
put shaft at the other end. Early motor vehicles transferred power from 
the engine to the axles by a chain-and-sprocket arrangement adapted 
from bicycles. The chains were noisy and hard to lubricate, and broke 
frequently.	 Several	 nineteenth-century	 experimental	 French	 vehicles	
replaced the chains and sprockets with a drive shaft; the 1901 Autocar 
may	have	been	the	firs 	American	car	with	a	drive	shaft.
Axles transmit engine power to the wheels. Most U.S. vehicles were 
rear-wheel drive until the 1970s. The rear wheels had responsibility for 
power while the front wheels had responsibility for steering and brak-
ing. Sending most of the weight to the rear made early cars more stable 
and easier to control.
In the wake of the 1970s energy crisis, front-wheel-drive vehicles 
became popular and accounted for about 70 percent of U.S. vehicles 
into	 the	 twenty-firs 	century.	A	major	advantage	of	 front-wheel	drive	
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Table 11.1  Chassis Parts Plants in the Midwest




Drive shafts and torque converters 46 63.0
Other driveline parts 49 60.8
Steering 257 61.5
Columns 26 65.4
Steering gears and knuckle 40 62.5
Steering hoses 11 45.5
Linkages and tie rods 17 58.8
Power steering systems 27 92.6
Steering wheels and shafts 34 41.2
Other steering parts 102 60.8
Wheels and related parts 158 46.1
Wheel bearings and bushings 15 46.7
Hubs and related parts 67 67.2
Wheels 47 31.9










Other fuel-related parts 64 54.7
Brakes 358 58.1
ABS 26 53.8
Calipers, master cylinders, rotors 49 63.3
Hoses, tubes, brake lines 54 57.4
Drum brakes 20 75.0
Parking brakes 19 42.1
Hydraulic pumps 14 92.9
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was elimination of the long drive shaft between the transmission and 
rear axle. The shorter distance from the transmission to the front wheels 
meant fewer parts and less weight, and therefore higher gas mileage and 
a	lower	price.	Front-wheel	drive	also	had	the	advantage	of	increasing	
interior	passenger	space	by	eliminating	the	large	hump	on	the	floo 	to	
accommodate the drive shaft connection to the rear axle. Putting the 
weight of the engine directly over the drive axle also improved traction 
in slippery conditions.
On front-wheel-drive vehicles, the transmission and axle form 
a module called a transaxle. The axle is in two halves, each attached 
to a wheel at the outer end. The two wheels on the driving axle must 
be interconnected in order to receive power from the same source, the 
driveshaft. 
Given	the	close	link	between	axles	and	transmissions	in	contempo-
rary vehicles, it is no surprise that axle production is as highly clustered 
in the Midwest as is transmission production. The two leading axle 
producers—American Axle & Manufacturing (AAM) and ArvinMeri-
tor—had 15 U.S. axle plants in 2007; 6 were in Michigan and 3 each 
were in Ohio, New York, and the South.
American Axle and Manufacturing
During the height of vertical integration, the Detroit 3 produced 
most	axles	for	cars	in-house,	but	GM	sold	its	axle-making	facilities	to	
Chassis parts Number of plants % in Midwest
Brakes (continued)
Disc brakes 34 44.1
Other brake parts 142 57.0
Suspension 229 56.3
Springs 37 56.8
Struts and stabilizers 40 57.5
Shock absorbers 31 58.1
Control arms 29 69.0
Other suspension parts 92 51.1
Total chassis 1,549 56.8
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database.
Table 11.1  (continued)
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AAM, which was easily the most successful of the suppliers spun off 
from	GM	during	the	1990s.	The	company	took	over	old	plants	that	many	
regarded	as	unsalvageable	yet	prospered	thanks	to	the	SUV	boom.	
Much of the credit for AAM’s early success was given to Richard E. 
Dauch,	its	founder,	firs 	CEO,	and	firs 	chairman	of	the	board.	AAM	has	
borne the imprint of this single individual as much as any of the very 
large	suppliers.	Even	the	AAM	corporate	offic 	in	Detroit	was	located	




full-sized pickups and large sport utilities. AAM would be responsible 
for both axles as well as the driveshaft, brake components, suspen-
sion parts, and design and sourcing of the driveline system (Sherefkin 
2002a). 
ArvinMeritor
The leading supplier of heavy truck axles has been ArvinMeritor, 
created through the merger of exhaust specialist Arvin Industries with 
Meritor Automotive. Meritor had been spun off as an independent com-
pany only two years before the 1999 merger. Prior to then, Meritor had 
been a division of Rockwell International.
Rockwell International’s predecessor Timken-Detroit Axle Co. was 
established in 1909 to make truck axles. Its founder Henry Timken 
(1831–1909) was better known for making roller bearings. The com-
pany,	renamed	Rockwell	Spring	&	Axle	Co.	in	1953	in	honor	of	its	firs 	
president Willard Rockwell, entered the aviation and defense business 
when it merged with North American Aviation in 1967.
As a division of Rockwell International, Rockwell Automotive was 
ripe to be spun off. Although the automotive division ranked among 
the	largest	suppliers	in	the	1990s,	its	parts	sales	of	$2	billion	per	year	
accounted for less than one-fourth of total sales at Rockwell. Of more 
importance, the automotive division was contributing only 10 percent 
to Rockwell’s corporate earnings. 
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Dana Corp.
Early	drive	shafts	shattered	easily	because	they	were	held	in	a	fixe 	
rather	 than	a	 flexibl 	position.	 Inventing	an	effective	way	 to	make	a	
drive	shaft	flexibl 	was	the	basis	for	the	success	of	Dana	Corp.	While	
an engineering student at Cornell University’s Sibley College in 1903, 
Clarence W. Spicer patented the solution—a universal or U-joint at-
tached to either end of the drive shaft. U-joints allow the drive shaft to 
change angle without breaking as the axle moves up and down. 
Spicer	Universal	 Joint	was	 rescued	 from	 financia 	 difficultie 	 in	
1914 when New York lawyer, politician, and entrepreneur Charles Dana 
(1881–1975) purchased controlling interest. Dana was company presi-
dent from 1914 to 1958 and chairman from 1948 to 1966, the longest 
period under a single leader of any of the major motor vehicle suppliers 
and	possibly	of	any	multibillion-dollar	fir 	in	the	United	States.	
Dana reorganized Spicer Universal Joint and moved its headquar-
ters and production facilities to Toledo in 1929, where it joined Willys-
Overland	and	Libbey-Owens-Ford	as	part	of	Toledo’s	growing	automo-
tive	production	complex.	In	recognition	of	Charles	Dana’s	firs 	32	years	
of service, the company was renamed for him in 1946. However, the 
Spicer name was retained for the company’s drivetrain products. 
Dana	file 	for	bankruptcy	protection	in	2006.	Declining	sales	to	De-
troit 3 carmakers and increased cost of raw materials, especially steel, 
were	blamed	for	the	financia 	difficulties 	The	company	sold	many	of	
its plants to other suppliers, restructured its labor contracts, and estab-
lished trusts for retiree health care obligations. Dana received a substan-
tial infusion of capital from Centerbridge Capital Partners in 2007. In 
2008 it emerged from Chapter 11 as Dana Holding Corporation.
GKN Automotive
Spicer’s	U-joint	had	one	notable	flaw 	it	caused	the	drive	shaft	to	
rotate at a variable speed. As long as rear-wheel-drive vehicles predom-
inated, the variability was not a problem. But on a front-wheel-drive ve-
hicle, the drive shaft’s variable rotation caused hard steering, slippage, 
and uneven tire wear when turning corners. 
In the 1920s, Spicer engineer Alfred H. Rzeppa invented a major 
improvement	 to	 the	U-joint,	 the	constant	velocity	 joint	(CVJ),	which	
eliminated the variable drive shaft speed. But Dana ceded leadership in 
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supplying	drive	shafts	and	CVJs	to	the	British	fir 	GKN	Automotive	
Inc. during the late twentieth century. 
Guest,	Keen	and	Nettlefolds	Ltd.	(shortened	to	the	acronym	GKN	
in 1986) was formed in the early twentieth century through merger of 
several	venerable	British	firms 	Dowlais	Iron	Company,	established	in	
1759 in the South Wales village of Dowlais, was the world’s largest 
ironworks in the late eighteenth century and the world’s largest steel 
mill	for	much	of	the	nineteenth	century.	John	Guest	and	his	descendants	
controlled Dowlais for more than a century until selling it in 1900 to Ar-
thur Keen, who merged it with Patent Nut and Bolt Company, which he 
had established in 1856. In 1902, Keen acquired Nettlefolds Ltd., one of 
the world’s largest manufacturers of nuts, bolts, screws, and nails.
GKN	was	nationalized	 in	1951	by	Britain’s	Labour	government,	
privatized later that year by the newly elected Conservative govern-
ment, nationalized a second time by Labour in 1967, and again priva-
tized by the Conservatives in 1973. With its core products of steel and 
nails	under	pressure	from	lower	cost	overseas	competitors,	GKN	was	
an unlikely survivor of the 1970s-era bankruptcies, closures, and merg-
ers. The company halted steel production altogether in the early 1980s 










The principal interface between the driver and chassis is through 
the	steering	system.	For	a	car	to	turn	smoothly,	each	wheel	must	follow	
a different circle. Since the inside wheel is following a circle with a 
smaller radius, it makes a tighter turn than the outside wheel. The steer-
ing linkage makes the inside wheel turn more than the outside wheel.
Nineteenth-century vehicles were steered by a tiller that pivoted the 
entire front axle. This was possible because most of the weight of early 
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vehicles was distributed to the rear. The tiller was generally positioned 
in the middle so that the driver could sit on either side. When the engine 
was moved to the front, a more elaborate steering system was needed 
to get the wheels to turn. A mix of tillers and steering wheels were of-
fered	through	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twentieth	century,	until	the	steering	
wheel became standard.
Two types of steering gears have been widely used: recirculating 
ball and rack-and-pinion. The recirculating ball system predominated 
for most of the twentieth century and is still used on many trucks and 
SUVs,	whereas	rack-and-pinion	steering	has	become	most	common	on	
cars.
The recirculating ball system has a steering shaft connected at one 
end to the steering wheel and at the other end to a block with a hole in 
the middle and gears on the outside. The end of the steering shaft has a 
worm	gear,	similar	to	a	bolt,	which	fit 	in	the	hole	in	the	metal	block,	
similar to a nut. With rack-and-pinion steering, the end of the steering 
shaft is fashioned into a pinion gear rather than a worm gear. Rack-and-
pinion	steering	was	confine 	to	racing	cars	and	sports	cars	until	it	was	
adopted on smaller European cars during the 1960s. The rapid expan-
sion of foreign car sales during the 1970s introduced many Americans 
to rack-and-pinion steering. 
Nearly all power steering parts were made in the Midwest in 2006, 
along with two-thirds of steering columns and gears. Hoses, shafts, and 
steering wheels were less likely to be made in the Midwest.
TRW
The leading supplier of steering gears in the United States was TRW 
Automotive Inc. TRW was formed through the merger of Thompson 
Products and Ramo-Wooldridge Corp. in 1958. The acronym TRW was 
adopted in 1965. 
TRW’s motor vehicle parts heritage came through Thompson, which 
was originally known as the Cleveland Cap Screw Co. and established 
in 1901 to make fasteners, including the eponymous cap screw, a large 
heavy-duty bolt with cap and stem welded together. An adaptation of 
the	cap	screw	became	Cleveland	Cap	Screw’s	firs 	motor	vehicle	part,	
an engine valve stem. Impressed with the part, Cleveland-based pioneer 
motor vehicle producer Alexander Winton purchased the company in 
1904 and installed the welder who created the valve, Charles E. Thomp-
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son, as general manager. The company’s name was changed in 1926 to 
honor Thompson.
The	 company’s	 firs 	 steering	product,	 introduced	 in	1914,	was	 a	
steering reach rod, also known as a drag link, a long, hollow tube with a 
ball-and-socket attachment at each end that connected the steering col-
umn with the front wheels (Dyer 1998, p. 42). The company introduced 
the	firs 	rack-and-pinion	steering	gear	in	the	United	States	in	1972.
Thompson’s valves were also used in aircraft engines. The com-
pany’s involvement in the aviation industry induced it to invest in a 
new company founded in 1953 by two former California Institute of 
Technology classmates and Hughes Aircraft Co. engineers, Simon 
Ramo and Dean Wooldridge. Ramo-Wooldridge grew rapidly after be-
ing	named	systems	engineer	and	technical	adviser	to	the	Air	Force	for	
the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program in 1955. The combined 




the public in 2004, although Blackstone retained control. Steering gears 
and other chassis products accounted for two-thirds of TRW’s revenues 
in 2004, occupant safety components one-fourth, and valves and other 
powertrain components the remainder (Dyer 1998).
TRW’s steering gear plants were split between northern and south-
ern locations. Three newer plants were in Tennessee and three older 
ones were in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
CHASSIS PARTS PRODUCTION MOVES SOUTH
The two chassis modules that have most aggressively moved out of 
the Midwest have been wheels and fuel handling. Only 46 percent of 
wheel parts and 51 percent of fuel-handling parts were still made in the 
Midwest in 2006. 
The wheel has been buffeted by contradictory trends. On one hand, 
it has been transformed from a purely functional component into an im-
portant design element. At the same time, it has been subject to intense 
pricing pressures through increased competition. As a result, the wheel 
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has become a low-cost commodity in the vanguard of outsourcing to 
cheap-labor locations, including China. 
Fuel	handling	includes	three	sets	of	components:	the	line	to	move	
the fuel from the tank to the engine, the control system to push the fuel 
into	the	engine,	and	the	tank	to	store	the	fuel.	Fuel	line	production	has	
been especially likely to remain in the Midwest, whereas the other two 
have been less tied to the Midwest.
Wheels: Ugly Duckling No More
The wheel is mounted to the axle with the brake drum or disc on 
one side and the tire on the other. The central part of the wheel through 
which the axle passes is the hub.
Nineteenth-century vehicles rode on enormous four-foot-diameter 
wheels inherited from buggies and bicycles. Long spindly wooden 
spokes—typically 12 or 14—radiated from a central hub to a wooden 
rim. As motor vehicle production increased after 1900, and vehicles 
acquired their contemporary appearance, wheels shrunk to about 2 feet 
in diameter. 
The	wooden	wheel	was	replaced	during	the	1920s	by	a	fla 	pressed-
steel disk wheel painted the same color as the body. The steel wheel 
was later reshaped to include a drop center, in which the diameter on the 
outside of the wheel was smaller, to facilitate installation and removal 
of the tire. The tire was mounted on the wheel by threading four to six 
lug nuts through holes in the tire hub onto bolts in the center of the 
wheel. The drop-center steel wheel with a roughly one-foot diameter on 
the outside became the industry standard during the 1930s and changed 
little over the next 60 years.
Beginning in the 1930s, the unattractive drop-center wheel was 
hidden by a cover, commonly known as a hubcap. The wheel cover 
was	pressed	from	steel	into	elaborate	flute 	patterns	and	plated	with	a	
shiny	finish 	The	covers	were	thought	to	enhance	a	new	vehicle’s	ap-
pearance, although they soon became tarnished, dented, misshapen, 
stolen, or dislodged by a bump in the road. Most hubs are made in the 
Midwest, but fewer than one-third of the wheels themselves are made 
in the Midwest.
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The veteran: Hayes
The leading supplier of wheels for most of the twentieth century 
was Hayes Wheels and its successors. Hayes’s wheel production has 
been heavily centered in the Midwest.
The company founded by Clarence B. Hayes in 1908 captured 
two-thirds of the wooden wheel market during the 1910s. Most of the 
remainder was held by K.H. Wheel Co., which was founded in 1909 
by John Kelsey and John Herbert and reorganized a year later as the 
Kelsey Wheel Co. As steel wheels replaced wooden ones, the two lead-
ing	wheel-making	firm 	merged	in	1927	to	form	Kelsey-Hayes	Wheel	
Corp. When it invented the drop-center wheel in 1934, Kelsey-Hayes 
solidifie 	 its	 position	 as	 the	 country’s	 dominant	 producer	 of	 steel	
wheels.
Kelsey-Hayes experienced multiple takeovers during the late twen-
tieth	century.	Fruehauf	Corp.,	a	semitrailer	manufacturer,	acquired	it	in	
1973	and	sold	it	in	1989	to	Varity	Corp.,	formerly	known	as	Massey-
Ferguson.	Varity	 spun	 off	Hayes	Wheels	 International	 as	 a	 separate	
company in 1992, while retaining Kelsey-Hayes’s other capabilities, 
notably	brake	components,	which	is	discussed	later.	Varity	announced	
its intention to buy back Hayes in 1995 but withdrew the offer a year 




Competition from both domestic and international wheel mak-
ers drove Hayes Lemmerz into Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001 from 
which it emerged two years later. The company has since sold most of 
the plants that made parts other than wheels. It also expanded wheel 
production in Mexico and India while closing some of its midwestern 
plants.
The upstart: Superior
Superior Industries International Inc., founded in California in 1957 
as an aftermarket supplier, successfully challenged Hayes’s stranglehold 
on the original equipment market beginning in the early 1970s. Key 
to Superior’s success was aluminum wheels. In contrast to Michigan- 
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based Hayes, four of Superior’s seven U.S. plants were located in 
Arkansas.
Like much of the automotive industry, long-standing wheel prefer-
ences	were	firs 	shaken	by	the	energy	crisis	of	the	1970s.	Looking	to	
shed weight from vehicles in the wake of the energy crisis, wheel sup-
pliers looked for alternatives to steel. A wheel made of aluminum was 
only half the weight of a steel one; the savings of 60 pounds per vehicle 
more than offset a four-times-higher price for aluminum than for steel. 
The share of the market held by aluminum wheels increased from 7 
percent in 1983 to 40 percent in 1993 and 56 percent in 2000.
Hayes had been a pioneer in the use of aluminum, but it stumbled 
when demand for aluminum wheels soared during the 1980s. Its sales 
declined from more than 22 million wheels in 1999 to fewer than 10 
million in 2004 (Chappell 2004e). Superior’s big break came in the late 
1980s,	when	Hayes	lost	several	large	GM	contracts	because	of	quality	
problems.	 Its	share	of	GM’s	aluminum	wheel	purchases	 fell	 from	45	
percent in 1989 to 12 percent in 1994, while Superior’s rose from virtu-
ally nothing to 53 percent. However, Superior also struggled because it 
was	deriving	three-fourths	of	its	sales	from	Ford	and	GM.	
The boutique wheel
The ugly duckling twentieth-century drop-center wheel was trans-
formed	into	an	attractive	component	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	“Wheels	
are what set autos apart from every other product out there.”2 The wheel 
became an important element in designing a distinctive appearance for 
a brand of vehicle. “In the evolution of the design of a vehicle, we look 
at wheel design on Day One.”3 Wheel diameters grew by 50 percent 
during the 1990s. “A big wheel and big tires make vehicles look more 
confident. 4 
The wheel was especially vulnerable to imports from low-cost coun-
tries, such as China. Wheels made in China gained a strong position in 
the aftermarket: “The aftermarket often leads the way on product in-
novations, since small suppliers need to respond fast to mercurial con-
sumer tastes. Wheels are an example. Aftermarket companies capital-
ized on the demand for oversized wheels and high-end rims long before 
the automakers did” (Chappell 2005e). Original equipment suppliers 
were	challenged	as	well,	especially	by	GM,	which	started	purchasing	
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aluminum wheels in China, thanks to a favorable contract arranged by 
the Chinese government (Andersson 2006).
Hayes tried to reclaim its lost dominance in wheel production by of-
fering “corner” modules, consisting of wheels, brakes, and suspension 
parts. In 1999, it acquired CMI International Inc., a producer of alumi-
num suspension components, including control arms, knuckles, spindle 
arms, hub carriers, cross members, and engine cradles. Hayes claimed 
it	was	capable	of	supplying	$1,100	worth	of	parts	out	of	the	$1,300	that	
carmakers typically spent to purchase components for “corners.” The 
portion of the corner that Hayes was not able to offer was the brake, 
ironically a capability that the company possessed until the convoluted 
restructuring of the 1990s.
Going	into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	it	was	still	unsettled	as	to	what	
the optimal strategy for a wheel maker was: Hayes’s effort to build 
modular capability or Superior’s concentration on one component. Car-
makers were not rushing to purchase entire modules from Hayes, pre-
ferring to continue to deal separately with the well-established suppliers 
of the other components. When Hayes was forced to reorganize under 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, Superior’s strategy appeared supe-
rior, at least in the short run.
Fuel Handling
The geographic distribution of fuel-handling parts has been mixed. 
Air	filters 	hoses,	and	 tanks	have	been	more	 likely	 to	be	produced	 in	
the	Midwest,	whereas	fuel	filters 	 injection	systems,	and	pumps	have	
been more likely to be located in the South. Overall, only one-half of 
the plants making fuel-handling parts were located in the Midwest in 
2006. 
The southward drift of fuel-handling production may have been a 
function of the dominance of foreign-owned suppliers. European sup-
pliers have been especially important in this sector.
Fuel lines: TI Automotive
The	 leading	 supplier	of	 fuel	 lines,	as	well	as	other	 fluid-deliver 	
lines, has been British-based TI Automotive Ltd. (Automotive	 News	
Europe 1999). TI’s predecessor, Tube Investments Ltd., founded in 
1919 in Birmingham, England, became a major U.S. supplier in 1987 
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through	the	acquisition	of	Bundy	Group,	then	the	world	leader	in	fuel	
and	 brake-flui 	 delivery.	 “Bundy	 supplies	 either	 the	 complete	 brake	
line or complete fuel line, or the two in combination. Carmakers in-
creasingly	favor	combined	systems.	These	are	efficien 	because	a	rigid	
steel	 fuel	system	supports	 the	sometimes	 flexibl 	brake	 flui 	system.	
The combined unit is more easily added to the car’s underbody on the 
assembly line” (Chew 1997).
In 1999, TI acquired Walbro Corp., which had been founded in 
1950	by	Walter	E.	Walpole	in	Fenton,	Michigan,	to	manufacture	carbu-
retors. TI combined Bundy’s fuel lines with Walbro’s fuel storage and 
delivery technology to create fully integrated fuel storage and delivery 
systems. Eight of the company’s nine U.S. plants that made fuel-han-
dling components in 2007 were located in the Midwest, including six 
in Michigan.
Fuel injection: Robert Bosch
The fuel control system includes fuel injectors to inject fuel into the 
intake	air	flo ,	 throttle	bodies	 to	control	air	flo ,	an	 intake	manifold	
to	distribute	air	flo 	from	the	throttle	bodies	to	engine	cylinders,	and	
a pump to push the fuel out of the tank. Increasingly popular is a com-
mon-rail injection system that stores fuel in a central rail and delivers it 
to the individual electronically controlled injector valves. 
Several of the world’s largest automotive parts suppliers have been 
leaders in producing fuel control systems. Robert Bosch Corp., the 
world’s largest supplier in 2007, was also the largest supplier of fuel 
control systems for gasoline engines. Delphi, Denso, and Continental 
were the other leading suppliers of fuel injection systems and common-
rail systems (Lewin 2005). 
Bosch introduced electronic fuel injection in 1967 and was supply-
ing nearly all European vehicles in the 1980s. Electronic fuel injection 
was less wasteful than a mechanical system using a carburetor because 
motorists no longer had to pump the accelerator or pull the choke knob 
to	get	a	steady	stream	of	fuel	to	the	engine.	Sensors	measured	airflo 	
and air temperature to adjust the amount of fuel being delivered (Arm-
strong 2004c). Bosch has supplied the U.S. market with fuel injectors 
primarily from overseas facilities. 
266   Klier and Rubenstein
Fuel injection: Keihin
The leading Japanese supplier of fuel injection modules has been 
Keihin Corp., a Honda keiretsu. Keihin was formed in 1997 through 
the merger of Keihin Seiki Manufacturing Co. with two Honda cap-
tives, Hadsys and Denshigiken. Honda controlled nearly one-half of 
company	shares.	Fuel	control	systems	accounted	 for	one-third	of	 the	
company’s worldwide revenues in 2004, air conditioning one-fourth, 
and	electronic	control	units	and	motorcycle	fuel	systems	one-fift 	each.	
The half-dozen fuel injection plants in the United States in 2007 were 
divided between three in Indiana and three in the Carolinas. 
Fuel tanks: Inergy
The leading supplier of fuel tanks, with about one-third of the U.S. 
market,	has	been	French-based	Inergy	Automotive	Systems.	Inergy	was	
a 50–50 joint venture between two of Europe’s leading plastics produc-
ers, Plastic Omnium and Solvay S.A., and was formed in 2000. Plastic 
Omnium,	a	French	company	established	after	World	War	II	by	chemical	
engineer Pierre Burelle, was an early European-based innovator in plas-
tic parts and has become a leading supplier of bumpers (see Chapter 4). 
Solvay, a Belgian company founded in 1863 by Ernest Solvay, was the 
leading producer of sodium carbonate, made through combining am-
monia with salt, carbon dioxide, and lime. The company ventured into 
plastics production during the 1950s, beginning with polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC).
Inergy became the world leader in fuel tanks by making them out 
of plastic (e.g., high-density polyethylene or HDPE). These tanks are 
lighter and less prone to corrosion than those made of metal (Chew 
2002, 2004a) and are relatively easy to transport. Inergy’s U.S. plant 
locations in 2007 included one each in the Midwest and South.
NORTH–SOUTH BATTLEGROUND
The brake may be the best example of part production being pulled 
toward	 the	 two	 ends	of	Auto	Alley	 in	 the	 early	 twenty-firs 	 century.	
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Cutthroat competition, induced by rapid technological change and price 
drops, favored southern, low-cost locations.
Suspension production has been divided between the Midwest and 
the South for different reasons. Assembled suspension modules, espe-
cially	control	arms,	are	especially	difficul 	and	fragile	to	transport,	thus	
favoring locations further north. At the same time, individual suspen-
sion parts, such as springs and shocks, can be transported easily, so the 
production of those parts is more likely to head south.
Brakes: Supplier Turmoil
Nineteenth-century vehicles were slowed by putting a long stick 
with a weight on the end in a front wheel, similar to the practice with a 
horse-drawn	carriage.	The	firs 	automotive	brakes	were	placed	only	on	
rear	wheels.	Four-wheel	brakes	did	not	become	standard	on	production	
vehicles until the 1920s.
Early automotive engineers believed that brakes on all four wheels 
would be dangerous because in a sudden stop the wheels could lock, 
causing the car to roll over and passengers to be thrown forward against 
the instrument panel (seat belts and other passenger restraint devices 
had	not	yet	been	invented).	Four-wheel	brakes	were	limited	during	the	
early twentieth century to racing cars, which were traveling too fast 
for two-wheel brakes to be effective. The percentage of vehicles with 
brakes on all four wheels increased quickly during the 1920s, from 2 
percent in 1923 to 36 percent in 1925 and 91 percent in 1927 (Epstein 
1928). Early brakes were mostly drum brakes. A strip or lining of fric-
tion	material	was	fastened	to	a	steel	shoe	or	block	shaped	to	fi 	snugly	
inside a drum attached to the wheel. When the brake pedal was de-
pressed, the curved brake shoe was pushed outward to make contact 
with the rotating drum. 
Introduced in the 1950s were disc brakes, which consisted of heavy 
discs or rotors bolted to the wheel hubs. When the brake pedal was de-
pressed, both sides of the disc were pressed by brake shoes or friction 
pads; two shoes were used to keep the wheel more stable. Because they 
initially required more pedal pressure than drum brakes, disc brakes 
were shunned by consumers until power assistance was added during 
the 1960s. 
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With power brakes, most of the work involved in pushing the pedal 
was done by vacuum pressure. Depressing the brake pedal exerted a 
force on a piston inside a master cylinder, made stronger through open-
ing and closing of vacuum control valves. The force was transferred 
from the master cylinder piston to cylinders located at each wheel. Pis-
tons in each of these wheel cylinders were then moved, causing the 
brake shoes to come into contact with the revolving disc.
Antilock brake systems (ABS) appeared during the 1980s. With 
ABS, a computer controlled the movement of the brake shoes when 
the brake pedal was pressed, enabling the shoes to press against and 
then release the discs or drums many times per second. ABS prevent-
ed wheels from locking up, thereby increasing the ability of drivers to 
maintain control of their vehicles. The percentage of U.S. vehicles with 
ABS increased from 0.7 percent in 1986 and 4 percent in 1989 to 44 
percent 1993 and 56 percent in 1994. 
Drum brakes were more likely to be made in the Midwest, whereas 
disc and ABS brakes were more likely to be made in the South. Other 
brake-related parts were also likely to be made in the Midwest.
Rapid diffusion of low-cost ABS brought chaos to brake suppliers. 
The price of a state-of-the-art brake declined during the 1990s from 
$1,000	to	$100	per	vehicle.	What	was	a	high-tech	component	back	in	
1990 had become a generic commodity by 2000. Of the four companies 
responsible for nearly all U.S. brakes in 1994—AlliedSignal Automo-
tive,	GM,	ITT	Automotive,	and	Kelsey-Hayes	Co.—not	one	was	still	
supplying	brakes	fiv 	years	later:	
• AlliedSignal sold its Bendix brake division to Robert Bosch in 
1996. 
•	 GM’s	brake	operations	were	spun	off	in	1999	as	part	of	Delphi,	
which in turn put it up for sale in 2007.




was sold to TRW in 1999. 
As was the case with wheels, the market share losers among brake 
competitors	into	the	twenty-firs 	century	were	firm 	based	in	the	North,	
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whereas the suppliers based in the South were gaining. Nationality 
also played a role. The two brake suppliers with most of their plants in 
the North, Delphi and TRW, were U.S.-owned, whereas the two with 
most of their plants in the South, Robert Bosch and Continental, were 
German-owned.	
Robert Bosch
Robert Bosch gained its strong position in the brake market as the 
ABS	pioneer.	The	company	built	the	firs 	ABS	in	1978	and	provided	the	
luxury	German	cars	with	it	beginning	in	the	1980s.	For	the	U.S.	market,	
Bosch opened ABS plants in the South during the 1980s, including two 
in Tennessee and one in South Carolina. Bosch became a leader in the 
U.S. brake market by acquiring Bendix in 1996. 
When four-wheel drum brakes became standard equipment during 








someday replace terrestrial motor vehicles. “During the 1920s, it be-





Meanwhile,	Bendix	official 	were	 instrumental	 in	 leading	Ford’s	
modernization and turnaround after World War II. Bendix president Er-
nest	R.	Breech	became	executive	vice	president	of	Ford	 in	1946	and	
chairman from 1955 to 1960. He was credited with hiring a team of 
energetic young executives known as the Whiz Kids. Lewis D. Crusoe, 
also	a	former	Bendix	official 	set	up	Ford’s	firs 	cost-accounting	system	
during the 1950s.
Bendix was acquired in 1983 by Allied Corp., which had been 
founded	in	1920	through	the	merger	of	fiv 	chemical	companies.	Allied	
merged in 1985 with Signal Companies, which had started producing 
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gasoline from natural gas in 1922. A decade later AlliedSignal sold its 
brake division to Bosch. 
Continental
The principal competition for Bosch’s leadership in ABS came 
from	another	German	firm 	Continental,	which	is	discussed	in	Chapter	
10 as a leading tire supplier and in Chapter 14 as an interior electronics 
supplier.	Continental,	like	its	fellow	German	brake	supplier,	set	up	U.S.	
brake plants in the South, including three in North Carolina and one 
across	the	state	line	in	Virginia.
Continental gained its leadership position in brake production by 
acquiring U.S.-owned ITT Automotive in 1998. Completing the inter-




ITT originated in 1925 as International Telephone & Telegraph 
when American Telephone & Telegraph spun off its overseas interests 
as separate company. ITT became one of the best examples of a large 
conglomerate with interests in numerous unrelated industries. During 
the 1990s ITT was one of the 10 largest parts suppliers in the United 
States, but the company chose to concentrate on sectors with higher 
rates of return, primarily defense electronics and water treatment.
TRW
TRW was the largest supplier focusing primarily on chassis compo-
nents; its steering operations have already been discussed. Its brake pro-
duction was acquired from Kelsey-Hayes. During the 1920s, Kelsey-
Hayes, already described as the leading supplier of wheels, was also 
Bendix’s chief competitor in producing drum brakes. One year after the 
company was formed through the merger of Kelsey Wheel and Hayes 
Wheel,	Kelsey-Hayes	produced	its	firs 	brakes	for	Ford	in	1928.
Kelsey-Hayes’s brake operations fell behind the other brake suppli-
ers during the 1990s; the company suffered from multiple takeovers and 
failed to stay competitive in the rapidly growing and ever-cheaper ABS 
market. TRW inherited plants clustered in the Midwest, including one 
in Michigan and two each in Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
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Delphi
The ABS price breakthrough came in the early 1990s from the un-
likely	 source	of	General	Motors.	GM’s	Delco	Products	division	had	
been building brakes in Dayton since 1934. The Delco Brake Divi-
sion was organized in 1936, moved to the Moraine Products division 
in	1942,	and	renamed	Delco	Moraine	in	1960	so	that	GM	could	use	the	
Delco trade name on its brakes. 
Delco Moraine’s ABS system, while less sophisticated than Bosch’s, 
cost	only	$300	per	vehicle	instead	of	$1,000	in	the	early	1990s,	when	
GM	made	ABS	 standard	 even	 on	 its	 low-priced	 vehicles.	 Stung	 by	 
Delco Moraine’s low price, other brake manufacturers quickly intro-
duced more advanced ABS at even lower prices. ABS designs soon be-
came fairly standard, and since quality was comparable, pricing became 
the key to market share. 
With the rapid conversion of ABS from an expensive option re-
served for luxury cars to low-cost accessory for all vehicles, production 
of brakes lost its attraction for the long-time market leaders. Delphi 
gave up on brakes, along with compressors, fuel handling, ignition, in-
teriors, and suspension. Plants making these parts were placed in the 
Automotive	Holdings	Group,	pending	sale	or	closure.
In 2007 Delphi sold its brake hose business to Marco Manufactur-
ing LLC, its brake component machining assets to TRW, and its two 
Mexican brake plants to Bosch. 
Suspension
When a vehicle is driven on uneven road surfaces, the suspension 
system stabilizes the vehicle and keeps its tires on the road. The suspen-
sion system also cushions passengers from uncomfortable bumps and 
vibrations. Suspension components were invented early in the history 
of the car to dampen the rough ride over poor roads. 
The principal components in the suspension system include springs, 
bars, and shock absorbers. The Midwest share of suspension production 
was below average for all parts.
Shock absorbers dampen much of the up-and-down movement 
because, if the car were suspended only on springs, it would bounce 
and sway uncomfortably after each bump. They are mounted inside the 
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front springs and in front of the rear springs, allowing the springs to 
compress fully and rebound slowly. 
A shock absorber consists of one cylinder nestled inside another. 
When the wheel travels over a bump, the lower cylinder moves with 
the wheel and is telescoped into the upper cylinder, which is bolted to 
the frame. A piston attached to the upper cylinder eases this telescoping 
action. As the shock absorber rebounds after impact, the lower cylinder 
is pulled downward. 
Monroe has been the leading supplier of shock absorbers in the 
United States and had a well-known brand name primarily because 
a large percentage of its sales has been in the aftermarket. Monroe’s 
predecessor,	Brisk	Blast	Manufacturing	Co.,	produced	 the	 firs 	mod-
ern shock absorber in 1926. Monroe was acquired in 1977 by Tenneco, 
which has split shock absorber production between northern and south-
ern	locations,	with	plants	in	Arkansas,	Georgia,	Indiana,	Nebraska,	and	
Ohio.
Suspension has attracted the interest of other chassis suppliers, in-
cluding the major steering suppliers and all of the major wheel suppli-
ers, because of the possibility of integration with other handling func-
tions through electronics. Continuous damping control is an electronic 
system that can adjust the tension in a shock absorber to improve vehi-
cle handling. Sensors in the suspension modules can detect the position 
of the body, movement of the wheels, pace of acceleration, and steering 
angle. However, it was unclear if that was going to happen. The leading 
wheel suppliers Hayes Lemmerz and Superior both exited the suspen-
sion business where the necessary capital investment was regarded as 
too	large	to	make	a	profi 	(Sherefkin	2006c).
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
Where a parts plant locates within Auto Alley depends to a great 
extent on the type of part being made. Parts that are relatively expensive 
and fragile to ship are more likely to continue to be produced in the 
Midwest.	The	question	of	where	to	produce	a	part	is	also	influence 	by	
labor considerations. As discussed in the next chapter, some suppliers 
have been lured to the South by a nonunion, lower-wage labor environ-
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ment. Except for electronics, chassis parts production is currently the 
most dispersed among the six major subsystems. Production of some 
chassis parts has been moved south within the auto corridor or out of 
the country, whereas other parts have stayed in the Midwest.
One possible impetus for moving the production of some chassis 
parts back to the Midwest would be the widespread diffusion of the 
so-called rolling chassis. The term refers to an integrated chassis that 
is rolled on its own tires to the position on the assembly line moments 
before needed. The roll-in chassis is particularly suitable for assembly 
of trucks that have bodies that are bolted to frames near the end of the 
assembly line. 
In the mid-1990s, Chrysler contracted with Dana, which secured a 
trademark on the name “Rolling Chassis,” to supply the rolling chas-
sis as a single module at its Camp Largo, Brazil, truck assembly plant. 
Dana itself manufactured some of the components, including the drive-
shaft, axles, fuel lines, and brake hoses. The remainder, including tires, 
fuel tanks, and steering linkages, were purchased from 66 suppliers. 
Altogether, the chassis module contained 220 components, accounting 
for more than one-fourth of the truck’s content (Automotive	News 1999; 
Kisiel 1998).
Dana	lost	out	unexpectedly	in	its	firs 	attempt	to	supply	a	rolling	chas-
sis in the United States. Korean supplier Mobis was awarded a contract 
in 2004 to supply rolling chassis to Chrysler’s Jeep plant in Toledo—an 
especially stinging defeat because Toledo is Dana’s hometown.
Mobis was already building rolling chassis for Kia at its plant in 
Hwasung, Korea. Mobis was part of the Hyundai chaebol through 
interlocking ownership. Hyundai owned 60 percent of Kia, which in 
turn owned 16.2 percent of Mobis, which in turn owned 13.2 percent 
of Hyundai. Mobis had no North American manufacturing operations 
when it won the Jeep contract. But Mobis expected to rank among 
the world’s top 10 suppliers by 2010. In the cutthroat world of global 
parts supply, Dana was caught asleep at the switch in its own backyard 
(Chang and Chappell 2004).
However, even if the rolling chassis were to become an industry 
standard, it is unclear how it would affect the geography of chassis pro-
duction because it involves a number of components that are currently 
characterized by a very different geography of production within Auto 
Alley. As this chapter has shown, the key subsystems of a rolling chas-
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sis are currently being produced at different locations within Auto Alley 












comes out to $65 [in total hourly compensation] . . . Roughly 
$20	is	what	we	say	is	competitive.1
The auto industry has been moving south in Auto Alley primar-
ily because of labor considerations. Wage rates have been lower in the 
South than in the Midwest, and union membership has been lower. As 
the auto industry has moved southward, it has been transformed in a 
generation from a high-wage to an average-wage industry, and rates of 
unionization have gone from high to low. 
At	firs 	glance,	labor	conditions	in	the	motor	vehicle	industry	in	the	
early	 twenty-firs 	century	would	appear	 to	be	 favorable	 to	 the	work-
force. The motor vehicle industry has been one of the highest-paid man-
ufacturing	sectors	in	the	United	States.	Production	workers	earned	$921	
per	week	in	motor	vehicle	plants	in	2007,	one-third	more	than	the	$705	
in the average U.S. factory. 
Not by coincidence, the motor vehicle industry has also been one of 
the most unionized sectors in the United States. Nearly one-half of mo-
tor vehicle production workers belonged to a union in 2007, compared 
to less than one-tenth of the total U.S. workforce.
This	early	twenty-first-centur 	snapshot	of	a	relatively	well	paid	and	
highly unionized workforce masked sharp downward trends in these 
figures 	As	recently	as	the	1980s,	90	percent	of	production	workers	in	
the U.S. motor vehicle industry belonged to a union, and in nominal 
terms, their wages were on average 35 percent higher than manufactur-
ing wages. 
The	decline	was	especially	steep	in	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-
firs 	century.	Wages	were	declining	by	1	percent	per	year	 in	 the	U.S.	
motor vehicle industry while, at the same time, rising 2 percent per year 
in manufacturing as a whole. Meanwhile, the percentage of unionized 
motor vehicle workers was declining by 2 percent per year.
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Wage rates in the seven leading southern states of Auto Alley—Ala-
bama,	Georgia,	Kentucky,	Mississippi,	North	Carolina,	South	Carolina,	
and	Tennessee—have	been	one-sixth	lower	than	those	in	the	fiv 	Mid-




west states had 3.4 million workers represented by a union in 2006, or 
16.7 percent of all salaried and hourly workers in the region (excluding 
self-employed workers). In Michigan, 20.4 percent of the workforce 
was unionized. The states in the portion of Auto Alley lying south of 
the Ohio River had 1.1 million unionized workers in 2006, representing 
only 6.6 percent of the total workforce.
The opportunity to move south within Auto Alley has been provided 
by the structural changes that the motor vehicle industry has undergone. 
As responsibility has shifted from carmakers to suppliers, and as market 
share has shifted from the Detroit 3 to foreign-owned carmakers, pro-
duction has shifted from higher wage unionized plants in the Midwest 
to lower wage nonunion plants in the South.
Outsourcing by carmakers has been most responsible for lower 
rates	of	pay	and	union	membership.	The	fina 	assembly	plants	and	pow-
ertrain and stamping plants operated by the carmakers have had wage 
rates nearly twice as high as the parts plants owned by independent 
suppliers. Two-thirds of the workers at carmakers were union members 
in	2007,	compared	to	less	than	one-fift 	at	suppliers.
Market shifts also have had an impact on wage rates because labor 
costs have been lower at foreign-owned carmakers than at the Detroit 
3.	In	2007,	hourly	labor	costs,	including	wages,	benefits 	and	pension	
obligations,	were	about	$72	at	the	Detroit	3,	compared	to	about	$45	to	
$50	at	 Japanese-owned	carmakers	 (Barkholtz	2007b).	The	 impact	of	
foreign-owned carmakers has been even greater on union membership 
because all foreign-owned assembly plants (with the exception of joint 
ventures with the Detroit 3) have been nonunion, and union member-
ship rates have been much lower at foreign-owned suppliers than at 
U.S.-owned ones.
As a result of the shifts, parts once made by union members earn-
ing	$70	an	hour	in	wages	and	benefit 	at	Detroit	3	facilities—most	of	
which are in the Midwest—have been turned over to nonunion suppli-
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ers—increasingly	located	in	the	South—paying	$20	an	hour	in	wages	
and	benefits
RISE AND FALL OF AUTO UNIONS
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. motor 
vehicle industry employed approximately 751,000 production workers 
in 2006. Approximately 162,000 of these production workers were em-
ployed at assembly plants (NAICS Code 33611) and 589,000 at parts 
plants (NAICS codes 336211 and 3363).
Our database of several thousand plants showed that, in 2006, 34.5 
percent of employees at supplier plants had union representation and 
65.5 percent did not. Applying these percentages to the total number 
of production workers, an estimated 203,000 workers at supplier plants 
belonged to a union and 386,000 did not.
A somewhat more precise count can be made of union workers at 
assembly plants. In 2006, approximately 122,000 production workers 
at assembly plants belonged to a union and 40,000 did not. Combining 
the	figure 	for	assembly	plants	and	suppliers,	we	estimate	that	a	total	of	
325,000 production workers (43.3 percent) belonged to a union in 2006 
and 426,000 (56.7 percent) did not. 
Profile of Union Decline
The principal auto-related union in the United States since 1937 
has	been	 the	United	Auto	Workers	 (UAW),	officiall 	 the	United	Au-
tomobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. 
At parts suppliers (excluding Detroit 3 facilities), though, other unions 
combined have represented more workers than the UAW.
UAW
The UAW had 538,446 members in 2006, according to the union’s 
2007 annual report. The “real” number at the time may have been as 
low	as	500,000	and	as	high	as	576,131	according	to	UAW	officials 2 
There was no uncertainty concerning the precipitous decline in 
UAW	membership.	From	 its	peak	of	1.5	million	 in	1979,	 the	union	
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lost two-thirds of its members in three decades. And there is no end in 
sight	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century.	The	decline	has	been	steady	and	
continuous: 1,150,000 members in 1985, 850,000 in 1990, 750,000 in 
1995,	650,000	in	2000,	and	550,000	in	2005	(Figure	12.1).
We estimate that about 251,000 UAW members held production jobs 
in the motor vehicle industry in 2006. The other UAW members worked 
in aerospace and agricultural equipment factories, as recognized in the 
union’s full name, as well as in casinos, hospitals, legal services, local 
government, and universities. UAW members also worked in nonpro-
duction jobs in the motor vehicle industry, as well as for manufacturers 
of medium- and heavy-duty trucks that have not been included in this 
book. The 251,000 UAW members in the motor vehicle production jobs 
in	2006	 included	approximately	120,000	 in	fina 	assembly	plants	and	
131,000 in parts plants. The UAW represented production workers at 
every assembly plant operated by the Detroit 3, with one exception—
GM’s	Moraine,	Ohio,	assembly	plant—which	recognized	the	Interna-
tional	Union	of	Electronic,	Electrical,	Salaried,	Machine	and	Furniture	
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Workers-Communications Workers of America (IUE-CWA). The IUE 
presence at Moraine was a legacy of the plant’s original purpose of 
making	refrigerators	for	Frigidaire,	which	GM	owned	until	1979.
The UAW also represented workers at three foreign-run assembly 
plants:	AutoAlliance	in	Flat	Rock,	Michigan;	Mitsubishi	in	Normal,	Il-
linois;	and	NUMMI	in	Fremont,	California.	All	three	plants	were	origi-




The 131,000 parts workers represented by the UAW could be divid-
ed into two groups: about 67,000 in parts plants owned by the Detroit 3 
and 64,000 in plants owned by suppliers. 
UAW membership was heavily clustered in the Midwest portion of 
Auto Alley. The Midwest had one-half of all automotive parts workers 
in the United States, compared with two-thirds of all unionized parts 
workers	and	four-fifth 	of	all	UAW	parts	workers.	Michigan,	with	one-
fift 	of	all	parts	workers,	had	one-half	of	all	UAW	members.	The	south-
ern portion of Auto Alley, on the other hand, with one-fourth of all parts 
workers, had only one-eighth of all unionized parts workers and one-
fourteenth of all UAW parts workers. 
Other auto industry unions
An estimated 72,000 parts workers belonged to a union other than 
the UAW in 2006. Roughly half of them were in the USW, a union that 
is derived from the United Steelworkers of America. The USW evolved 
from its steel-industry origins through numerous mergers. Most USW 
members in the motor vehicle industry arrived through a 1995 merger 
with the United Rubber Workers (URW), which had organized the tire 
factories. The second-largest group of USW members came through a 
2004 merger with the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy 
Workers International Union (PACE).
The third-largest auto-related union has been the IUE-CWA, which 
represented about 15,000 auto industry workers in 2006. Half were 
in	 former	GM	 factories,	especially	 in	 the	Dayton	area,	 that	had	been	
turned over to Delphi in 1999. As noted above, these factories origi-
nally produced electrical products, such as refrigerators and air con-
ditioners. Two other unions with roughly 10,000 auto workers each in 
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2006 were the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Union 
of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE). With the 
exception of the cluster of IUE-CWA plants in the Dayton area, the 
pattern of representation of the various unions has been a result of the 
happenstance of local events.
Foreign-owned suppliers: Unions not welcome
The	fli 	side	of	declining	market	share	for	the	Detroit	3	and	their	
suppliers has been an increasing market share for foreign-owned com-
panies and their suppliers. As a result, unions lose in two ways: the 
Detroit 3 and their suppliers have cut union jobs, while foreign-owned 
companies and their suppliers have added nonunion jobs.
Union representation has been extremely low among foreign-owned 
suppliers in the United States. Roughly 15,000 of the 125,000 employ-
ees of Japanese-owned supplier plants belonged to a union in 2006, in-
cluding only about 5,000 in the UAW. The two largest Japanese-owned 
suppliers in North America—Denso and Yazaki—had no union. At the 
largest	 German-owned	 supplier—Robert	 Bosch—only	 7	 percent	 of	
production workers were unionized.
Unions and companies agree that foreign-owned plants do not 
provide an environment conducive for collective bargaining, but they 
would describe the environment differently. The companies see an envi-
ronment in which collective bargaining is unnecessary, whereas unions 
see an environment in which collective bargaining is suppressed.
Foreign-owned	companies	argue	that	a	union	is	not	needed	in	plants	
run	according	 to	 Japanese-style	 flexibl 	work	 rules	and	 that	most	of	
their employees recognize and accept that fact. They view key elements 
of	flexibl 	production,	especially	reliance	on	teamwork	and	local-scale	
problem-solving, as inimical with union-imposed work rules.
At unionized motor vehicle plants, jobs were traditionally allocated 
to	hundreds	of	classifications 	and	workers	could	not	be	moved	from	
one	classificatio 	to	another	without	permission	of	the	union.	Jobs	were	
assigned to individual members according to seniority. Unions defend-
ed the seniority system for allocating jobs. A 50-year-old should not be 
placed in a team with a 30-year-old and told to do the same job. The 
older worker should be assigned a less physically demanding job, and 
the seniority system was the way to accomplish that.
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Unions have alleged that nonunion plants, especially Japanese-
owned plants, have had substantially higher injury rates. U.S. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) statistics used to 
support the charge have been vehemently disputed by the companies. 
The UAW has claimed that Honda’s East Liberty, Ohio, assembly plant 
had	annual	injury	rates	exceeding	50	percent,	a	figur 	that	Honda	has	
denied, compared to less than 10 percent at Detroit 3 plants (Hakim 
2002).
Unions and companies agree that automotive workers in union and 
nonunion plants alike have been prone to repetitive stress injuries, even 
if they disagree on the rates. The overall injury rate in the auto indus-
try ranks third highest among all sectors, behind only shipbuilding and 
meatpacking. Unions argue that company treatment of injured workers 
varies between union and nonunion plants, and those differences ulti-
mately contribute to the higher nonunion injury rates.
In a UAW plant, an injured worker with 10 years of service is as-
signed a less physically demanding job until the worker retires with 
maximum	benefits 	normally	30	years.	In	a	flexibl 	production	plant,	an	
injured worker can be returned to the same job that led to the repetitive 
stress	injury	in	the	firs 	place.	Rather	than	transfer	to	a	less	demanding	
job, a repeatedly injured worker in a nonunion plant may be offered 




factories hire people who pass through an elaborate process run by hu-
man	resource	specialists.	Applicants	are	firs 	 tested	for	basic	skills	 in	
reading, writing, arithmetic, and mechanical dexterity. Those with ac-
ceptable basic skills are placed in groups for a few hours of behavioral 
assessment. The groups are asked to work together to assemble a prod-
uct or solve a problem. Applicants considered successful team players 
are interviewed to determine if they are trainable, reliable, and willing 
to try unfamiliar work.
Unions	charge	that	the	more	elaborate	hiring	process	under	flexibl 	
production takes place at taxpayer expense. States routinely agree to do 
the	initial	screening	and	interviewing	at	their	office 	and	to	provide	sub-
sidies for training at community colleges. Unionized plants obtain new 
workers primarily through relatives or friends of people already work-
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ing there. With sharp reductions in hiring at the Detroit 3 and union-
ized suppliers, opportunities had been meager for children and other 





sands of grievances can pile up in a plant and take months to resolve. 
In	contrast,	under	flexibl 	rules,	a	worker	is	expected	to	look	for	so-
lutions through direct consultations with team and group leaders. Sug-
gestions for changing the immediate workplace environment are en-
couraged, reviewed, and often adopted. When the arrangement of ma-
chines	on	the	factory	floo 	needs	to	be	changed,	management	firs 	asks	
line	workers	how	they	think	things	should	flo .	When	tooling	changes	
take too long, management asks hourly workers rather than expensive 
outside	consultants	how	to	fi 	the	problem.
The UAW has viewed its failure to organize foreign-owned plants 
to be caused not by better plant conditions but by more effective in-
timidation	 tactics	by	employers.	Foreign-owned	carmakers	vigilantly	
guard against unionization at their suppliers as an outer line of defense 
against unionization attempts inside their facilities. Unions charge that 
international carmakers make explicit threats to drop a supplier that lets 
in the union. 
Unions	also	suggest	 that	 they	are	benefitin 	workers	 in	nonunion	
plants to the extent that they get a “free ride.” Workers in nonunion 
plants freely admit that collective bargaining agreements elsewhere in 
the	 industry	positively	 influenc 	 their	wages	and	benefits 	Given	 this	
reality, why go to the trouble of voting in the union and paying dues? 
The union may be providing informal services to the roughly one-third 
or so in a nonunion plant who signed union cards or voted for the union 
in a losing election. 
Organizing Parts Plants during the 1930s
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a	campaign	that	began	three	years	earlier	and	100	miles	south	of	Flint	
in supplier plants.
“In 1934 labor erupted,” wrote labor historian Irving Bernstein. “A 
number	of	these	strikes	were	of	unusual	importance	.	.	.	Four	were	so-
cial upheavals [including] those of auto parts workers at the Electric 
Auto-Lite Company in Toledo . . .” (Bernstein 1970, p. 217). Bern-
stein’s	three	other	three	definin 	events	were	strikes	by	truck	drivers	in	
Minneapolis,	longshoremen	in	San	Francisco,	and	cotton-textile	work-
ers in New England and the South.
Auto-Lite, the linchpin
Auto-Lite, now part of Honeywell, was one of the largest inde-
pendent parts suppliers at the time of the 1934 strike. The company 
was founded in Toledo in 1911 to produce generators that were called 
“Auto-liters” and were sold as a power source for electric headlamps, 
which	were	then	replacing	gas-fire 	ones.	
Founder	Clement	O.	Miniger,	a	native	of	Fostoria,	Ohio,	near	To-
ledo, had been a pharmaceutical salesman and so-called drug huckster 
among other professions and later would be a leading Toledo banker 
(Bernstein 1970, p. 219). Miniger sold Auto-Lite in 1914 to a friend, 
John Willys, owner of Willys-Overland Co., which was producing the 
country’s	second-best-selling	car	brand	behind	Ford.	Miniger	returned	
to Auto-Lite as president in 1918 and was chairman during the 1934 
strike.
Like most parts suppliers—and half of all U.S. manufacturers at the 
time—Auto-Lite	paid	workers	a	specifie 	sum	for	each	piece	produced	
rather than according to a preset hourly rate. Workers did not object to 
piece rate during prosperous times because the faster they worked, and 
the more they produced, the more pay they took home. But if the line 
stopped, workers were paid nothing. 
Suppliers like Auto-Lite stayed in business during the Depression 
by slashing the piece rate. Piece rate workers had to stay in the plant 
as long as 14 hours a day to take home what they could have made in a 
few hours before the Depression. In reaction, workers formed a union 
in 1933 at Auto-Lite, as well as at other large Toledo plants, including 
Willys and Spicer Axle (which became part of Dana).
When demands to grant union recognition, seniority privileges, and 
a	10	percent	wage	increase	were	rejected,	a	strike	was	called	on	Febru-
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ary	23,	1934.	It	ended	fiv 	days	later,	when	federal	mediators	convinced	
the employers to offer a 5 percent wage increase and to agree to “set 
up machinery for future negotiations . . . on all other issues.” The union 
understood “future negotiations” to mean that a settlement would be 
reached by April 1 (Bernstein 1970, p. 220). When Auto-Lite again re-
fused to negotiate, the union called a second strike for April 12. This 
time, only one-fourth of the workers went out on strike. The company 
hired strikebreakers and kept the plant open.
At	this	point,	the	Lucas	County	Unemployed	League,	an	affiliat 	of	
the Marxist American Workers Party, began mass picketing of the Auto-
Lite plant with unemployed workers. Court orders limiting the number 
of	picketers	to	25	were	defied 	Although	Party	official 	were	repeatedly	
arrested,	 the	number	of	picketers	grew	 to	10,000.	Fearing	he	did	not	
have enough personnel to control the crowd, the sheriff deputized spe-
cial police, who were paid by Auto-Lite. One of these deputies seized 
an elderly man in view of many in the crowd and started hitting him. 
“This triggered ‘the Battle of Toledo’” (Bernstein 1970, p. 222).
Fighting	between	 the	picketers	and	police	 lasted	 for	 seven	hours	
on	May	23,	1934.	The	Ohio	National	Guard	arrived	the	next	morning	
to evacuate 1,500 strikebreakers trapped in the factory all night. Twice 
the	picketers	charged	the	Guard	and	were	repelled	with	bayonets	and	
tear	gas.	On	 the	 third	charge,	 the	Guard	opened	 fire 	killing	 two	and	
wounding	15.	A	fina 	charge	was	repelled	by	more	rifl 	fire 	with	two	
more wounded.
Prominent Ohioan Charles P. Taft, son of President William How-
ard Taft and brother of long-time Senator Robert A. Taft, was brought in 
to mediate. He ordered closure of the Auto-Lite plant pending a settle-
ment of the dispute. Because it had recently negotiated a large contract 
to supply Chrysler, Auto-Lite was anxious to settle, so it agreed to ne-
gotiate directly with the union. A settlement was quickly reached, and 
the plant reopened June 5. The company recognized the union, rehired 
strikers, raised wages 5¢ per hour, and set a minimum wage of 35¢ per 
hour.
Organizing successes at other parts plants
The union’s Auto-Lite victory in June 1934 came at a critical time 
for the U.S. labor movement, which was split between the American 
Federation	of	Labor’s	(AFL)	entrenched	craft-based	unions	and	advo-
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cates of industry-wide unions for autoworkers and other mass produc-
tion	industries.	The	AFL	chartered	the	United	Automobile	Workers	of	
America in 1935 but permitted it to try to organize only workers on the 
fina 	assembly	lines,	excluding	parts	makers	and	other	workers	at	fina 	
assembly plants such as cleaners. The union was suspended a year later 
when	members	refused	to	accept	the	AFL’s	choice	of	leadership.
The	unwillingness	of	the	AFL’s	craft-based	unions	to	vigorously	or-
ganize unskilled mass production workers led disaffected UAW mem-
bers and other unions to create the Committee of Industrial Organiza-
tions (CIO) in 1935. The initial purpose of the CIO was to work for 
AFL	acceptance	of	industrial	unionism,	but	when	the	AFL	suspended	
the UAW and nine other unions in 1936, CIO leaders transformed the 
organization into an independent federation, which was renamed Con-
gress	of	Industrial	Organizations	in	1938.	The	CIO	and	AFL	remained	
rival organizations until merging in 1955.
Unable to make inroads at the Detroit 3, the UAW turned next to 
organizing	suppliers.	Its	firs 	use	of	the	sit-down	strike	came	at	a	Ben-
dix brake plant in South Bend, Indiana, beginning November 17, 1936. 
The plant was occupied by 1,500 of the 2,600 workers to forestall an 
attempted lockout—the company had ordered all workers to assemble 
outside the plant. After a nine-day strike, the company agreed to honor 
a	contract	negotiated	with	the	union	fiv 	months	earlier.
The day after settling at Bendix, the UAW brought the sit-down tac-
tic	to	Detroit	supplier	plants.	First,	Midland	Steel’s	1,200	Detroit-area	
production workers went on strike on November 27, 1936, to demand 
union recognition, a wage increase, and an end to piecework. The strike 
ended December 4, when Midland agreed to all demands. Six days later, 
500 of Kelsey-Hayes’s 5,000 workers occupied the company’s Detroit 
factory to protest a line speedup. The company settled on December 24, 
offering higher wages and overtime pay, seniority protection, and a 20 
percent reduction in the line’s speed.
The Midland and Kelsey strikes were both settled on terms favor-
able to the union in large measure because of pressure on the companies 










cember	30;	 to	 the	Chevrolet	 transmission	and	Guide	Lamp	plants	 in	
Norwood, Ohio, and Anderson, Indiana, respectively, on December 31; 
to the Chevrolet transmission plant in Toledo on January 4; and to the 
Fisher	Body	plant	 in	 Janesville,	Wisconsin,	on	 January	5.	Only	 then	
did	the	strike	finall 	reach	assembly	plants,	beginning	with	Chevrolet’s	
Janesville plant on January 5 and Cadillac’s Detroit plant on January 7. 
Strikes	at	parts	plants	produced	enough	shortages	to	force	GM	to	shut	
production	everywhere	until	the	strike	was	settled	on	February	11.
GM’s	 recognition	of	 the	UAW	 in	1937	was	 followed	quickly	by	
agreements at Chrysler, as well as at smaller independents such as Hud-
son, Packard, and Studebaker. Several large parts makers also reached 
an agreement with the UAW, including Bohn Aluminum, Briggs Body, 
Motor Products, Murray Body, Timken-Detroit Axle, and L.A. Young 
Spring	&	Wire.	Ford	held	out	until	1941.	By	the	time	the	United	States	
entered World War II, the UAW had successfully organized nearly the 
entire	motor	vehicle	industry,	both	fina 	assembly	and	parts.
The URW used a somewhat different form of the sit-down strike in 
the Akron tire plants. Hundreds of “quickie” sit-down strikes occurred 
in the tire plants beginning in 1934, ranging from a few minutes to a 




plants held out until 1941. 
Pattern bargaining
With most automotive production workers in a union, and with most 
production in the hands of only three companies, the motor vehicle in-
dustry in the years after World War II adopted a distinctive form of ne-
gotiations called pattern bargaining. Pattern bargaining was instrumen-
tal in securing high wages for Detroit 3 automotive workers compared 
to production workers in other manufacturing sectors. 
UAW contracts with the Detroit 3 expired on the same date. Shortly 
before the expiration, the union would select one of the companies for 
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intense negotiations. After the union and the targeted company reached 
an agreement, the pattern set in that contract became the basis for nego-
tiating with the other two carmakers. The contract covered workers in 
the	Detroit	3	parts	plants	as	well	as	fina 	assembly	plants.
The UAW selected as its target the company considered most likely 
to accede to the union’s principal demand. In general, the UAW targeted 
Ford	when	 it	 sought	 acceptance	of	 innovative	 concepts,	 such	 as	 an-
nual	improvement	factor	(AIF),	cost	of	living	adjustment	(COLA),	and	
supplemental	unemployment	benefit 	 (SUB).	When	 its	principal	goal	
was	a	higher	wage	rate,	the	UAW	targeted	GM—known	as	“Generous	
Motors” in those days. Chrysler was targeted if preliminary negotia-
tions indicated that it would balk at proposals accepted by its two larger 
competitors.
The UAW also targeted the company considered most vulnerable 
to a strike for competitive reasons. If an agreement were not reached, 
the union struck only that company, leaving the other two companies 
to continue operating at full capacity. The targeted company was pres-
sured to settle the strike quickly because customers were buying cars 
from the other two companies. Instead of annual contracts, the UAW 
agreed to sign multiyear contracts so that the companies could plan 
investment and product development over several years free from the 
uncertainty of possible work stoppages. The typical length was three 
years during the second half of the twentieth century and four years into 
the	twenty-firs 	century.
Pattern bargaining spilled over to the other auto-related unions after 
World War II. The URW negotiated the same wage increase with all 
four major tire companies beginning in 1946, rather than continue to 
bargain on an individual plant and company basis. U.S. Rubber signed 
a master agreement that applied uniformly to all 19 of its plants in 1947, 
and the other three large tire makers followed suit within a year.
In 1960, when pattern bargaining was new, Detroit 3 wages were 




ing workers (McAlinden 2007). 
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STATE OF THE UNION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With the precipitous decline in employment at the Detroit 3, the 
UAW has recognized that its future viability depends on organizing in-
dependent parts suppliers. A sign of its importance was the appointment 
for	the	firs 	time	of	a	vice	president	with	responsibility	for	organizing	
and representing supplier plants. In the past, the UAW had allocated the 
assignment	to	lower	level	officials
Subsequently the 2003 national agreement stated that the Detroit 
3 would inform their suppliers of their “positive and constructive re-
lationship” with the UAW and of their belief that all employers should 
respect the right of employees to seek union representation (Hudson 
2003). All things being equal, the Detroit 3 would award contracts to 
union suppliers, but that left the UAW with the challenge of actually 
demonstrating that productivity in the union plant was comparable to 
that of a nonunion competitor. Achieving competitive productivity in a 
union plant inevitably meant reducing wages, reducing workforce, or 
reducing both. 
Some Recent Organizing Successes
The UAW lacked the resources to attempt to organize several thou-
sand	parts	 suppliers.	So	 it	 identifie 	 the	group	of	 suppliers	with	 the	
brightest organizing prospects. This turned out to be Tier 1 interior parts 
producers. 
Organizing interior suppliers





they cannot run away from a union organizing campaign.
Second, wages in the interior sector have been near the average 
for all suppliers. Average hourly wages for production workers ranged 
from	a	high	of	$18.14	at	engine	parts	suppliers	to	a	low	of	$12.93	at	
stamping suppliers in 2003, a gap of 40 percent, according to the Center 
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for Automotive Research. Between the two, workers earned an average 
of	$14.07	at	electrical	parts	suppliers,	$14.15	at	chassis	parts	suppliers,	
and	$16.51	at	interior	parts	suppliers	(McAlinden	2004,	p.	41).	The	best	
prospects for expanding union membership seemed to be among work-
ers in the middle categories. 
The most important reason for targeting interior suppliers was the 
extreme consolidation of production at three very large suppliers—JCI, 
Lear, and Magna—incidentally, each with very different labor relations 
histories. As the UAW began to target the interior sector, nearly all of 
Lear’s production workers were union members in 2000, compared to 
only 2 percent at Magna and about half at JCI. The UAW was able to 
leverage its strong position at Lear to increase representation at JCI and 
Magna.
Lear’s high unionization rate stemmed in part from its acquisition 
during	the	1990s	of	Ford	and	GM	seating	plants	that	already	had	UAW	
representation. Subsequently Lear proactively decided to turn this leg-
acy of labor relations into a strategic asset. The UAW was invited to 
organize Lear’s nonunion plants, most notably the 5,000 production 
workers making headliners and instrument panels at plants acquired 
from UT Automotive in 1999. In part because of its employee relations, 
Lear was judged the most admired company in the United States in 
the motor vehicle parts industry in Fortune magazine’s 2004 survey of 
corporate reputation. 
At JCI, the UAW represented workers at 20 of its 32 plants in 2004, 
compared	with	only	10	of	28	plants	a	decade	earlier.	Gains	were	made	
in part at plants that JCI had acquired from Chrysler and in part through 
successful	 organizing	 campaigns.	The	 focus	 of	 conflic 	 between	 the	






was averted when JCI agreed to recognize the union in 1996 at the two 
plants, as well as at a third one in Strongville, Ohio, without an elec-
tion, after the UAW had collected enough cards to force an election at 
Oberlin. Two years later the JCI plants in Oberlin and Plymouth were 
struck. The workers demanded wages comparable to those paid by Lear 
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to its UAW-represented workers. The strike could have quickly brought 
Ford’s	production	of	 the	Econoline	and	Expedition	 to	a	standstill.	 In	
turn,	JCI	offered	 to	supply	Ford	with	seats	 from	 its	nonunion	plants,	
but	Ford	refused.	Instead,	Ford	moved	 to	obtain	seats	from	Lear	and	
Visteon.	Ford’s	move	forced	JCI	to	the	bargaining	table,	and	the	strike	
was settled on terms comparable to those at Lear.
JCI management has since reached the conclusion that antiunion 
activities and practices viewed as unfair by the union were not in the 
company’s strategic interest in attracting and retaining Detroit 3 busi-
ness. Consequently, in 2002 JCI gave the UAW an opportunity to orga-
nize 8,000 workers at the company’s 26 plants that supplied the Detroit 
3. Not all JCI plants immediately adopted more conciliatory attitudes. 
At three plants where the union had been recognized—Earth City, Mis-
souri; Shreveport, Louisiana; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma—con-
tracts were signed in 2002 only after a two-day strike. 
The UAW has secured JCI’s tacit agreement not to oppose organiz-
ing efforts at plants supplying the Detroit 3, and the union in turn has 
tacitly agreed not to attempt to organize JCI plants supplying interna-
tional carmakers. Although it has consistently trailed competitor Lear 
in total world and North American sales, JCI has become the dominant 
supplier of seats to Japanese transplants in the United States, one of the 
few U.S.-owned suppliers to achieve such a market position.
Japanese-owned assembly plants have been eager to have nonunion 
seat suppliers because of close links between the two: seats are put to-
gether	very	close	to	the	fina 	assembly	plant	and	are	delivered	frequent-
ly. A unionized seat plant could encourage organizing activities at other 
nearby	 suppliers,	not	 to	mention	 the	 fina 	 assembly	plant	 itself.	The	
ability to keep the union away from foreign-owned assembly plants is a 
significan 	component	of	JCI’s	strong	market	position	with	them.
Unions have also made progress organizing the other leading seat 
supplier, Magna, which had staked out an especially aggressive anti-
union stance. Magna’s Windsor, Ontario, seat plant, a Chrysler sup-
plier,	became	the	company’s	firs 	plant	to	recognize	the	Canadian	Auto	
Workers (CAW) union in 2001. In 2007, Magna and the CAW agreed 
on a landmark deal that ended years of adversarial relations. The union 
could organize Magna’s Canadian plants in exchange for a no-strike 
pledge	and	more	flexibl 	work	rules	(Sherefkin	and	Barkholz	2007a).
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In the United States, Magna and the UAW negotiated an arrange-
ment similar to the one in Canada (Sherefkin and Barkholz 2007b). As 
Magna became Chrysler’s leading seat maker and largest overall sup-
plier, union recognition was inevitable given the attitudes of competi-
tors Lear and JCI. 
As a result of the UAW’s organizing success at JCI and Magna, 
wages	for	seat	production	workers	coalesced	in	the	firs 	decade	of	the	
twenty-firs 	century	at	about	$17	per	hour,	about	$30	 including	ben-
efits 	Given	 the	 extreme	demand	 for	 just-in-time	delivery	 and	 sector	
consolidation, an orderly labor market proved especially critical in the 
rationalization of the interior sector of the supplier industry.
Other UAW organizing successes
Beyond seats, UAW organizing was also directed at selected chassis 
and	powertrain	suppliers.	The	principal	successes	in	the	firs 	few	years	
of	the	twenty-firs 	century	came	at	Dana	and	Eagle-Picher.
Toledo-based Dana, initially known as Spicer Axle, was one of the 
firs 	parts	suppliers	to	be	organized	during	the	early	1930s,	along	with	
Auto-Lite.	The	company	was	also	one	of	the	firs 	to	negotiate	a	master	
agreement with the UAW, in 1955. The UAW negotiated a neutrality 
letter with Dana in the late 1970s stating that the supplier would not 
communicate to its workers in an anti-UAW manner during organizing 
drives.
Nonetheless, Dana adopted aggressive antiunion policies. UAW-
represented plants were closed and new nonunion ones were built, pri-
marily in the South. Workers were threatened with job loss, questioned 
about voting intentions, forced to walk past antiunion management to 
get to work, and prohibited from wearing prounion shirts while the 
company supplied opponents with antiunion ones. Dana plant manag-
ers understood that they would lose their jobs if the union got in. The 
UAW	 took	Dana	 to	arbitration	 fiv 	 times	 for	violating	 the	neutrality	
agreement	and	won	each	time.	Into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	only	30	of	
Dana’s 200 U.S. facilities were unionized, only 9 by the UAW. 
The turning point in relations between Dana and the UAW came at 
a frame plant in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, the company’s largest and 
possibly	most	profitabl 	plant.	After	workers	 rejected	 the	union	by	a	
vote of 670 to 320 in 2002, and two earlier campaigns failed to reach 
the voting stage, the UAW accused Dana management of intimidation 
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and	 file 	grievances	with	 the	National	Labor	Relations	Board.	Cards	
were signed by 61 percent of Elizabethtown’s production workers ask-
ing for another vote.
Stepping into the picture at this critical juncture was Elizabeth-
town’s	 customer,	Ford.	Elizabethtown	was	 supplying	 frames	 for	 the	
Explorer	sport	utility,	assembled	at	nearby	Louisville,	and	Ford	wanted	
no disruption in production of what was then a very popular—and prof-
itable—model. Around the same time Dana lost its Jeep axle contract, 
the historic core of its business. The loss of that business was poignant 
because both Dana’s headquarters and the Jeep assembly plant were 
based in Toledo. 
Dana was then also facing a hostile takeover by ArvinMeritor. In 
its axle business Dana’s major competitor was Eaton Corp., a company 
with an impeccable prounion stance. All Eaton plants had been union-
ized	between	1937	and	1941.	Founder	 J.O.	Eaton,	a	New	Deal	 sup-
porter, raised wages of all employees by between 20 and 35 percent in 
1933 in the depth of the Depression. Eaton declared that the subsistence 
income	for	a	family	of	four	was	$25	a	week,	and	anyone	earning	less	
would receive the difference as a loan. Eaton reasoned that the com-




its long-standing antiunion stance in 2003. The company and union 




Only a few hours after announcing the agreement, it was explained 
to workers at Elizabethtown by Dana managers and Bob King, then 
UAW	vice	president	in	charge	of	organizing	suppliers.	This	was	the	firs 	
time	a	union	officia 	had	been	allowed	inside	the	plant.	Dana	recognized	
the union at Elizabethtown on the basis of a majority of workers having 
already signed cards requesting an election—normally only 30 percent 
of workers need to sign cards to hold an election. Dana also agreed to 
recognize the union at other Detroit 3 supplier plants on the same basis, 
beginning	with	 two	plants	 in	Virginia,	Buena	Vista	 and	Bristol.	The	
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company had been charged with 36 violations of federal law after the 
union lost an election by eight votes at Bristol in 2002. 
The UAW also made organizing gains at Eagle Picher, a Cincinnati-
based supplier of gaskets and dampers. The union had only 17 members 
at Eagle Picher in 1999, at a gasket plant in Inkster, Michigan, but it was 
able to organize another 1,200 workers at three plants in 2000 and 2001. 
The UAW won an election at Eagle Picher’s Hillsdale, Michigan, plant 
in 2000, after two previous failures in 1992 and 1998. The National 
Labor Relations Board had overturned the 1999 election and ordered 





cant because it represented the third major organizing victory in that 
northwestern Michigan community far from the union’s core support in 
southeastern Michigan. The other two were a Tower Automotive plant 
and a Lear plant acquired from United Technologies Automotive. In 
addition to Traverse City, the UAW also organized a Tower plant in 
Clinton Township, Michigan. 
A Time to Fold
Poker players know that there is a time to hold and a time to fold. 
For	the	UAW,	the	time	to	fold	came	early	in	the	twenty-firs 	century,	
as the carmaker-owned parts plants could not keep up with competi-
tion from independent parts producers. At the heart of the issue was 
the fact that the carmakers paid workers in their parts plants accord-
ing to the assembly wage schedule. As the competitive position of the 
Detroit 3 continued to erode rather quickly in the late 1990s, issues 
like the uncompetitive nature of in-house parts operations came to the 
forefront.	Continuing	to	pay	$70	an	hour	in	wages	and	benefit 	for	work	
that	could	be	done	by	competing	unionized	suppliers	for	$20	an	hour	
was not sustainable. 
That	issue	firs 	came	to	a	head	at	a	former	Chrysler	drivetrain	parts	
plant in New Castle, Indiana. The New Castle plant was one of the 
oldest in the country, having opened in 1907 as a Maxwell-Briscoe as-
sembly plant. When Walter Chrysler acquired Maxwell-Briscoe in 1925 
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and renamed the company after himself, New Castle was one of six 
original	facilities.	Rather	 than	fina 	assembly,	Chrysler	used	 the	New	
Castle plant to make drivetrain parts.
Metaldyne
When Chrysler put several of its parts plants up for sale, the future 
of the New Castle one was grim. Metaldyne agreed to purchase a 60 
percent stake in the plant and to run it for one year, 2003, to see if it 
could	be	made	profitable 	Metaldyne	was	willing	to	keep	the	union	in	
the	plant	but	said	it	couldn’t	run	it	profitabl 	unless	a	new	labor	contract	
was negotiated. The union was faced with a stark choice: keep the plant 
open, with fewer jobs at lower wages, or let the plant close. 
Under Metaldyne’s management, a new contract was successfully 
negotiated with the UAW. According to the agreement, average hourly 
wages	were	reduced	from	$26	to	$16,	and	new	hires	started	at	a	lower	
wage	 tier	of	$12	an	hour.	The	contract	also	 introduced	 flexibl 	work	
rules (Sherefkin 2002b). The 1,200 Chrysler employees at New Castle 
were given three choices: early retirement, transfer to Chrysler plants in 
other cities, or work for Metaldyne at lower wages. Those remaining at 
Metaldyne	with	at	least	10	years’	service	would	receive	a	$10,000	bo-
nus for each year of service. Only 200 stayed. Subsequently Metaldyne 
hired 550 new workers for the plant. 
Metaldyne has considered the New Castle plant to be a success. In 
the	 firs 	year,	sales	 increased	 from	$400	million	 to	$500	million	and	
productivity increased 30 percent. The UAW has also considered the 
Metaldyne story a success, as it has signaled that it would be willing to 
entertain similar restructuring at other endangered parts plants. 





$12.50	 for	new	ones	 (Armstrong	2004d).	However,	 this	was	of	 little	
relevance in the short run because few new hires were anticipated for 
many years. The new contract represented the erosion of a wage struc-
ture that had become unsustainable.




company agreed not to close any plants during the four-year term of 
the contract. It had wanted to close a forge plant in Detroit and an axle 
plant	 in	Buffalo.	To	gain	 ratificatio 	of	 the	 contract,	American	Axle	
threw	 in	a	signing	bonus	of	$5,000	plus	2	percent	of	wages	for	each	
worker,	as	well	as	$1,000	annual	Christmas	bonuses.	In	2008,	the	UAW	
struck American Axle again. This strike was over the company’s intent 
to	substantially	cut	wages	and	benefits 	It	severely	disrupted	its	princi-
pal	customer,	GM.	
By far, however, the greatest challenge that the UAW faced in sal-
vaging	 former	Detroit	3	parts	plants	 came	with	Visteon	 and	Delphi.	
When it was spun off in 1999, Delphi became the largest supplier in 
the	United	States	and	 in	 the	world,	 the	 largest	 supplier	 for	GM,	and	
the	 largest	unionized	 supplier.	Similarly,	Visteon	was	 turned	 into	 an	
independent	company	by	Ford	in	2000.	It	instantly	became	the	second-
largest	supplier	in	the	United	States	and	in	the	world,	as	well	as	Ford’s	
largest supplier. Likewise, it also instantly became the second-larg-
est	unionized	supplier.	The	UAW	represented	50	percent	of	Visteon’s	
24,000 workers and 90 percent of Delphi’s 44,000 workers, and other 
unions represented the rest.
However,	Delphi	and	Visteon	 found	 themselves	paying	Detroit	3	
wages while trying to compete for business with suppliers—unionized 
and nonunion—paying much lower wages. This was clearly an unsus-
tainable	position	for	Delphi	and	Visteon,	and	the	UAW	understood	that.	
But instantly slashing wages in half to become competitive was just as 
untenable—even if the UAW permitted it, the company would face a 
crippling morale problem. 
The	UAW	agreed	 to	a	 two-tiered	wage	structure	at	Visteon,	with	
starting	wage	for	new	hires	set	at	$14,	compared	with	$24	for	former	
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employees	“assigned”	to	Visteon.	Still,	Visteon’s	high	costs	continued	
to	cause	“considerable	tensions	with	Ford”	(Sedgwick	2003).
The	 arrangement	 at	Ford	 lasted	 less	 than	 fiv 	years.	Having	 lost	
money	each	year	of	its	existence,	Visteon	faced	bankruptcy	unless	dras-
tic	action	was	taken.	As	a	result,	half	of	Visteon’s	plants	were	“given”	
back	 to	Ford	because	Visteon	 couldn’t	operate	 them	profitabl 	 even	
with	$15-an-hour	 labor.	Like	the	children’s	card	game	old	maid,	Vis-
teon	hoped	to	survive	by	having	Ford	extract	the	“losers”	from	its	hand.	
Visteon	would	drop	 from	 the	 second-	 to	 the	ninth-largest	 supplier	 in	
the United States by shedding half of its business and workforce (see 
Chapter 2).
The principal way to address Delphi’s uncompetitive wage bill in a 
manner agreeable to the UAW in the short term was a sharp reduction 
in the size of the workforce, accelerated through buyout programs. The 
number of UAW employees at Delphi declined from 22,000 in 2006 to 
4,000 in 2008 (International	Herald	Tribune 2007; USA	Today 2006). 
Wages	were	cut	from	about	$27	per	hour	to	between	$14	and	$18.50	
an hour. To make the cuts more palatable, 4,000 long-term employees 
received	a	bonus	of	$105,000	 to	be	paid	over	 three	years	 (Barkholtz	
2007c; Stoll and McCracken 2007). 
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
The	restructuring	of	the	auto	industry	in	the	twenty-firs 	century	has	




 Between 2000 and 2006, the number of production jobs in the U.S. 
motor vehicle industry declined from 948,000 to 751,000. Production 
jobs declined from 207,000 to 162,000 at assembly plants and from 
741,000 to 589,000 at parts plants. The vast majority of the 197,000 
production jobs lost between 2000 and 2006 were held by unionized 
workers. On the assembly side, the loss of 45,000 production work-
ers masked an even larger decline in union members; employment at 
Detroit 3 assembly plants was reduced by more than 45,000 between 
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2000 and 2006, whereas employment at nonunionized foreign-owned 
assembly plants actually increased. 
On the parts side, about 64,000 of the 153,000 decline in employ-
ment	between	2000	and	2006	came	at	Delphi	and	Visteon,	where	most	
production workers were represented by a union. The share of union-
ized workers among the other 89,000 production jobs lost at parts plants 
between 2000 and 2006 cannot be determined from our data, but we 
believe it to have been a substantial percentage.
Two issues have shaped the changing labor agreements in the auto 
supplier	sector	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century.	By	paying	the	relatively	
high	levels	of	wages	and	benefit 	typical	of	assembly	plants,	the	Detroit	
3’s parts operations had become woefully uncompetitive compared to 
their	domestic	competition.	Furthermore,	continuing	erosion	of	the	De-
troit 3’s market share in combination with the southern movement of 
assembly and parts plants has contributed to a transformation of labor 
relations in the U.S. auto sector.
The higher wage rates at Detroit 3 parts plants have dominated the 
drive for increased outsourcing to independent suppliers. Contracts ne-
gotiated in unionized supplier plants were substantially lower than those 
in the Detroit 3 plants. In 2002 the average hourly wage in the UAW 
contract	with	25	suppliers	covering	19,379	workers	was	$15.76,	only	3	
percent higher than the average for all U.S. manufacturing (McAlinden 
2004). Wages paid in nonunion plants have been even lower.
A key to restructuring labor relations has been the southern move-
ment of assembly and parts plants. Auto alley has become the heart 
of U.S. motor vehicle production, its southern end having experi-
enced rapid growth as most new assembly plants and parts plants have 
been opened there. The attraction of the South has been its nonunion 
environment. 
As the downward spiral of market share loss and job loss ran its 
course, inevitably the Detroit 3 and unions have blamed each other. 
Companies	have	blamed	excessive	wage	and	benefi 	obligations,	and	
unions have blamed poor management and products. Corporate exec-
utives have reassured jittery shareholders that investments would be 
protected, while democratically elected union leaders have reassured 
jittery members that jobs would be protected. Neither could deliver on 
their promises.
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The precipitous decline in auto union representation showed no 
signs	of	 slowing	 in	 the	early	 twenty-firs 	century.	The	percentage	of	
union	workers	in	the	U.S.	auto	industry	in	the	twenty-firs 	century	was	
the lowest since the 1930s. At the current rate of decline, in a quarter 
century, the union would no longer have any auto workers to represent. 
Reversing that trend is the main challenge of automotive unions going 
forward.
The UAW leadership has held many discreet meetings with the 
Detroit	3,	parts	makers,	government	officials 	and	even	Toyota.	Ask-
ing current members to choose between unemployment and wage cuts 
has	been	politically	 impossible	for	UAW	 leadership,	a	surefir 	recipe	
for	being	voted	out	of	office 	Instead,	 the	UAW	has	negotiated	 lower	
wages and employment levels for the future while protecting the status 
of current members. When current employees retire, they are either not 
replaced or are replaced by new employees at lower wage rates. 
In moments of detached analysis, the UAW and the Detroit 3 rec-
ognize that the survival of one depends on the survival of the other. 
Yet	after	nearly	a	century	of	bitter	conflic 	between	them,	the	biggest	
challenge facing both parties is bringing themselves to acknowledge 
explicitly that they must transform the existing antagonist labor–man-
agement paradigm.4 The 2007 labor agreement between the UAW and 
the Detroit 3 offered promise of such a transformation. It improved the 
competitiveness of the Detroit 3 by establishing a lower wage struc-
ture and independent trusts to manage retiree health care liabilities. The 
agreement seemed based on a recognition by both the UAW and the 
Detroit 3 that their fates are inseparably linked (Howes 2007b; Simon 
2007a).
Notes
 1. Delphi chairman and CEO Robert S. Miller, quoted in The	 Washington	 Post	
(2005). 
 2. The lower number is from Congressional testimony presented in March 2007 by 
UAW	president	Ron	Gettelfinge .	The	higher	number	is	from	an	unnamed	UAW	
source in Shepardson (2007). 
	 3.	 The	rationale	was	that	a	growing	Visteon	would	get	labor	cost	relief	by	being	able	
to hire new workers at substantially lower wages.





The Endangered U.S. Supplier
On	paper,	 the	U.S.	auto	 industry	 looks	set	 to	prosper	 in	 the	 twenty-firs 	
century. New vehicle sales in the United States remained at historically high 
levels	through	the	1990s	and	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twenty-firs 	century.	Despite	
globalization of the industry, most vehicles sold in the United States in the early 
twenty-firs 	century	were	still	being	assembled	in	the	United	States	from	parts	
made mostly in the United States.
The supplier sector of the industry is expected to prosper as well. As this 
book has shown, suppliers are responsible for adding more than two-thirds of 
the value added to cars. And the supplier’s share is expected to increase. Hav-
ing been given more responsibility by carmakers, suppliers have evolved into 
providers of complex manufacturing tasks based on their own research and 
development.
Despite all of these favorable trends, U.S.-owned parts suppliers face an 
uncertain future. The number of U.S.-based Tier 1 suppliers is declining rapidly. 
As discussed in this section of the book, two factors account for this decline. 
First,	the	U.S.	auto	parts	industry	has	seen	an	increase	in	international	com-
petition, which manifests itself through an increase in both the percentage of 
imported parts as well as the number of U.S.-based suppliers owned by foreign 
companies. As a result, less than one-half of the parts in vehicles assembled 
in the United States were made in the United States by U.S. companies in the 
firs 	decade	of	 the	 twenty-firs 	century.	The	endangered	 status	of	U.S.	parts	
makers can also be attributed to decisions by vehicle assemblers to streamline 
their	supply	chains	by	sharply	reducing	their	numbers	of	Tier	1	suppliers.	GM	
reduced	its	Tier	1	suppliers	from	3,700	in	2001	to	3,200	in	2005,	and	Ford	from	
2,500 to 800. The international carmakers have set up assembly operations in 
the United States with only a few hundred Tier 1 suppliers. 
Even more vulnerable have been smaller Tier 2 suppliers, as surviving Tier 
1	suppliers	have	reduced	the	number	of	their	own	suppliers	in	turn.	Valeo	went	





The Rising Tide of Imports
Just	 about	 all	 electronic	 subcomponents	 now	 originate	 in	
China	or	Korea	or	Singapore	.	.	.	You	are	more	aware	and	
you	buy	better	when	you	are	where	the	action	is.1
The national origin of the parts installed on vehicles assembled in 
the United States can be divided into three portions: parts made in the 
United States at factories owned by U.S.-based companies, parts made 
in the United States in foreign-owned factories, and parts imported 
from other countries. This chapter examines the magnitude of imports 
and	exports,	the	specifi 	types	of	parts	that	are	being	imported	into	and	
out of the United States, and the countries of origin and destination. 
Imported parts captured one-fourth of the U.S. new vehicle mar-
ket	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century,	and	foreign-owned	factories	in	the	
United States another one-fourth. That left U.S.-owned factories in the 
United States with the remaining one-half. But with the domestic share 
declining by several percent per year, the three sources were positioned 
to hold approximately equal shares of the market by 2010.
At the same time, some of the parts produced in U.S. plants have 
been exported to other countries. Exports and imports expanded at about 
the same level during the 1990s, but after 2000, imports of parts into the 
United States continued to increase rapidly whereas exports stagnated. 
As	a	result,	the	United	States	opened	up	a	substantial	trade	defici 	in	car	
parts	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.
The changing fortunes of carmakers in the United States have been 
responsible for the widening trade gap. The principal exporters have 
been	the	Detroit	3	carmakers,	which	ship	parts	to	their	fina 	assembly	
plants in Canada and Mexico. As the Detroit 3 have lost market share, 
their assembly plants in these countries have needed fewer U.S.-made 
parts.
Meanwhile, foreign-owned carmakers have been meeting increased 
demand for their vehicles primarily through assembling more vehicles 
in the United States. Although a growing share of their parts has come 
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from U.S. suppliers, foreign-owned carmakers continue to import a 
higher	percentage	of	parts	 than	 the	Detroit	3	 (Figure	13.1).	For	 their	
part, the Detroit 3 have relied more on foreign-made parts to reduce 
their costs as they try to compete with the foreign-based carmakers 
(Klier and Rubenstein 2007).
NATIONALITY OF LARGEST SUPPLIERS
Consumers have long since recognized the blurred national origin 
of	vehicles	sold	in	the	United	States.	Foreign-owned	companies	have	
been	selling	some	vehicles	classifie 	by	the	U.S.	government	as	foreign	
and	 some	classifie 	as	made	 in	 the	United	States.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
some	of	 the	vehicles	 that	Chrysler,	Ford,	and	GM	 sell	 in	 the	United	
States	are	classifie 	as	domestic,	but	they	have	actually	been	assembled	
in Canada and Mexico. 
Figure 13.1  Production-Weighted Domestic Content of Light Vehicles
SOURCE:	Adapted	by	authors	from	the	National	Highway	and	Traffi 	Safety	Adminis-
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Distinguishing between U.S. and foreign origins has in some re-
spects	been	easier	for	parts	than	for	finishe 	vehicles.	Ultimately,	each	
individual part has been manufactured either in the United States or in 
another country, whereas every assembled vehicle is a blend of thou-
sands of parts made in many countries. 
In reality, classifying national origin of parts is a complex task be-
cause of the sheer magnitude of individual parts and companies that 
must be tracked and because of limitations on the sources of data. Each 
of the thousands of individual parts in a motor vehicle could be made 
by a U.S.-owned company in a factory it operates in the United States 
or in a factory it operates abroad, or it may be made by a foreign-owned 
company either in the United States or abroad.
Canadian analyst Dennis DesRosiers has estimated that 41 percent 
of parts used in the United States in 2005 for both original equipment 
and aftermarket were made in the United States by U.S.-owned sup-
pliers, 30 percent were made in the United States by foreign-owned 
companies, and 29 percent were imported into the United States. The 
share	held	by	U.S.-owned	firm 	has	declined	rapidly,	according	to	Des-
Rosiers.	In	1997,	68	percent	of	parts	came	from	U.S.-owned	firms 	12	
percent from foreign-owned plants in the United States, and 20 percent 
from abroad. Thus, the share of parts made in the United States by U.S.-
owned	firm 	was	declining	by	about	3.5	percent	per	year	in	the	early	
twenty-firs 	century	(DesRosiers	2006).
The changing nationality of the largest suppliers operating in the 
United	States	can	be	 tracked.	 In	1994,	 the	 firs 	year	 that	Automotive	
News listed the 150 largest suppliers of original equipment in North 
America, 108 of them, or 72 percent, were U.S.-owned companies. 
These 108 companies accounted for 83 percent of the combined sales 
of the 150 largest suppliers. Little more than a decade later, in 2006, 
only	59	U.S.-owned	 suppliers	 remained	among	 the	150	 largest.	For-
eign-owned companies included in the top-150 list more than doubled 
from 42 to 91, and their share of sales increased from 18 percent to 48 
percent	(Table	13.1).	Seventy-three	of	the	108	U.S.-owned	firm 	among	
the top 150 in 1994 disappeared during the next decade. Thirty-three 
stayed in business but were no longer in the top 150, and four were 
removed	following	changes	 in	 the	definitio 	for	 inclusion	on	 the	 list.	
Thirty-six of the 73 were sold to competitors, including 21 U.S.-owned 
suppliers	and	15	foreign	ones.	British	companies	bought	fiv 	of	them,	
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Canadian	and	German	three	each,	Swedish	two,	and	French	and	Japa-
nese one each. 
The dramatic increase in Japanese representation among the largest 
suppliers from 13 to 38 thus did not result from acquiring American 
competitors. Instead, new Japanese companies entered the U.S. market 
during the decade, especially to serve the rapidly growing electronics 
sector.
Table 13.1  Top 150 Parts Suppliers by Nationality and Sales
Number	of	firm
North American OEM 
sales	($,	billions)





Canada 4 8 2.6 16.5
China 1 0.2
France 3 6 1.6 5.8
Germany 10 18 5.4 22.6
Germany/Japan	JV 1 2 0.5 0.9
Italy 2 0.8
Japan 13 38 7.2 36.5
Japan/U.S.	JV 1 0.2
Korea 1 0.2





United Kingdom 4 5 1.3 3.5
United States 108 59 96.4 101.2
Total 150 150 116.2 193.9
NOTE:	JV	denotes	joint	venture.
SOURCE: Automotive	News (1995, 2007a).
The Rising Tide of Imports   305
WHICH TYPES OF PARTS ARE IMPORTED?
The widespread belief in Detroit is that most imports are price- 
sensitive generic parts that can only be produced competitively in low-
wage countries. “The giant sucking noise in Detroit is the sound of 
parts production being pulled into Mexico, or China”—or words to that 
effect	 reflec 	American	perceptions.	 In	 reality,	a	 large	and	 increasing	
share	of	imports	arriving	at	U.S.	fina 	assembly	plants	actually	consists	
of engines and transmissions made by highly skilled workers in wealthy 
countries like Canada and Japan.
Sources of Trade Data
Every good that moves in and out of the United States, as well as 
other leading trading countries, is assigned a four-digit Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) number by the World 
Customs Organization in Brussels. “Parts and accessories of motor ve-
hicles” has been assigned HS code 8708, but car parts are scattered 
among two dozen other four-digit codes as well, such as 9401 for vehi-
cle	seats.	Customs	official 	in	participating	countries	use	the	HS	code	to	
determine the duties, taxes, and regulations that apply to each imported 
and exported good.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in the Department 
of Homeland Security is responsible for setting and reporting the value 
of each good imported into the United States. The Customs Bureau 
generally sets the value of an imported good as the price paid for the 
merchandise minus import duties, freight, insurance, and other charges 
associated with the transfer.
The World Customs Organization subdivides four-digit HS codes 
into six-digit codes that are also standardized around the world. Code 
8708, for example, is divided into 15 six-digit codes, such as 870829 
for body parts. Individual countries are permitted to create their own 
eight- and 10-digit codes, as long as the more detailed levels are consis-
tent with the internationally mandated six-digit HS code. In the United 
States, the 1988 Trade Act created the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS), 
which authorized eight-digit and 10-digit codes for imports.
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The International Trade Commission, an independent quasi-judicial 
federal agency, maintains and publishes the HTS for U.S. imports. The 
Trade Commission also investigates allegations of unfair trade practic-
es, provides legal and technical assistance concerning remedies avail-
able under U.S. trade laws, forecasts impacts of proposed tariff and 
duty	changes	on	specifi 	products,	and	maintains	an	extensive	library	
of trade-related information.
Ninety-one eight-digit HTS codes have covered motor-vehicle 
parts. The top four codes together accounted for almost one-third of the 
value of all parts imported into the United States in 2006, and the top 10 
codes together more than one-half. Each of the top four was responsible 
for at least 5 percent of all parts imports, and each of the top 10 for at 
least 3 percent.
These	four	codes	each	exceeded	$4	billion	in	imports	in	2006:
 1) 87082950 Parts and accessories of bodies for motor vehicles. 
	 2)	 87089980	 Parts	and	accessories	not	elsewhere	classified
 3) 85443000 Insulated ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets 
of a kind used in vehicles, aircraft, or ships.
 4) 84073448 Spark-ignition reciprocating piston engines for ve-
hicles, cylinder capacity over 2000 cc.
Another	six	codes	exceeded	$2	billion	in	imports	2006:
 1) 87084020 Parts and accessories of motor vehicles—gear 
boxes.
 2) 87089967 Parts and accessories for powertrains not elsewhere 
classified
 3) 40111010 New pneumatic radial tires, of rubber, of a kind 
used on motor cars.
 4) 94019010 Parts of seats of a kind used for motor vehicles not 
elsewhere	classified
	 5)	 84099150	 Parts	not	elsewhere	classifie 	used	solely	or	princi-
pally with spark-ignition internal-combustion piston engines.
 6) 87083950 Parts and accessories of motor vehicles—brakes 
and servo-brakes and parts thereof.
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While the Trade Commission has had the responsibility for coding 
imports into the United States, the Census Bureau has had the respon-
sibility for coding exports. Each exporter is required to report the value 




Not surprisingly, having two agencies publish trade data means that 
two	differing	sets	of	figure 	are	being	circulated.	The	Trade	Commis-
sion and Census Bureau may start with the same raw data, but they 
process the data in different ways that are consistent with the distinct 
missions of the two agencies. The Trade Commission is concerned with 
trade practices, whereas the Census Bureau is concerned with the role 
of trade in the overall U.S. economy. The Trade Commission Web site 
has	a	 translation	wizard	 to	reconcile	HTS	and	NAICS	codes.	For	ex-
ample, NAICS 336340, which covers steering and suspension compo-
nents,	corresponds	to	a	combination	of	fiv 	HTS	codes:	87088030	for	
McPherson struts; 87088045 for shock absorbers; 887089450 for steer-
ing wheels, columns, and boxes; 87089970 for other suspension parts; 
and 87089973 for other steering parts.
THE BIG PICTURE IN TRADE
According to the Trade Commission, the United States imported 
$87	billion	of	motor	vehicle	parts	in	2007.	These	imports	accounted	for	
27 percent of all shipments of vehicle components in the United States 
in 2002, according to the Census Bureau. Both the Trade Commission 
and the Census Bureau combined original equipment with aftermarket 
parts, so it was not possible to determine the precise share of each. In 
compiling the data we only counted original equipment parts destined 
for cars and light trucks wherever possible.
The value of all imported parts more than doubled in a decade, from 
$37	billion	in	1996	to	$87	billion	in	2007,	according	to	Trade	Commis-
sion	data	(Figure	13.2).	Through	most	of	the	1990s,	exports	of	motor	
vehicle parts were roughly equivalent to imports. Were it possible to 
split out original equipment from aftermarket parts in the trade data, 
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original equipment exports may have actually exceeded imports in the 
1990s.
Of the major vehicle systems—chassis, electronics, exterior, inte-
rior, and powertrain—the expectation may have been that electronics 
would have the largest amount of imports. Although the percentage of 
electronics imported is high (see Chapter 14), the system with by far the 



























SOURCE: International Trade Commission, dataweb, and authors’ calculations.
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Assembly plants in the United States installed about one-half mil-
lion engines manufactured in Canada and one-quarter million each 
made	in	Mexico,	Japan,	and	Germany	in	2006.	Ford	has	been	the	pri-
mary producer of engines in Canada for export to U.S. assembly plants. 
Chrysler has been especially reliant on importing engines into the Unit-
ed States from Mexico (see Chapter 3 for the location of the Detroit 3 
engine plants). 
The Japanese-owned assembly plants in the United States have 
received most of their engines from North America. Honda, Nissan, 
Subaru, and Toyota have all built engines in the United States although 
they	have	imported	about	one-fift 	or	their	engines	from	Japan	(Chap-
pell	2005f).	Other	Japanese	carmakers	imported	their	engines.	Germa-
ny became a major source of engines after BMW and Mercedes-Benz 
began assembly operations in the United States during the 1990s.
The increase in transmission imports came especially from Ja-
pan. Toyota receives about one-third of its transmissions from Aisin’s 
Durham, North Carolina, plant, one-third from its own Buffalo, West 
Virginia,	plant,	and	one-third	from	Japan.	“Transmissions	may	be	the	
greatest bottleneck facing Toyota” (Chappell 2005f). Nissan similarly 
received a minority of transmissions from its plant in Decherd, Tennes-
see, and the remainder from Japan. The smaller Japanese-owned U.S. 
assembly plants also imported transmissions from Japan. 
About	$6	billion	worth	of	engine	components	were	 imported	 for	
use in engines assembled in the United States. Leading components 
included	$660	million	worth	of	filters 	$660	million	worth	of	cylinder	
heads,	and	$330	million	worth	of	camshafts	and	crankshafts.
Table 13.2  Value of Imports and Exports by System, 1995 and 2006 
Imports	($,	billions) Exports	($,	billions)
System 1995 2006 1995 2006
Powertrain 10 28 8 13
Chassis 6 18 6 8
Body 4 12 8 11
Interior 2 5 1 2
Electrical 9 16 3 3
Other 6 8 9 11
SOURCE: International Trade Commission and authors’ calculations.
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Air-	and	fluid-handlin 	components	accounted	for	$5	billion	worth	
of imports in 2006. Passenger air conditioning, engine cooling, and fuel 
and exhaust line components each accounted for about one-third of the 
total. Import levels were relatively low for fuel and exhaust lines be-
cause they are especially fragile and must be packed in elaborate in-
dividual	coffinlik 	containers	that	are	expensive	to	transport	over	long	
distances.	Most	air-	and	fluid-handlin 	components	 imported	 into	 the	
United States originated in Mexico.
Chassis Imports
The chassis has been the system where imports have made the 
greatest percentage gains since the 1990s, primarily because the starting 
base was so low. Imports may hold a larger market share in electronics- 
related components, and powertrain imports may be more valuable, but 
the chassis has become the principal “battleground” system between 
domestic and imported sources. 
Chassis imports grew rapidly in this period because major compo-
nents in the system—especially brakes, steering, and suspension—un-
derwent	 “commodification. 	Engineering	 advances	have	 transformed	
these chassis components from high-cost products requiring skilled la-
bor and careful handling to low-cost, easy-to-ship “generic” items that 
are highly sensitive to labor-cost savings. 
Despite	commodification 	most	chassis	imports	originated	in	high-
wage countries in 2006. Canada was the leading foreign source for four 
of	 the	 fiv 	major	chassis	systems,	with	 the	exception	of	steering.	Ja-
pan was the leading supplier of steering and was second to Canada in 
brakes, tires, and suspension systems. 
Among major chassis components, tires had the highest levels of 
imports,	with	$5	billion	in	2006.	Brakes	had	$4	billion,	suspensions	had	
$3	billion,	and	steering,	wheels,	and	bearings	each	contributed	about	$2	
billion to the import total. 
 Brakes have been viewed as especially vulnerable to outsourcing 
from cheap-labor countries. Antilock brakes that once cost thousands 
of dollars can be produced for under a hundred. Most brake imports 
were components such as drums, discs, linings, and pads, rather than 
complete modules.
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Imports	of	wheels	have	increased	relatively	rapidly,	from	$0.5	bil-
lion	in	1995	to	more	than	$2	billion	in	2006.	The	wheel	has	been	the	
chassis component most susceptible to outsourcing from low-wage 
countries. Canada was the leading source of wheels until it was passed 
by Mexico in 2002. Wheel producers in China, as well as other low-cost 
Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, tripled their factory 
capacity	during	the	firs 	years	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	from	10	mil-
lion	to	30	million	wheels	per	year.	At	first 	wheels	from	Asia	were	des-
tined primarily for the aftermarket, but OEM sales were likely to grow 
as well (Chappell 2004e).
One of the oddities in the trade and census data was the import of 
$120	million	of	steering	components	from	the	tiny	country	of	the	Prin-
cipality of Liechtenstein. These components originate at ThyssenKrupp 
Automotive’s Presta subsidiary, which produced steering systems in 
Eschen. Exports from that plant have dominated Liechtenstein’s overall 
trade picture. 
Exterior Imports
The major exterior components, such as stamped body panels and 
bumpers, are among the least likely of all components to be imported. 
Bulky and fragile to ship, these major body components have tradition-
ally	been	produced	near	the	fina 	assembly	plants.	
Although large stamped body components are unlikely to be im-
ported, small body parts are. Mirrors, door handles, trim, and other 
body parts rank among the highest percentage of the U.S. market held 
by imports. In contrast with panels and bumpers, small body parts are 
easy to ship and regarded as akin to generic bin parts. Nearly all of the 
growth in the miscellaneous body parts market has been captured by 
imports. Canada was the source of one-half of the small miscellaneous 
body parts during the 1990s, but Mexico has been gaining share and 
had one-fourth of the market in 2006. 
Interior Imports
The	leading	interior	suppliers	rarely	import	finishe 	seats.	The	com-
bination of bulkiness and short delivery notice makes it especially im-
perative	for	seat	suppliers	to	locate	facilities	near	fina 	assembly	plants.	
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The interior manufacturers have not placed the same demand for prox-
imity on facilities producing seat parts, such as foam, frames, and cov-
ers. Along with electronics, plants producing seating parts have long 
been established in Mexico.
Lear has been one of the largest employers in Mexico, with 30,000 
employees in 26 plants, 14 of which were in the state of Chihuahua. 
Into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	Mexican	plants	have	been	responsible	for	
producing two-thirds of the parts used to put together seats in the Unit-
ed States. However, Mexico has been losing share to Canada, whose 
share increased from one-fourth to one-third of the market in the early 
twenty-firs 	century.
Electronics Imports
Import of electrical and electronics components increased relatively 
modestly,	from	$8	billion	in	1995	to	$16	billion	in	2006.	At	firs 	glance,	
this modest increase may seem counterintuitive because electronics 
content has been increasing rapidly, and it has long been regarded as the 
quintessential candidate for outsourcing from low-cost labor countries.
The relatively modest growth in electronics imports in the twenty-
firs 	century	is	partly	a	legacy	of	high	growth	during	the	1980s,	at	a	time	
when imports of others components were still limited. Wiring account-
ed for the largest share of electrical imports, and 80 percent of wiring 
imports came from Mexico, which became the dominant producer of 
wiring harnesses in the 1980s as the centerpiece of the maquiladora 
program (see below). Relatively labor intensive and easy to ship, wir-
ing	was	the	firs 	major	component	to	be	shipped	in	large	batches	from	
foreign production sites.
The four leading importers of wiring harnesses from Mexico in 
2003 were Delphi, Alcoa, Yazaki, and Lear. Delphi’s Alambrados y 
Circuitos Electricos, Packard, and Rio Bravo Electricos divisions em-
ployed 26,000 workers at 18 Mexican plants in 2003 according to ELM. 
Alcoa employed 18,000 in Mexico in 2003, according to ELM, half at 
its Arneses y Accesorios de Mexico subsidiary and half at Areneses de 
Juarez,	Cableados	del	Norte,	and	Maquilados	Fronterizos	joint	ventures	
with	Fujikura.	Yazaki	had	14,000	employees	 in	 two	Mexican	subsid-
iaries, Autopartes y Arneses de Mexico in Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo 
Casas and AXA in Saltillo. Lear Corporation’s Electrical and Electron-
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ics Division employed 9,000 in 2003 in Chihuahua and Ciudad Juarez, 
producing wiring harnesses for seat recliners, track adjusters, and other 
power-assisted interior components.
Radio components have also been imported primarily from Mexico. 
However, the overall value of radio imports has declined from a peak 
of	$3.6	billion	in	2000	to	$2.8	billion	in	2006.	As	with	other	electrical	
components, the quantity and percentage of imports may be increasing, 
but because of rapidly declining prices, the value has decreased. Mexi-
co	has	been	losing	market	share	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century,	in	this	





the total U.S. market for vehicle lighting. Mexico and Taiwan have re-
placed Japan as the leading suppliers of lighting equipment. Apodaca 




Electronics imports from China are set to increase. Within a few 
days	of	each	other	in	2006,	GM	and	Visteon	both	announced	a	shift	of	
worldwide electronics purchasing from Michigan to Shanghai. Shang-
hai is “at the hub of China’s electronics industry . . . and China is widely 
viewed as the world’s new hub for consumer electronics” (Sherefkin 
and	LaReau	2006).	However,	because	China	is	“GM’s	largest	growth	
market	.	.	.	much	of	the	electronics	that	GM	buys	in	China	are	destined	
for its Asian assembly lines, not U.S. shores” (Sherefkin and LaReau 
2006).
NATIONAL ORIGIN OF IMPORTS
Canada, Japan, and Mexico were the countries of origin for 68 per-
cent of the parts imported into the United States in 2007. Imports in 
2006	 totaled	$27	billion	 from	Mexico,	$19	billion	 from	Canada,	and	
$13	billion	from	Japan.	That	is	down	noticeably	from	1996,	when	the	
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Canada was the leading source of parts in 1995, followed closely 
by	Mexico	and	Japan	(Figure	13.3).	Canada	and	Mexico	both	gained	
market share at the expense of Japan during the mid 1990s. Implemen-
tation	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA)	and	the	
high yen–dollar exchange rates contributed to Japan’s decline during 
the period. Mexico passed Canada as the leading source of imports for 
the	firs 	time	in	2002,	and	the	gap	widened	in	subsequent	years.	
Canada lost market share after 1997, slipping from 31 percent to 22 
percent in 2007, whereas the share of imports from Japan and Mexico 
changed little. Meanwhile, China gained 7 percent during the 12-year 
period,	passing	Germany	as	the	fourth-largest	source	of	inputs,	and	the	
rest of the world gained the remainder.
Figure 13.3  Auto Parts Imports by Country
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Canada, Japan, and Mexico have specialized in importing differ-
ent	types	of	parts	(Figure	13.4).	Canada	has	been	the	leading	source	of	
exterior and chassis components, which are bulky metal structures that 
have	traditionally	been	built	close	to	fina 	assembly	plants.	Japan	has	
been the leading source of powertrain components, which are closely 
tied to Japanese carmakers in the United States through keiretsu rela-
tionships. Mexico has been the dominant source of electrical and inte-
rior components that are especially sensitive to labor costs.
Imports from Canada
Canada’s distinctive contribution to the U.S. parts industry is a leg-
acy of policies from the 1960s that were designed to integrate the two 
countries’ vehicle production. Prior to that time, Canada’s motor ve-
hicle industry was organized separately from that of the United States. 
Canada placed tariffs of 17.5 percent on vehicles and 25 percent on 
























SOURCE: International Trade Commission, dataweb, and authors’ calculations.
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parts imported from the United States and required that at least 60 per-
cent of content in domestically built cars be sourced from the British 
Commonwealth.
A	Royal	Commission	headed	by	Vincent	Bladen	reported	in	1961	
that the Canadian motor vehicle assembly plants and parts suppliers 
would become increasingly uncompetitive because of the small size 
of the domestic market. The Bladen Commission recommended closer 
integration with the U.S. industry. The Canadian government reduced 
tariffs on transmissions and engines in 1962 and on other parts a year 
later. The 1965 Canada–U.S. Automotive Products Trade Agreement 
eliminated most of the remaining vehicle tariffs.
In a series of letters of understanding sent to the Canadian govern-
ment,	U.S.	firm 	agreed	to	maintain	a	minimum	level	of	production	in	
Canada, essentially at a level that exceeded sales in Canada. As a result, 
more vehicles have been produced than sold in Canada each year since 
1964. With 9 percent of the population of the United States and Canada 
combined, Canada has produced about 15 percent of the two countries’ 
vehicles, thus well above its “fair share” based on population and sales. 
Canada also had 11 percent of the two countries’ parts plants, according 
to ELM International. 
Canada’s disproportionately large contribution to North American 
vehicle assembly also stemmed from the country’s lower health care 
costs	 for	 employers.	Because	 of	 national	 health	 insurance,	 fina 	 as-
sembly	costs	as	recently	as	2002	were	about	$500	lower	per	vehicle	in	
Canada. “We do have a cost advantage here in Canada versus our pro-
duction, for example, in the United States. Health care costs probably 
contribute	just	a	little	under	half	of	that	advantage,”	according	to	GM	
Canada	president	Mike	Grimaldi	 in	2002	 (Automotive	 News 2002a). 
According to Canadian Auto Workers president Buzz Hargrove (Eng-
lish	2002),	Canada	held	a	$16-per-hour	wage	advantage	over	the	United	
States in 2002, when health care costs, productivity, and the value of 
the Canadian dollar were taken into consideration. By 2008, a rising 
Canadian dollar in combination with wage concessions agreed to by the 
UAW in 2007 had essentially eliminated that cost advantage.
Exterior parts have been especially prominent in Canada’s supplier 
industry.	Five	of	 the	six	 leading	suppliers	based	 in	Canada	specialize	
in exterior parts. The leading supplier has been Magna International, 
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with 10,000 employees in 30-some production facilities across Ontario. 
Magna’s largest division specialized in what the company calls “ex-
terior vehicle appearance systems,” such as plastic bumpers, fascias, 
body panels, liftgates, and sealants. Other leading Canadian exterior 
suppliers	included	ABC	Group,	Multimatic,	SKD	Automotive	Group,	
and	AGS	Automotive.	
Chassis parts have also been important for Canada’s suppliers. 
Magna’s second-largest unit has produced metal chassis and body com-
ponents	 such	as	cross	members,	 floo 	pans,	 suspension	 systems,	and	
other support structures. Canada’s second-largest parts maker, Linamar, 
with	3,000	employees	at	two	dozen	plants,	mostly	in	Guelph,	produced	
brake drums and powertrain components such as cylinder blocks, heads, 
camshafts, and crankshafts. 
Canada’s parts industry, clustered in Ontario between Windsor and 
Toronto, is within a one-day drive of U.S. vehicle production centers, 
and plants in Windsor are only minutes from Detroit’s assembly plants. 
But Canada’s advantageous proximity has been threatened by the drift 
of	U.S.	fina 	assembly	plants	southward	from	Michigan.	Newer	plants	
opened in the southern United States are beyond a one-day driving range 
from the southern Ontario production center. Ontario’s auto industry is 
tied more closely to the fate of Michigan than to the United States as a 
whole, and more to the Big 3 than to the international transplants (see 
Chapter 6 on border issues).
Imports from Japan
Canada’s parts industry has relied heavily on JIT delivery for and 
by the Detroit 3. Japan’s import record, in contrast, has been heavily 
influence 	by	the	changing	needs	of	Japanese-owned	assembly	plants	
in the United States.
When they opened assembly plants in the United States, Japanese 
carmakers ordered their major suppliers to start producing parts in the 
United States as well. “[U.S.-owned] large tier ones pressed [Presi-
dents] Bush and Clinton to press Japanese carmakers to buy more U.S. 
content” (Chappell 2005g). Once they started producing in the United 
States, many of these Japanese parts makers also became major suppli-
ers to Detroit 3 and European carmakers. By forcing their key suppliers 
to build in the United States, Japanese carmakers caused parts imports 
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from Japan to grow at a much lower level than would otherwise be ex-
pected from their increasing share of the U.S. light vehicle market.
Drivetrain components emerged as the leading imports to the Unit-
ed States from Japan after 2000. Complete transmissions have been 
shipped from Japan to transplants in the United States, as well as com-
ponents for producing transmissions in the United States. Toyota in par-
ticular has been a major importer of transmissions into the United States 
rather than depending primarily on U.S.-based suppliers. Meanwhile, 
the value of engines exported from Japan to the United States declined 
from	a	peak	of	$1.5	billion	to	less	than	$0.5	billion	in	2006.	
Powertrain imports are often for low-volume or newly established 
products,	for	which	production	 in	 the	United	States	 is	not	 justifie 	at	
the time, and may never be. In other cases, importing is a temporary 
expediency pending construction of another U.S. plant or redeployment 
of an existing one. Reliance on high-value imported powertrain com-
ponents is a major reason why transplants have had a lower impact 
on	the	local	economy	than	was	predicted	by	development	official 	and	
promised by politicians.
Competing	with	Mexico	or	even	Canada	on	price	 is	difficul 	 for	
parts makers in Japan. Japanese suppliers face much higher production 
costs than Mexican competitors, and much higher shipping costs than 
Canadian competitors. Consequently, Japan’s market share of parts im-
ports is small for bulky just-in-time body and interior components, and 
it is declining for most price-sensitive chassis components. 
Imports from Mexico
Mexico’s	parts	supplier	industry	has	a	profil 	that	is	very	different	
from those of Canada and Japan. Dominating production are electrical 
and interior components, both of which take advantage of hourly wage 
rates	of	less	than	$2	in	Mexico	in	2005.
The leading suppliers of electrical and interior components from 
Mexico have been foreign-owned maquiladora plants. The term maqui-
ladora derives from the Spanish verb maquilar, which means to take 
measure of payment for grinding or processing. The miller who did the 
grinding would be compensated with a portion of the grain known as 
the maquila, which was also the name of a colonial tax.
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Mexico’s Border Industrialization Program (BIP), established in 
1965, permitted foreign companies to import materials from the United 
States, assemble them in maquiladora plants, and export them back 
to the United States without having to pay duty on the raw materials 
brought into Mexico, the equipment in the maquiladora plants, or the 
subassemblies shipped back to the United States. Antonio J. Bermu-
dez,	firs 	head	of	the	BIP,	is	credited	with	developing	the	idea	as	a	way	
to generate economic development in his hometown of Ciudad Juarez. 
RCA	was	the	firs 	large	American	company	to	open	a	maquiladora	plant	
in Ciudad Juarez in 1968. 
It took another decade before U.S. auto parts makers started taking 
advantage	of	 the	maquiladora	 laws.	GM’s	Packard	Electric	Division,	
now part of Delphi, established Conductores y Componentes Electricos 
to make wire harnesses in Ciudad Juarez in 1978. Electrical compo-
nents dominated Mexican early maquiladora production, accounting for 
twice as many imports as all other systems combined into the 1990s. 
GM’s	Inland	Division,	now	also	part	of	Delphi,	arrived	in	Ciudad	
Juarez in 1978 to make seat covers and interior trim. Production of seat 
components	expanded	rapidly	into	the	twenty-firs 	century	as	the	three	
large assemblers of complete seats—Lear, JCI, and Magna—relocated 
production of some individual components to Mexico and purchased 
more individual seat parts from Mexican-based lower tier suppliers.
Maquiladora plants are strung out in Mexican cities along the U.S. 
border, especially (from east to west) in Matamoros (across the border 
from Brownsville, Texas), Reynosa (across from McAllen), Nuevo Lar-
edo (across from Laredo), Ciudad Juarez (across from El Paso), and Ti-
juana (across from San Diego). The more easterly cities have attracted 
most of the auto parts maquiladoras because of their relative proximity 
to Auto Alley, whereas Tijuana has more clothing and textile plants. 
Auto-related maquiladora production is also clustered in larger northern 
Mexican cities 100 miles or so south of the border, such as Nuevo Leon, 
Monterrey, Chihuahua, and Hermosillo. 
NAFTA	authorized	Mexicans	 to	drive	 trucks	 fille 	with	car	parts	
and other goods into the United States. However, U.S. and Mexican 
government regulations blocked free cross-border truck movement for 
several	years	after	implementation	of	NAFTA.	Administrative	red	tape	
required trucks to be unloaded at warehouses in U.S. border towns and 
driven into the interior of the United States on U.S.-registered trucks 
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border delays has forced major U.S.-owned maquiladoras to expand 
inventory being held in the U.S. border towns, essentially adding to the 
cost of producing in Mexico. 
According to the México Maquila Information Center, 24 of the 100 
largest maquiladoras in 2006 were motor vehicle suppliers. The three 
largest maquiladoras on the list were motor-vehicle suppliers—Delphi, 
Lear, and Yazaki. The 24 auto-related maquiladoras together employed 
216,696 workers in Mexico in 2006, including 66,000 at Delphi in 
Mexico, 34,000 at Lear, and 33,400 at Yazaki (México Maquila Infor-
mation Center 2006). 
The number of maquiladora plants—most of which were not au-
tomotive related—increased from 600 in 1982 to 1,000 in 1986, 1,800 
in 1989, and a peak of 3,630 in 2001. Employment in maquiladoras 
increased from 70,000 in 1982 to 360,000 in 1988, and a peak of 1.3 
million	in	2000.	In	the	firs 	years	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	the	number	
of	maquiladoras	declined	slightly	 from	 the	2000	peak.	Mexican	offi-
cials have feared that border plants will continue to decline in the face 
of competition from lower-wage countries, notably China (México Ma-
quila Information Center 2007).
Further	fanning	fears	for	the	future	of	the	border	plants,	the	growth	
in the value of auto parts imported into the United States from Mexico 
has been outpaced by the growth of imports from China for every year 
since 1996.
The China Factor
China’s contribution to the U.S. parts market in the early twenty-
firs 	century	could	be	seen	in	two	ways.	On	one	hand,	China	was	play-
ing	an	 insignifican 	role	 that	barely	registered	 in	 the	statistical	tables.	
Only 5 percent of all imports and only 2 percent of the total U.S. auto 
parts market came from China in 2006. Balanced against the statistical 
record and geographic constraints was the universal assumption that 
China would inevitably play a major role in all facets of the world’s mo-
tor vehicle industry, including original equipment parts production.
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China’s impressive compound annual growth rate of 58 percent be-
tween 1996 and 2006 was calculated from a very low starting base. 
Otherwise	 stated,	China	 accounted	 for	12	percent	of	 the	$45	billion	
growth in imports from all countries during the decade. Imports from 
China	increased	by	$4.5	billion	between	1996	and	2006,	from	$0.5	bil-




Chassis and electrical components accounted for almost two-thirds 
of	all	 imports	 from	China	 in	2006.	China’s	 firs 	major	 impact	 in	 the	
U.S. import market came through chassis components, which increased 
from	$142	million	in	1995	to	$2.55	billion	in	2006	(Table	13.3).	Among	
major chassis components, imports from China increased during the 
Table 13.3  Parts Imports from China by Major Subsystem, 2006






Other chassis 120 2.0
Electrical 1,314 21.6
Radios 676 11.1







Child’s seats 233 3.8
Other interior 114 1.9
Drivetrain 379 6.2
Total 6,104  
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database.
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decade	from	$9	million	to	$877	million	for	wheels,	from	$5	million	to	
$843	million	for	tires,	and	from	$51	million	to	$550	million	for	brakes.	
The aftermarket was the destination for most of these imports, but not 
all of them, especially after 2001. “It’s a scary prospect right now to see 
the Chinese gearing up for this [OEM wheel production]. Anybody in 
the wheel business who thinks this won’t matter is about to have their 
head served to them on a platter.”2 
Imports of electronic components such as radios also increased 
rapidly from China after 2000. Shanghai has become the center of 
manufacturing	motor	vehicle	electronics	in	China.	General	Motors	has	
moved	its	global	electronics	purchasing	office 	and	Visteon	has	moved	
its global electronics group to that city.
Does Mexico have reason to fear competition from China? Imports 
of	radios	from	Mexico,	which	had	increased	from	$1	billion	to	$2	bil-
lion	between	1995	and	2001,	declined	 to	$1.3	billion	 in	2006.	Simi-




and 2006. Thus, as the cost of the average radio declined sharply in the 
early	twenty-firs 	century,	China	nearly	tripled	its	share	of	imports	from	
9	to	almost	25	percent	in	fiv 	years.	China	has	started	to	make	a	dent	in	
Mexico’s dominance of electronics imports.
However, the growth in Chinese imports has not come without 
some problems. “Lured by promises of long-term, high-volume con-
tracts from their major customers—and sometimes encouraged at gun-
point,	metaphorically	 speaking—auto	 suppliers	 are	 findin 	plenty	of	
justificatio 	 for	 their	 early	 caution	 about	 committing	 to	 the	Chinese	
market” (Automotive	News	Europe 2005). As in other newly industrial-
izing countries, China has faced quality control issues. 
International parts makers in China are learning that a local sup-
plier-development program is a must. Patience is also a must since 
it often takes as long as two years for a Chinese supplier to meet 
international quality standards. Only 15 percent of Chinese sup-
pliers can meet those standards, says [manufacturing consultant 
Frank]	Ogden,	who	 is	vice	president	of	global	supplier	develop-
ment	for	the	PAC	Group,	a	Shanghai	consulting	company.	Prob-
lems range from not knowing how to meet a customer’s deadlines 
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to inadequate testing of raw materials. “You can’t just walk into 
a company and expect to buy off the shelf,” [TRW senior man-
ager	for	Asia	Pacifi 	supplier	development	Clive]	Woodward	says.	
“You have to be willing to work beside them and bring them up to 
your quality level.” (Webb 2005)
Again, as in other newly industrializing countries, however, China 
has	seen	rapidly	improving	quality.	GM’s	defect	rate	for	parts	in	China	
declined from 2,197 per million in 1999 and 1,397 per million in 2000 
to	only	23	per	million	in	2003.	In	comparison,	GM’s	worldwide	defect	
rate in 2003 was much higher (35 per million) and only slightly lower 
(22	per	million)	in	the	United	States	(Armstrong	2004e).	GM	“expects	
to increase its parts purchases from China 20-fold in six years—from 
$200	million	in	2003	to	$4	billion	in	2009—while	spending	about	$5	
billion on sourcing for its China production” (Automotive	News	Europe 
2005). “We will see a shift into more electronics, air conditioning, and 
also chassis parts, brake parts, steering parts . . .” (Lan 2007).
Though China’s quality control issues may fade over time, parts 
destined for assembly plants in the United States cannot avoid the 
6,500-mile	journey	across	the	Pacifi 	Ocean	and	the	2,500	mile	journey	
from	the	West	Coast	to	Auto	Alley.	For	all	but	the	most	labor-intensive	
components, the obvious attraction of low-cost labor in the manufactur-
ing process would continue to be offset by the high costs of maintaining 
a	trans-Pacifi 	supply	chain.
WHICH TYPES OF PARTS ARE EXPORTED?
Exports have performed differently than imports in the twenty-
firs 	century.	Imports	and	exports	increased	at	the	same	rate	during	the	
1990s, but imports accelerated after 2000 while exports stagnated. The 
combination of increasing of imports and stagnating exports has pro-
duced a widening trade imbalance in the United States. 
Canada and Mexico have been on the receiving end of three-fourths 
of	the	parts	exported	from	the	United	States	(Figure	13.5).	In	2007,	55	
percent of exports went to Canada and 20 percent to Mexico. A decade 
earlier, the percentages were virtually the same. 
324   Klier and Rubenstein
Mexico and Canada play a more dominant role in exports from the 
United States than they do with imports. With imports, Japanese- and 
German-owned	assembly	plants	in	the	United	States	have	depended	on	
parts from their home countries, and other U.S.-based producers have 
been	scouring	the	world	for	low-cost	suppliers.	With	exports,	fina 	as-
sembly plants in Canada and Mexico have been virtually the only mar-
kets for original equipment parts made in the United States. 
This	pattern	is	a	function	of	integration	of	parts-making	and	fina 	
assembly	operations	within	 the	NAFTA	zone	during	 the	1990s.	Final	
assembly plants in Canada and Mexico make heavy and increasing use 
of	parts	made	 in	 the	United	States,	 just	as	U.S.	fina 	assembly	plants	
make heavy and increasing use of parts made by suppliers based in 
Canada and Mexico. 
The export pattern has varied by type of system. The overwhelming 
majority of powertrain components and body stampings exported from 
the	United	States	 are	destined	 for	Canadian	 assembly	plants	 (Figure	
Figure 13.5  Value of U.S. Parts Exports by Country
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13.6). These parts are much less likely to be exported anywhere else, in 
part because they are bulky and fragile to ship long distances.
Export of powertrain components accounted for much of the in-
crease in exports during the 1990s, especially engines and complete 




$0.5	 billion	 each.	The	 principal	 chassis	 export	 has	 been	 axles,	with	
more	than	$1	billion	sent	to	other	countries	in	2006.	Exports	of	interior	
components	have	fluctuate 	between	$2	and	$3	billion;	the	leading	in-
terior export has been seat parts for use at seat assembly plants located 
near	fina 	assembly	plants.
As recently as the late 1990s, only electronics had a substantial 
trade	deficit 	 reflectin 	 the	 importance	by	 that	 time	of	Mexico’s	ma-
quiladoras. Exterior and drivetrain components showed trade surpluses 





















Figure 13.6  U.S. Exports by System to Canada and Mexico, 2006
SOURCE: International Trade Commission, dataweb, and authors’ calculations.






Are any sectors of the U.S. parts industry impervious to foreign 
competition? The short answer is no. As the auto sector becomes more 
international, foreign competition manifests itself in more ways than 
one. Domestic carmakers and their parts suppliers face competition 
from imported vehicles (that include mostly parts produced abroad) 
as well as from foreign carmakers and parts makers based in North 
America. In fact the low exchange rate of the U.S. dollar is expected 
to drive a fair amount of inbound foreign investment over the next few 
years.	Finally,	trade	in	motor	vehicle	parts	has	been	growing	faster	than	
domestic production for many years. Yet, not all sectors are equally 
exposed to foreign competition.
Of	the	fiv 	major	systems,	the	body	is	the	least	vulnerable	to	import	
competition. Large body panels have always been stamped out near 
fina 	assembly	plants,	and	that	trend	is	likely	to	continue.	They	are	too	
bulky	and	fragile	to	ship	long	distance	safely	and	efficient y.	Similarly,	
seats are too bulky to ship long distance and are designed to arrive at 
the	 fina 	 assembly	 ready	 for	 installation	within	hours	of	being	built.	
Nevertheless, large body and interior suppliers have been able to iden-
tify individual parts that can be produced in low-wage countries and 
shipped	to	trim	and	seat	plants	in	the	United	States	for	finishin 	before	
being	sent	on	to	fina 	assembly	plants	in	integrated	modules.
Similarly, engines and transmissions will continue to be assembled 
primarily in the United States, but they will contain a number of indi-
vidual parts that are manufactured overseas. Powertrain components 
will continue to account for more imports than bodies and seats because, 
to some extent, complete engines and transmissions will be imported, 
such as small-displacement engines from Mexico and small-batch en-
gines and transmissions from Japan.
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At	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-firs 	century,	the	main	battleground	
between domestic and foreign production was the chassis. The principal 
chassis modules—brakes, suspension, steering, wheels, and tires—were 
all vulnerable to outsourcing to lower cost producers. In general, the 
chassis	is	the	system	that	is	least	difficul 	to	ship	and	least	affected	by	
just-in-time delivery pressures. Innovations have reduced chassis prices 
quickly, adding pressure to relocate production to low-wage countries.
“There are some advantages when you go to low-cost countries. But 
on	the	fli 	side,	you	can’t	ignore	the	costs	of	freight,	duty,	the	cost	of	
inventory, the 45 days or whatever it is in the pipeline. Those are all true 
costs. What we look at is the total delivered cost.”3
Notes
	 1.	 Unnamed	GM	source,	quoted	in	Sherefkin	and	LaReau	(2006).
 2. Dick Lilley, president of Lilley Associates Inc., which tracks the original-equip-
ment wheel industry, quoted in Chappell (2004e).








A 1960 vehicle needed electrical power to operate little more than 
the lights, radio, heater motor, and wipers. The availability of ever 
cheaper and faster microprocessors has spawned a tremendous amount 
of control systems applications in the automotive industry in the last 
two	decades.	From	 engine	 and	 transmission	 systems,	 to	virtually	 all	
chassis subsystems, some level of computer control is present. A car is 
now actually a network of computers (The	Economist 2007). As elec-
tronics have become increasingly prominent features of motor vehicles, 
motorists have seen their service mechanics transformed into electrical 
diagnosticians (Couretas 2000). 
 “Automotive electronics are major criteria of differentiation in the 
automotive market. Car manufacturers use chips in increasing num-
bers to develop powerful electronic systems for driver information and 
communication, in-car entertainment electronics, power train and body 
control electronics, as well as automotive safety and convenience elec-
tronics”	(Gupta	2005).	
According to our database, 15 percent of all parts plants in the Unit-
ed	States	made	an	electronic	part	in	2006.	Our	figur 	is	a	little	lower	
than the average of four other studies: 11 percent according to the Cen-
ter for Automotive Research, 18 percent according to Merrill Lynch, 21 
percent according to the U.S. Census of Manufactures, and 25 percent 
according to Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (Armstrong 2004f; 
Couretas	2000;	Gupta	2005;	Guyer	2004;	Riches	2005).	The	dispar-
ity	comes	from	classificatio 	challenges.	Is	 the	 temperature	regulator	
counted as electronics or as part of the air conditioner? Is the seat ad-
juster counted as electronics or part of the interior?
Regardless of magnitude, the value of electronics has clearly in-
creased more rapidly than the value of the overall vehicle content. The 
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value of the electronics content rose 8.3 percent in 2004, for example, 
compared with only 2 percent for all content (Riches 2005). The world 
market	for	motor	vehicle	electronics	was	expected	to	increase	from	$36	
billion	in	2004	to	$58	billion	in	2012,	with	most	of	the	increase	coming	
from	 the	 interior	system	(Table	14.1).	“If	I’m	going	 to	grow	 in	a	fla 	
market, where is the growth? It’s in electronics.”2 
The	increasing	importance	of	electronics	is	reflecte 	in	the	chang-
ing composition of the largest suppliers. Only six of the top 150 suppli-
ers in 1994 listed electronics as a capability, compared to 41 in 2006, 
including eight of the nine largest (Automotive	 News 1995, 2007a). 
Some of these 41 suppliers were electronics specialists, but most com-
bined electronics with capabilities in chassis, exteriors, interiors, and 
powertrains. 
In our database, 39 percent of plants making electronics parts could 
not be allocated to a particular system. These parts included switches, 
sensors, actuators, circuit boards, relays, and miscellaneous electronics 
parts. Excluding these plants, 42 percent of electronics plants made a 
part for the interior, 30 percent for the powertrain, 18 percent for the 
exterior, and 10 percent for the chassis.
Given	the	large	percentage	of	electronics	parts	that	are	not	attribut-
able	to	a	specifi 	system,	this	chapter	is	organized	around	the	three	prin-
cipal purposes of electronics: performance, safety, and convenience. 
Performance-oriented electronics are found primarily but not exclu-
sively in the powertrain; safety-oriented parts are found in the interior, 














exterior, and chassis; and convenience-oriented electronics are found in 
the interior.
Most electronics parts are being made outside the United States, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Of those produced in the United 
States,	 less	 than	half	have	come	 from	plants	 in	 the	Midwest	 (Figure	
14.1, Table 14.2). Two-thirds of plants producing electronics for the 
exterior were in the Midwest, compared to only one-third of plants pro-
ducing parts for the interior. 
PERFORMANCE: GETTING POWER FROM THE ENGINE 
TO THE ACCESSORIES
Motor vehicles contain dozens of microprocessors, tiny computers 
known as electronic control units (ECUs). Information in microproces-
Figure 14.1  Location of Electronics Parts Plants
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources. 
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sors	 is	stored	on	semiconductors	made	 from	silicon	chips.	First-gen-
eration ECUs each performed one function, but electronics specialists 
were able to combine multiple functions in ECUs, thereby reducing the 
number needed. 
ECUs collect, store, and display information about vehicle perfor-
mance, such as speed, oil pressure, engine temperature, distance trav-
eled, and operator behavior. Information is collected through sensors 
embedded in key components. Based on information from sensors, 
ECUs	determine	optimum	 settings	 for	actuators	 that	operate	 specifi 	
functions,	such	as	opening	a	window	or	regulating	the	flo 	of	heat	into	
the passenger compartment. ECUs can be regarded as the brain of the 
system, sensors as the eyes and ears, and actuators as the hands.
Suppliers of ECU Components
Manufacture of semiconductors for the world’s motor vehicles was 
an	$18	billion	business	in	2005,	accounting	for	nearly	half	of	the	total	
electronics	market	(Gupta	2005).	One-third	of	the	semiconductors	were	
used in interior systems, one-fourth each in powertrain and exterior sys-
tems, and one-sixth in chassis systems (Table 14.3).
Table 14.2  Electronic Parts Plants in the Midwest
Electronic part Number of plants % in Midwest
Powertrain (engine management) 205 47.3
Chassis (wiring) 65 50.8
Exterior (lighting) 123 63.4
Interior 282 36.2
Safety 128 40.6
Driver information 112 28.6
Audio 42 42.9
Other electronics 432 46.8
Switches, sensors, actuators 282 43.3
Miscellaneous 150 53.0
Total electronics 1,107 46.2
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from the ELM International database and other 
sources.
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The semiconductor market has been one of the most highly frag-
mented in the motor vehicle industry. According to Hansen (2003):
The automotive semiconductor industry has too many suppliers 
. . . Yearly price cuts are guaranteed and pressures to cut prices 
further when industry margins are already thin or nonexistent are 
greater now than they have been in the last 15 years. While there 
are plenty of new electronics features on the horizon, it can take 
three	to	fiv 	years	following	the	development	of	a	new	component	
before it goes into volume production . . . 
What still attracts semiconductor suppliers to the auto industry and 
could bring in new players, is its relative stability. In 2001, when 
the worldwide semiconductor market dropped 32 percent, the auto 
semiconductor market dropped only 1 percent.
The three leading companies together held 29 percent of the market 
in	2003,	the	top	fiv 	had	43	percent,	the	top	seven	had	50	percent,	and	
the top 30 had 80 percent (Hansen 2003). Only one of the seven largest 
made the list of Automotive	News top 150 suppliers—Robert Bosch, 
the world’s largest parts supplier overall and the sixth-largest automo-
tive	semiconductor	supplier	 in	2006.	The	fifth 	and	seventh-largest—
NEC and Toshiba—were more familiar as small consumer electronics 
producers than as motor vehicle suppliers.3 The four largest semicon-
ductor	suppliers—Freescale,	Infineon 	STMicroelectronics,	and	Rene-
Table 14.3  Global Automotive Semiconductor Sales by System, 2005  
and 2006








Driver information 1.6 8.9
   Audio 1.7 3.5
Total 18.1 10.5
SOURCE: Webber (2005b, 2006b).
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sas—were unfamiliar names to most consumers and auto workers alike 
(Webber 2006a). All four, though, were spin-offs or mergers of well-
known	firm 	between	1999	and	2004.	
Freescale
Freescale,	 the	 largest	 semiconductor	 supplier,	was	 the	only	U.S.-
based	fir 	among	the	top	seven.	It	was	created	in	2004	when	Motorola	
spun	off	its	semiconductor	products	business.	In	2006,	Freescale	was	
acquired	by	 the	private	equity	 fir 	Blackstone	Group.	Motorola	had	
originated	in	1928	as	the	Galvin	Manufacturing	Corp.,	when	brothers	
Paul	V.	and	Joseph	E.	Galvin	took	over	a	battery	eliminator	business.	
The battery eliminator enabled radios to operate on household current 
instead	of	batteries.	The	company	produced	one	of	the	firs 	commercial-
ly successful car radios in 1930 (see below). The radio was sold under 
the	brand	name	Motorola,	said	to	have	been	invented	by	Paul	Galvin	by	
adding	the	suffi 	“ola,”	which	means	sound,	to	the	word	“motor.”	The	
company’s name was changed to Motorola in 1947, the year it started 
to sell televisions.
Motorola was a pioneer in development of semiconductors, set-
ting up a research center in 1949 in Phoenix, Arizona, one of the few 
parts	suppliers	to	locate	a	major	production	facility	in	that	state.	Its	firs 	
mass-produced semiconductor, for use in car radios, came in 1957. In 
1961 Motorola had its other major automotive-related breakthrough, 
the	silicon	rectifie ,	which	was	critical	to	manufacturing	an	attractively	
priced alternator and was the basis for the company’s leading position 
among	suppliers	 in	engine-related	electronics	(HowardForums	2006).	
The	firs 	major	application	of	Motorola	microprocessors	was	an	ECU	





Siemens’s predecessor Telegraphen-Bauanstalt von Siemens & 




ed by Siemens. Siemens became one of the world’s largest companies 
in the twentieth century through generation of electrical power and 
telecommunications. 
The	motor	vehicle	industry	was	not	a	significan 	component	of	the	
Siemens empire until the rapid rise in electronics content in the late 
twentieth century. Siemens set up an automotive engineering business 
unit in 1989, and spun it off as the independent Siemens Automotive 
AG	in	2000.	Although	it	was	one	of	the	world’s	10	largest	parts	sup-
pliers,	with	worldwide	sales	of	$12	billion	in	2004,	Siemens	generated	
only	one-eighth	of	 its	 total	2004	worldwide	 revenues	of	$95	billion	
from the motor vehicle industry. 
STMicroelectronics
Unlike the other three of the four largest semiconductor suppliers, 
STMicroelectronics (ST) did not trace its roots to the motor vehicle 
industry. It was a product of a 1987 merger between Italy’s Micro-
elettronica	and	France’s	Thomson	Semiconducteurs	and	was	known	as	
SGS-Thomson	Microelectronics	until	1998.	
Although it was the third-largest motor vehicle supplier of electron-
ics, ST derived only 15 percent of its revenues from that industry in 
2006. Communications, consumer products, and computers were the 
largest segments at ST. 
Renesas
Renesas, the fourth-place semiconductor company with 7 percent of 
the market and the leading microcontroller supplier, was spun off from 
prominent parts suppliers. Renesas was established in 2003 as Japan’s 
largest semiconductor supplier through a joint venture between Hitachi, 
which owned 55 percent, and Mitsubishi Electric Corp., which owned 
the other 45 percent.
Founded	 in	1910	by	Namihei	Odaira	as	an	electrical	repair	shop,	
Hitachi—the name combined Japanese words for sun (“hi”) and rise 
(“tachi”)—produced	its	firs 	automotive	product	in	1930,	a	generator.	
Hitachi Automotive Products, set up as a separate division in 1985, was 
only one of 10 U.S. subsidiaries and accounted for one-sixth of U.S. 
sales. 
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The	name	Mitsubishi	was	firs 	applied	in	1874	to	a	shipping	com-
pany originally called Tsukumo Shokai, launched in 1870 by Yataro 
Iwasaki on the island of Shikoku. The company started out with three 
steamships chartered from a powerful local clan called Tosa. Yataro’s 
son Hisaya expanded into banking, real estate, marketing, and adminis-
tration into the twentieth century. After World War II, the company was 
split into 139 companies, most of which abandoned the name Mitsubi-
shi. Motor vehicle parts production originated in 1934 at the predeces-
sor of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Motor vehicle electronics produc-
tion originated at the predecessor of Mitsubishi Electric Corp., founded 
in 1921 to produce electric fans. 
Engine Management
The most powerful computer on most cars is the engine control 
unit, referred to here as “engine ECU” to avoid confusion with the elec-
tronic control unit, which is also abbreviated “ECU.” The engine ECU 
is a special-purpose computer that manages such engine functions as 
fuel	injection,	idle	speed,	and	ignition	timing.	The	engine	ECU	fire 	the	
spark plugs, opens and closes the fuel injectors, and turns the cooling 
fan on and off. 
The engine ECU makes decisions through processing information, 
for example, engine coolant temperature and amount of oxygen in the 
exhaust, that it receives from sensors embedded in key engine com-
ponents. Based on information from input sensors, the computer de-
termines optimum settings for actuators that operate engine functions. 
By accounting for many variables and compensating for behavior of 
individual drivers, the engine ECU reduces engine emissions and fuel 
consumption and extends engine life.
The principal incentive for electronic engine management has prob-
ably been stricter emissions laws. Controls were needed to regulate the 
mixture of air and fuel so that the catalytic converter could remove pol-
lutants from the exhaust. Also driving growth in powertrain electronics 
has been the replacement of mechanical power steering and throttles 
with sensors and wires. Electronic throttle control uses sensors and 
wires to control the throttle based on the pressure the driver puts on the 
accelerator. 
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Rather than engine ECU specialists, engine electronics have been 




Electrical components get their power from a battery. Six-volt bat-
teries	were	sufficien 	to	generate	the	electricity	needed	to	run	the	hand-
ful	of	electrical	components	found	in	motor	vehicles	during	the	firs 	half	
of the twentieth century. Twelve-volt batteries became standard during 
the 1950s to handle the increasing number of power accessories appear-
ing in vehicles then. 
As power consumption continued to increase by 5 percent per year, 
conventional wisdom proclaimed during the 1990s that the twelve-volt 
battery would soon be obsolete, to be replaced with a 42-volt battery. 
Carmakers started announcing the imminent arrival of the 42-volt bat-
tery and ordered suppliers to plan accordingly. However, the 42-volt 
battery	was	shelved	because	engineers	figure 	out	how	to	make	the	12-
volt	battery	more	efficien 	(Truett	2004).
The leading supplier of batteries has been Johnson Control (JCI), al-
ready described as one of the two leading interior suppliers (see Chapter 
7).	JCI	entered	the	battery	market	through	acquisition	of	Globe-Union	
Inc. in 1978. The company sold 80 percent of its batteries to the af-
termarket (JCI 2006). In 2006, JCI formed a joint venture with Saft, a 
French	company	specializing	 in	 the	design	and	manufacture	of	high-
tech batteries. The venture combined Saft’s capabilities in lithium ion 
technology with JCI’s automotive electronics capability in order to pro-
duce lithium ion battery packs and control systems for gasoline-electric 
hybrid	vehicles.	Its	firs 	manufacturing	facility,	located	in	France,	was	
up and running by early 2008. The venture also operates a battery tech-
nical development center in Milwaukee (Truett 2007b).
Power is carried from the battery to the components through the 
vehicle’s wiring. Because of growing complexity of wiring, carmakers 
have increased their sourcing of a platform’s complete wiring system 
from a single supplier (Chew 2004b). Wiring suppliers have been asked 
to design a complete system three years in advance of a vehicle launch. 
The	average	entry-level	vehicle	had	$315	worth	of	wiring	in	2004,	and	
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high-end	models	had	$757	(Chew	2004b).	Although	the	amount	of	wir-
ing has increased rapidly in vehicles, prices have declined sharply. 
The amount of wiring needed to connect all the convenience equip-
ment would be excessive. Inside the door, for example, wires would 
be needed to connect power-window, mirror, lock, and seat controls. 
To	 address	 the	 challenge	of	 fittin 	more	wiring	 into	 a	 fixe 	 amount	
of	space,	suppliers	have	used	coaxial	cable	and	developed	fla 	wire.	A	
vehicle’s wiring is put together into a so-called wiring harness at a dedi-
cated supplier plant. The vast majority of wiring harnesses that end up 
in vehicles made in North America have been produced in Mexico (see 
Chapter	13).	Vehicles	may	contain	some	two	dozen	modules,	including	
a	central	module	called	the	body	controller.	For	example,	the	driver’s	
door contains a module that monitors all of the switches. Pressing the 
window switch causes the door module to close a relay that provides 
power to the window motor. “OEMs have packaging needs in headlin-
ers, dashboards and in the doors and mirrors, where traditional wiring 
solutions won’t allow you to package.”4
The two leading suppliers of wiring in North America have been 
Yazaki North America and Sumitomo. Both are Japanese owned.
Yazaki North America 
Yazaki North America was the leading Japanese-owned electron-
ics supplier and second-largest of all Japanese-owned suppliers in the 
United States, behind Denso. The company claimed to have invented 
harnesses in 1929 to bundle together the large amount of otherwise cha-
otic wires that thread through motor vehicles and has been the world’s 
leading supplier of wiring harnesses, with one-fourth of the world mar-
ket. Yazaki started selling harnesses in the United States in 1966 and 
gained production capability through acquiring Circuit Controls Corp. 
in Petoskey, Michigan, in 1987, and Elcom, Inc. and EWD Limited Li-
ability Co., both in El Paso, Texas, in 1988. 
Sumitomo 
Sumitomo Electric Industries was part of one of Japan’s largest en-
terprises,	with	interests	in	aerospace,	chemicals,	coal,	finance 	forestry,	
insurance, metals, real estate, and transportation, as well as electronics. 
The company’s roots may go back further than those of any other parts 
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supplier, possibly to 1590, when Kyoto medicine and book shop owner 
Masatomo Sumitomo is said to have opened an establishment to pro-
duce and sell copper items. The wiring operation began in 1897.
SAFETY SYSTEMS
A mid-twentieth-century auto industry “truth” was that safety didn’t 
sell.	GM	president	Alfred	P.	Sloan	argued	against	installing	safety	glass.	
“I	do	not	feel	that	it	is	equitable	to	charge	the	General	Motors	stock-
holders with the cost of it [safety glass] if the public shows it is not 
interested to pay a reasonable extra for it,” Sloan told shareholders in 
1932. “And so far they have not evidenced that willingness” (Cray 
1980, pp. 270–271).
In	1956	Ford	heavily	promoted	“Lifeguard	Design,”	a	package	of	
safety features that included seat belts, deep-dish steering wheel, and 
sun	visors.	Ford’s	safety	campaign	was	an	abject	failure:	Ford	trailed	
Chevrolet by 67,000 vehicles in 1955 and outsold it by 37,000 in 1957, 
but	 in	 the	 safety	 campaign	year	of	1956,	Chevrolet	outsold	Ford	by	
190,000.
Stung by consumer resistance, carmakers tried to make interiors 
safer in ways that did not remind motorists of the dangers of driving or 
require them to modify their behavior. Padded instrument panels, softer 
edged trim, and blunter control buttons were marketed as comfort and 
appearance features rather than for safety and did not require motorists 
to change their behavior. The principal exception was seat belts, which 
required drivers and passengers to take the action of clicking them into 
position. With the increased diffusion of electronics, key safety innova-
tions	in	the	late	twentieth	and	early	twenty-firs 	century	have	included	
airbags in the interior, lighting in the exterior, and stability control in 
the chassis.
Interior Safety 
The interior safety system received the most improvements during 
the twentieth century. The two principal interior safety features have 
been seat belts and airbags.
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Seat belts
The	firs 	automotive	customers	for	seat	belts	were	drivers	of	race	




1956 safety campaign. Seat belts were already being made for aircraft, 
so early manufacturers of automotive seat belts included aviation sup-
pliers, such as Davis Aircraft and American Safety Equipment, as well 
as Irvin. Brown Automotive and Superior Industries were also early 
automotive seat belt manufacturers. After the campaign failed, seat 
belt manufacturers turned to the aftermarket, where they were sold for 
as	low	as	$1	with	private	labels	of	such	retailers	as	NAPA,	Shell	Oil,	
Sears, and Pure Oil. 
An intensive education campaign to promote the use of seat belts 
was undertaken during the 1960s by the National Safety Council and 
the Advertising Council, as well as by the American Seat Belt Council 
(ASBC), a manufacturers’ association formed in 1961. The U.S. De-
partment of Transportation mandated seat belts in all cars beginning 
in 1968. Once seat belts were installed in all new cars, the aftermarket 
disappeared, leading to a consolidation into a handful of original equip-
ment manufacturers.
Despite the national seat-belt campaign, as well as intrusive warn-
ing bells and buzzers, few motorists bothered to use them. It took anoth-
er	generation	of	driver	education	to	make	buckling	up	an	unreflectiv 	





luxury vehicles during the 1970s, and required in all cars in 1998 (and 
in other light vehicles in 1999). A crash sensor located in the front of 
the vehicle detects rapid deceleration and sends a signal to activate the 
inflato 	in	25	to	55	milliseconds.	
When	firs 	made	available,	 the	airbag	was	viewed	with	suspicion	
by safety advocates because motorists did not have to do anything to 
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activate it. The ASBC-led seat-belt lobby feared that airbags would 
be counterproductive to its campaign to promote universal use of seat 
belts: motorists might incorrectly view the airbag as a substitute for the 
seat belt. Once the major suppliers of seat belts also became the major 
suppliers of airbags, the dispute dissipated. The ASBC expanded its 
mission to include all forms of automotive occupant restraints and was 
renamed the Automotive Occupants Restraint Council in 1988.
Suppliers of safety systems have consolidated into three major pro-
viders	 that	 together	hold	 about	 three-fourths	of	 the	$3	billion	North	
American airbag market. Autoliv was the leading supplier of airbags 
in	2005	with	two-fifth 	of	the	North	American	market,	followed	by	TK	
and TRW, each with one-sixth of the market. Delphi, Key, and Toyoda 
Gosei	split	most	of	the	remainder	of	the	airbag	market.	TRW	was	firs 	
and Autoliv second in seat belts.
Autoliv. Autoliv pioneered seat-belt technology in Europe in 1956, 
and it started selling seat belts in the United States in 1993 and airbags 
a year later. As Europe’s leading safety supplier, Swedish-based Autoliv 
had played a major role in establishing the reputation for safety of its 
fellow	Swedish	firm 	Volvo.	
Autoliv became the U.S. leader when it acquired Morton Interna-
tional’s Automotive Safety Products division in 1997. Morton was well 
known to U.S. consumers as the best-selling table salt. Expansion into 
other products came through development of specialty chemicals, ad-
hesives, and coatings. Morton’s airbag research began in 1968 as an ex-
tension	of	interest	in	chemicals,	and	it	produced	the	firs 	commercially	
successful airbag system in 1980.
Autoliv further expanded its share of the safety restraint market 
through acquisitions, including the seat-belt operations of the Japanese 
company	NSK	in	2000	and	the	Restraint	Electronics	operations	of	Vis-
teon in 2002. Airbags accounted for about one-half of Autoliv’s sales 
and seat belts for about one-third in 2003. It held about 30 percent of 
the U.S. market for airbags in 2002, down from 44 percent in 1997, and 
10 percent of seat belts.
TRW. TRW started producing seat belts in 1962 and airbags in 
1989. It got into the seat-belt business through the acquisition of indus-
try	pioneer	Hamill	Manufacturing	from	Firestone.	Its	airbag	business	
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was strengthened in 1996 through acquisition of Magna International’s 
operations. TRW held about one-third of the airbag market in 1997 and 
a higher share of the seat-belt market. 
TK.	Founded	in	1933	by	Takezo	Takada	to	make	textiles,	TK	start-
ed making seat belts in Japan in 1960 and in the United States in 1984. 
Airbags were produced in Japan beginning in 1983 and in the United 
States	in	1992.	TK	Holdings	had	about	one-fift 	of	the	U.S.	market	in	
both seat belts and airbags.
Exterior Safety 
Safety features added to the exterior have been far less controver-
sial than those in the interior. Lighting enabled the driver to see an oth-
erwise dark road and others to see an otherwise dark vehicle. 
Oil	lamps	were	firs 	attached	to	vehicles	around	1902,	and	they	were	
replaced by acetylene gas lamps about four years later. Electric head-
lamps	were	introduced	during	the	1910s;	filament 	were	made	initially	
of	carbon,	then	tungsten.	The	electric	lamps	were	the	firs 	headlamps	
that were useful for illuminating dark roads. Hella introduced rear lights 
in 1915, a red one for illumination and a yellow one for braking. Lamps 
with sealed beams became the dominant design from around 1941 until 
1983.
As nighttime driving became more common and roads more crowd-
ed, motorists complained that they were being blinded by oncoming 
headlights.	In	response,	manufacturers	inserted	a	second	filamen 	in	the	
lamp	during	the	1920s.	The	illumination	of	both	filament 	was	known	
at the time as “driving or country beam.” When another car approached, 
the	driver	used	only	the	filamen 	projected	lower	and	to	the	right,	a	posi-
tion then known as “passing beam.” 
Exterior lighting is an important design element because it is a high-
ly	visible	component.	During	 the	1950s,	 the	 twin	 filamen 	headlamp	
was replaced with dual headlamps, one of which was always used (“low 
beam”) and the other only on dark roads with no other vehicles in sight 
(“high	beam”).	Meanwhile,	rear	lamps	were	integrated	into	the	tailfin 	
of the era.
After spending much of the twentieth century developing uniform 
lighting standards, manufacturers have replaced interchangeable round 
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headlamps with individualized styles and shapes. Unique irregularly 
shaped exterior lights have given each vehicle a distinctive look, but 
they are more expensive to replace than the uniform headlamps of the 
past.
Into	 the	 twenty-firs 	century,	exterior	 lighting	suppliers	faced	 two	
particular	issues.	The	firs 	was	competition	between	halogen	and	xenon	
headlamps. Halogen lamps, introduced in the 1960s, were cheaper and 
easier to produce, but newer xenon lamps were more durable, brighter, 
and color adjustable. It was generally assumed that xenon headlamps 
would follow the traditional model of appearing on more expensive 
models	firs 	and	eventually	diffusing	to	lower	priced	models.	However,	
xenon headlamps cast a bluish light whose acceptance among consum-
ers was not assured. 
The second distinctive issue faced by exterior lighting suppliers was 
an adaptive front lighting system. On a curve, headlamps swiveled up to 
15 degrees in the same direction that the steering wheel was turned. Two 
types of adaptive lighting have been developed. One housed additional 
bulbs	in	specially	engineered	reflector 	within	the	headlight	lens	assem-
bly. The other used motors and projector lenses to pivot the headlamps. 
Swiveling headlamps diffused more rapidly in Europe, where roads are 
more winding, while they remained illegal in the United States.
Three independent suppliers were the leading producers of head-
lamps in the United States between the 1920s and 1970s. Two were 
the country’s dominant electricity pioneers, Westinghouse Electric Co. 
and	General	Electric	Co.	Neither	has	remained	a	supplier	of	automotive	
headlamps,	although	GE	produced	other	components	 into	 the	1990s.	
The third independent supplier, TungSol, stopped making automotive 






ing automotive accessories, because no other lamp makers were there. 
General	Motors	acquired	Guide	in	1928	and	relocated	lamp	production	
to	Anderson,	Indiana,	a	year	later.	A	second	Guide	plant	was	opened	in	
Monroe, Louisiana, during the 1960s.
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Guide	was	especially	buffeted	by	GM’s	late	twentieth	century	re-
structuring.	GM	merged	Guide	with	Fisher	Body	in	1986	and	with	In-
land in 1990, then sold it in 1998 to Palladium Equity Partners L.L.C., a 
New	York	leveraged-buyout	fund	management	firm 	Guide	then	passed	
to	B.N.	Bahadur,	founder	and	principal	of	BBK,	a	Southfield 	Michigan,	
consulting	 fir 	 to	 troubled	suppliers	 (Armstrong	2004d).	Guide	 file 	
for Chapter 11 protection and disappeared as a major parts supplier.
German	and	Japanese	companies	have	become	the	leading	suppli-
ers of exterior lighting in the United States.
Osram Sylvania 
The	 largest	exterior	 lighting	supplier,	German-owned	Osram	Syl-
vania, with one-third of the world market, was created in 1993 when 
Siemens’s	Osram	division	 acquired	GTE’s	Sylvania	division.	Osram	
Sylvania has supplied the U.S. market primarily through imports. Its 
major production facility in the United States was a 50–50 joint venture 
with	Valeo	in	Seymour,	Indiana.





1880, one year after Edison. 
Sylvania Products Co. was formed as a spin-off of Nilco Lamp 
Works in 1924 to make radio tubes. Nilco (an acronym for Novelty 
Incandescent Lamp Co.) had been established in 1906 to make nov-
elty lights as well as to recycle old light bulbs by cutting off the glass 
tips,	replacing	the	filaments 	and	resealing	the	bulbs.	Nilco	merged	with	
Hygrade	Incandescent	Lamp	Co.	in	1931.	Hygrade	made	carbon-fil -
ment	 light	bulbs	beginning	 in	1909	and	 tungsten	filamen 	 light	bulbs	
beginning in 1911. The combined company, called Hygrade Sylvania 
Corp., sold lamps under the Hygrade brand and radio tubes under the 
Sylvania brand. The company changed its name to Sylvania Electric 




The leading supplier of exterior lighting to Japanese-owned assem-
bly plants was Stanley Electric. Stanley Electric, founded in 1920, was 
named by its founder Takaharu Kitano for Sir Henry Morton Stanley, 
the nineteenth-century African explorer famous for rescuing Dr. Liv-
ingston. Stanley has constructed two plants in Ohio to supply Honda. 
North American Lighting
North American Lighting was a joint venture created in 1983 to 
supply Toyota and other Japanese-owned North American plants. It was 
originally owned 50 percent by Hella, 40 percent by Koito Manufactur-
ing Co., and 10 percent by Ichikoh. Hella sold its shares to Koito in 
1998.
Hella
Hella	was	 founded	 in	Germany	 in	1899	by	Sally	Windmuller	 to	




years earlier. A second plant was opened in Detroit in 1983 to supply 
relays and electronic control modules. 
Stability Control
Electronics suppliers specializing in the chassis have focused on 
electronic stability control (ESC), which uses sensors to work with the 
brakes, steering, and suspension to make sure a vehicle keeps going in 
the direction a driver intends and does not spin out of control (Lewin 
2007). ESC compares the vehicle’s trajectory with what sensors say the 
driver intended. If they differ, brakes are applied to one or more of the 
wheels to reposition the vehicle back to the course intended by the driv-
er. The system uses two sets of sensors. One set measures the motion of 
the vehicle, including acceleration and wheel and turning speeds. The 
other set measures driver behavior, including steering angle and accel-
erator and brake pressure (Automotive	News 2007c). “Electronic stabil-
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ity control is mostly a software add-on for cars with antilock brakes 
because it uses the same sensors and actuators” (Lewin 2007). 
In	2005,	40	percent	of	vehicles	 in	Europe	and	72	percent	 in	Ger-
many had ESC. The U.S. market share was only 25 percent, although 
it was expected to rise to 70 percent in 2010. The growth was expected 
because	of	a	2006	U.S.	National	Highway	Traffi 	Safety	Administra-
tion recommendation that electronic stability control be mandatory for 
all light vehicles sold in the United States starting with the 2009 model 
year (Wernle 2006). “With one less CD player in the car and more ESC, 
we might have several thousand fewer people killed on the roads.”6
The North American stability control market was, not surprisingly, 
dominated	by	German	companies.	Continental	had	40	percent	of	 the	
North American stability control market in 2005, Bosch 37 percent, and 
TRW 7 percent. 
Continental is one of the companies currently developing a brake-
by-wire system that it intends to introduce by 2010. According to the 
company, the new system will be 30 pounds lighter than a hydraulic 
brake	system.	Bernd	Gombert,	who	developed	the	system	for	the	com-
pany, said, “[W]e are concerned with intelligent electronics, but we 
don’t	want	to	build	brake	components”	(Floerecke	2007).
INTERIOR CONVENIENCE COMPONENTS
Convenience was far down the to-do list for nineteenth-century motor 
vehicles. In the absence of enclosed passenger compartments and wind-
shields, the top convenience items were sturdy outerwear and goggles. 
Gauges	and	controls	made	vehicles	more	convenient	to	use	into	the	
twentieth century. A speedometer, an odometer, a fuel level gauge, and 
a	clock	became	common	during	 the	1910s.	Gauges	were	soon	added	
to show oil pressure, engine temperature, and battery amperage. Con-
trols also proliferated, beginning with the starter, lights, and ventilation. 
These	gauges	and	controls	at	 firs 	were	bolted	 to	 the	body	almost	as	
afterthoughts, but during the 1910s they were integrated into the design 
of the interior.
With the essential operating equipment set in place and standard-
ized by the 1920s, carmakers started loading up the interior with fea-
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tures that enhanced comfort and convenience rather than performance. 
The most notable addition during the 1920s was the nation’s brand-new 
medium of popular entertainment, the radio. Another burst of conve-
nience features appeared after World War II, most prominently power 
assists for windows, door locks, and seat adjusters.
Carmakers	have	struggled	 to	 fin 	entirely	new	 realms	of	comfort	
and convenience beyond the entertainment and power assists of earlier 
generations,	but	they	have	continually	refine 	the	details	of	the	features.	
The	most	significan 	change,	especially	during	the	1980s,	was	replace-
ment of large clunky motors with electronics, enabling more features to 
be packed into the limited interior space.
The Control Center: Cockpit
Across the front of the passenger compartment, beneath the wind-
shield, is a plate, known for most of the twentieth century as the dash-
board. The dashboard—originally stamped from steel and more re-
cently molded from plastic—contains cutouts so that other parts can 
be inserted. A cluster of gauges and switches, known as an instrument 
panel, is mounted on the driver’s side of the dashboard. 
“Instrument panel” and “dashboard” sound too old-fashioned to de-
scribe	twenty-first-centur 	interiors.	Carmakers	and	suppliers	prefer	to	
use the term “cockpit,” following a long tradition of trying to closely 
align the driving experience with piloting an airplane. “Instrument pan-
el” lingers as a term for the portion of the cockpit in front of the driver, 
but many of the “cockpit” controls are actually housed in the center 
console or driver’s door. 
Electronics contribute an estimated 44 percent of the value of the 
cockpit. The instrument panel monitors a communications bus that 
sends updated information, such as speed and temperature, several 
times a second to the appropriate gauge. One-half of the vehicle’s total 
wiring is packed into the cockpit. The molded plastic housing of the 
dashboard comprises only about 3 percent of the value of a cockpit. 
Heating and cooling systems contribute an estimated 23 percent of the 
value of a cockpit, trim 21 percent, and safety restraints 9 percent (CSM	
Insights 2001).
Like seats, instrument panels and dashboards were traditionally put 
together	on	the	fina 	assembly	line	from	a	large	collection	of	individual	
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parts. “Outsourcing a module such as the cockpit would mean major 
changes for Nissan’s supply base. Currently [1999], Nissan itself is the 
gathering point for the dozens of subcomponents that go into the cock-
pit.”7 One-fourth of cockpits were being delivered in 2005 by outside 
suppliers as complete modules ready for installation. These cockpit mod-
ules	integrated	so-called	infotainment	components	with	HVAC	compo-
nents in the center or “mid-console” part of the instrument panel.
As	with	other	modules,	 fina 	assembly	 is	made	more	efficien 	by	
replacing dozens of individual components with a single installation. In 
addition to gauges and panels, a cockpit module may also include the 
heating and cooling system, safety restraints, and the audio equipment. 
More importantly, though, the cockpit replaces components that were 
among	the	most	difficul 	to	install,	because	they	went	in	places	difficul 	
for	fina 	assembly	workers	to	reach.	
Speedometers. Early motor vehicles were capable of moving much 
faster than the pedestrians, horse-drawn carriages, streetcars, and as-
sorted	chickens,	dogs,	and	pigs	then	fillin 	the	roads.	Taking	advantage	
of	that	capability,	early	motorists—often	selfis 	rich	young	men	inex-
perienced at driving—often plowed through the teeming throngs at high 
speed, frightening and scattering them.
To facilitate sharing of the increasingly crowded roads, many U.S. 
localities	enacted	speed	limit	laws	during	the	firs 	decade	of	the	twen-
tieth century, and European countries updated nineteenth-century laws. 
To obey speed limits, motorists needed a device to show how fast their 
vehicles were moving. Credit for inventing the speedometer is disputed. 
Numerous Web sites carry the following identically worded paragraph. 
“The Chinese invented the speedometer. In 1027, Lu Taolung presented 
the Emperor Jen Chung with a cart that could measure the distances it 
spanned by means of a mechanism with eight wheels and two moving 
arms. One arm struck a drum each time a ‘li’ (about a third of a mile) 
was covered. Another rang a bell every 10 li.”
Nice story, but that sounds like an odometer, not a speedometer, 
and the odometer is said by the Encyclopaedia	Britannica to have been 
invented	by	Roman	architect	and	engineer	Vitruvius	in	about	15	BCE.	
Vitruvius	is	said	to	have	attached	to	a	wheel	of	known	circumference	
a wheelbarrow-like frame that automatically dropped a pebble into a 
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container upon each revolution of the wheel. The odometer may be the 
third-oldest car part, following the wheel and the seat. 
As for the disputed speedometer, Warner Electric Co., part of Altra 
Industrial Motion, credits its founder, Arthur Pratt Warner (1870–1957), 
with the invention. Warner is said to have invented the speedometer that 
became “the industry standard” while serving as vice president and gen-
eral manager of Warner Electric between 1903 and 1912. Overland is 
said	to	be	the	firs 	U.S.	car	to	have	a	speedometer	as	standard	equipment	
in 1908. Warner, based in Beloit, Wisconsin, became the largest U.S. 
manufacturer of speedometers. Reorganized in 1912 as the Stewart-
Warner Manufacturing Co., the company, now known as Stewart 
Warner Performance, specializes in industrial clutch and brake technol-
ogy rather than car parts (Warner Electric 2005; Wisconsin Historical 
Society 2007).
Electrical engineer Nikola Tesla (1856–1943) is also credited with 
inventing the speedometer. Tesla, best known for inventing alternating 
current, is said by a number of sources to have invented the speedom-
eter in 1916 (e.g., Autotech 2004; DASH Electronics and Speedometer 
n.d.; Electroherbalism 2007; U-S-History.com 2005). No information 
is given in these Web sites that Tesla ever manufactured or sold his 
invention.
Meanwhile on the other side of the Atlantic, Continental company 
history suggests that the speedometer was patented in 1902 by Otto 
Schulze,	an	engineer	from	Strasbourg,	now	in	France,	then	in	Germany.	
The date is earlier than the Warner and Tesla claims, but the production 
predecessor of Continental did not start manufacturing speedometers 
until the 1920s, two decades after Warner.
Schulze’s “eddy current” speedometer had a shaft attached to a 
wheel at one end and a magnet at the other end. As the shaft revolved 
at a particular speed, a metal disc close to but not touching the magnet 
also turned, but only by a few degrees because a spring prevented it 
from rotating the full 360 degrees. A pointer attached to the metal disc 
indicated the speed. Production of the Schulze eddy current speedom-
eter	began	in	Germany	in	1905.	The	speed	of	the	wheel’s	rotation	was	
transmitted to the speedometer by means of an electric signal across 
a wire beginning in the 1950s, and electronically via a computer chip 
beginning	in	the	1980s	(Siemens	VDO	2002).
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Continental
Regardless of the speedometer’s origin, the leading supplier of 





Speedometer	 expertise	 came	 through	 VDO.	 VDO’s	 predecessor	
Otto Schulze Autometer (OSA), established in 1920 by Adolf Schin-
dling,	Georg	Häußler,	and	Heinrich	Lang,	started	making	speedometers	




the takeover in 1994. 
Competitors in supplying cockpit modules were the two down-
sized	 former	 captive	 suppliers	Delphi	 and	Visteon,	 as	well	 as	major	
interior	suppliers	JCI	and	Lear.	A	joint	venture	of	Valeo	SA	and	Textron	
Automotive formed in 2000 was also a major cockpit supplier. Textron 
provided	the	instrument	panel	and	trim	and	Valeo	the	electronics	and	air	
conditioning (Miel 2000).
Infotainment Center: Not Just a Radio Anymore
By the Roaring Twenties, with vehicles mechanically sound and 
reasonably reliable, motorists were ready for more creature comforts. 
Passenger	 compartments	 were	 enclosed,	 and	 outfitte 	 with	 sofalike	
seating.	Vehicle	interiors	were	ripe	for	marriage	with	the	new	medium	
of mass entertainment then sweeping America, the radio.
Like the speedometer, the car radio also has a disputed origin. Mo-
torola,	produced	by	Galvin	Manufacturing	Corporation,	has	been	most	
commonly	 cited	 as	 the	 firs 	 practical	 car	 radio,	meaning	 affordably	
priced for most motorists, in 1928. Philadelphia Storage Battery Cor-
poration, generally known as Philco, sold a radio called Transitone for 




No matter who created it, the car radio diffused quickly, essentially 
simultaneously with the spread of radio for home entertainment. A ra-
dio was an option on most new cars during the early 1930s, despite 
costing	more	 than	$100,	and	by	 the	 time	automotive	production	was	
halted for World War II, radios were being installed in all but the cheap-
est models.
Additions to the basic prewar AM radio included push buttons for 
tuning	in	favorite	stations	during	the	1950s,	FM	band	during	the	1960s,	
stereo speakers during the 1970s, tape decks during the 1980s, CD play-
ers during the 1990s, and satellite receivers during the 2000s. Through 
all of these technological updates, audio equipment has retained the 
prominent position accorded to it in the center of the dashboard.
Audio systems have been integrated with information services, a 
combination now known as infotainment or telematics. Telematics sys-
tems	combine	radio	with	navigation	devices,	DVDs,	GPS	systems,	traf-
fi 	reports,	voice-activated	cellular	phones,	and	MP3	players.





radios at a plant in Kokomo, Indiana, acquired from Crosley Manufac-
turing Co. in 1936. The division’s successor, Delco Electronics System, 





market and made it the largest supplier of electronics to Chrysler. 
Panasonic
Panasonic, a division of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. (MEI), 
was the leading automotive audio equipment supplier in North America, 
especially to international carmakers. MEI, founded in Japan in 1918, 
firs 	used	the	brand	name	Panasonic	in	1955	to	market	radios	in	North	
America. In 2003, MEI applied the Panasonic name to a division that 
consolidated the development, manufacturing, and sales functions of 
fiv 	Japanese	electronics	firms 	Automotive	Multimedia	Co.,	AVC	Co.	
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Automotive Systems, Kyushu Matsushita Electric Co., Ltd. (KME), 
Matsushita Communication Industrial Co. (MCI), and MEI Automo-
tive Electronics Business Promotion Center and Corporate Automotive 
Electronics Marketing Division.
Continental
Discussed earlier in the chapter as the leading supplier of cockpits, 
Continental	acquired	Motorola’s	automotive	electronics	business	for	$1	
billion in 2006. The acquisition gave Continental additional capabilities 
in electronics for powertrain and chassis systems and made it the lead-
ing telematics producer worldwide. Continental was the main supplier 
for	GM’s	OnStar	technology,	and	it	developed	a	telematics	product	for	
Ford,	called	“Ford	SYNC.”	Continental	designed	and	manufactured	the	
hardware, and Microsoft designed the software (Snavely 2007b).
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES: WILL THE TAIL WAG 
THE DOG?
The increasing importance of electronics in future motor vehicles is 
a given. What is up for grabs is control over the provision of the electron-
ics. A four-way battle is being waged among vehicle producers, parts 
producers, hardware producers, and software producers. Along the way 
we are observing some interesting combinations of different players. 
A	case	in	point	was	the	Ford	SYNC	system,	which	linked	telephones,	
MP3 players, and other devices to car electronics. The major contribu-
tors were Microsoft, which provided the operating system, Continental, 
which	provided	the	electronic	hardware,	and	Ford,	which	provided	the	
automotive technology (Automotive	News 2007d).
Vehicle	producers	have	 traditionally	played	 the	dominant	 role	 in	
the production process. Carmakers that took the early lead in provid-
ing	 electronics,	 notably	 German	 luxury	 brands	 Mercedes-Benz	 and	
BMW, stamped their own names on elaborate driver information cen-
ters. However, these driver information centers proved too complex for 
most drivers and dragged down quality ratings. BMW’s iDrive “is so 
complicated that even BMW’s own executives have had trouble learn-
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ing how to use it” (Teich’s Tech Tidbit 2003). To change the radio, “Tug 
the controller back, rotate it clockwise two clicks, depress it, rotate it 
clockwise	two	more	clicks,	depress	it	again	and	then,	finall ,	rotate	the	
knob	 to	your	desired	station.	Got	 it?	That’s	six	steps—assuming	you	
know the right path—all while looking at the display instead of the road 
ahead” (Bornhop 2002). The question, then, is not if electronics will 
play an increasingly important role but whether carmakers can success-
fully integrate the electronics functions.
Traditional vehicle parts suppliers have played an increasing role 
in provision of all systems, including electronics. The in-dash radio has 
long carried the brand name of the parts maker, as have navigation de-
vices and cell phones more recently. Roland Berger forecast in 2000, 
“Because only a few electronics suppliers will be able to shoulder the 
huge capital investments required to develop new products, OEMs will 
have to source most of their electronics from only a few key suppliers. 
And as the value of outsourced electronics increases, the value of OEM 
content will decline, increasing the suppliers’ bargaining power” (Crain 
2000).
Martin Anderson of Babson College predicted in 1997, “‘We will 
see the Hewlett-Packards and IBMs of the world among the major auto-
motive suppliers. And we will see a power struggle between carmakers 
and software suppliers over who owns the software architecture of the 
car . . . If you can update an engine’s performance by downloading a 
new software program,’ Anderson asked, ‘whose engine is it?’” (Chap-
pell 1997). We might also ask, will the consumer be aware of such link-
ages? The computer on which this book was written features a label that 
states “Intel inside,” but motor vehicle cockpits do not yet announce 
“Infineon 	or	“Freescale”	inside.
IBM predicted in 2005 that, by 2010, “almost all cars will have 
essentially the same mechanical systems. What will make the cars dif-
ferent	will	be	software	that	operates	the	systems	in	ways	specifi 	to	the	
brand of car” (Moran 2005). The world’s dominant software provider, 
Microsoft,	gained	 its	 firs 	visibility	 in	motor	vehicles	with	 a	deal	 to	
brand	Fiat’s	driver	 information	center.	Microsoft	 is	counting	on	driv-
ers increasingly insisting on connectivity with their computers, most of 
which prominently display the Microsoft name. “What we are looking 
at really is the car as a mobile PC . . . It is about the digital lifestyle and 
integration	between	the	car,	offic 	and	home.”8
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Which suppliers will become the major providers of electronics 
going forward is not obvious. At stake are not merely the billions of 
dollars in manufacturing contracts, but even more important, the elec-
tronics provider’s visibility to the consumer, and ultimately its brand 
recognition. 
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Conclusion: Surviving the Car Wars
[Consumers and investors] are looking at Detroit and say-
ing . . . get real . . . quit your crying, work together to fix your 
problems	or	get	out	of	the	way.1
This book was written to shed light on the manufacturers of motor 
vehicle parts. Parts suppliers employ far more people and add much 
more value to the vehicle than do carmakers. Yet our understanding of 
the parts makers is quite limited. 
We know much more about the identity and struggles of the com-
panies whose names are on the vehicles. Much is written about the his-
tories of the companies and their leaders, the features of their brands, 
and the distinctive assets and the challenges of each. But vehicles are 
made of thousands of parts about which we know relatively little. Who 
are the companies that made all of these parts? How do they relate to 
one another and to their customers, the carmakers? And where are these 
parts made?
The U.S. auto industry through most of the twentieth century con-
sisted of three major carmakers responsible for making most of their 
own components, supplemented by thousands of mostly small parts 
suppliers.	In	 the	 twenty-firs 	century,	 the	number	of	major	carmakers	
competing in the United States has increased with the addition of for-
eign-owned carmakers, and many suppliers have become major players 
in the vehicle production process.
Thus, the relationship between carmakers and suppliers has been 
transformed from a hierarchical one, with a steep pyramid shape, to 
a	 complex	Venn	 diagram	 of	 interrelations	 among	many	 competitive	
carmakers	and	many	competitive	 suppliers.	“Those	are	very	difficul 	
relationships to manage . . . People within the OEMs just are not trained 
to manage these relationships” (McKinsey & Company Automotive & 
Assembly Extranet 2005, p. 4). 
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The role of parts makers has evolved as substantial changes have 
occurred in the motor vehicle industry as a whole. Some of the most 
important changes include
• a shift from in-house production of parts by carmakers to out-
sourcing to independent suppliers;
• a smaller number of Tier 1 suppliers working directly with the 
carmakers;
• a complex supply chain of Tier 2 suppliers working with Tier 1 
suppliers, Tier 3 suppliers working with Tier 2 suppliers, and so 
forth;
• an increase in the demand for just-in-time delivery of parts to the 
fina 	assembly	plant;	and
• a quickening pace of technological change, especially in areas 
of energy conservation, reduced emissions, and enhanced safety, 
partly driven by regulatory requirements. 
 “‘Relentless’ and ‘brutal’ are the two words most often used to de-
scribe competitive pressure in the automotive supply chain. Battered by 
global over-capacity, shorter model lifecycles and seemingly permanent 
rebates	of	up	to	$5,000	per	car,	automakers	are	passing	the	pain—with	
interest—on	to	their	suppliers”	(Murphy	2004).	Given	these	competi-
tive pressures, a good relationship with its supply base represents one of 
the	most	significan 	competitive	advantages	a	carmaker	can	have.	
A good relationship with suppliers is a central element of the com-
petitive advantage in the U.S. market held by Japanese carmakers, es-
pecially Toyota. Most succinctly, SupplierBusiness.com cites two basic 
models for carmaker–supplier relationships: the command and control 
contract (or adversarial) model preferred by the Detroit 3 and the col-
laborative (or partnership) model preferred by Japanese automakers 
(Snyder 2005).
Time and time again during the course of this study, suppliers have 
repeated in private that relations with the Detroit 3 are poor, especially 
in comparison with their Japanese customers. Supplying the Detroit 3 
calls for “testosterone games to see who can squeeze more, pay more 
slowly, or demand extortion—uh, excuse me, productivity.”2
The Detroit 3 model of supplier relationships has been one of “exit” 
and the Japanese model one of “voice,” according to economists Susan 
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Helper	and	John	Paul	MacDuffie 	The	Detroit	3’s	exit	model	has	been	
characterized by “short-term relationships, limited amounts of collabo-
ration, and the willingness of either party to ‘exit’ the relationship for 
short-term gain.” The Japanese model has been characterized by “lots 
of collaboration (with supplier ‘voices’ being heard)” (McKinsey & 
Company Automotive & Assembly Extranet 2005, p. 1).
Differences	 in	quality	 and	 efficienc 	between	 Japanese	 and	U.S.	
carmakers observed in the twentieth century have narrowed if not dis-
appeared	altogether	in	the	twenty-firs 	century.	The	principal	measure	
where the gap between Japanese and U.S. carmakers has widened in the 
twenty-firs 	century	is	in	supplier	relations.	
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This book set out to document the existing structure of the North 
American motor vehicle parts industry. The key to the analysis was 
creating a database that allowed us to describe and analyze the industry 
at an unprecedented level of detail. The ability to draw on a database 
of 4,268 individual parts-making plants in North America, including 
plant-level geography and product information, allowed us to analyze a 
little-known	industry	at	a	rich	level	of	detail.	We	have	identifie 	several	
major trends currently shaping this industry.
•  Role of the Midwest. Most parts for motor vehicles were once 
made in and near southeastern Michigan. The area has lost its 
dominance in parts production, but it is still home to the largest 
number of plants. Most of the parts for the powertrain and ex-
terior continue to be made in the Midwest because the parts are 
relatively	bulky	and	are	most	efficientl 	produced	near	sources	
of both inputs (especially steel) and customers.
• Carmaker–Supplier Networks. Most parts need to be produced 
within a one-day delivery radius of the customer in order to ensure 
arrival	at	the	fina 	assembly	plant	on	a	just-in-time	basis.	Only	a	
handful of parts, though, need to be produced right next door to 
the	fina 	assembly	plant.	The	seat	is	the	single	most	prominent	
example of a major module that is invariably made within one 
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hour	of	the	fina 	assembly	plant.	Carmakers	and	suppliers	depend	
on	logistics	specialists	to	coordinate	the	flo 	of	information	and	
goods within a network.
• Auto Alley. The U.S. motor vehicle industry is still highly clus-
tered, but it is now located in a narrow north–south corridor 
known as Auto Alley. The industry’s traditional Midwest core 
now forms the northern end of Auto Alley. It is still home to most 
facilities operated by the Detroit 3 carmakers. But newer plants 
have headed south within Auto Alley, especially those operated 
by foreign-owned companies. The primary reason for selecting 
a southern location within Auto Alley has been to minimize the 
likelihood of a unionized workforce. Southern plants have some-
what	 lower	wage	 scales,	 but	 the	 principal	 benefit 	 have	 been	
much	lower	benefi 	packages	and	more	flexibl 	work	rules.	
• Global Shifts. The percentages of parts made outside the United 
States and inside the United States by foreign-owned companies 
have increased. Production of relatively bulky, low-value inte-
rior and exterior systems has been less likely to leave the United 
States. Instead, motor vehicle parts imports have grown for both 
high-value powertrain modules (e.g., complete engines and trans-
missions) and low-value, high-labor-content routine electronics 
parts.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES FOR PARTS SUPPLIERS
On paper, the U.S. auto industry looked set to prosper in the twenty-
firs 	century.	New	vehicle	sales	in	the	United	States	remained	at	histori-
cally	high	 levels	 through	 the	1990s	and	 into	 the	 twenty-firs 	century.	
Despite globalization of the industry, most vehicles sold in the United 
States were still being assembled in the United States from parts made 
mostly in the United States. In 2008, news stories suggested that a Chi-
nese automaker is planning to assemble cars in North America (Ying 
2008).
The supplier sector of the industry looked to be prospering as well. 
As this book has shown, suppliers were already responsible for adding 
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two-thirds	of	the	value	to	vehicles	in	the	early	twenty-firs 	century,	and	
the share was expected to rise. Having been given more responsibility 
by carmakers, suppliers have evolved into providers of complex manu-
facturing tasks that required their own research and development. 
Buffeting Headwinds 
Though the overall industry conditions appear favorable for parts 
producers, in reality individual motor vehicle parts producers had to 
navigate a challenging course to survive in a competitive environment. 
The parts industry based in North America has been buffeted by what 
billionaire investor Wilbur Ross (2006) has called “the perfect storm.” 
Key elements of what could be more modestly described meteorologi-
cally as strong headwinds include:
• Shifting Market Shares. Parts suppliers live and die by the for-
tunes of the carmakers. Suppliers dependent for their business 
primarily on the Detroit 3 carmakers have had to quickly adjust 
to a sharp decline in volume, more than 3 percent annually in 
the	 firs 	decade	of	 the	 twenty-firs 	century.	Conversely,	suppli-
ers dependent on foreign-owned carmakers have had to quickly 
respond to a corresponding increase in volume. 
• Globalization of Supply Chains. Suppliers producing com-
modity or generic parts are facing increased competition from 
producers located in low-wage countries such as China. On the 
other hand, suppliers producing high-tech and research-intensive 
parts face increased competition from European and Japanese 
suppliers with close ties to foreign-owned carmakers.
• High Cost of Inputs. The motor vehicle industry is the major 
manufacturing destination for steel, glass, aluminum, rubber, and 
a host of other materials, not to mention petroleum. Rising costs 
for these materials have been borne primarily by suppliers. As 
carmakers expect suppliers to lower the price of their product 
annually over the life of the contract, passing on cost increases to 
carmakers is next to impossible. 
• Technological Changes. In many instances technological chang-
es are driven by regulatory requirements, such as safety and 
emission standards. Some technological improvements, such as 
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more	efficien 	internal	combustion	engines,	are	incremental	and	
are being pursued by existing suppliers. New technologies, such 
as hybrids, electric, fuel-cell, and other alternative-fuel vehicles, 
are potentially much more disruptive to the existing supply chain. 
New suppliers will compete to provide new technology. A tech-
nological breakthrough can therefore have major implications 
for Auto Alley because it is not certain that new suppliers will 
feel compelled to locate in the traditional production region.
Supplier Restructuring
The consequences of Ross’s “perfect storm” have been severe for 
some parts suppliers. 
Bankruptcy 
Twenty-fiv 	suppliers	ranked	among	the	150	largest	file 	for	Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy protection between 1999 and early 2008. Suppli-
ers dependent on the Detroit 3 have been especially vulnerable. “As 
Detroit’s auto makers struggle with slowing sales, a slew of the parts 
manufacturers	who	depend	on	them	have	skidded	into	financia 	trouble.	
Several already have sought bankruptcy protection and others are rac-
ing	to	fi 	debt-laden	balance	sheets”	(Pacelle	2005).	“The	lenders	are	
very leery of people in the automotive parts business. They think the car 
companies are killing the suppliers.”3	Filing	for	Chapter	11	can	serve	as	
a backstop for a beleaguered company, providing some breathing room 
for its restructuring. In the case of Dana, it worked out that way. The 
case of Collins & Aikman illustrates, however, that restructurings can’t 
always	be	pulled	off.	Having	file 	for	bankruptcy	and	unable	to	emerge	






berus Capital Management, Heartland Industrial Partners, and Questor 
Management	Group.	They	have	specialized	in	applying	state-of-the-art	
management practices to struggling undervalued and underperforming 
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suppliers.	Capital	is	provided	to	fi 	these	struggling	parts	makers,	usu-
ally	in	order	to	generate	quick	profits 	In	some	cases,	the	massive	invest-
ment is designed to be recovered by a public sale of shares to investors. 
“The	growth	of	control	by	investment	firm 	is	bound	to	raise	concern	
at the Detroit 3, which have traditionally been uneasy with such deals. 
Automakers	worry	that	financia 	returns	for	these	owners	will	take	pri-
ority over quality and delivery, said a spokesman for one car company” 
(Sherefkin 2001).
Restructuring labor contracts
With a rising share of motor vehicle production undertaken by non-
union labor, both at home and abroad, owners of unionized plants have 
argued	that	their	labor	costs	need	to	be	reduced.	For	their	part,	union	
leaders have accepted the argument that protecting jobs and pensions 
required them to offer concessions. Suppliers have introduced two-tier 
wage structures, placing newly hired employees on a lower scale than 
veterans. Buyouts have been offered to entice voluntary retirement 
by long-term employees. Especially intractable has been the desire 
of employers to reduce their legacy costs, that is, their responsibility 
for	retiree	health-care	and	long-term	disability	benefits 	Establishing	a	
union-managed	voluntary	employees’	beneficiar 	association	(VEBA)	
was one way to shift responsibility from the company to separate man-
agement, such as the UAW.4
Survival Strategies
Successful suppliers are adopting one of three business models: sys-
tems integrator, high-tech module developer, or low-cost parts provider. 
“Trying to combine all three in one corporate structure will be futile.”5 
Two of these three business models are typical of many industries: com-
panies	often	choose	between	 trying	 to	be	 the	most	efficien 	 low-cost	
producer or the most advanced high-tech producer. In the auto industry, 
carmakers have also opened the door to the systems integrator.
Systems integration
Systems	integrators	benefi 	from	having	relatively	low	manufactur-
ing and research and development costs. As they bring together modules 
and components provided by other suppliers, they add value through 
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efficien 	management	and	cost	control.	Magna	International,	an	espe-
cially exuberant proponent of systems integration, started calling itself 
a Tier 0.5 supplier, and even trademarked the term Tier 0.5. Ignoring 
Magna’s trademark, other suppliers began to call themselves Tier 0.5 to 
promote their ability to design and manufacture entire vehicle systems 
(Chappell 2002). 
Becoming a systems integrator has attracted many suppliers, who 
have been encouraged by carmakers wishing to deal with fewer larger 
suppliers,	but	some	financia 	analysts	have	questioned	the	model’s	log-
ic. A study by Booz Allen Hamilton compared the returns on investment 
of highly specialized suppliers and broad-based system suppliers with 
the	industry	average.	For	many	companies,	the	time	and	effort	invested	
in becoming a system supplier failed to produce the desired effect. “All 





The second survival approach for suppliers is to develop unique 
technologies. Especially attracted to this business model are technol-
ogy-oriented suppliers. Increased electronics content is especially im-
portant to high-tech suppliers. “Companies that develop features their 
customers	will	pay	a	premium	price	for	will	win.	For	example,	there	are	
more and more sensors and actuators. The whole market in the devel-
oped countries has gone nuts relative to driver features such as power 
sliding doors in minivans. You’ve got this huge motors market.”6
Examples	of	high-tech	module	specialists	are	Autoliv	and	Freuden-
berg-NOK.	Freudenberg-NOK	was	the	largest	supplier	of	engine	seals	
and the world’s largest producer of molded rubber products other than 
tires. The company prides itself on its “laser-sharp focus on the core 
competencies of sealing, vibration control and elastomeric technolo-
gies”	 (Freudenberg-NOK	2007).	Autoliv	was	 the	 leading	 supplier	of	
airbags	in	the	United	States	and	worldwide.	Their	firs 	product	was	lo-
cated inside the steering wheel to protect the driver. Additional airbags 
have been located in the instrument panel in front of the passenger, at a 
lower level to protect knees, and as “curtains” along the sides of the in-
terior. Each successive airbag system developed has generated revenue 
Conclusion: Surviving the Car Wars   363
for Autoliv and its competitors. “[D]river and passenger airbags have 
become a commodity. But extra airbags, such as side curtains or knee 
bolsters, are promoting growth for companies such as Autoliv Inc.”7
Low-cost suppliers 
Meanwhile,	some	contrarian	suppliers	are	findin 	success	by	 fol-
lowing the industry’s traditional model of producing generic parts and 
components. “It’s hard for a supplier to survive just building to the 
automaker’s design. There’s nothing setting you apart. You’re just com-
peting on price, and that’s really hard.”8 Even though it is “really hard,” 
the strategy is working for some suppliers. They gain contracts through 






moved down the supply chain to lower tiers. A thriving practitioner of 
this model, Illinois Tool Works, made door handles, seat latches, and 
hundreds of generic “bin” parts for motor vehicles, as well as a wide 
variety of parts for consumer and industrial applications. The company 
has	earned	a	profi 	through	efficien 	management	practices,	notably	de-
centralizing operations to several hundred autonomous business units 
while maintaining an exceptionally lean central staff.
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES FOR COMMUNITIES
The	twenty-first-centur 	auto	parts	industry	in	the	United	States	is	
concentrated in a region known as Auto Alley, a 700-mile-long north–
south corridor through the interior of the United States between the 
Great	Lakes	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico,	with	extensions	into	Canada	and	
Mexico. This book presents the contemporary Auto Alley as the sum of 
a complex web of relationships between carmakers and their suppliers.
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Traditional clustering in Michigan
For	most	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	motor	vehicle	industry	was	
highly clustered in and near southeastern Michigan. The area’s preemi-
nence	in	the	auto	industry	derived	from	the	emergence	of	Ford,	GM,	and	
Chrysler,	which	were	all	based	there.	For	most	of	the	twentieth	century,	
the Detroit 3 produced nearly all of their parts in and near southeastern 
Michigan, although they assembled most of their vehicles elsewhere. 
Thus, the preponderance of Michigan’s Detroit 3 auto jobs have tradi-
tionally been in parts-making facilities.
Geographical implications of market shifts 
Into	the	twenty-firs 	century,	the	declining	fortunes	of	the	Big	3—
now more modestly known as the Detroit 3—have brought declining 
fortunes to Michigan’s economy. Michigan was losing 6 percent of its 
auto	industry	jobs	annually	in	the	firs 	years	of	the	twenty-firs 	century.	
During the twentieth century, Michigan’s motor vehicle employment 
frequently declined, but with very few exceptions, these were all tem-
porary or cyclical declines: workers were laid off during slow-selling 
years and hired back during boom years. In contrast, Michigan’s job 
losses	 in	 the	early	 twenty-firs 	century	were	 structural	 in	nature.	Be-
cause of the changes discussed in this book, the jobs lost during this 
time period were not going to return. This represented a stunning re-
versal of the late 1990s during which the auto industry was booming. 
Michigan had to adjust to this harsh new reality. Its implications for fu-
ture	vehicle	employment	in	the	state	have	been	difficul 	for	Michigan’s	
citizens and policymakers to recognize and accept. 
Management and technical operations have remained in the Detroit 
area, but the growth in production employment has been further south 
in Auto Alley. Ironically, as the Detroit 3 made the necessary capacity 
reductions at plants at the periphery of their footprint, they were more 
concentrated at the northern end of Auto Alley at the beginning of the 
twenty-firs 	century	than	they	had	been	for	many	decades.	
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Carmaker–supplier networks 
The tightness of an assembly plant’s network of suppliers deter-
mines that plant’s regional economic footprint. Surrounding each of 
these assembly plants is a supplier network extending, for the most part, 
to within a one-day shipping distance as a result of widespread adoption 
of just-in-time delivery. However, just-in-time does not mean that sup-
pliers	must	be	located	immediately	next	door	to	fina 	assembly	plants.	
In fact, most of the supplier networks extend far beyond the immediate 
vicinity of an assembly plant.
Location by type of part 
Just-in-time doesn’t mean the same geographical arrangement for 




drive, and those that can be made further away. Seats are nearly always 
produced within an hour of an assembly plant. Sequencing and kitting 
operations are also located in a very close vicinity. At the other end of 
the distance spectrum, most electronics parts are produced outside the 
United States.
Attracting New Plants
States within Auto Alley have provided incentives to entice carmak-
ers	to	locate	in	one	of	their	communities.	Financial	incentives	have	in-
cluded tax breaks, training programs, and site improvements.9 
To attract Toyota, the state of Kentucky agreed in 1985 to provide 
$147	million	in	incentives.	The	package	included	$10.3	million	for	land	
acquisition,	$20	million	 for	 site	preparation,	$10.3	million	 for	water	




that Toyota could incur in conjunction with plant construction.
Kentucky’s	commitment	of	at	 least	$147	million	 to	Toyota	repre-
sented a substantial escalation in the subsidies being offered to inter-
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national carmakers at the time. Less than a year earlier, Illinois had 
attracted	Mitsubishi	with	subsidies	totaling	only	$86	million,	and	$86	
million	was	sufficien 	to	entice	Subaru	to	Indiana	a	year	later.	Honda,	
the	 firs 	 Japanese	carmaker	 to	build	an	assembly	plant	 in	 the	United	
States,	received	only	$24	million	from	Ohio	fiv 	years	earlier	(Molot	




benefit 	 to	measure	 and	how	 to	measure	 them.	For	 example,	 econo-
mist	Larry	Ledebur	calculated	expected	benefit 	to	be	only	$267.5	mil-
lion and therefore concluded that Kentucky had overpaid for Toyota 
(Fiordalisi	1989).
In hindsight, Kentucky may have paid more than its neighbors for 
an assembly plant during the 1980s, but the Bluegrass State appreci-
ates thoroughbreds, and in Toyota it backed the company that subse-





ures soon climbed to substantially higher levels than Toyota had prom-
ised.	In	1997,	Toyota’s	investment	in	the	plant	had	reached	$4.5	billion,	
7,689 workers were employed, 435,000 vehicles were assembled, and 
payroll	was	$470.4	million	(CanagaRetna	2004).	
Between	1986	and	2005,	[a	1998	University	of	Kentucky	Gaton	
College of Business and Economics] study noted that Kentucky 
would collect over and above the costs of the incentive package, 
approximately	$1.2	billion	in	tax	revenues,	attributable	to	the	direct	
and indirect effects of Toyota’s operations in the commonwealth.
In	terms	of	state	revenue	collections,	discounted	cash	flo 	analy-
sis in 1985 indicated an annual rate of return of 8.5 percent from 
increased revenue collections attributable to the direct and indirect 
effects of the plant’s operations. A 1992 economic impact study, 
also carried out by the University of Kentucky, revealed that the 
projected rate of return had increased to 16.8 percent per annum. 
These projections were revised upward again in the 1998 study 
which indicated that the updated annual rate of return stood at 36.8 
percent. (CanagaRetna 2004, p. 74)
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A generation later, the lesson other states seemed to have learned 
from Kentucky was the value of subsidizing assembly plants. During 
the	1990s,	incentives	averaged	about	$100	million	per	assembly	plant.	
Incentives increased because carmakers “learned to bargain” (Molot 
2003). That Kentucky had backed a winner was the real point. States 
that had subsidized also-rans were getting much less value for their 







factories in neighboring states like Alabama are churning out pay-
checks by the thousands, while the Peach State stands to lose its 
only	plants,	Ford’s	and	General	Motors’.	(Woods	2006)
It	was	 not	 just	 that	Kia’s	 assembly	 plant	would	 arrive.	Georgia	
official 	 argued	 that	 an	 assembly	plant	 always	brings	 along	 supplier	
plants. 
As we documented earlier in this book, “just-in-time” does not trans-
late into “right next door.” Many suppliers only need to be within one 
day’s	drive	of	an	assembly	plant.	In	Kia’s	case,	Georgia	was	unlikely	
to see many supplier plants materialize because much of Kia’s supplier 
base	had	already	built	plants	within	the	one-day	radius	of	the	Georgia	
site to support the nearby Hyundai plant in Alabama. “Hyundai (Kia’s 
corporate parent) is supported by 78 suppliers in the U.S. and Mexico, 
35	of	them	located	in	Alabama.	Kia	has	promised	Georgia	there	will	be	
at	least	fiv 	suppliers	in	the	state”	(Columbus	Ledger-Enquirer 2006).
The spatial characteristics of assembler–supplier networks pre-
sented in this book call into question the logic of providing enormous 
subsidies to carmakers. States have been providing generous subsidies, 
especially	to	fina 	assembly	plants,	in	part	not	because	of	jobs	gener-
ated inside these plants but primarily because of the multiplier effect, 
that is, the number of supplier jobs that are expected to come along 
with	fina 	assembly.	The	number	of	suppliers	within	close	range	of	the	
assembly plant rarely exceeds 30, suggesting that the supply chain of 
an	individual	assembly	plant	is	regional	in	nature.	Furthermore,	within	
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a given supplier network, many supplier operations count among their 
customers more than that one assembly plant. 
Consider	 the	fate	of	 the	Greensburg,	Indiana,	site	of	an	assembly	
plant	opened	by	Honda	 in	2008.	Greensburg	has	 seen	 the	 arrival	of	
several thousand new jobs at the Honda plant as well as in such services 
as grocery stores and restaurants. The community, though, has not seen 
a boom in parts makers other than the inevitable seat plant plus a few 
trim producers. Southeastern Indiana is strategically placed between the 
southern end of the traditional auto production region centered in the 
Great	Lakes	and	the	northern	end	of	the	recent	growth	in	Kentucky	and	





sites that were passed over during the push south in the late twenti-




The analysis presented in this book is intended to provide a frame-
work that helps put in context ongoing developments in the motor ve-
hicle parts industry. We demonstrated that underneath the robust cluster 
that characterizes this industry in North America lies a complex web of 
very dynamic relationships. We suggest that it is at that level of detail 
one has to assess the impact of ongoing changes, be they in trade or 
technology.
Based on our analysis, we believe that the fundamental geography 
of auto assembly in North America is not likely to change anytime soon: 
most vehicles sold in North America will continue to be assembled in 
North America. But more parts will be coming from elsewhere in the 
world. And the parts made in North America and vehicles assembled 
in North America will increasingly be produced by corporations with 
global headquarters outside North America.
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All of this means that there will be more turmoil ahead for suppli-
ers. Surviving companies will have picked a winning strategy of either 
low-cost supplier, high-value supplier, or systems integrator. Survivors 
will have selected winning customers, those that are gaining market 
share, while reducing exposure to those that are losing market share. 
Surviving suppliers will also have selected a winning global strategy. 
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